Filed 10/25/19 Moore v. Bragg CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

IVAN RENE MOORE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KIMBERLY MARTIN-BRAGG,

Defendant and

Respondent.

B272445

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC464111)

RONALD HILLS et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

KIMBERLY MARTIN-BRAGG et al.,

Defendants and

Respondents.

B272445

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC475551)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle R. Rosenblatt and Michael M. Johnson, Judges. Affirmed.

Ivan Rene Moore, in pro. per.; for Plaintiff and Appellant Ivan Rene Moore.

Ronald Hills, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant Ronald Hills.

Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro and Felton T. Newell for Defendant and Respondent Kimberly Martin-Bragg.

____________________________

Ronald Hills and vexatious litigant Ivan Rene Moore appeal from a trial court judgment dismissing all of their causes of action against Kimberly Martin-Bragg and awarding Bragg declaratory and injunctive relief related to the parties’ dispute over real property located at 6150 Shenandoah Avenue in Los Angeles. Moore also appeals from the trial court’s order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant. Finding no error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Because the record in this case is deficient, the background is necessarily drawn entirely from the trial court’s statement of decision issued after a six-day bench trial.

“This action concerns conflicting claims for the title to real property located at 6150 Shenandoah Avenue in Los Angeles (‘6150 Shenandoah’). The property consists of a single family residence located in the Ladera Heights area of the city.

“The plaintiffs and cross-defendants are [Moore] and [Hills]. Moore is a singer, songwriter and music producer. He controls and operates music and radio corporations that include Rene Moore Music Inc., Rufftown Entertainment Inc. and Radio Multi-Media Inc. Hills is Moore’s close friend and business associate, who has served as the corporate secretary for Moore’s corporations since the late 1980s.

“The defendant and cross-complainant is [Bragg]. She is a licensed real estate agent and a former police officer. [Bragg] owns and occupies 6160 Shenandoah Avenue in Los Angeles, which is the property adjacent to 6150 Shenandoah. She and Moore lived together as domestic partners beginning in 2002 and ending several years later (the exact date was unclear in the evidence).

“[A.] PROCEDURE

“This action involves a number of consolidated and related cases, and together they have a long and tortured procedural history. [¶] . . . [¶]

“The legal proceedings started on April 13, 2011 when [Bragg] filed [Los Angeles Super. Ct. No.] BC459449. That case was an unlawful detainer action against Moore regarding 6150 Shenandoah, the same property involved in this trial. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Fruin.

“On June 20, 2011, Moore filed BC464111, an action for quiet title and related claims against [Bragg] regarding 6150 Shenandoah. The case was assigned to Judge Michelle Rosenblatt.

“During the course of the unlawful detainer proceedings in BC459449, Moore repeatedly asked for his quiet title action in BC464111 to be related and transferred to Judge Fruin for a consolidated trial with [Bragg’s] unlawful detainer claim. Judge Fruin denied his requests.

“The unlawful detainer claim in BC459449 was tried in late 2011. On January 23, 2012 Judge Fruin issued a statement of decision in favor of [Bragg], and entered judgment for her possession of 6150 Shenandoah. A writ of execution was issued, and [Bragg] obtained possession of the property. Moore appealed the judgment, but he has remained out of possession.

“On December 20, 2011 Moore and Hills filed BC475551, another action for quiet title and related claims against [Bragg] and various banking defendants regarding 6150 Shenandoah. Although BC475551 was somewhat broader than BC464111, the two cases raised very similar claims. BC475551 was ultimately related to BC464111, assigned to Judge Rosenblatt, and consolidated with BC464111.

“On March 2, 2012 Moore filed BC480013, an action against [Bragg] for trespass and conversion of personal property located within the 6150 Shenandoah property. Moore alleged that [Bragg] retained his personal property after he vacated the premises in response to the unlawful detainer judgment. The case was ultimately related to BC464111 and assigned to Judge Rosenblatt. [¶] . . . [¶]

“By mid-2012 there were two groups of consolidated cases before Judge Rosenblatt: the quiet title and real property claims between Moore, Hills and [Bragg] in BC464111 (c/w BC475551), and the personal property claims between Moore and [Bragg] in BC480013 (c/w BC483652). At that time, [Bragg’s] unlawful detainer action in BC459449 was pending on appeal and inactive in the trial court.

