Filed 11/6/19 Marbun v. Manullang CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JHON MARBUN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAINAL MANULLANG,

Defendant.

JAINAL MANULLANG,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JHON MARBUN,

Defendant and Respondent.

E071006

(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1314399)

OPINION

(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1404585)

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S. McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.

Jainal Manullang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Clayson, Bainer & Saunders and Roland C. Bainer, for Defendant and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and appellant, Jainal Manullang, appearing in pro. per. appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent, Jhon Marbun. Manullang’s briefs are not clear, but he appears to argue the trial court erred in four ways: (1) the trial court denied his request for a trial continuance; (2) the trial court improperly granted Marbun’s three unopposed motions in limine; (3) the trial court did not allow him to present “witnesses, photographs, documents and/or evidences”; and (4) the trial court failed to properly instruct Marbun on the “proper rules of court and/or court procedures.”

We reject Manullang’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After Manullang and Marbun got into a physical altercation, Manullang sued Marbun in November 2013 for, among other things, assault and battery. Manullang amended his complaint over two years later, in November 2016.

In January 2017, Manullang appeared pro. per. at a trial setting conference during which the trial court set trial for August 2017. In July 2017, however, the trial court granted Manullang’s motion for a continuance of the trial, and reset the trial for October 2017.

In October 2017, the trial court held another trial setting conference. Manullang’s attorney, Kelly Casado, appeared on his behalf. The trial court set trial for May 14, 2018, and set the trial readiness conference for May 10, 2018.

Manullang appeared at the May 10, 2018, conference, but Casado failed to appear. On the morning of the May 14, 2018, trial, Casado requested a continuance of the trial because he “completely miscalendared the matter and did not prepare trial documents.” The trial court denied the request.

The trial court then ruled on Marbun’s three unopposed motions in limine and proceeded with trial. The jury returned a full defense verdict in Marbun’s favor. Manullang timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Manullang’s Request for a Trial Continuance
B.
Manullang contends the trial court erred when it denied Casado’s oral request to continue the trial. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in doing so.

We review a trial court’s order denying a continuance for an abuse of discretion. (Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) “The decision to grant or deny a continuance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court’s exercise of that discretion will be upheld if it is based on a reasoned judgment and complies with legal principles and policies appropriate to the case before the court. [Citation.] A reviewing court may not disturb the exercise of discretion by a trial court in the absence of a clear abuse thereof appearing in the record.” (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984-985; see also City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 [a trial court abuses its discretion only if “its action was utterly irrational”.)

Trial continuances are “disfavored” and may be granted “only on an affirmative showing of good cause.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (c) lists seven circumstances “that may indicate good cause,” none of which applies here. However, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (d) lists additional factors the trial court may consider, including “the proximity of the trial date, whether there were previous trial continuances, the length of the requested continuance, and the prejudice that parties or witnesses would suffer as a result of the continuance. [Citation.]” (Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126.)

In County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 781 (Doria) [Fourth Dist., Div. 2], this court upheld the trial court’s denial of an oral motion to continue made on the morning of the first day of trial. This court concluded the denial was justified because (1) the continuance was requested on the first day of trial; (2) the opposing party was ready to proceed; (3) the party requesting the continuance made the request orally, not in writing; and (4) the request did not have a supporting declaration (or evidence). (Id. at p. 783.)

Here, as in Doria, Manullang’s attorney, Casado, made the request for a continuance orally on the first day of trial in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (b). Casado did not submit any written motion or evidence in support of the request, even though Manullang presumably knew days before—when Casado failed to appear at the trial readiness conference due to a calendaring error—that Casado was not prepared for trial. Under Doria, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Manullang’s request for a trial continuance. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Casado’s oral motion, because it would have required the trial court to violate California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (b)’s requirement that requests for a trial continuance must be made in writing.

But even if Casado had properly and timely made the request, the trial court reasonably denied the request on its merits. At the time of the May 2018 request for a continuance, the case had been pending for over four and a half years, and the trial court had already granted Manullang’s first request for a trial continuance in July 2017. (See Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126 [affirming trial court’s denial of request for a continuance when trial had already been continued].) None of the grounds listed in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332 that “may indicate good cause” for a continuance was present, and we are unaware of any authority that suggests Casado’s being unprepared because he “miscalendared” the trial date was good cause to continue the trial. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Manullang’s second request for a trial continuance.

Manullang seemingly argues the trial court’s refusal to continue the trial prejudiced him because it prevented him from presenting evidence. For the reasons explained below, we conclude Manullang forfeited this argument by failing to properly support it with argument and citations to the record. Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Manullang’s request for a trial continuance, even if doing so precluded Manullang from offering evidence at trial. (See Doria, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 783.)

Finally, Manullang suggests the trial court should have continued the trial because Casado provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Even assuming Manullang is correct, Casado’s allegedly deficient performance would not justify reversal because the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not apply in civil matters, such as this one. (See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 [“[A]n indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”].)

C. The Trial Court’s Rulings on Marbun’s Motions in Limine Do Not Justify Reversal
D.
In the argument section of his brief, Manullang argues, without explanation, that “[t]he [trial] [c]ourt [c]ommitted [p]rejudicial [e]rror [i]n [n]ot [a]llowing [him] [t]o [f]ile [e]vidence [n]ecessary [t]o [p]rove [h]is [c]ase.” Manullang further asserts that “[d]uring the subject hearing [he] was not allowed by the court to produce his witnesses, photographs, documents and/or evidences that was crucial to [his] case.” Elsewhere in his brief, Manullang faults Casado for not opposing Marbun’s three motions in limine “filed to exclude everything [Manullang] needed to use to prove his case.” In granting Marbun’s first motion in limine, Manullang contends the trial court impermissibly “limited [his] testimony to . . . testifying as to what happened” during his altercation with Marbun. Manullang also claims the trial court granted Marbun’s third motion in limine, and excluded him from showing the jury photographs of himself after the altercation.

