Filed 11/27/19 Khatari v. Goodfellas Cash for Gold CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

PRADEEP K. KHATRI, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

GOODFELLAS CASH FOR GOLD, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

A152253

(Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. HG15774562)

Appellant Viral Khatri, the 21-year-old son of appellant Pradeep Khatri, had quickly accumulated $30,000 in debt on his credit cards. Taking numerous fine watches, gold coins, and various items of jewelry from his father’s collection—items determined at trial to have a value of $448,000—Viral pawned the items with David Jaser, a person from whom he had bought an item of sports memorabilia. Pradeep learned of this days later, and the family set out to retrieve the items, to no avail. He and Viral sued, naming three defendants, David, his brother Harb Jaser, and Goodfellas Cash for Gold, Inc., a store owned by Harb, at which location the pawn transaction took place—a store that had no pawn license and in fact never pawned anything. The lawsuit alleged two claims, “theft by false pretenses” and conversion. Following a six-day court trial, the court issued a comprehensive 22-page statement of decision holding that none of the defendants was liable under the theft claim and that only David was liable for conversion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Parties and the General Setting

Plaintiffs and appellants are Pradeep (sometimes called Peter at trial) Khatri and his son Viral. Pradeep lived in Belmont with his wife and three children—21-year-old Viral, his sister Farrah, and his older brother Sonny. Pradeep collected fine watches and gold coins, and by 2015 had between 20 and 25 fine watches and some 60 to 75 gold coins. He also collected jewelry and gemstones, all of which items he kept in his bedroom.

Defendants and respondents are Goodfellas Cash for Gold, Inc. (Goodfellas) and David and Harb Jaser, twin brothers who were age 31 at the time of the trial. Goodfellas is a California corporation, whose only shareholder is Harb, who is also its only officer. It has no employees. Goodfellas is a “cash for gold business,” one that purchases broken jewelry, necklaces, earrings, and rings, and melts the gold from them. It is not a pawn shop, and is not licensed to do pawns or make loans.

David, who had not graduated high school, had attended several community colleges but had not graduated. He had not had a job for some 10 to 12 years, and relied for financial support on his family, for whom he provided services such as taking care of the house, shopping, and running errands. Around 2014, David had tried to launch a business selling sports memorabilia, but was unsuccessful. He had never been an owner of Goodfellas or involved in the business in any way, and had never received a paycheck or any other form of compensation from it.

The Transaction

The transaction giving rise to the dispute occurred on April 18, 2015, brought about by Viral. It was as follows:

Viral described himself as a “musical engineer,” and claimed to produce, and perform in, rap and hip-hop videos and shows under the name “Overdose.”

Viral—whom the trial court would come to describe as an “impulsive, extremely foolish, susceptible and immature young man”—had within months of obtaining credit cards accumulated some $30,000 in credit card debt, some of which included expenses for the music business. And Viral came up with a plan to pay that debt: to pawn his father’s watches, gold coins, and jewelry to obtain cash to pay it. Viral knew David, from whom he had bought an item of sports memorabilia, and Viral several times texted and called David to attempt to set up a time to meet, testifying he told David he wanted to pawn some items. After several attempts, a meeting was set.

On April 18, Viral met David outside the Goodfellas store. They entered, and David first took Viral into the back area to show him some WWF professional wrestling items that he thought a rapper friend of Viral’s might be interested in. They then moved to the other side of the store, to the main area behind the glass partition. David asked Viral what he had, and Viral opened his backpack and showed him the items he had taken from his father’s bedroom.

At this point Harb was in the store behind the glass partition, walking toward the front door. As he was going out, Harb looked at the items in the backpack—for some five seconds, Viral said—and told David to weigh everything out, and give him a call. Harb then left the store. Viral and David remained alone in the store in the section behind the glass partition, where David laid out the jewelry items, weighed the gold coins but not the watches, and tested the gold and the watches with a liquid and a machine. Then, after the testing, and with Harb on speaker phone, David said the items were authentic. According to Viral, Harb asked David, “How much . . . it would come out to?” and David said “$25,000.” Viral believed that offer to be low, so he asked David to raise the offer to $27,000 or $28,000. And, Viral testified, after performing some calculations on his phone David agreed to $28,000, and Harb said “ok,” after which he hung up. The phone call was brief, one to two minutes.

Viral testified that David then went into a back room to obtain the cash. He also testified that David fingerprinted him and placed the fingerprint on a receipt he gave Viral. Viral never read the receipt and, claiming to have lost it, did not produce it at trial.