“On October 9, 2012 in BC464111 Judge Rosenblatt entered an order declaring Moore to be a vexatious litigant under Code [of Civil Procedure section] 391. Judge Rosenblatt stayed all proceedings in BC464111 and ordered Moore to post a security bond in the amount of $100,000. When Moore failed to post a bond, Judge Rosenblatt dismissed BC464111 by order entered on February 26, 2013. On July 3 and July 11, 2013 Judge Rosenblatt entered orders requiring Moore to post a vexatious litigant bond in BC475551 and BC480013. On October 23, 2013 Judge Rosenblatt entered an order rescinding the dismissal of BC464111 but adhering to the requirement that Moore post a bond in all of his cases.

“In July 2013 a jury trial was conducted before Judge Rosenblatt on some of Moore’s personal property claims against [Bragg] in BC480013 (c/w BC483652). The claims related to trespass to chattels, conversion and similar claims concerning personal property located within the 6150 Shenandoah property that [Bragg] had retained after Moore vacated the premises following the unlawful detainer judgment. On July 29, 2013 the jury returned a verdict in favor of Moore. An interlocutory judgment was entered on the verdict on November 8, 2013, awarding Moore damages against [Bragg] in the amount of $3,150,000, reduced to $650,000 if [Bragg] returned specified personal property to Moore.

“On August 1, 2013 [we] issued a decision that reversed [Bragg’s] unlawful detainer judgment in BC459449. [(Moore I, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 367.) We] held that Judge Fruin erred by failing to consolidate Moore’s claims for quiet title in BC464111 with [Bragg’s] unlawful detainer action in BC459449, and that Moore was prejudiced because his quiet title issues were too complex for the summary procedures followed in the unlawful detainer trial. [(Id. at p. 395.)] Judge Fruin recused himself following [our] decision, and on November 20, 2013 [Bragg] dismissed the BC459449 unlawful detainer action.

“Judge Rosenblatt granted summary judgment in favor of the banking defendants on August 13, 2013 and judgment on the pleadings in favor of [Bragg] on November 8, 2013 for Moore and Hills’[s] operative Second Amended Complaint in BC464111 (c/w BC475551). These rulings left only the 5th cause of action for quiet title and 4th cause of action for slander of title against [Bragg], as well as [Bragg’s] cross-complaint against Moore and Hills.

“On February 21, 2014 Judge Rosenblatt recused herself from all of the consolidated cases assigned to her: the quiet title and real property claims in BC464111 (c/w BC475551), and the personal property claims in BC480013 (c/w BC483652). All of the cases were reassigned to Judge Frederick Shaller.

“Judge Shaller presided over all of the cases from March 24, 2014 through March 23, 2015. Among the more significant rulings: on October 15, 2014 Judge Shaller denied Moore’s motion for a preliminary injunction removing [Bragg] from the 6150 Shenandoah property, because the ownership and quiet title issues were pending in BC464111 (c/w BC475551); and on January 5, 2015 Judge Shaller ruled that the November 8, 2013 money judgment in BC480013 (c/w BC483652) could not be enforced because it was an interlocutory determination.

“Moore challenged his status as a vexatious litigant before Judge Daniel Buckley, [then-]Supervising Judge of the Civil Division. On November 20, 2014 Judge Buckley denied Moore’s motion to rescind Judge Rosenblatt’s vexatious litigant and bond posting orders.

