Filed 10/8/19 Marriage of Seth CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of AMITABH SETH and NEETI SETH.

H044876

(Santa Clara County

Super.Ct.No. 2014-6-FL-013782)

AMITABH SETH,

Appellant,

v.

NEETI SETH,

Respondent.

Respondent Neeti Seth (mother) filed a request for order (the request) seeking to enforce child support orders. She sought an order requiring appellant Amitabh Seth (father) to reimburse her for expenses totaling $10,615.27, and also requested an order that he pay mother attorney fees and costs of $30,000 as sanctions, pursuant to Family Code section 271, subdivision (a). Under that statute, the court is empowered to award attorney fees and costs for a party’s or an attorney’s “conduct [that] . . . frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” After a hearing on the request on March 30, 2017, the court ordered father to pay mother $30,000 in attorney fees and costs under section 271, subdivision (a).

Father on appeal challenges the postjudgment order imposing sanctions against him. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married in September 1996. They have two children. After the parties separated in November 2014, father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on December 23, 2014.

On June 5, 2015, a stipulation and order was filed which addressed child support issues. Under the stipulation and order, father was required to pay temporary child support of $2,642 per month, effective May 1, 2015. The stipulation and order also included a provision that “[t]he parties shall equally share in all costs associated with any mutually agreed upon extra-curricular activities for the child. All agreements must be in writing.”

A second stipulation and order concerning property division and support was filed May 16, 2016. In it the parties agreed, inter alia, that (1) mother would be awarded the family residence as her sole and separate property; (2) father would make a nontaxable equalization payment to mother of $119,128 by May 31, 2016; (3) all prior child support orders would remain in effect; (4) father would pay mother $50,000 by May 31, 2016, as a nontaxable buyout of spousal support; (5) the parties would each bear their respective attorney fees and costs through May 9, 2016; and (6) the parties through their agreement were resolving all issues that were anticipated to be addressed in the trial set for June 14, 2016, which was taken off calendar. The document also contained the following language: “The parties specifically agree that dance, piano, Kumon, tutoring of any kind, SAT and test preparation, and anything described as enrichment activity, shall be deemed a mutually agreed upon extracurricular activity. [Mother] shall provide notice to [father] of the costs of these expenditures.”

On August 23, 2016, a status-only judgment was filed in the case.

On January 31, 2017, mother filed a request for order seeking enforcement of child support orders and $30,000 attorney fees and costs. She requested that father reimburse her for his share of unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurricular expenses in the amount of $10,615.27. The details of mother’s request, which was accompanied by supporting declarations from mother and her counsel, are presented, post. Father filed opposition to mother’s request. After a hearing on March 30, 2017, the court granted mother’s request for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $30,000, payable within 30 days. A formal order after hearing signed by the court was filed April 7, 2017. Father filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the order. (See In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fn. 4 [appeal from order awarding attorney fees as sanction under § 271 is proper].)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

Subdivision (a) of section 271 provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.” As a sanction, “[t]he statute is aimed at conduct that furthers or frustrates settlement of family law litigation and at reduction of litigation cost.” (In re Marriage of Freeman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.)

Sanctions under section 271 are appropriate to address “obstreperous conduct which frustrated the policy of the law in favor of settlement, and caused the costs of the litigation to greatly increase.” (In re Marriage of Daniels (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1106.) Unlike other sanctions statutes, such as Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, where the conduct to be sanctionable must be “frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay,” section 271 “is aimed at conduct that frustrates settlement of family law litigation. Expressed another way, section 271 vests family law courts with an additional means with which to enforce this state’s public policy of promoting settlement of family law litigation, while reducing its costs through mutual cooperation of clients and their counsel.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1318.)

A party moving for relief under section 271 need not “show harm as a prerequisite to an award of sanctions.” (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1480.) Further, while the statute plainly requires that the award be based upon attorney fees and costs related to a party’s conduct that frustrates the policies of promotion of settlement and, where possible, reducing litigation costs, “the party seeking sanctions pursuant to section 271 need not establish with great precision an amount directly caused by the improper conduct. [Citation.] In part, this flexibility exists because the misconduct may increase attorney fees in ways that are indirect and difficult to prove.” (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1155-1156.) And the court need not wait for the litigation to be concluded to award attorney fees and costs as sanctions under section 271. Rather, “to promote cooperation a trial court must be able to apply sanctions during the course of the litigation when the uncooperative conduct arises in order to encourage better behavior as the litigation progresses.” (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, at p. 1495, original italics.)

