Case Number: BC665467 Hearing Date: May 13, 2019 Dept: 4B

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 2017, Plaintiffs Jennifer Knopp and Kevin Knopp (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants City of Los Angeles (“City”) and Joshua Willis (“Willis”) for wrongful death arising out of a dangerous condition of public property. City moves for summary judgment on grounds there was no dangerous condition; if there was a dangerous condition it had no notice of it; and if there was a dangerous condition, it is entitled to design immunity.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2016, Jeffrey Knopp (“Decedent”) was operating his bicycle eastbound in the number two lane of Foothill Boulevard immediately east of the intersection of Wentworth Street in Los Angeles. Decedent was struck by a vehicle driven by Willis. (Undisputed Material Fact “UMF” No. 1.) Decedent was an experienced cyclist who rode his bicycle every Monday through Thursday after work, as well as Saturday mornings and regularly rode on Foothill Boulevard. (UMF No. 19.)

Willis was familiar with the area and had traveled that stretch of Foothill Boulevard at least twice per month and approximately twenty times prior to the accident. (UMF No. 3.) It was still light out and Willis had no trouble seeing the roadway or Decedent on his bicycle. (UMF No. 4.) Willis was traveling approximately 30 miles per hour. (UMF No. 8.) Willis was aware of the shoulder on the roadway and was aware that it gradually merged into the highway until the shoulder gradually ended at the K-rail, and was aware of a “merging” sign. (UMF No. 9.) There was nothing blocking Knopp’s view of Decedent. (UMF No. 11.) However, he never saw Knopp ride into his lane (UMF No. 12), and the next thing Willis knew, he heard a boom and noticed the windshield shattered and immediately pulled over to the side (UMF No. 13). The right front of the passenger side of Willis’s vehicle had impacted Decedent. (UMF No. 15.) Willis’s vehicle never came into contact with the K-rail. (UMF No. 16.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A moving defendant need not conclusively negate an element of plaintiff’s cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

City’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence

City’s Objections Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 are OVERRULED.

City’s Objections Nos. 2 and 9 are SUSTAINED.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs allege that City’s property was in a dangerous condition due to “abruptly reducing the shoulder on Foothill Boulevard for bicyclists going east forcing any and all bicyclists to dangerously proceed closer to motorists in the road; abruptly ending the bike lane for bicyclists going east without warning and guidance; failing to provide a bike lane for bicyclists going east on Foothill Boulevard at the subject location; creating a trap for motorists and bicyclists at the location; failing to utilize striping, lighting, signage and traffic devices used by other public and private entities which have proven to be successful at creating a safe environment for bicyclists sharing the road with motorists; failing to address change physical conditions at the site; failing to maintain the road shoulder and related structures and signs in a safe condition.” (UMF No. 25; Complaint, ¶ 10.)

Defendant argues: (1) City’s property was not in a dangerous condition; (2) City did not have notice of a dangerous condition; (3) City is immune from liability under Government Code sections 830.4 and 830.8; (4) City is immune from liability under Government Code section 830.6; and (5) there can be no indemnity without liability.

Dangerous Condition

The Collision Site

Foothill Boulevard travels east/west. There were two lanes of traffic in each direction divided by a 10-foot wide, two-way left-turn lane in the middle of Foothill Boulevard, with two 12-inch diagonal yellow lines in the middle, adjacent to the collision location; a 4-inch wide white edgeline, with three 12-inch wide white diagonal cross hatch lines on the south edge of Foothill Boulevard between Wentworth Street and the beginning of the K-rail, east of the collision site; a 10.5 to 11 foot wide eastbound number one lane for Foothill Boulevard between Wentworth and Riderwood Drive. (UMF No. 26.)

