Tom Pappas v. County of Santa Barbara
Case No: 1417388
Hearing Date: Mon Apr 22, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer to Cross-Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate

Tom Pappas, et al., v. State Coastal Conservancy, et al. (Judge Sterne)

Case No. 1417388

Hearing Date: April 22, 2019

HEARING: Demurrer of Plaintiffs to Cross-Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate of Intervenor Defendant and Cross-Complainant Gaviota Coastal Trail Alliance

ATTORNEYS:

For Plaintiffs The Hollister Ranch Cooperative and the Hollister Ranch Owners’ Association:Steven A. Amerikaner, Beth Collins, Hillary H. Steenberge, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP

For Plaintiffs Tim Behunin, Trustee of the Behunin Family Trust, Carolyn Pappas, Patrick L. Connelly, individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff Classes:A. Barry Cappello, Wendy D. Welkom, Cappello & Noel LLP

For Defendants California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy:Xavier Becerra, Jamee Jordan Patterson, Office of the California Attorney General

For Defendant Rancho Cuarta:Joseph Liebman

For Intervenor Defendant Gaviota Coastal Trail Alliance: Ellison Folk, Rica V. Garcia, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP; Marc S. Chytilo, Ana Citrin, Law Office of Marc Chytilo, APC; Todd T. Cardiff

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of plaintiffs to the cross-complaint of intervenor Gaviota Coastal Trail Alliance is overruled. Any answer to the cross-complaint shall be filed and served on or before May 7, 2019.

Background:

In this class action, plaintiffs seek to quiet title as to easements and other asserted rights of access and use within and across private property known as the Hollister Ranch. Plaintiffs assert that the public access easements are unenforceable and provide no rights of access or use. Defendants California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy (State Defendants) have opposed the claims of plaintiffs supporting the validity of the asserted public access rights.

The original parties reached a conditional settlement of this action (the Settlement). In very general terms, the Settlement provides that the State Defendants abandon any claim to rights pursuant to the underlying offer to dedicate upon which the State Defendants have based their claims for public access rights. In exchange, plaintiffs grant a license for public access to certain beach areas, accessible only by the ocean and subject to various restrictions, and the expansion of the Hollister Ranch Managed Access Program, providing certain controlled access for primary and secondary school children and for approved non-profit groups.

On May 21, 2018, the court granted preliminary approval of the class action Settlement. In granting preliminary approval, the court noted the unusual procedural posture of this matter in that, unlike a traditional class action, this is a class action by the owners of the underlying real property interests to quiet title and declare unenforceable the property interests set forth in the offer of dedication giving rise to the claim for public access. A traditional class notice would have been provided only to the settlement class of property owners. The court noted that although the public interest in the public access ostensibly granted by the offer of dedication is represented by the State Defendants, the Settlement abandons disputed rights of public access without having first provided notice to the public. The court determined that notice to the public was appropriate, but cautioned that the public, as neither a member of the plaintiff class nor a party to the action, is not permitted to participate in this action simply by voicing an opinion as to the merits of the action or as to the wisdom of the Settlement without first becoming a party to the action, ordinarily by obtaining leave of court to intervene in the action.

The court approved a notice to the public requiring a member of the public wishing to intervene to file and serve a motion to intervene no later than July 23, 2018.

In response to the notice to the public, Gaviota Coastal Trail Alliance (GCTA) filed a motion to intervene in order to oppose final approval of the Settlement and otherwise to participate in the action as a defendant. The motion was opposed by plaintiffs Hollister Ranch Owners’ Association and The Hollister Ranch Cooperative (collectively, HROA). On August 27, 2018, the court granted GCTA’s motion to intervene. GCTA’s answer in intervention was filed on September 7, 2018. GCTA filed its first amended answer in intervention (FAA) on October 9, 2018.

The FAA alleges that GCTA is an alliance of organizations committed to effectuating both a continuous coastal trail from Gaviota State Park to Jalama Beach County Park and appropriate vertical access to beaches at Hollister Ranch. (FAA, ¶ 1.) Members of GCTA organizations include residents of Santa Barbara County who currently use and enjoy the ocean and beaches of Santa Barbara County for recreational purposes and who are excluded from accessing Hollister Ranch’s beaches by virtue of physical barriers. (FAA, ¶ 2.) The Settlement would adversely affect members of GCTA by extinguishing public rights to access the beach at Hollister Ranch. (Ibid.) Most members of GCTA lack the physical ability or financial resources necessary to access the Hollister Ranch beach via the ocean as provided in the Settlement and member organization are unlikely to be considered for the non-profit access program because of their respective constituencies. (Ibid.) GCTA intervened as a defendant in defense of the contested offer to dedicate public access accepted by the State Coastal Conservancy by Certificate of Acceptance recorded on April 26, 2013. (Ibid.) The FAA admits or denies the various allegations of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (SAC). (FAA, ¶¶ 3-133.) The FAA also asserts eleven affirmative defenses.