An award of attorney fees and costs as sanctions under section 271 is “reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] . . . [W]e will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order. [Citations.] ‘We review any findings of fact that formed the basis for the award of sanctions under a substantial evidence standard of review.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225-1226; see also In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478.) In short, “ ‘[w]e will not interfere with the order for sanctions unless the trial court abused its broad discretion in making it.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 828.)

B. Background Concerning Mother’s Request for Order

1. Mother’s Request for Order

In her request for order, mother asked that the court order father “to immediately reimburse her in the amount of $10,615.27 as and for his share of unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurriculars.” In mother’s accompanying declaration, she stated that the parties had agreed to share equally “all costs associated with any mutually agreed upon extra-curricular activities for the children”; she had advised father in writing, updated monthly, of the amount of the monthly extracurricular expenses subject to being shared by the parties; and father had refused to provide such reimbursement to her.

Mother declared further that the parties had also agreed to share equally in unreimbursed or out-of-pocket health costs, including medical, dental mental health, orthodontia, and vision costs for the children, but father had “ignored [her] request for reimbursement of these expenses,” and she had not received reimbursement as far back as June 2016. A portion of these medical expenses for which mother requested reimbursement included expenses paid by mother for father’s medical insurance. Mother also stated that over the prior seven months, she had received only one payment from father, occurring in August 2016.

Mother’s counsel sent father a letter on December 16, 2016, requesting payment to mother by December 19. There was no response from father.

Mother declared that there was conduct “beyond [father’s] willful refusal to comply with existing court orders” that justified her request for sanctions. This conduct included (1) when father filed for dissolution, rather than having her served with process, she learned of the filing after a realtor contacted her about listing the family home for sale; (2) after the parties separated, father ceased paying for any household bills, resulting in their home and car insurance being cancelled and electricity being turned off; (3) after mother and her counsel arranged a meeting with father and his counsel to discuss settlement, father canceled it without explanation the evening before it was to have occurred; (4) father refused to consider mother’s custody and visitation proposals, which necessitated a custody evaluation, the results of which yielded recommendations less favorable to father than mother’s proposals; (5) father’s refusal to respond to a stipulation and order proposed by her attorney; (6) father’s disagreement with mother as to the date of the parties’ separation, where he claimed without evidence that the separation was in 2010, ultimately agreeing to mother’s proposed separation date on the eve of trial; and (7) father, through his counsel, requested that mother produce various financial records that she had previously produced, resulting in mother’s counsel being required to file a motion to quash.

Mother stated that as of the filing of her request, she had expended $83,373.24 in attorney fees and costs in the proceeding.

Mother’s counsel filed a separate declaration in support of the request. She declared that throughout the proceedings, father “ha[d] engaged in bad-faith conduct ranging from refusing to comply with Court orders (such as those related to his failure to pay his share of the children’s extra-curricular activities), refusing to co-parent with [mother], issuing baseless subpoenas, filing motions without a proper legal basis, and refusing to settle even the simplest of issues.” Mother’s counsel stated that her client had “made every effort to settle the parties’ divorce but ha[d] been unsuccessful due to [father’s] actions.”

2. Father’s Opposition to Request

Father submitted a memorandum of points and authorities, and father’s declaration in opposition to the request. Father argued in his memorandum that mother was not entitled to reimbursement of either medical insurance costs or costs for the children’s Margam dance recital. He also opposed mother’s request for attorney fees and costs. In addition, father requested sanctions from mother for her pursuit of an unnecessary request for order.

In his declaration, father stated that he had reimbursed mother for unreimbursed healthcare costs. He stated further that the monthly insurance premiums were part of the guideline support calculation, and that separate payment for them would constitute “double dip[ping].” Father declared further that he had reimbursed mother for agreed-upon extracurricular expenses for the children. He disputed that he was obligated to share the cost of “the girls’ Margam dance program” which he “felt was incredibly expensive” and incurred without his advance approval. Father also objected that he had not been provided with receipts for extracurricular activity expenses for which mother sought reimbursement.

