Case Number: BC688913 Hearing Date: June 03, 2019 Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

MARIA VICTORIA WHITFIELD,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

MARC SEAN LAPSLEY, SR., et al.

Defendant(s).

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Case No.: BC688913

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Dept. 3

1:30 p.m.

June 3, 2019

Background Facts

Plaintiff, Maria Victoria Whitfield filed this action against Defendants, Marc Sean Lapsley, Sr. and Perris Valley Auto Center, Inc. for damages arising out of an automobile accident.

Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend her complaint. She seeks leave to add a prayer for punitive damages and related allegations against Defendant, Kia Perris. She contends punitive damages are appropriate because Defendant, at the time it sold the car involved in the automobile accident that forms the basis of this action to Lapsley, knew (a) Lapsley did not have a valid CA driver’s license, (b) Lapsley had a history of drinking and driving and other driving offenses, and (c) Defendant knew Lapsley did not have insurance, and provided its own insurance, which covered the vehicle only and not damage to other persons injured by Lapsley.

Defendant argues the motion should be granted because the proposed allegations do not state a claim for punitive damages. Defendant also notes that, during discovery, it has become apparent that Defendant has a policy of not selling vehicles to persons without licenses and with a history of driving under the influence violations, and this sale was a one-time mistake.

Standard for Leave to Amend

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading. (CCP §§473 and 576.) Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties and, therefore, leave to amend is generally liberally granted. Ordinarily, the court will not consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave since grounds for a demurrer or motion to strike are premature. However, the court does have discretion to deny leave to amend where a proposed amendment fails to state a valid cause of action as a matter of law and the defect cannot be cured by further amendment. (California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281.)

The application for leave to amend should be made as soon as the need to amend is discovered. The closer the trial date, the stronger the showing required for leave to amend. If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the Court has the discretion to deny leave to amend. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation such as an increased burden of discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.)

Analysis

Civil Code §3294(c)(1) defines “malice” as conduct “intended by the defendant to cause injury to plaintiff, or despicable conduct that is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” Of note, Plaintiff’s opposition leaves the word “despicable” out of the second half of the definition, and argues solely that Defendant’s conduct was done with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others; standing alone, this is not sufficient. Under the statute permitting punitive damages against a defendant, “malice,” if there is no intent to injure plaintiff, requires more than “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiff’s interests; ¿the additional component of “despicable conduct” must be found. College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704.

Of note, “malice” as a basis for an award of punitive damages implies an act conceived in a spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference toward the obligations owed to others, and there must be intent to vex, annoy or injure; mere spite or ill will or negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient. Gombos v. Ashe (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 517.

At its core, the proposed amended complaint alleges Defendant negligently and improperly sold a car to a person (Lapsley) who later was involved in an automobile accident with Plaintiff. Of note, while the complaint alleges Lapsley had a history of driving under the influence and related violations, there is no allegation that he was under the influence at the time of the accident; the sole allegation is that Lapsley was driving over the speed limit when the accident occurred. This does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of “malice” as defined above. Because it does not appear further amendment would cure the deficiencies, the motion for leave to amend is denied.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.