Case Number: 18NWCV00007 Hearing Date: September 24, 2019 Dept: SEC

GARDNER v. CERRITOS COLLEGE HOSPITAL

CASE NO.: 18NWCV00007

HEARING: 9/24/19

JUDGE: MARGARET M. BERNAL

#1

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant Cerritos College Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues is GRANTED.

Moving Party to give NOTICE.

Defendant College Hospital Cerritos (“Hospital”) moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, pursuant to CCP § 437c.

Defendant’s objection to Statement of Answers is sustained.

A defendant moving for summary judgment/adjudication has met its burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).)

On 10/10/18, Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging a single cause of action for False Imprisonment. The Complaint alleges that on 11/17/17, Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned, and made to stay at the Hospital for 20 days until 12/6/17 on a “5150 hold.”

The elements for a cause of action for False Imprisonment are: 1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person; 2) without lawful privilege; and 3) for appreciable period. (Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exch. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888; Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496.)

Immunity

Involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California is governed by the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (“LPS Act”). Under the LPS Act a designated facility, like HOSPITAL, may detain an individual for up to 72 hours for evaluation and treatment if there is “probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.” (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150.) It was designed for the prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders…”[t]o guarantee and protect public safety, [and to] safeguard individual rights through judicial review.” (People v. Triplett (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 283, 286, citing Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5001.) The LPS Act also provides for “escalating periods of involuntary confinement for persons described in the Act in approved psychiatric facilities within the county of detention…” (Id.)

The LPS Act is “a comprehensive scheme designed to address a variety of circumstances in which a member of the general population may have to be evaluated or treated for different lengths of time. (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150 [short-term emergency evaluation]; § 5250 [intensive 14-day treatment]; § 5300 [180-day commitment for the imminently dangerous]; §5260 [extended commitment for the suicidal]; § 5350 [30-day temporary conservatorship or one-year conservatorship for the gravely disabled].” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.)

The present case involves Plaintiff being placed on a Section 5150 hold, which was extended to a Section 5250 hold.

Welf. & Inst. Code 5278 provides that an individual authorized to detain a person pursuant to sections 5150 and/or 5250 “shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for exercising this authority in accordance with the law.” While section 5278 provides immunity for “individuals,” California courts have applied this immunity to entities that are not “natural persons.” (See Heater v. Southwood Psychiatric Center (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1068 – psychiatric center; Cruze v. National Psychiatric Services, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 48-56 – “we construe the statutory use of the word here as including within its plain meaning individual entities such as Hospitals and clinics.”) “[S]ection 5278 means precisely what it says it means, and that civil liability… for false imprisonment… is precluded insofar as the detention is ‘in accordance with the law.’” (Heater, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 1068; Bias v. Moynihan (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 1212, 1221.)

In determining whether Defendant Hospital’s actions were “in accordance with the law,” this court must examine whether Hospital complied with the procedures delineated in the LPS Act. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150 provides:

When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of an evaluation facility designated by the county, designated members of a mobile crisis team provided by Section 5651.7, or other professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Social Services as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5250 provides:

If a person is detained for 72 hours under the provision of Article 1 (commencing with Section 5150), or under court order for evaluation pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 5200) or Article 3 (commencing with Section 5225) and has received an evaluation, he or she may be certified for not more than 14 days of intensive treatment related to the mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism…”

After a determination has been made that involuntary admission to the facility is appropriate, an individual must receive “an evaluation as soon as possible…and shall receive whatever treatment and care his or her condition requires for the full period (up to and including 72 hours) that he or she is held.” (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5152(a).) The detained individual has “the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication.” (Id., § 5325.2.) The appropriate officers or medical professionals must also inform the individual of the reasons for his or her detention and treatment, and such must be recorded with the patient’s medical record upon admission. (Id., § 5157.) An individual may be detained for longer than 72 hours only when he or she is again evaluated by the professional staff of a facility, and the evaluating officer makes a determination that the individual is “a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.” (Id., § 5250(a).)

“The person delivering the copy of the notice of certification to the person certified shall, at the time of delivery, inform the person certified that he or she is entitled to a certification review hearing, to be held within four days of the date on which the person is certified for a period of intensive treatment in accordance with Section 5256 unless judicial review is requested, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to detain the person for intensive treatment related to the mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism. The person certified shall be informed of his or her rights with respect to the hearing, including the right to the assistance of another person to prepare for the hearing or to answer other questions and concerns regarding his or her involuntary detention or both.” (Welf. & Inst. Code 5254.)

