Filed 9/16/19 Rodriguez v. Sneden CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PRISCILLA RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONNIE SNEDEN, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D074561

(Super. Ct. No. 18FDV01515C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Rachel Cano, Judge. Affirmed.

Ronnie Sneden, Jr., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Priscilla Rodriguez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Ronnie Sneden, Jr., appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (Order) issued at the request of his former spouse Priscilla Rodriguez. Sneden’s arguments on appeal are based on what Rodriguez alleged in her written request for the restraining order. However, by not providing an adequate record on appeal from which we can determine the evidence that was presented or what was said at the hearing at which the family court issued the Order, Sneden has not met his burden of establishing error. Accordingly, we will affirm the Order.

I.

BURDENS ON APPEAL

” ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; accord, Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).) As the appellant, Sneden has the burden of establishing reversible error. (Jameson, at p. 609; Denham, at p. 566; Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 419, fn. 2 (Gonzalez) [domestic violence restraining order].)

“It is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment [or order] has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) ” ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ‘ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) As particularly applicable in the present appeal, Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973 (Fain) instructs: “Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment [or order] must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Id. at p. 992, italics added & deleted.) Very simply, ” ‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson, at p. 609.)

Sneden and Rodriguez represented themselves in the family court and are representing themselves in this appeal. In both courts, the procedural rules apply the same to self-represented parties as to parties represented by counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210 [“a party appearing in propria persona . . . is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys”].)

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rodriguez initiated the underlying proceedings in April 2018 by filing a request for a domestic violence restraining order. In principal part, she sought a stay-away order and a personal conduct order for her benefit and the benefit of her husband; her 11-year-old son, A. V.; her 10-year-old stepdaughter, J. R.; her eight-year-old son, A. S.; and her seven-year-old stepson, Jo. R. In addition, Rodriguez requested changes to existing orders for custody, visitation, and child support related to the eight-year-old child, A. S., whom she and Sneden are coparenting.

In support of her request, Rodriguez submitted a declaration that sets forth evidence of an incident on April 6, 2018, in which Rodriguez testified that Sneden abused her during a visitation exchange of A. S. Rodriguez’s request contains her additional declaration testimony with regard to prior abuse, including evidence of a temporary restraining order that she obtained against Sneden in January 2017 and evidence of threats Sneden made to her with a shotgun in 2011. Finally, the request also contains Rodriguez’s declaration testimony that Sneden had threated Rodriguez’s husband, son (A. V.), and stepdaughter (J. R.)—without any dates or details.

As part of her request, Rodriguez also asked for a change in the existing orders of custody and visitation for A. S.

On the date of the filing of the request in early April 2018, the family court granted Rodriguez temporary relief. In principal part, the court issued personal conduct orders and stay-away orders for the benefit of Rodriguez and the four children (A. V., J. R., A. S., and Jo. R.) and custody and visitation orders for the child of the parties (A. S.).

On April 23, 2018, the family court held a hearing on Rodriguez’s request. The family court’s minutes indicate that, based on Sneden’s request for a continuance “so that he may obtain counsel,” the matter was continued until May 21, 2018. The minutes also indicate that Rodriguez’s request was “partly granted, child custody and visitation granted”; but there is no explanation as to any specifics.

Sneden did not file any written opposition to Rodriguez’s request.

Chronologically, the minutes of the family court from the continued hearing on May 21, 2018, are the next item in the clerk’s transcript. In what will become outcome determinative in this appeal, the minutes indicate that Rodriguez “testifie[d] on her own behalf in support of her request for a restraining order”; Sneden “testifie[d] on his own behalf in opposition to [Rodriguez’s] request for a restraining order”; and Rodriguez “further testifie[d] on her own behalf in response to [Sneden’s] testimony.” The family court then inquired about custody and visitation, and Rodriguez and Sneden each answered under oath. In addition to other entries, the minutes indicate that the family court granted Rodriguez a one-year restraining order based on the court’s finding of “sufficient and credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred or is likely to reoccur.”

Consistent with the minutes, the family court filed a Restraining Order After Hearing (Order of Protection) (previously identified as the Order). In part, the Order contains a stay-away order and a personal conduct order, protecting Rodriguez, A. V., and J. R. from Sneden. In part, the Order also includes a Child Custody and Visitation Order as to A. S., the terms of which are irrelevant to this appeal. The Order expired on May 21, 2019.

Sneden timely appealed from the Order.

III. DISCUSSION

We review a trial court’s order issuing a domestic violence restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Gonzalez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) ” ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.)

Thus, in determining whether the family court abused its discretion in issuing the Order, we must consider all of the facts that were before the trial court. Here, however, as we explained ante, without a reporter’s transcript, we “presume[] that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992, italics added.) Indeed, without a complete reporter’s transcript, we presume the court heard testimony both that supported Rodriguez’s claims and that defeated any defense Sneden may have presented. Stated differently, because the record presented by Sneden is ” ‘ “inadequate for meaningful review,” ‘ ” Sneden did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error, ” ‘ “and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ‘ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)

We recognize and appreciate that Sneden’s underlying entitlement to custody and visitation is serious and important—not only to Sneden, but also to A. S. However, so too is the Order (based on evidence of domestic violence) and the protection it affords—not only to Rodriguez, but also to her family, including A. S. As an appellate court, we have not seen the witnesses, heard the testimony, or reviewed the exhibits (if any) that were presented to the trial court—i.e., the evidence upon which the Order is based. By not providing this information to us, Sneden has precluded meaningful appellate review of the Order.

DISPOSITION

The Order—i.e., the Restraining Order After Hearing (Order of Protection), which includes a Child Custody and Visitation Order, filed May 21, 2018—is affirmed. Rodriguez is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.