Case Name: Gurdial Dosanjh, et al. v. Mangal Singh, et al.
Case No.: 16-CV-293825 (consolidated with 16-CV-302129)

Currently before the Court is the motion by defendants Mangal Singh (“Mangal”), Jaswinder Singh (“Jaswinder”), and JM Bhullar Properties, Inc. (“JM Bhullar”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication.

Factual and Procedural Background

This consolidated action arises out of a dispute between former business partners who invested in a business, Happy Hollow Market, and real property together. The consolidated action includes the following cases:

(1) Gurdial Dosanjh, et al. v. Mangal Singh, et al. (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 16-CV-293825) (“Lead Action”)

(2) Gurdial Dosanjh v. Mangal Singh, et al. (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 16-CV-302129) (“Derivative Action”).

On April 13, 2016, plaintiffs Gurdial Dosanjh (“Gurdial”) and Satnam Singh (“Satnam”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the operative complaint against Mangal and Jaswinder in the Lead Action.

According to the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement with Mangal and Jaswinder on September 1, 2002, to jointly purchase, own, and operate a business known as Happy Hollow Market, located at 1704 Senter Road, San Jose, California, thereby creating a partnership. (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 14, 22, 28, & 34.) Plaintiffs “agreed to contribute a substantial portion of the down payment on the purchase price” and Mangal and Jaswinder agreed “to operate the business and … make monthly payments from the income of the business to the seller.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8 & 40.) Plaintiffs relied on Mangal’s “representation that he and his wife would honor the oral agreement” as Mangal is Satnam’s brother and Gurdial’s good friend. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

However, at the time the agreement was made, Mangal “had no intention of performing as promised or honoring the agreement and … harbored a secret intention to operate the business, receive the income therefrom and to claim ownership, along with his wife [Jaswinder], of the business, its income and assets, to the exclusion of [Plaintiffs].” (Complaint, ¶¶ 15, 16, & 29.)

Plaintiffs then “contributed a substantial amount of money, which was used for the purchase of the … business.” (Complaint, ¶ 40.) Once the business was purchased, Mangal and Jaswinder “operate[d] the business and over the course of the ensuing years [Mangal] represented … that the payments to the seller were being made[ ] as agreed.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) Mangal also “continued to mislead [Plaintiffs] … by concealing his true intentions and scheme, with the hope that at some point in time, after years of operating the business, he and [Jaswinder] could claim ownership of said business, its income, profits and assets to the economic detriment of [Plaintiffs].” (Id. at ¶ 17.)

On November 1, 2014, Plaintiffs approached Mangal and inquired “about the status of the business and why they were not receiving any income ….” (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Mangal “claimed, for the first time, to solely own the business along with … [Jaswinder],” thereby breaching and repudiating the oral agreement between the parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11, & 25.) Plaintiffs contend they each own an interest in the partnership business. (Id. at ¶ 25.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action against Mangal and Jaswinder: (1) breach of oral agreement; (2) fraud; (3) declaratory relief, accounting, and dissolution of partnership; (4) deceit; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6) constructive trust; and (7) conversion.

After Plaintiffs filed the complaint in the Lead Action, Mangal and Jaswinder filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging various affirmative defenses. As is relevant here, Mangal and Jaswinder’s second affirmative defense alleges that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by the doctrine of estoppel and their fifth affirmative defense alleges that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiffs later filed a Doe amendment substituting JM Bhullar for a Doe defendant.

Subsequently, JM Bhullar filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging various affirmative defenses. As is relevant here, JM Bhullar’s second affirmative defense alleges that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by the doctrine of estoppel and its fifth affirmative defense alleges that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.

On November 1, 2016, Gurdial filed the operative complaint against Mangal and Jaswinder in the Derivative Action.

