Case Name: Hortencia Dominguez v. Soyoung Park

Case No.: 18CV336434

I. Factual Background

This action filed by plaintiff Hortencia Dominguez (“Dominguez”) against defendant Soyoung Park dba Emahs Laundry (“Park”) arises out of purported wage and hour violations.

As alleged in the complaint, Dominguez worked as a presser for Emahs Laundry from around 2001 to March 31, 2018. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) As a presser, Dominguez’s daily duties included laundering, pressing, and ironing customers’ garments. (Id. at ¶14.) Around 2012, Park acquired Emahs Laundry and became Dominguez’s employer until her termination in March 2018. (Id. at ¶ 12.) During this time, Park engaged in numerous wage and hour violations, including failing to properly compensate Dominguez for overtime, requiring Dominguez to work without receiving timely meal and rest breaks, failing to staff the laundromat such that Dominguez could receive meal and rest breaks, failing to provide Dominguez with paid sick leave, and failing to provide Dominguez with accurate itemized wage statements. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-27, 36-38, 58, 69-70.) When Dominguez complained about these issues, Park retaliated against her by terminating her employment. (Id. at ¶ 74.) To date, Dominguez has not received all wages that were due upon her separation from employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.)

The complaint alleges causes of action for failure to pay all wages owed, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay wages on separation, failure to provide sick leave, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, retaliation, and violations of the unfair competition law.

Park answered the complaint and also filed a cross-complaint against Dominguez , pleading claims for interference with legitimate business operations, obstruction of business, and false claims.
As alleged in the cross-complaint, prior to her acquisition of Emahs Laundry, Park had no experience running a laundry business. (Cross-Comp., ¶ 3.) As such, she relied heavily on the employees who were already working there, among whom Dominguez was the most experienced. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4.) Dominguez was fully aware of this fact and nonetheless refused to follow Park’s instructions and interfered with her ability to run the business. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) Among other things, she rested and took meal breaks whenever she wanted and attempted to exploit Park by bringing false wage and hour claims to the Department of Labor. (Id. at ¶ 11.) She also habitually took out her time card without Park’s permission and refused to allow employees with less experience than her to receive more work than her. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17.) Moreover, in addition to filing the Complaint, Dominguez submitted three claims to the Department of Labor, all of which were based on falsehoods. (Id. at ¶ 21.) As a result, Park has been forced to respond to each of these claims and now suffers from anxiety, depression, and decreased business efficiency. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.)
Currently before the Court is Dominguez’s special motion to strike the first and third causes of action in the cross-complaint, which is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (“Section 425.16”). Park opposes the motion and also seeks that this Court stay its ruling so she can obtain limited discovery.

II. Request for Stay on the Ruling to Seek Limited Discovery

When a motion is brought under Section 425.16, all discovery proceedings in the action are stayed until notice of entry of an order ruling on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g).) A court has no power to allow discovery while a special motion to strike is pending unless a party files a noticed motion establishing good cause for conducting discovery. (Ibid.)

Here, Park did not file a noticed motion seeking to conduct discovery while the special motion to strike was pending. As such, her request to obtain limited discovery is not properly before the Court. Accordingly, Park’s request that the Court stay its ruling on the special motion to strike so she can obtain limited discovery is DENIED.

III. Merits of the Motion

Section 425.16 authorizes a party to bring a special motion to strike a cause of action arising from his or her exercise of the constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances and speak freely in connection with a public issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e); Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387.) In evaluating such a motion, courts employ a two-step analysis. (Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116.) The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity. (Id. at 1116-17, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) If that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on those causes of action. (Id. at 1117; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit — is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, italics in original.) In the event only some of the allegations in a cause of action involve protected activity, the court may strike only those allegations while leaving averments regarding unprotected activity intact. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)

A. Protected Activity

To satisfy its initial burden of demonstrating the challenged claim arises from a protected activity, a defendant must show that the “act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits one of the [four] categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 88), “identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 396). “When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.” (Ibid.)

Dominguez asserts the first and third causes of action arise from activity falling within the categories of any written or oral statement or writing made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2).)

The first cause of action, which is labeled “Defendant’s interference with Plaintiff’s legitimate business operations,” alleges Dominguez interfered with Park’s business by ignoring Park’s meal and rest break policies, resting and eating when she wanted, “attempt[ing] to exploit [Park’s] actions to bring false claims to the Department of Labor in order to gain inappropriate advantage,” and hindering day-to-day operations by habitually misplacing her time card or taking it out without Park’s permission. (Cross-Comp., ¶¶ 11-12.) The third cause of action for “A false claim” alleges that Dominguez submitted three claims to the Department of Labor that were based on falsehoods; Park was forced to defend against these claims; and the time, effort, and emotional stress Park expended to respond to the claims resulted in her inability to maintain her normal work hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-24.)

