Case Name: Aria Hematian v. Claudia Castro, et al.
Case No.: 18CV338234

This matter arises from a dispute over ownership of real property. The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Aria Hematian (“Plaintiff”) states six causes of action against Defendants Claudia Castro (“Castro”) and Hassan Abpikar (“Abpikar”): 1) Imposition of Constructive Trust; 2) Declaratory Relief; 3) Fraud/Deceit; 4) Quiet Title; 5) Partition by Sale, and; 6) Injunctive Relief. On February 6, 2019 the Court ordered this case consolidated with an unlawful detainer action (case no. 18CV337024) between the same parties, but brought by Defendant Abpikar against Plaintiff. In that unlawful detainer action, Defendant Abpikar was represented by attorney Daniel T. Paris until Mr. Paris’s motion to be relieved as counsel was granted by the Court in the unlawful detainer action (Hon. Overton) on January 31, 2019, before the action was consolidated with this one. On May 2, 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant Abpikar to provide responses to written discovery, to have Plaintiff’s request for admissions, set one, be deemed admitted by Defendant Abpikar, and to impose monetary sanctions on Defendant Abpikar.

Currently before the Court is a “motion to strike” interrogatory answers brought by Defendant Abpikar, who has been representing himself in pro per in this action from its inception. Without citing any statutory authority Defendant Abpikar moves the Court ‘[t]o strike down the answers to any and all interrogatory questions from the record for the above entitled case, due to Abpikar’s ex-attorney Daniel T. Paris was not an ‘attorney of record’ at the time he was getting the answers to the interrog[atories] . . .” (Notice of Motion and Motion at p. 1:31-34.) Again, in this action as opposed to the unlawful detainer action, Defendant Abpikar has always been self-represented and was never represented by Mr. Paris.

The Court concludes that Defendant Abpikar’s motion can only be reasonably interpreted as a defective motion to strike bought under code of civil procedure (“CCP”) §§435 & 436. Under CCP §436, the Court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted into any pleading or strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. (CCP §437(a).)

Defendant Abpikar’s “motion to strike” is defective on its face and must be DENIED. This is simply not a valid motion under California law. Pursuant to CCP §435, a motion to strike may only be brought against a “pleading,” defined in CCP §435(a) as a “demurrer, answer, complaint or cross-complaint.” The term “answer” as used in CCP §435(a) means the pleading filed in response to a complaint or cross-complaint, not answers to written discovery. The Court notes that Defendant Abpikar’s answer was filed on January 25, 2019.

Defendant Abpikar is not entitled to any special treatment because he is representing himself. “[W]hen a litigant is appearing in appearing in propia persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. Further, the in propia persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267. See also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [“A doctrine requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.”])

The Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer or motion to strike. Accordingly, the Court has not considered either of the two declarations submitted by Defendant Abpikar or the declaration from Plaintiff’s Counsel Steven Hoffman. The request for judicial notice included with Defendant Abpikar’s May 20, 2019 declaration, seeking judicial notice of two emailed communications is DENIED. First and foremost, a precondition to judicial notice in either it’s permissive or mandatory form is that the matter to be noticed be relevant to the material issue before the Court. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307, citing People v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2.) The emails are not relevant to the issue of whether Defendant’s “motion to strike” is a valid motion. Second, private communications between individuals are rarely if ever a proper subject of judicial notice.

Plaintiff’s request, in the opposition, for monetary sanctions on the basis that this motion is “discovery abuse” is DENIED. This is not a discovery motion, nor could it reasonably have taken Plaintiff a substantial amount of time to oppose a facially invalid motion.