According to the allegations of the complaint, on August 1, 2004, Mangal, on behalf of himself and his wife Jaswinder, “proposed to [Gurdial] that [Gurdial] provide [Mangal] with funds from the sale of a business owned by [Gurdial], which [Mangal] would use to purchase property that would be jointly owned and from the eventual sale of which [Gurdial] would be repaid in proportion to his investment in [the] property.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 7, 16, & 24.) Mangal stated that “he would oversee and manage their joint investment in order to assure each of them a good, valuable and reasonable rate of return.” (Id. at ¶¶ 7 & 16.) Gurdial orally agreed to provide Mangal with funds from the sale of his business in reliance on Mangal’s promise that Mangal would “invest the funds in the manner indicated and … that [he] would be repaid thereafter.” (Id. at ¶ 8.)

In reliance on Mangal’s statements, Gurdial authorized a payment to Mangal in the sum of $167,832.84. (Complaint, ¶ 10 & 17-20.) The payment was made “out of escrow from the sale of [Gurdial’s] business.” (Ibid.) Over the following years, Gurdial would occasionally ask Mangal “about the money he had invested” and Mangal represented to him and assured him that “the money had been invested in various properties and that the funds were earning a very good rate of return.” (Id. at ¶¶ 11 & 16.)
On November 1, 2014, Plaintiffs approached Mangal “to inquire about the status of [the] business they … purchased together.” (Complaint, ¶ 12.) During that conversation, Gurdial also asked about the funds he paid to Mangal to invest in real property. (Ibid.) Mangal then “stated, for the first time, that he would not repay [Gurdial] the funds paid … to him and denied that [Gurdial] had every [sic] loaned, invested or paid … [him] those funds.” (Ibid.) Mangal and Jaswinder thereby repudiated and breached their oral agreement with Gurdial. (Id. at ¶ 13.) In addition, Mangal and Jaswinder allegedly converted the funds for their own purposes and use. (Id. at ¶ 25.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Gurdial alleges the following causes of action against Mangal and Jaswinder: (1) breach of oral agreement; (2) fraud; and (3) constructive trust.

After Gurdial filed the complaint in the Derivative Action, Mangal and Jaswinder filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging various affirmative defenses. As is relevant here, Mangal and Jaswinder’s second affirmative defense alleges that Gurdial’s causes of action are barred by the doctrine of estoppel and their fifth affirmative defense alleges that Gurdial’s causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.

The two actions were consolidated for all purposes by court order on June 8, 2017.

On August 21, 2019, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. Plaintiffs filed papers in opposition to the motion on October 22, 2019.

Discussion

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, Defendants move for summary judgment of the complaints filed in this consolidated action or, alternatively, summary adjudication of each and every cause of action alleged against them.

I. Requests for Judicial Notice

A. Defendants’ Request

In connection with their moving papers, Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of: the docket in Gurdial Dosanjh and Parmjit K. Dosanjh (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 2015-6-FL-014705); court records filed in Gurdial Dosanjh and Parmjit K. Dosanjh (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 2015-6-FL-014705); an Individual Grant Deed for real property located at 1704 Senter Road, San Jose, California; and a Fictitious Business Name Statement.

The docket and the documents filed in Gurdial Dosanjh and Parmjit K. Dosanjh (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 2015-6-FL-014705) are generally proper subjects of judicial notice as the documents are court records relevant to arguments raised in the pending motion. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [permitting judicial notice of court records]; see also First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [taking judicial notice of court docket]; People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455 [courts may “take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached—in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments—but [the court] cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact.”].)

As to the recorded documents (i.e., the Individual Grant Deed and Fictitious Business Name Statement), the law is clear that recorded documents are generally proper subjects for judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h); see also Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265 (Fontenot), disapproved on other grounds in Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 [“[t]he official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorder’s office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute”].) While it would be improper to take judicial notice of the truth of statements of fact recited within such documents, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of the legal effect of the language therein when that effect is clear. (Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) Therefore, the Court may take judicial notice of existence and legal effect of the recorded documents.

Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

B. Plaintiffs’ Request

In connection with their opposition, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of a Fictitious Business Name Statement.

