Filed 11/20/19 Hristopoulos v. Giannaris CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MARIA HRISTOPOULOS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NICK GIANNARIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A154868

(San Mateo County

Super. Ct. No. FAM119610)

We are familiar with the background of this family law case through our review of four prior appeals. (Hristopoulos v. Giannaris, A152099 & A152239, filed Jan. 28, 2019; A154077 & A154773, filed June 17, 2019.) In the present appeal, Nick Giannaris (Father) challenges a prefiling order declaring him a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7.) We shall affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and respondent Maria Hristopoulos (Mother) are the parents of one child (Minor), who lives with Mother. They have been litigating issues of custody, visitation, and child support since 2012. Father has been representing himself in these proceedings.

On May 14, 2018, the trial court sought to declare Father a vexatious litigant, apparently on its own motion, and set a hearing on the matter. On July 6, the trial court declared Father a vexatious litigant and issued a prefiling order prohibiting him from filing any new litigation without approval of the presiding judge or justice.

In the accompanying findings, the trial court explained that Father had filed 13 requests for order (RFO) while in propria persona. It considered 11 of those unmeritorious or vexatious. They are as follows: (1) an RFO filed November 17, 2017 seeking appointment of counsel for Minor, which the court denied; (2) an RFO filed January 4, 2018 seeking conditional unsealing of court records to allow investigation of Mother’s counsel, which the court denied as unnecessary; (3) an RFO filed January 8, 2018 seeking judicial review of Father’s driver’s license suspension, which the court denied; (4) an RFO filed January 12, 2018 seeking designation of the action as complex and assigning a single judicial officer, which the presiding judge denied; (5) an RFO filed January 16, 2018 seeking sanctions against Mother for fraud, perjury, and malice, which was denied on the ground the relief sought was not authorized by law; (6) an RFO filed March 19, 2018, seeking modification of custody and visitation orders and an assessment, which was almost identical to requests the trial court had denied just three weeks earlier; (7) an RFO filed April 6, 2018 seeking to compel Mother to respond to third party subpoenas that Father had issued but never served on the third parties, which was denied; (8) an RFO filed April 19, 2018 seeking reconsideration of the denial of Father’s motion for complex designation, which the court found was stayed by Father’s appeal of the order; (9) Father’s refusal to stipulate to a commissioner hearing a child support modification motion filed April 30, 2018, although he had previously entered an all-purpose stipulation to a commissioner hearing such matters; (10) an RFO filed May 10, 2018 seeking sanctions, which was nearly identical to an RFO filed the following day; the court had not yet ruled on the May 10, 2018 request; and (11) an RFO filed May 11, 2018 (erroneously referred to in the order as May 10, 2018) seeking sanctions under section 128.7 and sanctions for fraud, perjury, and malice, which was denied as seeking relief not authorized by statute

Father has appealed from the prefiling order.

DISCUSSION

The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391–391.8) are “designed to curb misuse of the court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system and other litigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169–1170.) “ ‘Vexatious litigant’ ” is defined to include a person who, “[i]n any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(3).) One of the remedies provided by the statutory scheme allows a court to enter a “prefiling order” prohibiting a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in propria persona—including a motion or application for an order under the Family Code—without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or presiding justice of the court. (§ 391.7, subds. (a) & (d).)

We presume an order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct, and uphold it if supported by substantial evidence. (Holcomb v. U.S. Bank. Nat. Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498–1499.) As appellant, Father has the burden to show error with an adequate record (Cypress Security, LLC v. City of County of San Francisco (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1014 (Cypress Security)), and we presume the evidence supports the judgment (Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003). The appellant must support his arguments by references to the record, including page citations: “ ‘An appellate court is not required to search the record to determine whether or not [it] supports appellants’ claim of error.’ ” (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140–1141.) A party acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules on appeal as one represented by counsel. (Cassidy v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 628; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)

Father has not met his burden to show error. First, Father does not provide record citations for most of the RFO’s or other pleadings on which the trial court based its finding that he is a vexatious litigant and, as far as we can tell, the appellate record does not contain them. We have no basis to conclude the trial court erred in finding them unmeritorious. (See Cypress Security, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014 [appellant has burden to show error with adequate record].)

Moreover, the trial court relied on 11 RFO’s and other pleadings to find Father a vexatious litigant, but Father’s specific challenges are limited to two of them. Neither challenge is persuasive. One of the pleadings Father contends is meritorious is a motion to “ ‘quash’ ” service of an order. But the court explained that Father had received some of the relief he requested in that motion, and therefore the court did not find it unmeritorious or rely on it in finding Father a vexatious litigant. It does not assist Father.

The other pleading Father contends was meritorious is a motion seeking review of the suspension of his driver’s license by San Mateo County’s Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). He argues that he has a disability that requires him to use an automobile for his daily activities, and that he sought review of the suspension in good faith at the suggestion of DCSS. Even assuming this is true, Father has not demonstrated that his request, which the trial court denied, had legal merit. And, in any case, this request was only one of 11 that the court relied on to find Father a vexatious litigant. (See People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237 [“ ‘one good reason is sufficient to sustain the order from which the appeal was taken’ ”].) We are not persuaded the court would have reached a different result if it had taken into account only ten, rather than 11, unmeritorious motions.

In affirming the trial court’s order declaring appellant a vexatious litigant, we emphasize that the order does not close the courthouse doors to him. Where he has a meritorious request for orders in his family law case, appellant may seek and obtain the permission from the presiding judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County (or his/her designee) to litigate an issue. (§391.7, subd. (a).)

Father’s brief on appeal also purports to challenge a number of other orders of the trial court. Those matters are not before us in this appeal from the vexatious litigant order, and we do not consider them.

DISPOSITION

The July 6, 2018 prefiling order is affirmed. Maria Hristopoulos shall recover her costs on appeal.

_________________________

TUCHER, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

POLLAK, P. J.

_________________________

STREETER, J.

Hristopouls v. Giannaris (A154868)