On October 18, 2018, plaintiffs filed their demurrer to the FAA. Plaintiffs demurred on the grounds that: (1) GCTA lacked standing to file any answer in this action and to assert any affirmative defenses; (2) GCTA failed to make any affirmative claims against the Settlement yet includes a prayer for judgment to decline to approve the class action settlement and the 2017 settlement agreement with HROA; and (3) failed to allege fact sufficient to state the seventh affirmative defense that the burdens of a coastal development permit run with the land.

On December 10, 2018, the court heard the plaintiffs’ demurrer to the FAA. For the reasons set forth in the Order After Hearing, filed December 12, 2018, the court overruled the demurrer to the FAA.

On January 14, 2019, the court heard argument on the motion of GCTA to set aside the settlement between HROA and the State Defendants (the HROA Settlement) and on the motion of the plaintiffs for final approval of the class action settlement. The court’s tentative decision was to deny both motions. The court’s tentative decision also requested that the parties be prepared at that hearing to discuss the best procedural approach to resolve the issues of the validity and effectiveness of the HROA Settlement raised by GCTA in the event the court affirmed its tentative decision. The parties discussed all issues at the January 14, 2019, hearing.

By written order filed on February 8, 2019, the court denied the two motions for the reasons set forth in the court’s tentative decision. As a result of the discussion with counsel at the January 14 hearing, the court determined that the most direct and efficient procedural approach to resolving the issues of the validity and effectiveness of the HROA Settlement raised by GCTA was for GCTA to file a cross-complaint to plead the requested relief on those issues directly. The court accordingly granted GCTA leave to file such a cross-complaint.

In response to the court’s grant of leave, GCTA filed its cross-complaint (Cross-Complaint) on February 22, 2019. The Cross-Complaint asserts eight causes of action: (1) violation of Public Resources Code section 31107.1 (against State Coastal Conservancy); (2) violation of Public Resources Code section 30609.5 (against California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy); (3) violation of Government Code section 11005.2 (against State Coastal Conservancy); (4) violation of Public Resources Code sections 30610.3 and 30610.8 (against California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy); (5) violation of Public Resources Code section 30600 et seq. (against California Coastal Commission); (6) violation of Government Code section 7050 and Civil Code section 1009 (against State Coastal Conservancy); (7) violation of Government Code section 11120 et seq. (against California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy); (8) violation of Government Code section 11135 and Public Resources Code section 30013 (against California Coastal Commission and State Coastal Conservancy).

The Cross-Complaint alleges that GCTA is an alliance of organizations committed to effectuating both a continuous coastal trail from Gaviota State Park to Jalama Beach County Park and appropriate vertical access to beaches at Hollister Ranch. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 5.) Members of GCTA organizations include residents of Santa Barbara County who currently use and enjoy the ocean and beaches of Santa Barbara County for recreational purposes and who are excluded from accessing Hollister Ranch’s beaches by virtue of physical barriers. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 6.) The HROA Settlement would adversely affect members of GCTA by extinguishing public rights to access the beach at Hollister Ranch. (Ibid.) Most members of GCTA lack the physical ability or financial resources necessary to access the Hollister Ranch beach via the ocean as provided in the HROA Settlement and member organization are unlikely to be considered for the non-profit access program because of their respective constituencies. (Ibid.) The State Defendants authorized approval of the two settlements between HROA and the plaintiffs in closed session and without notice to the public. (Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 30-33.)

GCTA filed a motion to intervene as a defendant in this action on July 23, 2018. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 38.) On August 27, 2018, the court granted the motion to intervene. On September 7, 2018, GCTA filed original answer in intervention. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 41.) Among other things, GCTA asserts that the State Defendants failed to follow legal requirements in entering into the HROA settlement. (Cross-Complaint, ¶¶ 45-99.) The Cross-Complaint seeks declaratory and other relief that the HROA Settlement is void or otherwise unenforceable under the procedures used for authorization. (Cross-Complaint, prayer.)

On March 22, 2019, plaintiffs filed their demurrer to the Cross-Complaint. Plaintiffs argue that the Cross-Complaint fails to state any cause of action because GCTA lacks standing to object to the settlements.