As the Fictitious Business Name Statement is a recorded document, it is generally a proper subject of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h); see also Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264-265 [“[t]he official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorder’s office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute”].) While it would be improper to take judicial notice of the truth of statements of fact recited within the document, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of the legal effect of the language therein when that effect is clear. (Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) Thus, the Court may take judicial notice of existence and legal effect of the recorded document.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

II. Evidentiary Objections

In connection with their opposition, Plaintiffs assert various evidentiary objections in their separate statement. Additionally, Plaintiffs submit a separate document containing evidentiary objections to exhibits attached to the declaration of Defendants’ counsel.

As an initial matter, the evidentiary objections set forth in Plaintiffs’ opposing separate statement are procedurally improper because they are not set forth in a separate document. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1354(b) [all written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion].)

Furthermore, the separate document containing Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. Rather than submit two separate documents as required by the rule—one setting forth the objections and another setting forth a proposed order—Plaintiffs submitted a single packet of objections signed by counsel, with blanks apparently for the Court to indicate its rulings, but with no place for the Court to sign. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1354(b) [a party must provide written objections that comply with one of the formats described in the rule] (c) [a party must provide a proposed order that complies with one of the formats described in the rule].) This hybrid document does not comply with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1354.

Because Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections do not comply with the California Rules of Court, the Court is not required to rule on the objections. (See Vineyard Spring Estates v. Super. Ct. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 633, 642 [trial courts only have duty to rule on evidentiary objections presented in proper format]; see also Hodjat v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [trial court is not required to rule on objections that do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354 and is not required to give objecting party a second chance at filing properly formatted papers].)

Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections.

III. Legal Standard

The pleadings limit the issues presented for summary judgment or adjudication and such a motion may not be granted or denied based on issues not raised by the pleadings. (See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258; Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73.)

A motion for summary judgment must dispose of the entire action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a); All Towing Services LLC v. City of Orange (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 946, 954 [“Summary judgment is proper only if it disposes of the entire lawsuit.”].) “Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more of its elements cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. [Citation.] Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.’ [Citation.] ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ [Citation.]” (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272 (Madden).)

“Summary adjudication works the same way, except it acts on specific causes of action or affirmative defenses, rather than on the entire complaint. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (f).) … Motions for summary adjudication proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.’ ” (Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, 464.)

For purposes of establishing their respective burdens, the parties involved in a motion for summary judgment or adjudication must present admissible evidence. (Saporta v. Barbagelata (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 463, 468.) Additionally, in ruling on the motion, a court cannot weigh said evidence or deny the motion on the ground that any particular evidence lacks credibility. (See Melorich Builders v. Super. Ct. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 931, 935; see also Lerner v. Super. Ct. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 656, 660.) As summary judgment or adjudication “is a drastic remedy eliminating trial,” the court must liberally construe evidence in support of the party opposing the motion and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (See Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389; see also Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 714, 717-18.)

IV. Substantive Merits of the Motion

Defendants initially argue they are entitled to summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication because the doctrine of judicial estoppel provides a complete defense to Gurdial’s claims against them. (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 8:23-12:9.) Defendants assert Gurdial did not disclose his partnership or ownership interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or his investment in real property purchased by Mangal in a prior marriage dissolution action, Gurdial Dosanjh and Parmjit K. Dosanjh (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 2015-6-FL-014705). (Ibid.) Defendants contend Gurdial represented that he had disclosed all of his assets in court filings, and the court accepted his position when it entered a Stipulated Judgment for Dissolution. (Ibid.) Defendants conclude that Gurdail “repeatedly denied the existence of the very claims that he now presents in this case” and he should, therefore, be judicially estopped from asserting that he has an interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or real property purchased by Mangal. (Ibid., italics omitted)

