Case Number: BC689702 Hearing Date: August 20, 2019 Dept: 4B
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
On January 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants for negligence and strict liability for injuries resulting from a dog bite. On May 15, 2019, Defendants Any Agopian and Madeleine Terzian filed this motion for determination of good faith settlement.
“A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(c).) “[T]he intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of the settlement.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)
Additionally, “the trial court’s good faith determination must take into account the settling tortfeasor’s potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as then settling tortfeasor’s potential liability to the plaintiff.” (Far West Financial Corp. v. D&S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 816, fn. 16.) “If section 877.6 is to serve the ends of justice, it must prevent a party from purchasing protection from its indemnification obligation at bargain-basement prices.” (Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 865, 876.) “[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Torres v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 499, 509.) As long as the settlement is not so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to the above factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6, the settlement shall be determined as being made in good faith. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)
When a motion for determination of good faith settlement is contested, the moving party must provide the court with declarations or other evidence demonstrating the facts necessary to evaluate the settlement in terms of the Tech-Bilt factors. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) After an initial showing by the moving party, the burden of proof then shifts to the nonsettling defendant to demonstrate the settlement lacks good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(d); Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 895.)
Under the settlement, Plaintiff will provide a full release of claims against Defendants in exchange for $79,000 to be paid by Defendants’ insurance carrier. Plaintiff’s pre-mediation demand was $125,000, thus $79,000 is within the ballpark of Plaintiff’s desired recovery against Defendants. Defendants’ insurance policy limit is $1,000,000.00 during the relevant time frame. Further, the dog that attacked Plaintiff belonged to and was within the control of the co-defendants. Thus the settlement may exceeds Defendants’ proportionate liability. Defendants state they made an informed decision to settle to avoid further litigation costs. No opposition or motion to challenge the settlement has been filed.
Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED. The Court finds this settlement was made in good faith and any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor is barred from asserting further claims against Defendants for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
Moving party to give notice.