Father declared further that attorney fees imposed as sanctions against him were not warranted, stating that (1) he had taken valid positions to protect his financial interests and his interests as a parent, and (2) mother had made false claims against him and had engaged in a “campaign . . . to terminate [his] relationship with” the children. He stated that mother’s actions caused him to request a custody evaluation which resulted in a favorable recommendation. Father declared further that he had raised financial issues in his motion to set aside, and that the motion was necessary because “there still remain[ed] questions as to whether the agreement reached [was] in fact equitable in light of [mother’s] tactics.

3. Hearing on Mother’s Request for Order

A hearing on mother’s request and on father’s request for sanctions took place on March 30, 2017. Mother appeared with her attorney, Jennifer Mello. Father appeared with his attorneys, B.J. Fadem and Patricia Zerbini. Attorneys Mello and Fadem argued their clients’ respective positions. No witnesses were sworn or provided testimony. But both counsel made factual representations to the court, including offers of proof as to matters to which testimony could be provided.

Father’s counsel at the outset objected to the introduction of more than 100 pages of documents mother presented in support of her request. He stated that he had received the documents by e-mail the morning of the hearing and was given copies of them that afternoon before the hearing. The court continued the case for approximately 20 minutes to permit father’s counsel to review the documents. Over father’s objection. the court ultimately received into evidence four group exhibits offered by mother, including billing statements, and two exhibits offered by father.

a. Presentation by Mother

Mother’s counsel, Mello, presented argument in support of the request. Mello noted that of the three issues—reimbursement for extracurricular expenses for the children, reimbursement of health insurance expenses, and an award of attorney fees and costs—the first issue had been resolved at the hearing through stipulation. Mother’s attorney recited a number of matters that supported the request for sanctions under section 271, including father’s conduct referred to in mother’s declaration (discussed above). Mello noted that early in the proceedings, mother had arranged for a meeting in an effort to resolve issues in the case, but father’s then-attorney cancelled the meeting the evening before its scheduled date.

Mello argued that father “took a very aggressive position” regarding the parties’ separation date. Despite multiple efforts to meet and confer, the issue was not resolved until the eve of trial, when father ultimately agreed to mother’s position. This tactic resulted in the expenditure of substantial litigation costs.

Counsel for mother explained that there had been much “conflict between father and the children [that] resulted in ultimately a private custody evaluation.” Before the parties had expended the time and money on that evaluation, mother had offered father a greater amount of custody time than was ultimately recommended in the evaluation.

Mello explained that the parties settled nearly all property issues in May 2016, approximately one month before trial. Mother authorized Mello to prepare a detailed stipulated judgment. After sending it to father’s attorney, Mello did not receive a response for several weeks. Father ultimately refused to sign the stipulated judgment. In addition to the expense of preparing the stipulation, mother incurred expenses resulting from that refusal, including counsel attending multiple court hearings to obtain a bifurcated status termination of marriage.

Mello argued further that after the case was concluded and there were no outstanding issues, father (1) claimed that the property division made pursuant to the parties’ stipulation was unfair, a position for which “[t]here was no justification”; and (2) served discovery after the discovery cutoff. Mello contended the discovery was unnecessary; it consisted of request for documents from an account in father’s name, financial documents provided to father’s prior attorneys, and documents concerning an account mother had established postseparation. Mother was required to go to the expense of filing a motion to quash. Father ultimately withdrew the subpoenae shortly before the hearing.

Father also filed a request for an order in an effort to set aside the status-only judgment of dissolution. There was a hearing on the request. Mother incurred costs in opposing the request, which included Mello having “to effectively go back and [again account] for and recalculate all the accounting to show opposing counsel that there was not an error in the division of assets.” Father’s request to set aside was denied by the court. Mello argued that there were “never any justifiable grounds” for father’s request.