In support of their argument, Defendants offer undisputed material fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-10. UMF Nos. 1-10 state that: Gurdial and his ex-wife married in 1993, and all of their assets developed during their marriage, including Gurdial’s interest in the Happy Hollow Market business; Gurdial and his ex-wife separated in 2015 or 2016; Gurdial filed a petition to dissolve their marriage on May 29, 2015; in August 2015, Gurdial filed a schedule of assets and debts, in which he did not disclose his alleged interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or any investment in real property; in January 2016, Gurdial provided responses to discovery requests, stating that he did not have any interest in property held by others and he did not have records supporting claims to property, debts, or obligations; in May 2016 and January 2017, Gurdial filed declarations, stating that his only significant assets were the family home and his pizza business; and a Stipulated Judgment for Dissolution was filed on May 28, 2019, which purported to list all of Gurdial’s assets, but did not disclose his alleged interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or any investment in real property.

The evidence submitted in support of these UMF includes Gurdial’s deposition testimony, Gurdial’s responses to discovery requests propounded in the marital dissolution action, and court records filed in the marital dissolution action.

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes called the doctrine of ‘ “ ‘preclusion of inconsistent positions’ ” ’ [citation] precludes a party from obtaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then seeking a second advantage by asserting an incompatible position. [Citation].” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448–449 (Minish).) “However, ‘numerous decisions have made clear that judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and its application, even where all necessary elements are present, is discretionary.’ [Citations.] Moreover, because judicial estoppel is an extraordinary and equitable remedy that can impinge on the truth-seeking function of the court and produce harsh consequences, it must be ‘applied with caution and limited to egregious circumstances’ [citations] that is, ‘ “ ‘when a party’s inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 449.)

Judicial estoppel applies “when ‘ “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Thomas v. Gordon (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 113, 118; Minish, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.)

In order for Defendants to succeed in demonstrating that judicial estoppel should apply, they are required to adduce admissible evidence establishing each element underlying the doctrine. (See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178.) Defendants produced undisputed evidence that Gurdial failed to list his claims against Defendants in his marital dissolution action, which was initiated in 2015. Undisputed evidence establishes that the family law court entered a Stipulated Judgment for Dissolution, based on Gurdial’s representation that he had disclosed all of his assets. Thus, Defendants presented evidence that establishes the first four elements of judicial estoppel, i.e., that Gurdial took two inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings and he was successful in the marital dissolution proceeding.

With respect to the fifth element, Defendants attempted to establish that Gurdial intentionally failed to disclose his claims against them by showing that the alleged wrongful conduct occurred, and Gurdial was aware of said conduct, before the filing of the marital dissolution action. (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 11:27-12:8.)

However, there is no evidence that Gurdial placed a value on his claims against Defendants before he filed the instant action. Nothing indicates that Gurdial knew that his claims had any value when he filed his declarations and schedule of assets and debts in the marital dissolution action. Second, although the trier-of-fact could make the inference Defendants suggest based on the timing of Gurdial’s awareness of the alleged wrongful conduct and his marital dissolution filing, the trier-of fact could also make the reasonable inference that Gurdial did not know he was required to disclose his potential claims against Defendants to the family law court. After all, Gurdial did not file suit against Defendants until after he submitted his schedule and declarations in the marital dissolution action. His failure to list his claims could be attributed to oversight or neglect as easily as to some ulterior motive. As the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of Gurdial, the Court therefore infers that Gurdial’s failure to disclose his claims against Defendants in his marital dissolution case was unintentional. (See Kelsey v. Waste Management of Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 590, 599 (Kelsey).)