“The person delivering the copy of the notice of certification to the person certified shall, at the time of delivery, inform the person certified of his or her legal right to a judicial review by habeas corpus, and shall explain that term to the person certified, and inform the person of his or her right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel pursuant to Section 5276.” (Welf. & Inst. Code 5254.1.)

“When a person is certified for intensive treatment pursuant to Sections 5250 and 5270.15, a certification review hearing shall be held unless judicial review has been requested as provided in Sections 5275 and 5276. The certification review hearing shall be within four days of the date on which the person is certified for a period of intensive treatment unless postponed by request of the person or his or her attorney or advocate. Hearings may be postponed for 48 hours or, in counties with a population of 100,000 or less, until the next regularly scheduled hearing date.” (Welf. & Inst. Code 5256.)

Hospital contends that Gardner’s 5150 and 5250 holds were applied properly, with sufficient probable cause, and in accordance with the law. Hospital submits the following evidence:

· Plaintiff had already been placed on a § 5150 hold by the time he was transferred to Hospital being deemed a “gravely disabled adult” by Alisa Kim at the Fountain Valley Regional Hospital Medical Center by the time he was transferred to Hospital on 11/17/17. (Defense Separate Statement (DSS) 3A.)

· Hospital staff notified Plaintiff that he was being admitted under a 5150 hold, and that the 72-hour period commenced on 11/17/17 at 1138 and was to terminate on 11/20/17 at 1138. (DSS 4A.)

· Hospital had sufficient evidence that Plaintiff warranted an evaluation as a “gravely disabled adult.” (DSS 5A.)

· On 11/19/17, Plaintiff was placed on a 14-day hold by Dr. Gadson Johnson thereby permitting Hospital to continue to detain Plaintiff. (DSS 6A.)

· Hospital timely scheduled a probable cause hearing for 11/22/17, but Plaintiff chose to bypass the hearing. (DSS 7A.)

· Hospital staff caused a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to be filed with the mental health court thereby permitting Plaintiff to be able to challenge the 14-day hold in court. (DSS 8A.)

· A recertification was issued on 11/21/17. (DSS 9A.)

· On 11/27/17, the Writ hearing was held with Plaintiff in attendance wherein the 14-day hold was upheld by the Court, thus permitting Hospital to continue to detain Plaintiff. (DSS 10A.)

· On 12/2/17, Plaintiff was notified in writing that he was to be held for an additional 30 days for treatment, and that a probable cause hearing was set for 12/6/17. Upon order of the Court Plaintiff was discharged from HOSPITAL. (DSS 11A.)

Plaintiff was admitted on a 5150 (72-hour) hold, which was to terminate on 11/20/17. (DSS 4A.) Plaintiff was provided with an Involuntary Patient Advisement notifying him of the 5150 hold. (Garrick Decl., 4:6-8.) On 11/17/17, an evaluation was “attempted” by Dr. Oliver Mason, but Plaintiff refused to be examined. (Id. at 4:2-3.) On 11/17/17 and 11/18/17, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Hiruy Gessesse, who diagnosed Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. (Id. at 5:23.)

On 11/19/17, Plaintiff was placed on a 5250 (14-day) hold by Dr. Gadson Johnson thereby permitting the Hospital to continue to detain Plaintiff. (DSS 6A.) On 11/20/17, Dr. Manolito Fidel assessed Plaintiff with schizophrenic chronic paranoid type. (Garrick Decl., 6:24.) The Hospital timely scheduled a probable cause hearing for 11/22/17, but Plaintiff chose to bypass the hearing. (DSS 7A.) Hospital staff helped Plaintiff file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the mental health court thereby permitting Plaintiff to be able to challenge the 14-day hold in court. (DSS 8A.) A recertification was issued on 11/21/17. (DSS 9A.) On 11/27/17, the Writ hearing was held with Plaintiff in attendance wherein the 14-day hold was upheld by the Court, thus permitting Hospital to continue to detain Plaintiff. (DSS 10A.)

