Motion to Compel Answers to Special Irogs

Ruling: Off Calendar – no hearing will be held. The Motion by Plaintiff Ernest Castro to Compel Further Responses to Special Irogs is DENIED as to Irog Nos. 10, 46-50, 58, 59, 61-64, 71, 84-89 and 93. If the information requested in Irogs Nos. 90-91 which Defendant has agreed to provide has not yet been provided by 4-15-14, the Motion will be GRANTED as to these Irogs, and Defendant will be ordered to provide verified supplemental responses within 20 days.

The Court strongly encourages counsel to meet and confer in good faith regarding discovery in this case, and to prepare and submit a Stipulation and Proposed Protective Order, if necessary, to protect private information of third parties that may be relevant and discoverable. For instance, with respect to Irog Nos. 61, 64, 71, 84, 85, 86, 87 and 88, while they are objectionable as drafted, they do also encompass a request for basic contact information for potential witnesses from the store in which Plaintiff worked, including Plaintiff’s supervisors and co-workers, and statistical data, that may be discoverable. Moving Party is to give notice.

Basis for Rulings on Specific Irogs:

No. 10 (seeks the names of all employees in similar position as Plaintiff who were fired in the last 10 years), is overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of non-witness third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

No. 46 (asks Defendant to identify documents that “involve or otherwise reflect” any claim against Defendant during the past ten years for wrongful termination, or harassment), is overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of non-witness third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.) The request is also appears unduly burdensome given the size and number of locations and employees of Defendant, and the overly broad description of the documents.

Nos. 47, 48 and 49 (asks Defendant to provide contact information for (No. 47) all employees who were fired, (No. 48) were forced to resign, (No. 49) complained of harassment, retaliation, discrimination, or wrongful termination within the last 10 years at the same store where Plaintiff worked), is overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of non-witness third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

No. 50 (asks Defendant to state the “name, age, gender, marital status, race and ancestry” and contact information for all individuals who made a “formal or informal” complaint to defendant concerning his or her “age, gender, race or ancestry during the past ten years”) is overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of non-witness third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

No. 58 (seeks the identity of employees of Defendants who drafted any portion of any “Affirmative Action Policy Plan” that defendant has used or instituted in last five years) While the existence and content of Defendant’s employment policies may be relevant, which Defendant represents they have already produced, the identity of all employees who drafted any part of them is overbroad and does not appear to be relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

No. 59 (asks Defendant to state precisely how Defendant has implemented any type of Affirmative Action Policy Plan during the last five years), is overly broad, vague and ambiguous as drafted.

Nos. 61, 84 (seeks the name, age, race, gender, marital status, and ancestry, and contact information for all employees who worked in plaintiff’s department, division or work area during the last five years of Plaintiff’s employment (84 not limited by time)) are overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

Nos. 62 and 63 (seeks the name, age, race, gender, marital status, and ancestry, and contact information for anyone who reported to defendant that any employee made disparaging, discriminatory, harassing, or otherwise inappropriate comments about the age, race, gender, marital status, and ancestry of individuals during the last five years of Plaintiff’s employment, and the exact statement made) are vague and ambiguous, and overly broad as to both time and scope, and seeks private information of non-witness third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

Nos. 64, 85, 86 (seeks the “name, age, race, gender, marital status, and ancestry” of each person who supervised or managed Plaintiff, and who had input on the decision to terminate plaintiff) is overly broad as drafted as to scope, and seeks private (and irrelevant) information of third parties without a showing of relevance and a compelling need for the information through this manner of discovery. (Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 640, 652-653.)

No. 71 (asks Defendant to state the contact information for all individuals who had authority to hire, fire, etc., Plaintiff) is overly broad in that it seeks the identity and contact information of all individuals, without regard to time or location, to hire, fire, etc. the Plaintiff.

Nos. 87, 88 (requests the number of persons of plaintiff’s age, race, gender, marital status and ancestry whose employment has been involuntarily terminated (87), hired (88) by defendant during the past ten years) is vague and ambiguous as drafted, and overly broad. It is overly broad as to time and it not clear whether Plaintiff is seeking statistics in each of those categories individually or individuals or fit all of those categories, and Plaintiff has not defined the categories.

No. 89 (seeks the title and location of each document that reflects defendant’s statistical employment practices with regard to employees’ and applicants age, race, gender, marital status and ancestry) is vague and ambiguous as to “statistical employment practices,” and unintelligible.

No. 93 (asks how defendant has “preserved” the information about race, gender, marital status, national origin, and age of each employee and applicant during the last ten years), is vague and ambiguous, and overly broad in that it purports to seek information that is not relevant to the subject matter of the action or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.