Case Name: In re Estate of Arnab Chanda
Case No.: 17PR182420

I. Background

The matter currently before the Court pertains to the Petition Pursuant to PC § 850 (“Petition”) filed on April 27, 2018 by Arundhati Parmar (“Petitioner”), executor of the estate of Arnab Chandra (“Decedent”).

According to the allegations of the Petition, Decedent and Amrita Chandra (“Respondent”) married in August 2012. Decedent was subsequently diagnosed with Stage IV kidney cancer in June 2015, after which time Respondent mistreated him in various ways. Decedent later filed for divorce in March 2017. Around the same time, he executed estate planning documents expressly disinheriting Respondent and devising all of his assets to Petitioner, his sister.

In the divorce proceeding, Decedent and Respondent executed a Stipulation and Order Re: Partial Property Settlement (“Stipulated Order”) entered on October 4, 2017, which in pertinent part addressed the division of a Vanguard brokerage account (“Vanguard Account”). Per the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed that a portion of the Vanguard Account was community property while a portion was Decedent’s separate property, and the amount of the parties’ respective interests would be determined by accountants. The Stipulated Order also permitted Decedent to change the beneficiary designation after the Vanguard Account was divided, as Respondent had been designated the beneficiary during marriage.

It was ultimately determined that Decedent’s share of the Vanguard Account was 55.1%, while Respondent’s share was 44.9%. Although Decedent and Respondent jointly directed Vanguard to transfer assets accordingly on October 25, 2017, Vanguard did not comply before Decedent’s passing on November 9, 2017. As such, Decedent did not have the opportunity to change the beneficiary designation. And Vanguard otherwise later refused to comply with the Stipulated Order since Decedent had died. Vanguard advised it might release the assets in the account to Respondent as the named beneficiary absent an order from the probate court, but subsequently advised it intended to maintain a freeze on the account pending resolution of the dispute.

Petitioner then filed the Petition, seeking a declaration that the Stipulated Order is a binding, enforceable contract, as well as an order that Decedent’s estate shall receive the share of the Vanguard Account agreed to by the parties. Petitioner claims the Stipulated Order survives Decedent’s death as a matter of law, Respondent is estopped from denying the validity and enforceability of the order, and the Court must honor Decedent’s documented intent with respect to the distribution of his assets as opposed to the Vanguard Account’s pay-on-death beneficiary designation.
Respondent now moves for judgment on the pleadings to the Petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Petitioner opposes the motion. Each party filed a request for judicial notice in support of their positions.

II. Requests for Judicial Notice

“ ‘Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.’ [Citation.]” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may consider judicially noticed matters in addition to the face of the challenged pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)

A. Respondent’s Request

In support of her motion, Respondent requests judicial notice of “[t]his Court’s file in Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 17-FL-001300 (In re Marriage of Chanda), including, but not limited to, the ‘Stipulation and Order re: Partial Property Settlement,’ filed on October 4, 2017” pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). Petitioner objects to this request.

Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) authorizes a court to take judicial notice of court records. Thus, as a general matter, records contained in the court file for Decedent’s and Respondent’s divorce are proper subjects for judicial notice. Nevertheless, Respondent’s request for judicial notice is problematic. As gleaned from Respondent’s memorandum of points and authorities, the apparent purpose of the request for judicial notice is to show that Decedent was represented by counsel at all times in the divorce proceeding; to confirm the existence and contents of the Stipulated Order; and to establish that no judgment was ever entered terminating the marital status of Decedent and Respondent.

But the fact Decedent was represented by counsel in the divorce action is immaterial to the issue raised by Respondent’s motion. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [a precondition to taking judicial notice is that the matter is relevant to an issue under review].) As for the Stipulated Order, it is part of the pleading under review by virtue of being attached thereto; thus, taking judicial notice of the order is wholly unnecessary. (See Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091, fn.1 [denying as unnecessary a request for judicial notice of pleading under review on demurrer].) As for the nonexistence of any judgment was entered terminating marital status, the docket reflects that fact. While that fact is highly relevant to Respondent’s motion, it was improvident to broadly request judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file to establish the same; Respondent simply should have requested judicial notice of the docket, which is electronically available to both the court and the parties. With that said, it is nevertheless appropriate under the circumstances to take judicial notice of the docket for the discrete purpose of establishing the absence of any judgment of dissolution.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file from the divorce action. Rather, judicial notice is granted of the docket to show the no judgment of dissolution was ever entered between Decedent and Respondent.