A rock fence was constructed along the south edge of Foothill Boulevard, beginning approximately 163 feet from the prolongation of the west curb of Riderwood Drive and continuing to the east of Riderwood Drive. (UMF No. 28.) A metal beam guardrail begins approximately 63 feet to the west of the beginning of the rock fence and shields the west end of the rock fence from approaching traffic. (UMF No. 29.) The edge line traffic stripe along the right side of the roadway travel lanes and the lane lines that separated the two eastbound lanes shifted toward the center of the roadway over a distance of 300 feet to properly shift the travel lanes away from the rock fence. (UMF No. 30.) There were also white diagonal stripes within the transition area to hightlight the shift and discourage motor vehicles from entering the shoulder area. (UMF No. 31.) The rock fence located near the south edge of pavement results in a narrowing of the south shoulder for Foothill Boulevard as the roadway approaches the beginning of the fence. (UMF No. 32.)

Dangerous Condition

To hold a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the property was a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and (4) that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition or the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Gov. Code, § 835.)

A claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property must “specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition” and “a plaintiff’s allegations, and ultimately the evidence, must establish a physical deficiency in the property itself.” (Mixon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 124, 131.) “To establish a qualifying condition, the plaintiff must point to at least one ‘physical characteristic’ of the property.” (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 759.) A dangerous condition exists where the property is “physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property, or possesses a physical characteristic in its design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users. (Mixon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 131.)

The existence of a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact but can be decided as a matter if law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion. (Id. at p. 148.)

Here, the physical characteristics identified by Plaintiffs are: (1) the abruptly reducing shoulder on Foothill Boulevard for bicyclists going east, forcing all bicyclists to dangerously proceed closer to motorists in the road; (2) failing to provide a designated bicycle lane, creating a trap for bicyclists and motorists at the location; (3) failing to use striping, lighting, signage and traffic devices; (4) failing to address changed physical conditions at the site; and (5) failing to maintain the road shoulder and related structures and signs in a safe condition.

City argues there was no abrupt reduction of the shoulder on Foothill Boulevard. Rather, the collision occurred in the area where the roadway striping was transitioning to clear the guardrail and rock fence. The two eastbound traffic lanes shift toward the center of the roadway over a distance of 300 feet to shift the travel lanes away from the rock fence. City argues the 300-foot transition from a 5-foot shoulder to a 2-foot shoulder would have been clearly visible and is reasonable for a shift in the lateral position of travel lanes and reduction in shoulder width. City submits evidence, discussed below, of the absence of prior accidents at the location of the incident and argues that it tends to prove the condition was not dangerous or was trivial. Further, City argues no law or guideline required City to provide a designated bicycle lane. Therefore City, a public entity, cannot be liable because there is no violation of a statute.

Regarding the absence of signage or warnings, City argues that while a concealed dangerous condition that constitutes a trap may require the posting of warning signs, the absence of warning signs itself is not a dangerous condition. (Mixon, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 136.) Rather, a dangerous condition must first exist independent of the absence of the warning. (Ibid.) Further, “[a] condition is not a dangerous condition . . . merely because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriciton signs . . . or distinctive roadway markings . . .” (Gov. Code, § 830.4.) Defendant argues nothing about the roadway as hidden, there were not unusual roadway conditions, and nothing defective about the roadway condition.[1]

In support, City submitted the declarations of Brian Gallagher and Rock Miller. They inspected the scene of the accident in late 2018 and early 2019, after the road had been restriped to eliminate lanes of traffic and add a bike lane and a buffer zone between the traffic and bike lane. They use Google Street View shots to establish the configuration and appearance of the location on a date before the accident. They both conclude that the reduction in the shoulder and the guardrail were visible to approaching bicyclists, the traffic striping transition before the guardrail and rock wall (or rock fence) was sufficiently long, and whether or not a warning sign was in place, there was no dangerous condition.

