Case Name: Richard B. Beauchesne v. Bradford Baugh
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-287472

This action arises from a dispute between plaintiff Richard B. Beauchesne (“Plaintiff”) and his former attorney defendant Bradford Baugh (“Defendant”) over Defendant’s provision of legal services. The parties have a discovery dispute. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order and Defendant’s motion to compel Plaintiff to provide further responses to discovery requests.

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he is entitled to a protective order. First, he does not clearly and consistently identify the nature and scope of the protective order he seeks. In the caption of his combined notice and motion, he states he seeks an order limiting the scope of discovery, restricting the extent or use of a discovery method, and appointing a discovery referee. Yet, in the body of this same document he states “by way of an example only and without limitation” that he seeks to limit the number of interrogatories he must respond to. (Not. at p. 1:26–27.) These statements are insufficient to give the Court and Defendant notice of the precise relief he seeks. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1112(d) [required elements of motion], 3.1345(d) [requirements for discovery motions].) Next, Plaintiff does not cure this deficiency in his supporting memorandum of points and authorities. His memorandum is deficient because it consists of two block quotations from the Code of Civil Procedure and is completely devoid of any explanation or legal analysis. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(b) [required contents of memorandum].) Finally, it is not otherwise apparent Plaintiff is entitled to any relief from his declaration as it contains seemingly unrelated grievances and does not set forth facts from which the Court can independently conclude a protective order is necessary and the nature of the remedy that should be used. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff to provide further responses to: (1) requests for admissions, set one (“RFA”), Nos. 1–12; (2) special interrogatories, set one (“SI”), Nos. 1–93; (3) requests for production of documents, set one (“RPD”), Nos. 1–8; and (4) Form Interrogatories (“FI”) Nos. 1.1, 2.1–2.2, 2.5–2.8, 2.12, 9.1–9.2, 12.1–12.2, 12.3–12.4, 12.6, 13.2, 14.1–14.2, 17.1, and 50.1–50.6. Defendant served Plaintiff with these requests in December 2018, along with a declaration for additional discovery, and gave him several extensions of the deadline to respond. On March 8, 2019, Plaintiff served identical objections directed—not to individual requests—but to each set as a whole.

Defendant attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff, although the parties apparently could not come to an agreement on the means and location for a discussion. Plaintiff wanted to meet in person, while Defendant wanted to correspond in writing to ensure he had a written record of their discussions in light of past interactions. At an impasse and believing further discussions to be futile, Defendant filed the present motion to compel and seeks to recover the attorney’s fees incurred in preparing the motion. Plaintiff filed an opposition that does not address the substantive issues before the Court and consists entirely of conclusory assertions as follows: (1) Defendant rejected his offers to meet and confer; and (2) his motion for protective order must be ruled on first.

A party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories, inspection demands, and requests for admissions if the responses received are not code-compliant. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, 2031.310, 2033.290.) “While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) The same is true with respect to requests for admissions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290.) But, when moving to compel further responses to inspection demands, the moving party must first make a threshold showing of good cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To do so, the moving party must make a fact-specific showing of relevance for the discovery sought. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) The burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to justify the objections and responses provided. (Ibid.)

Although Defendant does not explicitly address good cause in his memorandum of points and authorities, he does ultimately identify facts and allegations showing there is good cause in his separate statement. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to justify his responses to the RPD at issue along with his responses to the FI, SI, and RFA (which he bears the burden of justifying in the first instance).

Plaintiff’s responses are not code-compliant and he does not articulate any reason for reaching a contrary conclusion. First, he improperly provided vague objections to each set of requests as a whole rather than responding to each, individual request. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.210, 2031.210, 2033.210.) Second, he neither stated his objections with the level of clarity and specificity required nor stated a complete substantive response in the manner required for each type of discovery request. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.210–2030.240, 2031.210–2031.240, 2033.210–2033.230.) In opposition, he does not address these deficiencies in form or substance or attempt to justify his objections. Given Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order was not of the same scope as Defendant’s motion to compel further responses and was devoid of substance, it does not excuse him from defending his objections in opposition or from providing code-compliant responses as a general matter.

For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide further, verified, code-compliant responses to each of the requests at issue—without objections—within 20 calendar days of the Court’s order. To be clear, Plaintiff must provide further responses to RFA Nos. 1–12, SI Nos. 1–93, RPD Nos. 1–8, and FI Nos. 1.1, 2.1–2.2, 2.5–2.8, 2.12, 9.1–9.2, 12.1–12.2, 12.3–12.4, 12.6, 13.2, 14.1–14.2, 17.1, and 50.1–50.6.

A court shall impose a monetary sanction against a party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further responses to discovery requests unless the court finds the opposing party was substantially justified or other circumstances would make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h), 2033.290, subd. (d).) Here, Plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed the motion without substantial justification because there were significant problems with his responses and he did not attempt to justify them in either his opposition to Defendant’s motion or his own motion for a protective order.

With that said, it would be unjust to impose a monetary sanction against Plaintiff, notwithstanding his own improper conduct, if Defendant failed to meet and confer in good faith. In an initial meet and confer letter, Defendant’s counsel stated: “I am assuming that any attempt to meet and confer will be pointless, and we will need to file a motion to compel. Please advise immediately if I am incorrect.” (MacLeod Decl., Ex. J.) The exasperation of Defendant’s counsel as reflected in the parties’ correspondence is unsurprising in light of the course of discovery and litigation history in this case. But the statement above is inflammatory and cannot reasonably be characterized as a genuine invitation to attempt to informally resolve the discovery dispute. The Court expects counsel to rise to the occasion and does not condone the devolution of meet-and-confer discussions into bickering irrespective of who qualifies as the initial transgressor. (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293–94.) And, while a party need not proceed past the point of futility once discussions have begun, a party is not excused from initiating such discussions in good faith. (See ibid.) Despite this harsh startup, Defendant’s counsel did persist in engaging with Plaintiff to try to informally resolve the dispute. The Court finds Defendant’s counsel credibly and reasonably feared he and his staff would be subject to harmful and unprofessional behavior based on past experiences engaging with Plaintiff in person and over the phone. (MacLeod Decl., ¶ 24.) In light of this finding and given the nature of the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s responses to the discovery at issue, counsel’s request to exchange written correspondence was not unreasonable.

Plaintiff’s refusal to do so was. Based on the totality of these circumstances, the Court does not find Defendant failed to engage in good faith meet-and-confer efforts such that the imposition of a sanction against Plaintiff would be unjust.

Defendant requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $8,050 for the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in preparing the motion. Defendant’s counsel states he spent “in excess of 20 hours” preparing the motion, bills $250 per hour, and believes $400 per hour is a reasonable rate. (MacLeod Decl., ¶ 27.) The Court does not find the amount requested—inclusive of the rate of $400 and time spent—is reasonable under the circumstances and based on the evidence presented. Most significantly, Defendant was not required to address the sufficiency of individual responses to each discovery request. The Court finds Defendant may recover reasonable expenses of $2,500. Consequently, Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall pay Defendant, through his counsel, $2,500 within 20 calendar days of the Court’s order.