Mello argued that mother was required to incur expenses for the current request, which “started as an enforcement motion . . . [in which mother] was simply asking for the court to order compliance with the child support orders. It took until today to get full compliance on those orders.” Counsel stated that father had not paid for unreimbursed medical expenses until March 22, 2017 (eight days before the hearing), although mother had been requesting payment since May 2016. Mello argued further that although father had made a payment for extracurricular costs on February 15, 2017, he had been ordered to pay them in May 2016. In addition, although father had made a payment in September 2016 for extracurricular costs, “it took [mother] more than 3 months to get compliance with [the] court order.” Thus, Mello argued, although father claimed compliance, mother had typically incurred expenses to compel that compliance.

Mello advised the court that mother had spent $93,000 to date for attorney fees and costs in the proceeding. She asserted that more than $30,000 of those fees and costs had been incurred since May 10, 2016, most of which having been incurred postjudgment, “after we [had] settled everything and [had taken] the trial off [calendar] in May of 2016.” Mello stated that because she believed the issues had been concluded, she had substituted out of the case in December 2016; because father commenced new litigation by issuing subpoenae and threatening to file a motion to set aside orders, mother was required to rehire her.

Mello argued that father had the ability to pay the requested fees and costs and there would be no detriment to him if he were ordered to do so by the court. As of one year earlier, father was earning a base salary of $200,000. Mello argued further that, based upon the division of assets that occurred in 2016, father held an account with Merrill Lynch with a balance of between $700,000 and $800,000.

b. Father’s Presentation

Father’s counsel, Fadem, argued in opposition to mother’s request. He asserted that it had been father who had hired a mediator at the outset of the case, but mother cancelled after he had paid the mediator. Fadem asserted that most of the fees incurred in the case were related to custody. It was noted by the professional in the custody evaluation that Mother “was gatekeeping, and there was unjustified resistance by the children.”

Fadem explained the circumstances surrounding father’s having not signed the stipulated judgment prepared by Mello. After there had been a mediated agreement, father discovered two assets that had been omitted by mother, who had responded that she had “forgot[ten] these 2 minor assets.” Fadem explained that father had resisted signing the proposed stipulated judgment because it included a waiver of his right to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim resulting from mother’s omission of assets. Father had proposed a stipulated judgment that would have reflected the terms of the mediated agreement without a waiver of father’s right to assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim, but mother rejected the proposal.

Father’s attorney argued that there were still outstanding issues as to the account balances of the omitted assets and whether the documents produced at mediation were accurate. Father had expended more than $120,000 in attorney fees and costs in the proceeding.

Fadem explained that with respect to mother’s request for unreimbursed medical expenses, the process was that father would receive an e-mail from mother with a request for payment and a spreadsheet. Father would request copies of backup documentation as required, and once mother supplied it, father would make the payment.

With respect to reimbursement for extracurricular expenses, Fadem argued that the largest component of mother’s request was “for a very expensive dance competition” of approximately $14,000. The expense was incurred before the May 2016 stipulation was entered into in which the parties agreed that dance was a reimbursable extracurricular expense. Fadem argued that father had not specifically agreed to the expense, and although he had been looking forward to attending the dance event, he was told he was not invited. Because of this circumstance and the fact that it had preceded the May 2016 stipulation, father told mother he would need to check with his attorney to see whether he was obligated to pay for the dance expense. Mother “went ahead and filed the request for order.”

Fadem argued that mother’s request for order was unnecessary. He argued further that as to one aspect of the request, “there’s absolutely no legal basis for the reimbursement of health insurance prior to the bifurcated marital status.”

c. Mother’s Reply Presentation

In reply, Mello disagreed with Fadem’s assertion that father had hired a mediator at the beginning of the case. She asserted that she had been counsel of record from the beginning and had a good memory of what had transpired; she stated it had been father’s attorney at the outset who had suggested that mother did not need an attorney because father’s attorney could mediate for both parties, a proposal which Mello stated was “not proper or appropriate.” Mello disagreed further with Fadem’s claim that most of the case concerned custody issues, and his assertion that the custody evaluator had found that there were gatekeeping issues with mother. As to the claim by Fadem that the dance expense was not agreed upon and therefore was the subject of a reasonable dispute, Mello argued that (1) although she had written three letters and filed a motion, she had received no response to the request for reimbursement, and (2) it was not until the day of the hearing that father signed a stipulation agreeing to make the reimbursement. Mello stated that the two omitted assets consisted of a small amount of Hewlett Packard stock and an account in father’s name. Mello had tried unsuccessfully to reach a resolution as to these two assets to have them divided equally.