The Court cannot conclude that based on this evidence reasonable minds could come to only one conclusion – that no dangerous condition existed. City’s experts state that the road at the time of the accident satisfied guidelines for traffic control devices, lane shifts and shoulder reductions, but the experts do not state whether these guidelines are for motor vehicle traffic, bicycle traffic, or both. The experts discuss signage, visibility, roadway markings, stopping distance and shoulder reduction, and conclude that they were all reasonable and did not comprise a dangerous condition. But the experts do not distinguish between what is appropriate and reasonable for a road with motor vehicle traffic, with bicycle traffic, or with both. They do not discuss whether a condition could be safe for motor vehicles, but could be dangerous where motor vehicles and bicycles share the road. (Lane v. City of Sacramento (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1345 [“on summary judgment [the court] must strictly construe [the defendant’s] affidavits”].)

A public entity “may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property . . . if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence.” (Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1457-1458.) “Public entity liability lies under section 835 when some feature of the property increased or intensified the danger to users from third party conduct.” (Id. at p. 1458.) Here, a reasonable person might conclude that the road configuration was not a dangerous condition for motor vehicles, which would not be driving on the shoulder, but was a dangerous condition for cyclists riding on the shoulder who would need to shift over into the lane of traffic to avoid the guardrail and could end up in front of a fast moving vehicle approaching quickly and unexpectedly behind the cyclist. The road configuration could increase the danger to cyclist from drivers. And City’s evidence of the absence of other similar accidents is not dispositive of whether a dangerous condition existed. (Lane, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.) Thus, City did not establish a prima facie case that, as a matter of law, no dangerous condition existed.

And, even if it had, Plaintiffs’ expert Edward Ruzak raised questions of fact about whether the road configuration – a possibly missing road sign, narrowing shoulder, guardrail, and wide shoulders on roads approaching the site – created a dangerous condition for cyclists.

Ruzak opines the wide shoulders on northbound Wentworth Street approaching the intersection with Foothill Boulevard and on eastbound Foothill Boulevard approaching the intersection with Wentworth Street provided a false sense of security for motorists and bicyclists who continue traveling on those streets to the accident location. He states the encroaching guardrail was a significant factor rendering the area unsafe and increased risk of harm by making bicyclists susceptible to being struck by automobiles. A photograph from the day of the accident could be interpreted to show the Road Narrows sign missing. Ruzak concludes the lack of the sign contributed to a dangerous condition where motorists and bicyclists would not anticipate the sudden narrowing of the shoulder.

Notice

City next argues that even if a dangerous condition existed, City had no notice of it as required by Government Code section 835. A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (a).) A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subd. (b).) On the issue of due care, admissible evidence includes, but is not limited to evidence of whether the condition and its dangerous character would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate or whether the public entity maintained and operated an inspection system with due care and did not discover the condition. (Gov. Code, § 835.2, subds. (b)(1)-(b)(2).)

City argues it had no notice based on the testimony of Blanca Mora, Tom Wong, and its experts Gallagher and Miller about the lack of complaints and requests about the accident site or dangerous condition, lack of accident reports, and lack of claims for damages. City also points to Google Street View images showing the Road Narrows sign present as late as June 2016. If the sign was missing on November 1, 2016, City says it was unaware of it, as there were no complaints or reports made about the sign. Plaintiff argues that City knew about the dangerous condition because it created it, submitted some evidence that the Road Narrows sign was not present at the time of the accident, and suggests City did not have an adequate inspection system.

The road configuration had been in existence for years, and because City created it, it knew about it. (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 842 [no evidence city had actual notice because “[i]t did not erect the sign nor did it receive actual notice of the sign’s existence by a permit application”].) City’s only argument that it did not know about the dangerousness of the condition (assuming it was dangerous) is the absence of accidents, complaints, or reports. The absence of complaints or reports about a missing sign does not establish lack of notice because whether City had a sufficient inspection system – waiting to receive complaints – is a question of fact for the jury. (Id. at p. 843 [“The questions of whether a dangerous condition could have been discovered by reasonable inspection and whether there was adequate time for preventive measures are properly left to the jury”].) As the Legislative Committee Comments to section 835.2 state, “the issue of whether or not a public entity had constructive notice will turn on whether a reasonable inspection system would have disclosed the existence of the condition.” The absence of prior accidents and complaints does not establish lack of notice; it is “at most . . . grounds for a finding in [the defendant’s] favor, which is hardly enough to sustain a summary judgment.” (Cole, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 749-780.)