On 12/2/17, Plaintiff was notified in writing that he was to be held for an additional 30 days. (DSS 11A.) On 12/6/17, a probable cause hearing was held, and the court discharged Plaintiff from the Hospital on that day. (Id.)

The court finds Hospital complied with its duties and obligations under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Plaintiff’s medically involuntary admissions were based on a determination that Plaintiff was “a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.” (Welf. & Inst. Code 5250(a).) Upon admission on the 5150 hold, Plaintiff was immediately evaluated by medical personnel, and advised of his rights. Plaintiff was then advised that his stay was being extended on a 5250 (14-day hold). On 11/27/17, the Writ hearing was held with Plaintiff in attendance wherein the 14-day hold was upheld by the Court, thus permitting Hospital to continue to detain Plaintiff. (DSS 10A.)

On 12/2/17, Plaintiff was notified in writing that he was to be held for an additional 30 days for treatment, and that a probable cause hearing was set for 12/6/17. Upon order of the Court Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on that date. (DSS 11A.) The court finds that the probable cause hearing was timely set for within 4 days of the certification. Upon the final probable cause hearing, Plaintiff was discharged as ordered by the Court.

The court finds that Defendant has met its burden of production on summary judgment.

Plaintiff now bears the burden of producing evidence that would create triable issue.

The court initially notes that Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of CCP 437c(b)(3) and CRC 3.1350(c)(3) because Plaintiff’s Opposition does not contain a separate statement. It is unclear what particular facts are being disputed. Upon that basis alone, the motion may be properly granted.

The motion is also granted on the merits on the following additional grounds.

Plaintiff cites Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69 for the proposition that immunity does not apply. However, Jacobs involved an action for negligence for a fractured leg bone that occurred during the patient’s 5150 hold. Here, Plaintiff does not allege any negligence against Hospital. Therefore, Jacobs is distinguishable.

Plaintiff also cites Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 806 to support denial of immunity. However, Rodriguez does not deal with immunity under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Rodriguez is distinguishable.

Moreover, the standard of practice against which the acts of healthcare providers are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts and can be proven only by their testimony, unless the conduct required by particular circumstances is within the knowledge of laymen. (Osborn v. Irvin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234; Contreras v. St. Luke’s Hospital (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 919; Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229.) A declaration that affirmatively indicates the declarant’s knowledge and application of the standard of practice in the community of which the declaration addresses itself is competent, since of course a physician is entitled to give opinion testimony. (Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639.) In Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.3d 406, the Supreme Court held that expert evidence in a professional liability suit is conclusive as to the truth of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in that locality, and of the propriety of the particular conduct by the practitioner in the particular instances because such standard and skill are not in the matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony affidavit.

Here, the underlying decision to detain Plaintiff for involuntary treatment involves a medical assessment of Plaintiff’s medical condition. Hospital submits the declaration of Thomas Garrick, M.D. The court finds Garrick is a qualified expert. Garrick attests that the nursing staff and personnel at the hospital appropriately evaluated Plaintiff’s medical and psychiatric condition, providing Plaintiff with the appropriate assistance for his medical condition, and ensuring that Welf. & Inst. Code Sections 5150, 5151, 5157, and 5250 were complied with, and that the hospital staff and physicians had probable cause to find Gardner being a “gravely disabled adult” as a result of his diagnosis and clinical condition. (Garrick Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.) Garrick’s opinion is further supported by the observations of the staff and physicians involved. Alisa Kim, LCSW, deemed Plaintiff a “gravely disabled adult,” after he was found on a street in Costa Mesa, California, and taken to the Fountain Valley Regional Hospital Emergency Department. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was then transferred to Cerritos College Hospital because of unavailable beds at Fountain Valley Regional Hospital. (Id.) Plaintiff’s medical condition was also confirmed by Drs. Hiruy Gessesse, Manolito Fidel, and Gadson Johnson.

In opposition, Plaintiff Gardner states, “I do not believe this though and think that this ‘expert’ is clearly mistaken.” (Gardner Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s disagreement with the expert’s opinion is not supported by any contrary expert declaration, and is insufficient to create a triable issue as to Plaintiff’s medical diagnosis.

Plaintiff’s remaining declaration refers to acts that occurred during his stay at non-party Fountain Valley Regional Hospital, or citations to Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary. These attestations are irrelevant to this motion.

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED pursuant to the immunity provided in Welf. & Inst. Code 5278.