Viral believed he could retrieve the property upon repayment of the $28,000, as long as he came back in a timely fashion, describing timely as not six months or a year. He and David never discussed interest or other charges associated with the transaction, and Viral understood that if he did not return to claim the property, David would become the owner. Viral believed he was conducting a pawn and eventually told his father he pawned the property.

Viral took the cash he obtained from David and deposited $8,000 in a bank account. He gave the remainder to his uncle, who wrote checks to two credit card companies on Viral’s behalf.

Events Following the Transaction

Pradeep soon discovered that the items were missing, and asked his children if they had taken them. They all said no. On April 26, Viral told his brother Sonny what had occurred, and Sonny told Pradeep. And on April 27, Pradeep telephoned Viral and asked him to come to the house so they could speak. Pradeep was “very calm” during the call.

The next day, April 28, Pradeep, Viral, and Viral’s two siblings went to Goodfellas to try to reclaim the items. Pradeep asked Harb to return the items, who replied that the transaction was private between David and Viral. Harb testified that when he asked Pradeep if his son had stolen the items, Pradeep became very upset and said his son was not a thief, that he had permission to bring the items in.

On April 29, the four Khatris returned to Goodfellas along with Allen Davidson, a pawnshop owner who frequently sells jewelry to Pradeep. Davidson testified that Harb was not in the store, but that he and Viral spoke to him on the telephone. Harb told Davidson he did not have the merchandise, and that if there was a problem with stolen items, they should report the incident to the Hayward Police. Viral testified that Harb said he could not find a record of the transaction, and if items had been stolen they should go to the police station to file a report.

The Khatris went to the police department and were told it was a civil matter. This lawsuit followed.

The Proceedings Below

On June 17, 2015, Pradeep and Viral (when referred to collectively, plaintiffs) filed a complaint naming three defendants: Goodfellas, Harb, and David (when referred to collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged two causes of action, both against all defendants: (1) “theft by false pretenses” and (2) conversion. Among other things, the complaint alleged that “defendants were agents of each other and in performing the actions alleged herein and were acting within the course and scope of such agency and with the permission and consent of one another.” And the prayer included an “order that plaintiffs be awarded their costs of suit, treble damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 496.”

Defendants quickly filed an answer, and in November the case was set for jury trial in June 2016. In late May plaintiffs filed a trial brief, but at a May 27 case management conference the case was reset for court trial for September 6, then reset to September 12, on which day the case came on for court trial before a most experienced judge, the Honorable Jo-Lynne Lee. Judge Lee heard evidence for six days, on September 12, 13, 14, and 15, 2016, and February 27 and 28, 2017. Judge Lee did not just listen to the testimony or rule on the numerous exhibits that were referred to, but was a most active participant in the case, questioning the witnesses herself, sometimes at length, perhaps best illustrated by the 16 pages of questioning at the conclusion of Viral’s second session of testimony after he resumed the stand on September 14. Every volume of the reporter’s transcript contains examples of Judge Lee’s intense involvement in the trial, including her questioning of Harb and David. Judge Lee was, in short, a most involved jurist.

Following the close of evidence on February 28, the attorneys provided closing arguments, and the day ended with Judge Lee requesting the attorneys provide her with the actual pages of the reporter’s transcript that supported their arguments. And, the register of actions reflects, “excerpts” of trial testimony were filed on March 22.

On April 25, Judge Lee issued a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision (proposed statement) which found as follows: on the first cause of action, theft by false pretenses, for all defendants; and on the second, for conversion, against David only, awarding damages of $448,000.

On May 8, defendants filed objections to the proposed statement. A week later, plaintiffs filed their objections, which among other things asserted that the proposed statement failed to address the issue of respondeat superior liability as to Goodfellas and Harb based on what plaintiffs asserted was “the undisputed evidence” that David was at least an ostensible agent of Goodfellas and Harb. Plaintiffs also asserted that Judge Lee had misconstrued the civil remedy provided in Penal Code section 496 by limiting her analysis to a theory that defendants had received stolen property through false pretenses, when the civil remedy applied to receipt of property stolen through any kind of theft.

On May 15, Judge Lee filed her statement of decision. It was 22-pages long, and set forth in great detail, for over 10 pages, the “parties and the claims” and the “factual background.” There followed her “analysis and findings,” which included eight pages discussing the applicable law and applying it to the facts, leading to her three findings, which were as follows:

“(1) Plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements required to establish theft by false pretenses in violation of Penal Code section 496(a);

“(2) Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements of conversion as against Defendant David Jaser; and

“(3) Plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements required to find Defendant H[a]rb Jaser or Goodfellas Cash for Gold Liable for Conversion.”

Judgment was entered on June 19.