Design Immunity

City asserts the affirmtive defense of design immunity. Government Code section 830.6 provides that a public entity is not liable for injury caused by the plan or design of a construction or improvement to public property where the plan or design was approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval. A public entity claiming design immunity must establish: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction, or that the plan or design was prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design. (Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 68-69.)

The first question is whether there is undisputed evidence that the accident was caused by a design defect, and not some other cause. (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 940.) City may rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish causation. (Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550.) Here, Plaintiffs alleged that City “negligently, recklessly, and carelessly owned, maintained, designed, constructed, improved, repaired, marked, painted, provided traffic control signs for, controlled and otherwise negligently conducted themselves with respect to subject property so as to directly and legally cause injury” to Decedent and damages to Plaintiffs. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Therefore, City has met the first element of design immunity.

The second element of design immunity is whether there was approval for the plan or design prior to construction. Discretionary approval “simply means approval in advance of construction by the legislative body or officer exercising discretionary authority.” (Ramirez v. City of Redondo Beach (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 515, 526.) “A detailed plan, drawn up by a competent engineering firm, and approved by a city engineer in the exercise of his or her discreitonary authority, is persuasive evidence of the element of prior approval.” (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) Design immunity does not immunize decisions that were not made. (Cameron v. State of California (1972) 7 Cal.3d 318, 326.) Therefore, the injury-producing feature must have been part of the approved plan. (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)

The roadway was relinquished to City upon the completion of the I-210 freeway. The plan for the roadway at the collision site bears City File Number P-23992 and shows the alignment, vertical profile, width and number of travel lanes for the roadway. The plan was approved on March 16, 1964 by the State Highway Engineer and became built on December 28, 1964. (Declaration of Ali Nahass, ¶ 10.) Street Plan D-31270, titled “Foothill Boulevard Relinquishment – Wheatland Ave to Lowell Ave” was approved on September 23, 1996 by Sam L. Furuta, City Engineer, and shows the signing and striping at the collision site. (Nahass Decl., ¶¶ 4, 11.)

Under the Administrative Code and City Charter, the City Engineer has discretionary authority to approve the design or plan for construction on behalf of City. LADOT Plan No. A-5856, titled “Street Resurfacing Project Foothill Boulevard – Wentworth St to Sunland Blvd” depicts the signing and striping of Foothill Boulevard between Wentworth Street and Riderwood Drive, including the section of Foothill Boulevard where the collision occurred. The plan was approved by Zaki Mustafa, Principal Transportation Engineer of the City of Los Angeles, on March 20, 2012. (Gallagher Decl., ¶ 7.) Edward Giron, Transportation Engineering Associate II, approved the work orders for Plan No. A-5856, directing LADOT crews to implement the marking, signage, curb zone, and striping items shown in the plan. (Gallagher Decl., ¶ 9.) Thus, City has met the second element of discretionary approval prior to construction.

The third element of design immunity requires substantial evidence of reasonableness of design. “[A]s long as reasonable minds can differ concerning whether a design should have been approved, then the governmental entity must be granted immunity. The statute does not require that property be perfectly designed, only that it be given a design which is reasonable under the circumstances.” (Ramirez, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 525.) Generally, a civil engineer’s opinion regarding reasonableness is substantial evidence to satisfy this element. (Grenier, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) That a plaintiff’s expert may disagree does not create a triable issue of fact. (Ibid.) “The issue is not whether the trial court or jury could find the design unreasonable based on conflicting evidence, but whether there is any reasonable basis on which a reasonable public official could initially have approved the design.” (Compton v. City of Santee (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 591, 596-597.) Approval by competent professionals is persuasive evidence of reasonableness of approval. (Ramirez, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 526.)

