Cheryl Lynn Lewis vs Douglas Paul Harley
Case No: 18CV03678
Hearing Date: Wed Apr 17, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion to Strike Punitive Damage Allegations

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant’s motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied.

BACKGROUND:

This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident. According to the allegations, on October 20, 2017, plaintiff Cheryl Lewis was operating her vehicle on U.S. Highway 101 south of Hot Springs Road when she was sideswiped at a high rate of speed by a vehicle driven by defendant Douglas Harley. Defendant did not stop at the scene, but sped away. Plaintiff reported the incident and defendant was later stopped by police officers after they observed his vehicle drifting left to right on the roadway. After making contact with defendant, the officers noted that he had red, watery eyes. The officers also detected the smell of alcohol coming from his vehicle. Defendant was placed under arrest and a subsequent blood alcohol test revealed that he had a blood alcohol level of 0.15, nearly twice the legal limit.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges a single cause of action for negligence. The FAC includes a claim for punitive damages based on the fact that defendant was driving under the influence at the time of the collision and then fled the scene of the accident. Defendant contends that the punitive damages allegations are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts and should be stricken. Plaintiff opposes the motion to strike.

ANALYSIS:

Code of Civil Procedure Section 435, subdivision (b)(1), provides that “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” A motion to strike may be brought to strike out “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” Code Civ. Proc. §436, subd. (b). The motion may also be brought to strike out “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” Code Civ. Proc. §436, subd. (a). “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” Code Civ. Proc. §431.10, subds. (b)(3) and (c).

In this case, defendant moves to strike the punitive damages allegations in the FAC. Under Civil Code Section 3294, subdivision (a), punitive damages are recoverable where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice or oppression. “Malice” means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Civ. Code §3294, subd. (c)(1). “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Civ. Code §3294, subd. (c)(2). Defendant contends that the FAC fails to allege specific facts to support a claim for punitive damages.

Preliminarily, the court notes that defendant’s motion to strike is untimely. A motion to strike must be filed within the time period that a defendant has to file a response to the pleading. Code Civ. Proc. §435, subd. (b)(1). A defendant is required to respond to a complaint within 30 days of service of the pleading. Code Civ. Proc. §412.20, subd. (a)(3). A motion to strike that is filed after the defendant has already answered the complaint is untimely and may be denied on that basis. Adohr Milk Farms, Inc. v. Love (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 366, 371 (“[A] defendant can move to strike a complaint only before he has answered it and not afterward.”). Here, defendant filed his answer to the FAC on January 29, 2019, nearly two months before filing his motion to strike. The time for a motion to strike has therefore expired.

That being said, since both sides have fully briefed the matter, the court will address the merits of the motion.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts evidencing “despicable conduct” or conduct carried “with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Civ. Code §3294, subd. (c)(1). The court disagrees. In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the California Supreme Court held that the malice requirement for punitive damages is satisfied when a person voluntarily drinks alcohol to the point of intoxication and thereafter drives a motor vehicle and causes an accident. Taylor was a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver who collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing serious injuries. In reversing the trial court’s order sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the punitive damages allegations, the Court stated:

“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents. [¶] The allowance of punitive damages in such cases may well be appropriate. . . .”

Id., at 896-897.

The gravamen of plaintiff’s FAC, as in Taylor, is that defendant willfully became intoxicated and thereafter drove a vehicle in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard. Specifically, plaintiff alleges:

“Defendant DOUGLAS PAUL HARLEY, for a substantial period of time, had known that he had serious problems with alcohol intake mixed with other intoxicants and was well aware of the serious nature of driving under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants and had a tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity, and inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol mixed with other intoxicants. . . .

“[O]n or about October 20, 2017, Defendant DOUGLAS PAUL HARLEY consumed alcohol to the point of legal intoxication, knowing said substance would affect his motor skills and ability to operate a motor vehicle, knowing that he would be intoxicated after ingesting the alcohol and knowing that he would be operating a motor vehicle shortly after ingesting said alcohol and knowing that he would be operating a motor vehicle while in a state of intoxication from ingesting the alcohol.

“[D]ue to his state of intoxication and/or impairment, Defendant DOUGLAS PAUL HARLEY could not properly operate a motor vehicle, and as a result, collided with Plaintiff, causing serious bodily injury to Plaintiff.”

(FAC, ¶¶ 25, 26, 30.)

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant fled the scene of the accident instead of stopping and rendering assistance:

“At the time of the collision, Defendant DOUGLAS PAUL HARLEY committed a hit and run crime by fleeing the scene of the collision to escape responsibility, liability, and culpability for the damage and injuries caused by his negligence and caused by his intoxicated state. Instead of stopping at the scene of the collision as required by California Vehicle Code Sections 20001 and 20003, identifying himself to Plaintiff, offering assistance to Plaintiff and waiting for an investigative officer to make a record of the event, he absconded from the scene at a very high rate of speed while driving erratically, swerving and further endangering the public on the roadway . . . .”

(FAC, ¶31.)

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to strike will be denied. Plaintiff has more than met the pleading standard for punitive damages.