Case Name: Izabella and Alexandra Kipnis v. Helgah Yeff, et al.
Case No.: 18CV337737

This is a dispute over a $500,000 life insurance policy between Plaintiffs, the adult children of Decedent Gary Kipnis (“Decedent”) and Defendant Helgah Yeff (“Defendant”), Decedent’s fiancé at the time of his death. The dispute originally also included New York Life Insurance Company (“NY Life”) as a defendant. On March 11, 2019 the Court signed an order “Granting Motion to Deposit of Funds and for Dismissal.” Pursuant to that order, in exchange for NY Life depositing the full policy amount with the Court, NY Life “is discharged of all liability in connection with the Death Benefit and the Policy and all claims against NYLIC that could be asserted herein and/or in relation to the Death Benefit and/or the Policy shall be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice.”

Plaintiffs’ original and still operative Complaint was filed Nov. 5, 2018 and stated three causes of action: 1) Declaratory Judgment; 2) Prohibitory Injunction (against NY Life only), and; 3) Mandatory Injunction (against NY Life only). With NY Life removed from the case, there is effectively only one cause of action remaining, the first cause of action for declaratory judgment. Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment/adjudication of that sole remaining claim.

Request for Judicial Notice
A precondition to judicial notice in either its permissive or mandatory form is that the matter to be noticed be relevant to the material issue before the Court. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307, citing People v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422 fn. 2.)

In support of their motion Plaintiffs have submitted a request for judicial notice of three documents (presented as exhibits A, F & G in their packet of supporting evidence) pursuant to Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A is a copy of the marital dissolution judgment (case no. 6-11-FL-007154) between Decedent and Svetlana Kipnis with a copy of the Marital Settlement Agreement (which the parties refer to as the “MSA”) attached to it. These same documents are attached to the Complaint as exhibit A. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit F is a copy the Complaint in this action. Exhibit G is a copy of March 11, 2019 Order in this action that essentially ended NY Life’s involvement in the case.

While taking notice of the operative Complaint is unnecessary as it is already considered by the Court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, notice of all three documents is GRANTED pursuant to Evid. Code §452(d). Only the Court’s March 11, 2019 order and the marital dissolution judgment can be noticed as to their contents.

The portion of MSA that sets forth the life insurance requirement (on page 6) states in pertinent part as follows (brackets added):

“Life Insurance: The parties [Decedent and Svetlana] each agree to maintain the other as the primary beneficiary on a life insurance policy in an amount no less than $150,000.00 to secure any existing or potential child/spousal support obligations. The insured will be responsible for maintaining the policy and making any payments when come due. . . . In lieu of obtaining new insurance, either or both parties may satisfy this obligation by naming or maintaining the other as beneficiaries on their existing policies with New York Like Insurance Company . . . Husband shall have an obligation to maintain this insurance until the youngest child emancipates and there is no potential child support obligation remaining or 8/1/2019, whichever occurs later.”

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication of the first cause of action

The pleadings limit the issues presented for summary judgment or adjudication. (See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258; Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73 [“the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.”].) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (See CCP §437c(f)(1); McClasky v. California State Auto. Ass’n (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 975 [“If a cause of action is not shown to be barred in its entirety, no order for summary judgment—or adjudication—can be entered.”]; Palm Spring Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 288.) Summary adjudication of general “issues” or of facts is not permitted. (See Raghavan v. The Boeing Company (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1136.)

The moving party’s declarations and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate or disprove an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim “in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s (or opposing party’s) favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64, parentheses added.) While the same standards of admissibility govern both, the opposition declarations are liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) The evidence must be liberally construed in support of the opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of that party. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)

Where a plaintiff (or cross-complainant) seeks summary judgment, the burden is to produce admissible evidence on each element of a “cause of action” entitling him or her to judgment. (CCP §437c(p)(1); Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287, disapproved on other grounds in Aguilar; S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 383, 388.) This means that plaintiffs who bear the burden of proof at trial by a preponderance of evidence must produce evidence that would require a reasonable finder of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not. “Otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar, supra at p. 851; LLP Mortgage v. Bizar (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 773, 776 [burden is on plaintiff to persuade court there is no triable issue of material fact].)

“Summary judgment is appropriate in a declaratory relief action when only legal issues are presented for the court’s determination.” (California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Yolo (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 150, 185, emphasis added.) To qualify for declaratory relief under CCP §1060, a plaintiff is required to show two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief; and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.) “The ‘actual controversy’ language in … section 1060 encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.” (Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885.) It does not embrace controversies that are “conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court.” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.)

Whether a claim presents an “actual controversy” within the meaning of CCP §1060 is a question of law for the Court. (Environmental Defense, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) When an actual controversy does exist, CCP §1061 gives the trial court discretion to determine whether it is “necessary” and “proper” to exercise the power to provide declaratory relief. (CCP §1061.)

Plaintiffs seek “a declaratory judgment that they are entitled to all the death benefit proceeds from the Policy for which [Defendant] is the named beneficiary.” (Complaint at ¶4, brackets added.) The first cause of action more specifically alleges that a controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendant “concerning their respective rights and duties in that Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to the death benefit proceeds from the Policy in the amount of $500,000.00, whereas [Defendant] disputes this contention. [Defendant] contends that she is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the death benefit proceeds. Plaintiffs desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of Plaintiffs, [Defendant], and NY LIFE as to Plaintiffs’ interest in the death benefit proceeds from the Policy. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the death benefit proceeds from the Policy. Plaintiffs further contend that [Defendant] is entitled to none of the death benefit proceeds from the Policy.” (Complaint at ¶¶ 29-30, brackets added.)

Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED for failure to meet their initial burden. Plaintiffs have not established that they are entitled to the sought-after declaration or that only legal issues are presented for the Court’s determination.

Plaintiffs’ own evidence demonstrates that they have not established that they are entitled to the sought-after declaration. The MSA itself (submitted as part of Plaintiffs’ exhibit A and also attached to the Complaint presented as Plaintiffs’ exhibit F) makes clear that under its terms Plaintiffs could not have reasonably expected to receive more than $150,000 in total from Decedent’s life insurance as he was only required to establish a policy in “an amount no less than $150,000.00” for the sole purpose of securing future child and spousal support payments. While Plaintiffs were obviously intended beneficiaries of the MSA and the insurance policy it required (to the limited extent that the policy was only intended to secure, if necessary, child and spousal support payments), they would each receive more money (a 1/3 share of $500,000, or approximately $166,000 each) under the policy in existence at the time of Decedent’s death than they could claim to be entitled to under the MSA which only required a policy of “in an amount no less than $150,000” to pay out to Svetlana Kipnis, not Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have in no way established, or even clearly articulated, how they could be possibly be entitled to the entire $500,000 policy amount.

Furthermore, none of Plaintiffs’ evidence can be reasonably interpreted as supporting their argument that Decedent was somehow barred by the marital dissolution judgment or the MSA from naming anyone other than Svetlana Kipnis (or Defendant in particular) as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy, so long as “an amount no less than $150,000” was available for the express purpose of securing “any existing or potential child/spousal support obligations.”

Plaintiffs’ exhibit B (the August 11, 2017 letter from New York Life to Decedent confirming the changes in beneficiaries) and exhibit E (the purported “assignment” of rights under the New York Life policy dated November 4, 2018) together also present a triable issue of fact as to whether Svetlana Kipnis could assign any rights to Plaintiffs given that she had been removed as a beneficiary on the policy more than a year before the purported assignment was executed. This calls into question whether Plaintiffs even have standing to bring any claim based on the policy as the purported assignees of Svetlana Kipnis.

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