City presents evidence that both the street and highway plan and the signing and striping plans were approved by the City’s licensed civil engineers, demonstrating, “at a minimum, that reasonable minds could differ over the reasonableness of the design, which suffices to create design immunity.” (Compton, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 597 [showing the plan was supervised by a county engineer “alone, probably suffices to establish immunity”].) City also cites to the accident history, or lack thereof, at the collision cite as supporting the reasonableness of the design. (Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 374, 380 [“The statistical facts heretofore referred to disclose that in the course of four and one-half years there was only one accident per 685,000 cars fortify the conclusion that reasonable discretion and judgment were exercised by those in authority who approved the plan and design prior to construction”].)

Accordingly, City has met its initial burden of showing that even if there was a dangerous condition, it is entitled to design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show a triable issue of fact exists as to the elements of design immunity.

Plaintiffs argue there is evidence the Road Narrows sign, approved in the City’s plan, was missing at the time of the accident, thus showing the maintenance of the road did not conform to the original plan or design.[2] Design immunity can be lost as set forth in Government Code section 830.6: “Notwithstanding notice that constructed or improved public property may no longer be in conformity with a plan or design . . . the immunity provided by this section shall continue for a reasonable period of time sufficient to permit the public entity to obtain funds for and carry out remedial work necessary to allow such public property to be in conformity with a standard previously approved.” (Gov. Code, § 830.6.) “[W]here triable issues of material fact are presented . . . a plaintiff has a right to a jury trial as to the issues involved in loss of design immunity.” (Cornette, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 67.)

The Road Narrows sign was present as late as June 2016 according to photographs taken from Google Maps, but a photograph from the day of the accident suggests the sign could be missing. As discussed above, City argues it had no notice of a missing Road Narrows sign. However, whether City had an adequate inspection system and reasonable time to carry out remedial work are questions for the jury.

Defendant also argues it is immune under sections 830.4 and 830.8, which hold a public entity immune from liability for injury caused by the failure to provide a traffic or warning sign unless the sign is necessary to warn of a hidden dangerous condition. (Weintstein v. Department of Transportation (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 52, 61 [“the simple absence of a warning sign cannot create liability unless there is a hidden dangerous condition”].) Plaintiffs’ theory is not that the absence of the sign alone created the dangerous condition, but that the missing sign was one part of the dangerous condition of the narrowing shoulder, guardrail, and wide shoulders leading to the accident site.

Indemnity

City seeks summary judgment as to Willis’s cross-complaint for indemnity on grounds it is not liable to Plaintiffs. As questions of disputed fact exist concerning potential liability to Plaintiffs, this argument fails.

VI. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT4B@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.

[1] City also argues Plaintiffs’ allegations have no merit in light of Vehicle Code section 21200, which provides that every person riding a bicycle on a highway has all the rights and is subject to all the provisions applicable to the drivers of vehicles. Defendant contends a bicyclist riding on the highway is exposed to vehicular traffic regardless of how close or far from the edge he is riding and Willis had a statutory duty to drive with caution and circumspection.

This might be an argument about the other parties’ contributory negligence, but it is not clear how it defeats a claim of the existence of a dangerous condition. A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even when the immediate cause of a plaintiff’s injury is a third party’s negligent or illegal act (such as a motorist’s negligent driving), if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality. (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 152.) Section 835 does not require the plaintiff to show that the allegedly dangerous condition caused the third party conduct that precipitated the accident. (Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1106.) Therefore, negligence by Willis does not relieve the City of liability for a dangerous condition if it exposed Decedent to increased danger.

[2] Plaintiffs cite to De La Rosa v. City of San Bernardino (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 739, where the plaintiff’s case was based on the theory that the maintenance of a stop sign in such a position that its visibility was obscured constituted a dangerous condition. There, the court found the stop sign and its placement were not part of the city’s approved plan for construction and therefore, design immunity did not apply. (Id. at p. 748.) The “Road Narrows” sign here was part of City’s approved plan, as acknowledged by both parties.