d. Court’s Decision

After hearing argument, the court denied mother’s request for reimbursement of health insurance premiums, concluding that she had failed to cite authority to support the request. The court granted mother’s request for attorney fees and costs under section 271, subdivision (a) in the amount of $30,000, payable within 30 days. And the court denied without prejudice father’s request for attorney fees, concluding that the request had not been properly made. A formal order was filed on April 7, 2017.

C. No Error in Granting Request or Sanctions

Father argues on appeal that the court abused its discretion in granting mother’s request for sanctions under section 271. He contends, inter alia, that (1) he was “permitted zealous advocacy” under the law; (2) his conduct in resolving issues in the proceeding demonstrated “his willingness to engage in good-faith dealing”; (3) the facts presented through the pleadings and at the hearing did not show that he had “caus[ed] unnecessary litigation”; (4) the court erred in failing to identify or recite in its order “Father’s specific conduct that frustrated the promotion of settlement and the reduction of litigation costs”; (5) the order imposing sanctions thus “lack[ed] the foundational evidence of frustration” required under section 271; (6) the court failed to make a determination that father had the ability to pay the sanctions; (7) the court erred by permitting mother to present numerous billing records at the hearing that were not previously disclosed to father, and by overruling father’s objection to this belated presentation; and (8) the court abused its discretion by failing to adequately review the billing records before making its order.

In addressing father’s claim of error, we reiterate relevant legal principles concerning the purpose of section 271 and our standard of review. Sanctions under section 271 are intended to address a party’s or an attorney’s “obstreperous conduct which frustrated the policy of the law in favor of settlement, and caused the costs of the litigation to greatly increase.” (In re Marriage of Daniels, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.) We review such an order for abuse of discretion, and “will overturn such an order only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Corona, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225-1226.)

Mother, in her request and in the argument of her counsel at the hearing, identified conduct by father in several aspects of the proceedings that she urged was sanctionable. We discuss seven of those matters below.

First, mother identified father’s alleged conduct that directly resulted in the filing of her request. She explained in her declaration that father was obligated to reimburse her for one-half of the children’s monthly extracurricular expenses, but he had refused to comply after she provided an accounting to him, updated monthly. Father had also failed to reimburse her for his share of unreimbursed or out-of-pocket health costs. Mother declared that she had received only one payment from father in seven months. And after mother’s counsel, Mello, sent a letter on December 16, 2016, requesting payment to mother by December 19; father did not respond, resulting in the filing of mother’s request on January 31, 2017. In fact, Mello stated that she had sent three letters on her client’s behalf requesting reimbursement, and it was not until the day of the hearing that father stipulated to the reimbursement.

Father’s attorney argued at the hearing—which for purposes here we will consider an offer of proof—that (1) any delay in father’s payment for unreimbursed medical expenses was due to the process of his requesting backup documentation from mother after she made her initial requests for reimbursement by enclosing a spreadsheet of claimed expenses; and (2) there was a good faith dispute concerning a large component of the extracurricular expenses that were incurred for a dance competition to which he was not invited and the expense for which he had not approved, and mother acted precipitously in filing the request after father told her he needed to check with his attorney. There was further argument, however, from mother’s counsel—which we will also treat as an offer of proof—that (1) as to the extracurricular expenses, Mello had written three letters and had filed the request without a response to the request for reimbursement, and it was only on the day of the hearing that father had signed a stipulation agreeing to the reimbursement; and (2) father had not paid his share of unreimbursed medical expenses that were the subject of the request until eight days before the hearing.

Second, mother asserted that after she had arranged for a meeting with her attorney, father and his counsel to discuss settlement, father cancelled the meeting without explanation on the evening prior to its scheduled date. Although father’s counsel, Fadem, asserted that it had been father who had hired a mediator at the outset of the case and mother had cancelled the meeting, Mello rebutted this assertion by stating that she had personal knowledge (because she had been counsel of record from the beginning of the proceedings) that father’s former attorney had suggested that he act as mediator (with mother unrepresented), which proposal was “not proper or appropriate.”