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Defendants met their initial burden, Gurdial raises a triable issue of fact in his opposition. Gurdial submitted a declaration stating that he omitted his claims against Defendants from his filings in the marital dissolution case because Mangal “disclaimed [his] interest in Happy Hollow Market in November 2014,” he had never been provided with tax documents evidencing his interest, and, “at the time, [he] did not believe [his] litigation claim was an ‘asset’ ” such that it needed to be disclosed in the marital dissolution proceedings. (Gurdial Dec., ¶ 3.) These statements must be accepted as true. (See Zeilman v. County of Kern (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1179, fn. 3 [“The facts alleged in affidavits by the party against whom summary judgment is based must be accepted as true.”].) Gurdial’s declaration thus shows that he was ignorant of the need to disclose his claims against Defendants in his marital dissolution case, and raises a triable issue regarding Gurdial’s motives in failing to disclose his interest in the Happy Hollow Market business and real property purchased by Mangal in his schedule and declarations. (See Kelsey, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 599–600 [party’s declaration that he was not aware that he was required to disclose a Department of Fair Employment and Housing charge in bankruptcy court created a triable issue of material fact as to the fifth element of judicial estoppel].) Because triable issues of fact exist regarding the defense of judicial estoppel, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment or adjudication on this basis.

Next, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication because Gurdial’s “inconsistent deposition testimony defeats his claims [in the Derivative Action] that there is property to be jointly-owned with [Mangal].” (Mem. Ps. & As., p. 12:10-28, emphasis omitted.) Defendants contend that Gurdial admitted during deposition that “he has no claim to any real estate investment.” (Ibid.) Specifically, Defendants assert that Gurdial replied, “No, no other thing” when he was asked if he ever invested “in any other real property with Mangal.” (Ibid.) Defendants further assert that Gurdial testified he was currently employed as a truck driver and he did not own an interest in any business other that Happy Hollow Market. (Ibid.)

In support of their argument, Defendants offer UMF No. 1, which provides that Gurdial stated at deposition that he has no claim to any real estate investment.

The evidence cited in support of UMF No. 1 is page 109 of Gurdial’s deposition testimony, which is purportedly attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the declaration of Defendants’ counsel.

Defendants’ argument is not well-taken. First, although excerpts from Gurdial’s deposition testimony are attached as Exhibit 1 to the declaration of Defendants’ counsel, Exhibit 1 does not include page 109 of Gurdial’s deposition testimony. Furthermore, the pages that are included in Exhibit 1 do not contain Gurdial’s purported testimony that is quoted in Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities. Thus, the evidence proffered by Defendants does not support UMF No. 1.

Second, even if Defendants had submitted evidence that Gurdial testified as quoted in their memorandum of points and authorities, that testimony, in and of itself, does not establish the purported undisputed material fact. As explained above, Gurdial’s testimony, as quoted in Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities, was merely that he had not invested “in any other real property with Mangal,” he was currently employed as a truck driver, and he did not own an interest in any business other that Happy Hollow Market. (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 12:10-28, italics added.) As is relevant here, this testimony demonstrates that Gurdial had at least one investment in real property with Mangal. It does not show that Gurdial admitted he has no claim to any real estate investment. Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment or adjudication on this basis.

Defendants also argue they are entitled to summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication because Plaintiffs “are unable to establish their real property claims by clear and convincing evidence.” (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 13:2-14:28, emphasis omitted.) Defendants begin their argument by stating that an owner of legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title, and this presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. (Ibid.) Defendants then assert that “[a]t issue is the real property located at 1704 Senter Road, San Jose, California.” (Ibid.) Defendants state that Plaintiffs claim they obtained ownership interests in the real property when the Happy Hollow Market business was acquired as a partnership. (Ibid.) Defendants contend that title to the real property is in Mangal and Jaswinder’s names only. (Ibid.) Defendants indicate that the real property has been transferred since it was initially purchased in 2002, but the transfers were exclusively between Mangal and Jaswinder. (Ibid.) Defendants urge that Plaintiffs cannot rebut the presumption created by Mangal and Jaswinder’s ownership of legal title because legal title to the real property has never been in Plaintiffs’ names; Plaintiffs have not contributed money towards the real property since 2002; other than cashier’s checks, there is no writing that evidences Plaintiffs’ claim of ownership of the real property; and there is no written evidence showing that the checks were paid. (Ibid.)