Analysis:

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Plaintiffs’ demurrer is to the complaint as a whole and not to any particular cause of action.

As an initial matter, the court agrees that the demurrer is not an improper motion for reconsideration. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) The demurrer is a different procedural device than previously raised by plaintiffs and presents for the first time a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading of the Cross-Complaint. The arguments raised in the demurrer, however, are the same arguments raised by plaintiffs in their opposition to GCTA’s motion to intervene, in their demurrer to GCTA’s FAA, in opposition to GCTA’s motion to set aside the HROA Settlement, and in support of final approval of the class action settlement. In overruling plaintiffs’ demurrer to GCTA’s FAA, the court stated:

“The court previously granted GCTA’s motion to intervene as a defendant. ‘Code of Civil Procedure section 387 provides that any person who has an interest in the subject matter in litigation may intervene therein at any time prior to trial. The purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of persons affected by a judgment, to obviate delay, and to avoid multiplicity of actions. [Citation.] To avail himself of the right to intervene granted by section 387, a proposed intervenor must have an interest in the litigation, either in the success of one of the parties to the action or an interest against both of them. The interest must be direct and not consequential, and must be one which will be determined in the action in which the intervention is sought.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[A]n intervener becomes an actual party to the suit by virtue of the order authorizing him to intervene.’ [Citation.] … [A]n intervenor is not limited by every procedural decision made by the plaintiff. For example, an intervenor may move to disqualify a judge, even if the plaintiff is content to try the lawsuit in that court. [Citation.] An intervenor may object to the jurisdiction of the court or that the pleadings do not state a cause of action.’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, … “[a]n intervenor of right has by definition … an interest at stake which the other parties will not fully protect, and which the intervenor can fully protect only joining the litigation. [Citation.] Such a party therefore has an interest in the litigation similar to that of the original parties.” ’ [Citation.]

“ ‘An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following: [¶] … [¶] (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff.’ [Citation.]

“When the court granted GCTA’s motion to intervene, the court implicitly determined that GCTA had an interest in this litigation as a defendant. [Citation.] That same interest, and the court’s analysis of that interest in ruling on the intervention motion (not repeated here, but incorporated by reference), is sufficient to establish standing as a defendant in this motion. GCTA has alleged the basis of its standing consistent with the court’s determination in the intervention motion. On that basis the demurrer to the answer on the grounds of standing is overruled.” (Order After Hearing, filed Dec. 12, 2018, attachment, p. 5.)

While plaintiffs disagree with the court’s reasoning, the present demurrer is a reargument of well-trodden issues for which there is little to add to this analysis. The same interests of GCTA argued in the motion to intervene are the same interests GCTA pleaded in the FAA and the court found sufficient to confer standing. GCTA alleges those same interests in the Cross-Complaint.

One point warranting additional comment is the argument that the Cross-Complaint enlarges the issues of this action. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, the argument is incorrect because, as discussed by the court in its prior rulings, settlement as a means of disposing of this action was in the first instance asserted by plaintiffs. Thus, the validity and effectiveness of the settlement was put directly at issue by plaintiffs themselves. GCTA’s challenge to the settlement no more expands the issues in this litigation than had a challenge to the settlement been made by a member of the plaintiff class. The subject matter is the same and has already been placed at issue; the only difference here is the party who makes the challenge.

Second, this argument is incorrect because whether or not the Cross-Complaint expands the scope of the litigation, that the issue of scope was an issue for the motion to intervene and is not an issue for demurrer. GCTA has been granted intervention as a defendant. A defendant may assert in cross-cross complaint a claim which asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10, subd. (b).) GCTA’s Cross-Complaint asserts claims against the State Defendants to declare invalid the State Defendants’ agreement to the HROA Settlement, which, as noted above, has placed directly at issue by the plaintiffs as a subject of this action. The Cross-Complaint is properly filed with leave of court. Whether or not the issues raised in the Cross-Complaint expand the scope of the litigation does not affect the issue presented by a demurrer, namely, whether a cause of action is or is not stated by the pleading. “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

(Note: Because it is unnecessary for the disposition of this demurrer, the court assumes, without deciding, that plaintiffs themselves have standing to challenge by demurrer the sufficiency of the pleadings in GCTA’s Cross-Complaint where plaintiffs are not cross-defendants in any cause of action set forth in the Cross-Complaint.)

For the reasons discussed herein and incorporated herein from the court’s prior rulings, the court finds that allegations of the Cross-Complaint are sufficient to plead GCTA’s standing to assert the claims of the Cross-Complaint. Plaintiffs’ demurrer will be overruled.