“On January 8, 2015 Moore and Hills filed a statement of disqualification against Judge Shaller in all of the cases. Judge Shaller failed to respond to the statement, and on March 23, 2015 Judge Shaller ruled that he was disqualified as a matter of law for failing to respond in a timely manner. All of the cases were reassigned to Judge Michael Johnson on May 27, 2015. [¶] . . . [¶]

“[After the cases were reassigned to Judge Johnson, both] parties filed motions that challenged prior rulings by other [j]udges, and all the motions were denied. [Bragg] moved for a preliminary injunction preventing Moore and Hills from filing an unlawful detainer action for possession of 6150 Shenandoah; it was denied on June 26, 2015. Moore and Hills moved to modify a protective order issued by Judge Rosenblatt on July 25, 2012; it was denied on August 24, 2015. Moore and Hills moved for an order permitting them to enforce the November 8, 2013 interlocutory judgment in BC480013 (c/w BC483652) and to inspect the 6150 Shenandoah property, which had been previously denied by other [j]udges on September 18, 2013, June 26, 2014, September 23, 2014 and January 5, 2015; the motion was denied again on September 2, 2015. On September 2, 2015 [the trial court] expressly ordered both parties not to file motions to reconsider prior rulings without complying with Code [of Civil Procedure section] 1008, and threatened sanctions for any violation of the order.

“On July 15, 2015 [Bragg] moved to dismiss all claims by Moore in the related and consolidated cases on the ground that he had failed to file a bond in compliance with the vexatious litigant orders. The [trial court] denied the motion, ruling that Moore’s interlocutory judgment of $3,150,000 against [Bragg] in BC480013 served the same purpose as a security bond and could be used to satisfy any expenses incurred by [Bragg] in the defense of Moore’s actions.

“On July 15, 2015 the [trial court] set a trial date for the remaining quiet title and real property claims between Moore, Hills and [Bragg] in BC464111 (c/w BC475551). The equitable claims were bifurcated pursuant to Code [of Civil Procedure sections] 598 and [1048, subdivision (b)], and the matters were set for a bench trial on October 5, 2015.

“The trial commenced on October 5, 2015. Trial was on the equitable claims in the operative pleadings, specifically: Moore and Hills’[s] 5th cause of action for quiet title based on a purchase money resulting trust, stated in the [Second] Amended Complaint filed April 11, 2012 in BC475551 (c/w BC464111); and [Bragg’s] 1st cause of action for declaratory relief, 2nd cause of action for cancellation of instruments, 3rd cause of action for injunction, and 4th cause of action for quiet title, stated in the [cross-complaint] filed February 21, 2013 in BC464111 (c/w BC475551). These equitable claims were bifurcated for a bench trial, with the remaining legal claim (Moore and Hills’[s] 4th cause of action for slander of title) reserved for later determination.

“On the first day of trial Moore and Hills moved to vacate the order for a bench trial and to instead conduct a jury trial of all claims. The motion was denied, and the matter proceeded as a bench trial. Trial was conducted on October 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14, 2015, with a court reporter present each day.

“During the trial Moore and Hills filed statements of disqualification against Judge Johnson. . . . The first statement against Judge Johnson was filed on October 9, 2015; on the same date it was stricken and the trial proceeded. On October 13, 2015 Moore and Hills orally objected to Judge Johnson’s participation in the trial, announcing that Moore had filed a federal lawsuit against Judges Rosenblatt, Fruin, Shaller, Buckley, Johnson and other [superior court judges]; the objection was overruled and the trial proceeded. On October 14, 2015 Moore filed a second statement of disqualification against Judge Johnson; on the same date it was stricken and the trial proceeded.

“ . . . Moore filed three pleadings seeking to disqualify Judge Johnson on October 20, October 21 and November 3, 2015. None of these pleadings were served in compliance with Code [of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1)]; the [trial court] learned of the unserved pleadings on November 6, 2015, and issued an order striking them on the same date. On November 30, 2015 Moore filed and served two additional pleadings seeking to disqualify Judge Johnson, and they were stricken by order entered on December 1, 2015. On December 18, 2015 Moore and Hills filed and served two additional pleadings seeking to disqualify Judge Johnson, and they were stricken by order entered on December 21, 2015. On January 4, 2016 Moore and Hills filed and served another pleading seeking to disqualify Judge Johnson, and it was stricken by order entered on January 12, 2016. On February 10, 2016 Moore filed yet another pleading seeking disqualification, and it was stricken on February 11, 2016.”

The trial court entered judgment for Bragg on March 29, 2016. Moore and Hills timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Vexatious Litigant Order & Disqualification of Judge Johnson
B.
Moore contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered an order declaring him a vexatious litigant because, he explains, two of the six actions upon which the trial court relied for its determination of his vexatious litigant status were summary denials of writ petitions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(1).)