Manullang thus appears to assert the trial court’s rulings on Marbun’s three motions in limine were erroneous and warrant reversal. We disagree.

As a threshold matter, Manullang forfeited his right to challenge on appeal the trial court’s rulings on Marbun’s motions in limine by failing to oppose them in the trial court. (See Mangano v. Verity, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217, 221 [defendant who failed to oppose motion in limine to exclude evidence forfeited his ability to argue on appeal that the evidence was improperly excluded]; Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 286 fn. 52 [party forfeits ability to challenge trial court’s exclusion of evidence on appeal by failing to object in the trial court].)

But even if Manullang did not forfeit his challenges to the trial court’s rulings on Marbun’s motions in limine, we reject them on the merits.

Trial courts have “broad discretion” when ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and a trial court’s “ruling will be upset only if there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” (Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 519-520.) Even if a trial court erroneously excludes evidence, the error does not justify reversal unless “‘it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the error. [Citations.]’” (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 998, 1013.)

In his first motion in limine, Marbun moved to preclude Manullang from testifying about the diagnosis, prognosis, or cause of his medical or psychological conditions related to the parties’ altercation. Marbun asserted that, as a layperson, Manullang was not qualified to offer any such testimony. The trial court granted the motion in part, allowing Manullang to testify only about what occurred and any injuries he suffered to the extent his diagnosis or the cause of the injuries did not require expert medical attention. The court explained, for instance, that Manullang could testify about whether he was bleeding after the altercation, but could not testify about whether he suffered a concussion.

The trial court’s ruling was proper. Laypersons like Manullang are not permitted to testify about medical issues that require expert knowledge, skill, or training. (Evid. Code, § 800; Salasquevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379.) The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in limiting Manullang’s testimony to what he perceived about his injuries and symptoms, and excluding him from offering any medical diagnosis or evaluation.

The trial court granted Marbun’s second motion in limine, which sought to prevent Manullang from offering any expert testimony because he did not disclose any expert in discovery. Although it is unclear whether Manullang is challenging on appeal the trial court’s ruling on Marbun’s second motion in limine, we nevertheless address the issue on the merits.

Upon the demand of any party, all parties must exchange written information about their expert trial witnesses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210.) If a party does not identify an expert witness in discovery, the trial court “shall exclude” the expert’s testimony at trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.300.) Because Manullang did not disclose any experts in discovery, the trial court was required to preclude him from offering any expert testimony. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in granting Marbun’s second motion in limine.

Marbun’s third motion in limine sought to exclude photographs of Manullang after the parties’ altercation. The trial court denied the motion. We therefore assume Manullang is not challenging that ruling on appeal. To the extent Manullang claims the trial court impermissibly excluded “photographs” that were “crucial” to his case, he has forfeited the argument by failing to support it with appropriate record citations. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407 [argument forfeited if not supported by record citations].) Manullang has not pointed to anything in the record that suggests the trial court excluded photographs that he sought to introduce into evidence.

Thus, to the extent Manullang claims the trial court erred when ruling on Marbun’s motions in limine, we disagree and find no error in the trial court’s rulings.

E. Manullang Forfeited His Remaining Arguments
F.
“Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) Pro. per. litigants therefore are “treated like any other party and [are] entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) This means pro. per. litigants must follow the courts’ rules. (Ibid.)

One of those rules is that, on appeal, the appellant has the burden “to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204, subd. (a)(1)(C).) “We need not address points in appellate briefs that are unsupported by adequate factual or legal analysis.” (Placer County Local Agency Formation Com. v. Nevada County Local Agency Formation Com. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 793, 814.) More importantly, we cannot address a party’s argument if it is devoid of any meaningful explanation because “‘[i]t is neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb the record on [a party’s] behalf.’” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.) Thus, when a party fails to support an argument with appropriate and adequate citations to the record, we may disregard it. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1110, fn. 8.)

Manullang argues the trial court excluded “witnesses, photographs, documents, and/or evidence that was crucial to [his] case” and that the trial court “[e]rroneously [r]efused [t]o [i]nstruct [t]he [o]pposing [c]ounsel [p]roperly [l]eading [t]o [i]mproper [r]ulings and/or [o]rders.” Manullang also seems to suggest the trial court’s refusal to grant a trial continuance prevented him from presenting “[p]ertinent evidence and information.” Manullang does not expound on these argument or cite any record evidence to support them. He does not explain with any specificity what evidence the trial court purportedly excluded, why it was “crucial,” or how its exclusion affected the outcome of the trial. Manullang also does not explain how the trial court’s denying his request for a trial continuance precluded him from proffering evidence at trial, and he does not identify the evidence he would have presented had the trial court granted his request. Nor does Manullang explain how the trial court failed to properly instruct Marbun or his counsel, or how its alleged failure to do so prejudiced him.

In short, the deficiencies in Manullang’s opening brief and reply brief effectively prevent us from reviewing his claims of error because we are left guessing what the trial court excluded from evidence, how the trial court failed to instruct Marbun and his attorneys, how the trial court’s alleged errors affected the trial, and whether the trial court’s alleged errors justify reversal. We therefore conclude Manullang forfeited his remaining arguments. (See Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 599-600 [appellant forfeited argument that trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous because appellant “fail[ed] to identify which evidentiary rulings were purportedly made in error and fail[ed] to offer any legal argument in support of the claims of error”].) Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment.

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.