In support of their argument, Defendants offer UMF Nos. 1-11. UMF Nos. 1-11 state that: at issue is real property located at 1704 Senter Road, San Jose, California; Plaintiffs claim they obtained ownership interests in the real property when the Happy Hollow Market business was acquired as a partnership; Mangal and Jaswinder acquired title to the real property solely in their names; there were separate escrows for the purchase of the Happy Hollow Market business and the purchase of the real property; although the real property has been transferred since 2002, the transfers were between Mangal and Jaswinder; title to the real property was not in Plaintiffs’ names; Plaintiffs did not contribute money to the real property since 2002; Plaintiffs never paid property taxes or insurance on the real property; Plaintiffs never paid for upkeep; Mangal and Jaswinder have received all of the income on the real property since 2002; and there is no writing evidencing Plaintiffs’ claim to ownership in the real property.
The evidence submitted in support of these UMF includes Gurdial’s deposition testimony, the Individual Grant Deed, and Mangal’s declaration.

Defendants’ argument fails to establish that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. As is relevant here, Defendants bear the initial burden of showing that one or more of Plaintiffs’ causes of action lack merit by showing that one or more of the elements of those causes of action cannot be established. (See Madden, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272; see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.) Defendants fail to meet their burden because they do not clearly tie their argument to any of the ten causes of action alleged in this consolidated action. Rather, Defendants merely assert that their argument disposes of Plaintiffs’ “real property claims.” (Mem. Ps. & As., p. 13:2-3.) Nowhere in their memorandum of points and authorities do Defendants forth the requisite elements of Plaintiffs’ claims. Furthermore, Defendants do not explain why the proffered UMF prove that one or more elements of Plaintiffs’ causes of action cannot be established, thereby entitling them to summary judgment or summary adjudication of the alleged claims. Where, as here, Defendants have failed to identify the elements of any of Plaintiffs’ claims and present reasoned argument explaining why their UMF prove that one or more elements of those claims cannot be established, they are not entitled to summary judgment or adjudication. (See Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67–68 [a party is not entitled to summary judgment based on undisputed material facts if the party has not identified in the moving papers how said facts are material to the complaint and how those facts entitle the party to summary judgment as a matter of law]; see also Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2 (Schaeffer) [same].)

Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication because Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations. (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 15:1-16:3.) Defendants assert that this consolidated action was required to be brought within three years of the time that Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their fraud claim, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (Ibid.) Defendants further contend that inquiry notice of facts underlying a claim is sufficient to show that a plaintiff show have known of the claim. (Ibid.) Defendants then state that: they never acknowledged that Plaintiffs had an ownership interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or real property; Fictitious Business Name Statements were recorded, which did not include Plaintiffs’ names; and Gurdial claims his requests for information about the alleged partnership were ignored for years. (Ibid.)

In support of their argument, Defendants offer UMF Nos. 1-3. UMF Nos. 1-3 state that: Mangal never acknowledged that Plaintiffs had any ownership interest in the Happy Hollow Market business or real property; Mangal bought out Plaintiffs’ interest in the Happy Hollow Market business in 2003; and Gurdial claims his requests for information about the alleged partnership were ignored for years.

The evidence submitted in support of these UMF includes Mangal’s declaration and Gurdial’s deposition testimony.

Defendants’ argument fails to establish that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. As a preliminary matter, Defendants do not present any legal authority or reasoned argument showing that the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) is applicable to all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d) applies to “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) Many of Plaintiffs causes of action do not seek relief on the ground of fraud and mistake. For example, Plaintiffs allege claims for breach contract, declaratory relief, accounting, dissolution of partnership, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and conversion. Defendants do not present any legal authority or reasoned argument showing that these claims are governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). (See Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785 [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; Schaeffer, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 619, fn. 2 [same].)

Furthermore, Defendants do not state or otherwise establish, in their memorandum of points and authorities or in their UMF, when each cause of action accrued or when the applicable statute of limitations expired. Because Defendants do not establish these necessary material facts, they fail to demonstrate that Plaintiffs filed their complaints in this consolidated action after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. For these reasons, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment or adjudication on this basis.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication is DENIED.