“A court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)

Moore argues that Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1172 (Fink) “is clear” that a summary denial of a writ petition does not qualify as litigation that has been “finally determined adversely,” and that the trial court therefore erred when it relied on summary denials of two writ petitions to find that Moore is a vexatious litigant. We disagree.

What Fink says is that a summary denial of a writ petition “does not necessarily constitute a litigation that has been ‘finally determined adversely to the person’ . . . .” (Fink, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172, italics added.) Fink distinguished between summary denials of writ petitions that can and cannot support a vexatious litigant finding. Where appellate review may be obtained only through a writ petition, a summary denial will suffice to support a vexatious litigant finding; where appellate review may be obtained through a later appeal, a summary denial of a writ petition might not support a vexatious litigant finding. (Id. at pp. 1172-1173.)

The distinction is academic here; Moore has not provided us with information from which we may discern the nature of either of the two writ proceedings relied upon by the trial court (or any other information from which we might meaningfully review the trial court’s order). “It is the burden of appellant to provide an accurate record on appeal to demonstrate error. Failure to do so precludes an adequate review and results in affirmance of the trial court’s determination.” (Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.) Because Moore has not provided us a record that demonstrates the trial court’s error, we affirm the trial court’s order declaring Moore a vexatious litigant.

Based on the record before us, we would affirm the trial court’s order declaring Moore a vexatious litigant even if both of the unsuccessful writ petitions the trial court cited were insufficient to support the finding. Between October 9, 2015 and February 10, 2016, Moore filed at least nine pleadings seeking to disqualify Judge Johnson under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3. Those pleadings alone support a vexatious litigant finding under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3), which provides that “[i]n any litigation while acting in propria persona, [a person who] repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” is a vexatious litigant.

C. Jury Trial
D.
One of the primary categories of error Moore and Hills assert on appeal is that they were entitled to a jury trial below rather than the bench trial the trial court conducted. The appellants’ jury trial arguments are threefold. First, the appellants contend that they were entitled to a jury trial because their action was a quiet title action involving possession of the 6150 Shenandoah real property (citing Thomson v. Thomson (1936) 7 Cal.2d 671 (Thomson)). Second, the appellants contend that court orders by a variety of judges they sought to have disqualified (and that did eventually recuse or otherwise disqualify themselves from the matter) guaranteed them a jury trial on all of their claims. Third, Moore and Hills argue that the trial court’s denial of a jury trial contradicted our decision in Moore I.

Thomson is inapposite by its own terms. “In a simple action to quiet title when the possession of the property is not involved, it is an equitable action.” (Thomson, supra, 7 Cal.2d at p. 681.) The trial court tried the appellant’s quiet title action based on the fifth cause of action in their second amended complaint. As Bragg points out in her brief, the appellants did not seek possession of the property by that cause of action. “A quiet title action is equitable in nature except when it takes on the character of an ejectment proceeding to recover possession of real property. [Citation.] In this case, neither party sought possession of the property under an ejectment theory. The trial court therefore adjudicated the matter as a chancellor in equity.” (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109-1110.)

Moreover, regardless of statements in prior judges’ orders referring to a jury trial based on the appellants’ posting of jury fees, Moore and Hill were not entitled to have equitable claims heard by a jury. “As a general proposition, ‘[t]he jury trial is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity.’ ” (C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 8.)

Finally, our opinion in Moore I reversed the trial court’s judgment in BC459449 and remanded that case to the trial court for further proceedings. Moore and Hills argue that our statement that the trial court’s error in that case “require[ed] the judgment’s reversal and remand to the trial court for determination of the parties’ rights to legal and beneficial title to the property, and their respective rights to possession based on that determination” required a jury trial on remand. (See Moore I, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) It did not. The parties’ respective rights to legal and beneficial title to 6150 Shenandoah have now been determined. And nothing in the record leads us to conclude that there was any question left requiring a jury after the trial court conducted its bench trial on the equitable issues it bifurcated.

