Case Number: BC506143 Hearing Date: April 17, 2014 Dept: 1

#2 – JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Inglewood Woman’s Club, et al. – BC 506 143

The court heard arguments from the Cross-Complainants in this case on February 20, 2014, at that time noting that both this matter and case BS 141 211 were related before Judge Ernest Hiroshige. The Cross-Complainants – once again acting without counsel – now belatedly move the court to reconsider its denial of their original irregular motion to relate cases BC 506 143 and BS 141 211 before Judge Deirdre Hill in Department 49 and invalidate all of Judge Hiroshige’s rulings. Their motion for reconsideration is opposed by Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Bescheinen (Bescheinen), who is joined by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank. The opposition highlights the untimeliness of this motion under CCP § 1008(a) and the lack of “new or different facts” on which the court would be justified in reconsidering its prior decision. It also requests that this court issue an Order to Show Cause (OSC) re Sanctions pursuant to CCP § 1008(d), so that Bescheinen might recover the $2,125.00 in attorney fees she anticipates incurring as a result of the Cross-Complainants’ motion.

In this regard, when an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within ten (10) days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. CCP § 1008(a). Such a motion for reconsideration may only be brought if the party moving for reconsideration can offer “new or different facts, circumstances, or law” which it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the time of the prior motion. CCP § 1008(a); Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690. Thus, a motion for reconsideration will be denied absent a strong showing of diligence. Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at 690.

The reconsideration motion of the Cross-Complainants is plainly untimely, given its March 18, 2014 filing and service date. The motion also does not offer “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” Rather, it simply parses the language of the court’s February 20, 2014 tentative ruling, using that language as a springboard from which to argue the merits of the Cross-Complainants’ case and draw attention to perceived inconsistencies in the rulings of the various judges that have presided over this matter. The motion, therefore, does not satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements of CCP § 1008(a).

The motion may, however, fall within the scope of CCP § 1008(d) as a possible violation of the statute and, thus, sanctionable in the court’s discretion, under CCP § 128.7. People v. Silva (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 538, 554 – 555 (Ordinarily a court will refuse to consider repeated motions supported by substantially the same showing as the one denied, although it is not obligated to do so. A trial court has discretion when it comes to reconsidering a renewal motion and imposing contempt sanctions for noncompliance with CCP § 1008.). If so, the text of CCP § 128.7 clearly gives an attorney 21 days to correct a pleading otherwise sanctionable under the statute, and that 21 days plainly runs from the service of the opposing party’s CCP § 128.7(c)(1) motion or the CCP § 128.7(c)(2) OSC threatening the sanctions. See CCP § 128.7(c)(1); Interstate Specialty Marketing, Inc. v. ICRA Sapphire, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 708, 710 – 711. The text also forbids that sanctions be payable to an opposing party when the court sets the OSC on its own motion. See CCP §§ 128.7(d), 128.7(d)(2); See also Interstate Specialty Marketing, Inc., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 711. Consequently, the sanctions sought by Bescheinen would neither be automatic nor payable to her and, for this reason, the court finds no practical reason to issue a CCP § 128.7(c)(2) OSC re sanctions.

The court is concerned, nonetheless, that the Cross-Complainants persist – despite repeated warnings – in jointly litigating their claims and appearing on behalf of the corporate entity, the Inglewood Woman’s Club. Again, a corporation like the Club cannot represent itself in court, either in propria persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney. Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729. The Cross-Complainants are essentially holding themselves out to be attorneys by appearing on behalf of each other and the Inglewood Woman’s Club.

Accordingly, this motion is DENIED, and the court advises the Cross-Complainants that it intends to report their conduct to the California State Bar.