B. Petitioner’s Request

In support of her opposition, Petitioner requests judicial notice of two court records, particularly Respondent’s Objection to Petition filed in this action and certain excerpts from the Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings held on August 28, 2017 in Decedent’s and Respondent’s divorce case. These matters are not ultimately necessary to the Court’s resolution of Respondent’s motion. The Court therefore declines to take judicial notice of the records. (See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [declining to take judicial notice of materials that are not “necessary, helpful, or relevant”].)

III. Merits of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to the Vanguard Account as a matter of law since she is the pay-on-death beneficiary and Decedent’s surviving spouse. Respondent briefly points to a few statutes in support of her position; the balance of her presentation is dedicated to attempting to discredit arguments and legal authorities Petitioner has previously relied on in this litigation to support her claim of interest in the Vanguard Account.

“The Probate Code provides several mechanisms to transfer property outside the probate context. (See § 5000 et seq. [Nonprobate Transfers].)” (Estate of Gardner (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 543, 549.) Property excluded from probate includes property disposed of by means of a provision for nonprobate transfer in a written instrument, such as pay-on-death provision in a deposit account agreement. (Ibid. at pp. 549–550; see also Prob. Code, § 5000.)
The allegations in the Petition reflect the Vanguard Account is a pay-on-death account, with Respondent designated as beneficiary. But the allegations also indicate the existence of a Stipulated Order between Decedent and Respondent providing for a different disposition of account proceeds. To that point, Respondent argues the pay-on-death beneficiary designation does not fail since the couple’s marital status was never terminated. In other words, Respondent essentially contends the Stipulated Order is not binding or enforceable at this juncture. Respondent relies on Probate Code section 5040 in support.
Section 5040, subdivision (a)(1) states: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), a nonprobate transfer to the transferor’s former spouse, in an instrument executed by the transferor before or during the marriage…, fails if, at the time of the transferor’s death, the former spouse is not the transferor’s surviving spouse as defined in Section 78, as a result of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage[.]” Since Respondent is Decedent’s surviving spouse (see Prob. Code, § 78), she concludes the subject nonprobate transfer is preserved.

Petitioner persuasively argues in opposition that Respondent’s reliance on Probate Code section 5040 is misplaced because the statute does not purport to limit the circumstances under which a nonprobate transfer fails. On its face, the statute merely establishes a general rule for the effect of martial dissolution or annulment on a nonprobate transfer as between spouses executed before or during marriage. Neither the language in the statute itself nor legislative history reports reveal any intent by the Legislature to create a rule that a nonprobate transfer to a spouse cannot fail unless the couple’s marital status has been formally terminated.

Section 5040 became operative on January 1, 2002 , enacted by the passage of Assembly Bill 873. The purpose of the statute was “to clarify the effect of the filing and judgment of a marital dissolution on nonprobate transfers” since the law provided for automatic revocation of probate dispositions upon divorce but did not extend similar protection to nonprobate transfers. (Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of AB 873 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), hearing April 3, 2001, pp. 1 & 4.) The rationale for such protection is the general assumption that divorcing parties typically do not intend or expect property dispositions benefitting one spouse upon the death of the other to survive divorce. (Ibid. at p. 4; see also Senate Judiciary Committee, Analysis of AB 873 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.), hearing July 3, 2001, pp. 5-7.) None of the legislative history reports suggest the Legislature intended to otherwise bar any challenge to a spousal nonprobate transfer absent divorce.

Since Respondent’s motion is predicated on an unsubstantiated premise—that a stipulated court order between separated spouses for the disposition of property on death has no force or effect following one spouse’s death—the motion for judgment on the pleadings must fail. It is consequently unnecessary to evaluate Petitioner’s additional arguments in opposition to the motion (e.g., Respondent waived any right to Decedent’s share of the Vanguard Account, is estopped from claiming an entitlement to the account, etc.).

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.