2017-00208300-CU-MM

Kevin L. Vaughn, Sr. vs. Vibra Hospital of Sacramento, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

Filed By: Foley, Scott

Defendants Dheeraj Kamra, M.D., Nathaniel Gordon, M.D., and Ravi Chinthakini, M.D. (together, “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED.

The Complaint in this case stems from the care and treatment rendered to Deirdre Vaughn (“Ms. Vaughn”) in November 2015 at Vibra Hospital. Ms. Vaughn was transferred to Vibra for continued management of her IV antibiotics, wound VAC,, hemodialysis, physical therapy, and occupational therapy, after treatment for methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), and prosthetic valve endocarditis at Sutter Medical Center Sacramento in September and October 2015. (Def. Ex. A at p. 32.).

Ms. Vaughn’s surviving spouse, Kevin Vaughn, Sr., and her adult children, Tashma Vaughn, Tamisha Vaughn, and Kevin Vaughn, Jr., (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants and others, alleging causes of action for medical malpractice and wrongful death. Plaintiff Kevin Vaughn, Sr. has also alleged a loss of consortium cause of action.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs cannot establish they breached the applicable standard of care.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the court engages in a three step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting C.C.P § 437c, subs. (p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v Advance, Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is only required to show that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, at 853-855.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, at 854-855 fn. 23; Addy v Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subs. (p); see, generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, at 843.)

In a medical negligence action, Plaintiff must establish: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence. (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 122.)

There is no dispute that in medical negligence cases expert testimony is the proper means to establish compliance vel non with applicable standard of care. (See, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305 [in medical malpractice cases “expert testimony is required to prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care unless the negligence is obvious to a layperson”] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted].)

Defendants have established by admissible evidence that their care and treatment of Ms. Vaughn was at all times reasonable and within the standard of care. (UMFs 52-58; Dr. Fleischman Decl. ¶¶ 95-102.) Defendants’ expert opines that the treatment provided by Defendants met the applicable standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical probability. (Ibid.)

Once the moving party meets the burden of production, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Here, the evidence is sufficient to shift to Plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

To rebut Defendants’ showing by their experts, Plaintiffs were required to submit evidence of a prima facie case of medical malpractice in the form of expert witness testimony to prove a breach of the standard of care by the health care professional and that the breach of the standard of care was the cause of the patient’s injury, and this must be established by testimony from a competent medical expert. (See Alef v. Alta Bates Hospital (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 208, 216.) Given that Defendants supported the motion with expert declarations that the care and treatment they provided to Ms. Vaughn met the applicable standard of care and did not cause or contribute to Ms. Vaughn’s injuries, they are “entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1989)

215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.) The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony. (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.) In other words, once the moving party meets this burden of production, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 849; Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Such opposition generally must be established by testimony from a competent medical expert. (See Alef, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at 216.)

Having failed to oppose the motion, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden. Defendants are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, as the undisputed evidence establishes Defendants’ care and treatment met the applicable standard of care, the loss of consortium claim and wrongful death causes of action must also be dismissed.

The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. As the motion for summary judgment is granted, the motion for summary adjudication is denied as moot.

Defendants’ counsel shall submit an order and judgment of dismissal pursuant to CRC 3.1312 and CCP § 437c.