Third, Mother claimed that father had vigorously asserted without supporting evidence that the parties’ date of separation was in 2010. Mello made multiple efforts to meet and confer on the subject, but there was no resolution until the eve of trial, when father agreed to mother’s position (i.e., that the separation occurred in November 2014). There was no argument or evidence presented by father on this issue.

Fourth, mother asserted that her attempts in the case to resolve custody issues were rebuffed by father, and he “demanded that [the parties] proceed all the way to a Custody Evaluation.” The results of the custody evaluation involved recommendations that were less favorable to father than those mother had previously proposed. There was no argument presented by father on this issue. Father, however, in his declaration stated that there was a recommendation favorable to him that came out of the custody evaluation.

Fifth, mother noted that after the parties had resolved various issues, including property division to avoid trial, her counsel prepared a proposed stipulation and judgment to reflect the parties’ agreement. After sending the document to father’s counsel, Mello did not receive a response for several weeks. Father ultimately refused to sign the stipulation, causing mother to incur expenses in having her attorney prepare the document and attend multiple hearings. Father’s counsel at the hearing responded that father was justified in refusing to sign the proposed stipulated judgment because mother had omitted two assets at the time of their settlement, and father’s execution of the document would have caused him to waive a potential breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Sixth, mother contended that, after the parties had settled outstanding issues and taken the trial off calendar, father had acted improperly by claiming that the property division made pursuant to the parties’ stipulation was unfair, a position for which “there was no justification.” Father, through his counsel, filed a request to set aside the status-only judgment of dissolution, which was denied. Mother incurred fees and costs in opposing the request because Mello had to repeat accounting efforts done at the time of the settlement to demonstrate to Fadem there was not an error in the property division. Fadem responded at the hearing that there were still outstanding issues regarding two omitted assets and that father was having a consultant review documents because it was potentially the case “that the account balances and the documents that were produced at the mediation [were] not accurate.”

Seventh, after the trial was taken off calendar, father served discovery that Mello contended was unnecessary and improper. Mello stated that it was propounded after the discovery cutoff, and that it included the production of documents from an account in father’s name, financial documents provided to father’s prior attorneys, and documents concerning an account mother had established postseparation. Mother incurred the expense of Mello’s having to file a motion to quash, and father withdrew the subpoenae shortly before the hearing. Fadem responded that the documents were needed to address the issue of the two omitted assets. Further, as to the fact that he had subpoenaed records that had been produced to father’s former counsel earlier in the case, Fadem argued that Mello had not mentioned this fact to him, even though she knew that Fadem had been unable to obtain the file from former counsel. There was no response from father as to mother’s contentions that it was improper and unnecessary to serve subpoenae for documents for an account held by father himself and from an account that mother opened postseparation.

“Viewed most favorably to the judgment below,” there is substantial evidence in the record that father “engaged in obstreperous conduct which frustrated the policy of the law in favor of settlement, and caused the costs of the litigation to greatly increase.” (In re Marriage of Daniels, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.) The evidence—indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the court’s order—supported an award of attorney fees and costs as sanctions because father’s conduct frustrated settlement and drove up litigation costs, inter alia, as follows: (1) father engaged in a pattern of delaying in making reimbursement payments to mother for unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurricular expenses, notwithstanding stipulations and orders requiring timely reimbursements, resulting in unnecessary litigation expense to mother; (2) father made the vigorous assertion without factual support that the parties’ separation date was four years earlier than as claimed by mother, only to withdraw that position on the eve of trial after mother incurred expenses to address the claim; (3) father, after the parties settled their issues to avoid a trial (including settlement of the division of property), asserted that the stipulation was unfair and he brought a motion to set aside the status-only judgment of dissolution, which required mother’s counsel to repeat accounting efforts performed before the settlement, which motion was denied and (mother argued) was without justification; and (4) father caused to be issued subpoenae for records after the matter had settled and after discovery had closed, when the records were easily available to father, had previously been produced, or involved a postseparation account opened by mother, which action necessitated mother’s filing a motion to quash that led to father’s withdrawal of the subpoenae.