Dominguez contends these causes of action are predicated, at least in part, on her filing of claims with the Office of the Labor Commissioner which she asserts was a protected activity. The constitutional right to petition “includes the basic act of…seeking administrative action,” which is an official proceeding authorized by law. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115, emphasis added; see also Dible v. Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 843, 850.) Filing a claim with the Department of Labor is an administrative action (see, e.g., Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 117, 119, fn. 1); thus, this conduct constitutes protected activity.

Park’s argument in opposition does not compel a contrary conclusion. Park asserts “[p]etitions of Ms. Dominguez would be the acts on the basis of fabrication for unjust gain that they shall not be applicable to the right of petition guaranteed under the Constitution.” (Opp. at p. 7.) Though not clearly articulated, Park appears to be contending that petitions made on the basis of fabrication or for the purpose of unjust gain are not protected activities for purposes of a special motion to strike. She cites no authority, however, in support of this proposition.

In sum, Dominguez carries her initial burden of demonstrating the first and third causes of action arise from a protected activity. The Court emphasizes that the showing of protected activity made by Dominguez relative to the first cause of action is limited to the allegation she filed claims with the Department of Labor. Though there is other conduct forming the basis of the claim, Dominguez does not challenge the cause of action to the extent it is based on that conduct. As such, only the allegation regarding Dominguez’s filing of her labor claims may be stricken from the pleading. In contrast, the whole third cause of action may potentially be stricken as it is predicated solely on the filing of Dominguez’s administrative claims.

B. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

Having demonstrated that the first and third causes of action arise from a protected activity, the burden shifts to Park to “demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396). “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) If it determines there is no probability the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, the claim is stricken and allegations of protected activity supporting that claim are eliminated from the complaint. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)

Here, Park asserts she has “established a probability of prevailing by proving that the petition of Ms. Dominguez is false,” as demonstrated by the “evidence attached to the Answer…as well as the earlier-mentioned contents and evidences.” (Opp. at p. 7.) She does not further elaborate. Park’s argument is flawed for several reasons.

First, Park does not explain how the purported falsity of petitions submitted by Dominguez demonstrate she will likely prevail on her first cause of action for “interference with…legitimate business operations” or third cause of action for “[a] false claim.” To that point, it is not apparent in the first instance that these are cognizable claims. Though the claim for interference with legitimate business operations connotes the torts of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage or intentional interference with contractual relations, the facts pled do not seem to relate to either of these torts as Park does not allege interference with a contractual agreement or an economic expectancy (see, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1157), but rather interference with Park’s “day-to-day” business. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Similarly, the Court is unaware of a cause of action for “[a] false claim.” And while a label of a cause of action is not controlling in determining if a claim has been stated (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38), here, it is not clear what cause of action Park is seeking to plead. Park’s argument does not illuminate matters. She asserts there is evidence demonstrating the falsity of Dominguez’s petitions but does not connect this purported fact to any elements of her claims or explain what the relevant elements are such that the Court can discern what causes of action are being pled. As such, Park fails to carry her burden of demonstrating the legal sufficiency of her claims.

Second, even if the falsity of Dominguez’s claims was relevant to establishing a probability of Park prevailing on the first and third causes of action, Park does not submit any admissible evidence supporting her contention Dominguez’s claims were false. Park submits no evidence along with her opposition and, though she references “evidence” attached to her answer, the Court observes the “evidence” referred to consists solely of exhibits that purport to be Dominguez’s itemized wage statements, Park’s notices of meal and rest periods, and text messages between Dominguez and Park. (See Answer, Exhs. 1-3.) But these documents are not authenticated; as such, they are not admissible. (See Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a) [stating that a writing must be authenticated before being admitted into evidence]; McAllister v. George (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 262 [stating that the proponent of evidence must introduce evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that writing is what it is purported to be].) Moreover, even if the evidence presented was authenticated, it is unclear how these documents demonstrate Dominguez’s claims to the Department of Labor were false as Park provides no explanation regarding this issue.

In sum, Park fails to carry her burden of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the merits of her first and third causes of action.

C. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Dominguez’s special motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The allegation that Dominguez “attempted to exploit the Plaintiff’s actions to bring false claims to the Department of Labor in order to gain inappropriate advantage” in paragraph 11 of the first cause of action, and the entire third cause of action are hereby stricken. The Court does not strike any other allegations in the first cause of action as no other allegations were challenged.