E. Discovery Rulings
F.
The appellants also challenge the trial court’s judgment based on what they characterize as discovery rulings.

Moore argues, for example, that “Judge Johnson erred in not allowing [him] discovery on critical issues.” That argument, however, is based on a disagreement with a factual finding the trial court made, and contains no citations to law or any aspect of the record that explain the issue, much less demonstrate error.

Moore also argues that the trial court’s entry of a protective order Bragg sought to prevent discovery of various financial records was unfair and deprived him and Hills of due process. The protective order alludes to the California Right to Financial Privacy Act. (Gov. Code, § 7460 et seq.) We can only surmise (the record does not contain supporting documents) that Bragg’s motion for the protective order and the reporter’s transcript from the hearing on the motion would explain why the trial court invoked the “financial privacy act.” Regardless, the appellants’ arguments contain no information from which we could conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying Moore and Hills access to Bragg’s sensitive financial information.

“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) We can discern no error from the appellants’ arguments regarding evidentiary rulings.

Likewise, Moore contends that Judge Johnson was asked to enforce Judge Rosenblatt’s order for Bragg to return Moore’s personal property, including files he needed for litigation. But again, the record contains no such request or denial.

G. Sufficiency of the Evidence
H.
Citing inferences from evidence favorable only to their conclusions, the appellants allege in conclusory fashion that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. On appeal for sufficiency of the evidence, however, “we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, accept as true all the evidence and reasonable inferences tending to establish the correctness of the jury’s finding, and resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment.” (Grassilli v. Barr (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1277.)

We “start with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment; it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate otherwise. [Citation.] The appellant’s brief must set forth all of the material evidence bearing on the issue, not merely the evidence favorable to the appellant, and it also must show how the evidence does not sustain the challenged finding. [Citations.] And the appellant must support all of its factual assertions with citations to evidence in the appellate record. [Citations.] If the appellant fails to set forth all of the material evidence, its claim of insufficiency of the evidence is waived.” (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368.)

Neither Moore nor Hills, nor their submissions taken together, have provided an adequate basis to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence here. (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447-448.) Even if we were able to determine what the asserted error is from the record and briefs they have provided us, we would then be faced with very specific findings by the trial court that the appellants cannot overcome here. “The parties have raised a number of claims,” the trial court said, “but cutting through all of the issues is the question of credibility. The [trial court] has evaluated the credibility of both sides, and specific credibility determinations are explained in the [trial court’s] factual summary. In general, the [trial court] has concluded that [Bragg] was credible and truthful, while Moore and Hills were not. [¶] The testimony by Moore and Hills was unconvincing, frequently misleading, and often appeared to be deliberately untruthful. The [trial court] has no confidence in their testimony or version of the facts. Moore and Hills represented themselves during trial, and their lack of personal credibility has infected all of their evidence.”

The appellants’ arguments regarding sufficiency of the evidence rely largely on their assertions about evidence they contend the trial court should not have believed. “[I]t is the province of the trial court and not this court to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.” (Saunders v. Saunders (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 557, 558.)

I. JPMorgan Chase Bank Summary Judgment
J.
In addition to the arguments Moore raised in his opening brief, Hills also argued that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to JPMorgan Chase Bank. The record contains no summary judgment briefing regarding JPMorgan Chase Bank, no evidence regarding that motion for summary judgment, no reporter’s transcript from any hearing on a motion for summary judgment, and no ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Nor does the record contain the trial court’s register of actions from which we would be able to discern if there were a motion for summary judgment ruled on in this particular action.

While the trial court’s statement of decision after trial alludes to “summary judgment in favor of the banking defendants on August 13, 2013,” we have no information regarding that order that would even allow us to determine if the order is appealable or if a notice of appeal filed in 2016 was timely. And we are aware of no appearance here or service of any of the documents in this matter on any counsel for JPMorgan Chase Bank, including the notice of appeal, which was served on counsel for Bragg.

Hills’s argument regarding a JPMorgan Chase Bank summary judgment suffers from the same flaws as the other arguments appellants have made here; the appellants have not provided us information sufficient for us to review their challenge.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order declaring Moore a vexatious litigant and the judgment are affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.*