Case Number: BC697051 Hearing Date: March 25, 2019 Dept: 4B

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION

On March 7, 2018, Plaintiffs Noel Suarez Melena (“Noel”) and Jonathan Melena (“Jonathan”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants Latham Richard Bell (“Bell”) and Long Beach Unified School District (“District”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress relating to a May 4, 2017 vehicle versus pedestrian collision. Noel and Bell have settled for $150,000.00 and Jonathan and Bell have settled for $100,000.00. District contests these applications for good faith settlement.

The Court must approve any settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6.) This requirement furthers two sometimes-competing policies: (1) the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and (2) the encouragement of settlements. (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.) If the settlement is made in good faith, the Court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) The non-settling tortfeasors or obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

In order to demonstrate a lack of good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section 877.6. (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213.) The Court will typically consider: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly) approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiffs settle before trial; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) whether there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt).) These factors will be evaluated accordingly to what information is available at the time of settlement. (Ibid.)

On May 4, 2017, Bell, a part-time water polo coach at Wilson High School, was driving from class to a water polo meet. Bell suffered a medical emergency while driving, which caused him to veer off the road and directly through an outdoor seating area of a Los Potros Restaurant, striking three pedestrians, including Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed this action against Bell and District, alleging that Bell was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

District contests the settlement based mainly on the fact that Bell’s insurance coverage has not been exhausted. Bell’s insurance policy provides for $250,000/$500,000 in coverage, meaning up to $250,000.00 per person up to $500,000.00 per occurrence. District argues that Bell’s insurance coverage is primary to District’s pursuant to Vehicle Code section 11580.9(d). Bell was operating his own vehicle under his own insurance when the accident occurred. Therefore, regardless of whether he was acting within the scope of his employment, Bell’s insurance is primary and District’s is secondary. District argues it is only liable to the extent Bell is liable. Therefore, if Bell settles the claims against him, there is no viable theory of liability against District. District argues that if a jury were to award any additional damages, Bell should be liable for them.

Bell argues District has failed to meet its burden of showing the settlement was not made in good faith. Bell argues Noel incurred $77,983.56 in medical bills and Jonathan incurred $55,177.96 in medical bills. Bell’s settlement with each Plaintiff exceeds their medical specials. Further, this accident was the result of a medical emergency. Therefore, Bell argues the settlement is within his proportionate share of liability. Further, there is no evidence of collusion or fraud and District failed to show how Bell’s insurance being primary to its own insurance coverage is relevant to the determination of good faith settlement.

The District failed to meet its burden of showing a lack of good faith settlement. District did not discuss any of the Tech-Bilt factors besides the available insurance policy limits. District states the settlement figures are “reasonable” and generally discusses Bell’s share of liability in relation to its own in terms of which insurance policy is primary and secondary. However, it presents no information regarding Plaintiffs’ injuries, Plaintiffs’ rough approximated total recovery, the size of the settlement at issue, the discount value when settling before trial, and any evidence of fraud or collusion. District failed to show “that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 874.)

Accordingly, the Motion contesting good faith settlement is DENIED. The Court finds this settlement was made in good faith and any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor is barred from asserting further claims against Bell for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.

Moving party to give notice.