Notwithstanding the record made in support of the request as recited above, father argues that “Mother’s claims of sanctionable conduct committed by Father were baseless even if viewed in a favorable light.” He argues that, as shown in his declaration, he “took valid, meritorious positions to protect his interests and defend himself, both financially and as a parent of two children.” Father contends further that “[b]ased on the facts presented in the pleadings and during the hearing, father’s conduct could [not] be construed to be causing unnecessary litigation. Father demonstrated a good faith attempt to protect his rights.” But father presents few facts in the legal argument section of his brief to support of these very general statements. (See Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [points in appellate brief “unsupported by ‘adequate factual or legal analysis’ ” were deemed forfeited].) He explained—reiterating what Fadem argued below—that the subpoena of records was made in good faith because father and his current counsel were unaware that the requested documents had been supplied to former counsel, and mother’s counsel did not disclose this fact until after the subpoena issued. Even crediting this position, it does not address the other arguments asserted by mother concerning the propriety of father’s actions in causing the issuance of the subpoenae.

Father argues that the court erred because “[t]he order . . . contains no factual recital, with reasonable specificity, of the circumstances leading to the order; no . . . circumstances and legal arguments providing the basis for the Court’s conclusions.” We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it is one made without citation of supporting legal authority. “We are not bound to develop appellants’ argument for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) Second, section 271 does not require an order detailing the court’s reasons for imposing sanctions. (See In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970 [Civ. Code, § 4370.6, the predecessor statute to Fam. Code, § 271, did not require trial court to prepare written order detailing its reasons].) Nor is the trial court required to issue a statement of decision after ruling on a sanctions request under section 271. (In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 294-297.) The court did not err by failing to making detailed findings in support of its order.

Father contends further that the court erred by failing to consider, as required by section 271, subdivision (a), father’s ability to pay sanctions or the burden such an order would impose upon him. There was ample evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding under the statute that the sanctions award would not “impose[] an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) This included evidence that father (1) as recently as one year prior to the hearing, was earning a base salary of $200,000, and (2) at the time of the division of assets in 2016, held a Merrill Lynch account with a balance of between $700,000 and $800,000. Father presented no evidence to rebut this showing. The trial court did not err by failing to consider father’s financial ability to pay sanctions.

Lastly, father argues that the court erred by permitting mother to present at the hearing attorney invoices and other documentary evidence in support of her request. He argues that admission of these documents over his objection—which constituted “surprise service [by mother] of her billing statements on the day of the hearing”—constituted a denial of “fundamental due process.” Father cites no legal authority to support this constitutional claim, and accordingly we will not address it. (See Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [appellate courts “need not consider an argument for which no authority is furnished”].) Further, to the extent that father contends that mother proceeded improperly by not attaching the voluminous attorney invoices to her request, he is mistaken. Family Rule 4 of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, of which we have taken judicial notice (see fn. 2, ante), provides that in instances in which a party requests attorney fees, he or she “shall not attach the billing statements to the attorney fee request, but shall exchange billing statements before the hearing. The attorney shall also bring copies of the bills to the hearing.” Mother’s counsel, in e-mailing the invoices to father’s counsel on the morning of the hearing, and in bringing copies to the hearing and providing them to opposing counsel, complied with this local rule. And the trial court considered Fadem’s objection and addressed it by passing the case to give him an opportunity to review the invoices (to the extent he had not done so the morning of the hearing after having received them by e-mail). The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting mother’s evidence.

After considering all of the evidence presented to the court below, and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the order, this is not an instance in which “no judge could [have] reasonably [made] the order.” (See In re Marriage of Corona, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225-1226.) We conclude that substantial evidence supported the court’s order awarding mother $30,000 in attorney fees and costs as sanctions under section 271, subdivision (a).

III. DISPOSITION

The April 7, 2017 order requiring father to pay mother $30,000 in attorney fees and costs as sanctions under Family Code section 271, subdivision (a) is affirmed.

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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

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ELIA, ACTING P. J.

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MIHARA, J.

Seth v. Seth

H044876