On June 30, plaintiffs filed notices of intent to move for new trial and to vacate judgment, and on July 10 filed their memoranda in support of the motions. Defendants filed opposition, plaintiffs a reply, and by order of August 15, Judge Lee denied both motions. It was not just a simple denial, but a comprehensive nine-paragraph order that, as pertinent to the issues plaintiffs raise on appeal, held as follows:

“First, Plaintiffs argue that the court did not address the allegation in the complaint that each of the Defendants were the agents of the other Defendants. Plaintiffs argue that Goodfellas should be found liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of David Jaser. The court does not agree with Plaintiffs’ claim that the issue was not addressed in the court’s Statement of Decision. The Statement of Decision addressed the evidence the court considered when determining that the transaction at issue occurred between only defendant David Jaser and plaintiff Viral Khatri. The court found that ‘the sufficiency of the evidence against defendants Goodfellas and Harb Jaser is, at best, questionable and that David was not representing Goodfellas or Harb Jaser . . . during the transaction.’ (Statement of Decision, Page 18, ¶2.) Further, the court specifically stated that ‘[a]t best, the evidence reflects that Harb Jaser may have believed his brother was working on a cash-for-gold transaction, but later determined no sale had actually occurred and his brother had concluded some “private” deal with Viral.’ (Id.) Additionally the Statement of Decision found that ‘the record does not sufficiently establish that Defendants Harb Jaser or Goodfellas knowingly and intentionally participated in the transaction.’ (Statement of Decision, Page 19, ¶3.)

“Plaintiffs’ argument hinges on a finding—specifically rejected by the court—that David Jaser was an employee or agent of Harb Jaser and/or Goodfellas and he was acting on behalf of them. Further David Jaser’s actions must be found to be within the scope of David’s employment/agency in order for plaintiffs to succeed under a theory of respondeat superior. See: Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 citing Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 967. The court explicitly found that David was not representing Goodfellas or H[a]rb Jaser when the transaction at issue occurred. Therefore, David Jaser was not acting within the scope of any employment. Additionally, the court’s evidentiary findings in the Statement of Decision do not support a finding of ostensible agency on behalf of Harb Jaser or Goodfellas. (Statement of Decision, Page 18, ¶2.)

“Second, Plaintiffs claim that the court did not address whether Goodfellas and Harb Jaser were liable under Penal Code section 496(b) and for the first time argue that the court should have considered embezzlement when determining if Defendant received property obtained ‘in any manner constituting theft.’ The record reflects that Plaintiff Pradeep Khatri has never accused Viral Khatri of theft in any manner. Indeed the evidence at trial was that when Defendant Harb Jaser accused Viral of being a thief, his father, plaintiff Pradeep Khatri, vehemently denied that accusation. Moreover, Viral Khatri is not a defendant in this case, nor has there ever been a claim that he was in conspiracy to embezzle property from his father. In any event, based upon the evidence introduced by Plaintiffs themselves, Viral Khatri’s actions did not constitute embezzlement. The court found that plaintiff Viral Khatri mistakenly believed that [he] was going to pawn the property and obtain a short term loan. (Statement of Decision, Page 18, ¶3.) As the Court of Appeal held in People v. MacArthur pawning property ‘does not transfer ownership or necessarily deprive the owner of possession permanently.’ People v. MacArthur (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 275, 277. The plaintiffs’ own evidence establishes that Viral did not have the required intent to permanently deprive his father of property and therefore, the elements of embezzlement cannot be satisfied.”

Plaintiffs appealed.

DISCUSSION

Judge Lee’s Ruling on the Conversion Claim Was Correct

As quoted above, on plaintiffs’ second cause of action for conversion Judge Lee found Goodfellas and Harb not liable, on the basis that “(3) Plaintiffs have not established by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements required to find Defendant H[a]rb Jaser or Goodfellas Cash for Gold Liable for Conversion.” Addressing the issues in reverse order from the claims in the complaint, plaintiffs first assert error in connection with the conversion claim, arguing that Judge Lee prejudicially erred by, in plaintiffs’ words, “failing to make a finding on uncontroverted evidence that David Jaser was an actual or ostensible agent of Goodfellas and/or Harb Jaser, and hence that these defendants were vicariously liable for David Jaser’s conversion of Plaintiff’s property under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Or, as plaintiffs put it in another place, “[their] evidence showing David Jaser was at least an ostensible agent of Goodfellas and Harb Jaser is uncontradicted and unimpeached; as a matter of law the record cannot support a finding that David Jaser was not an agent of the other defendants.”

Plaintiffs are wrong on all counts, beginning with the claim that the evidence was “uncontroverted,” “uncontradicted,” and “unimpeached.”

Plaintiffs’ view of the evidence, myopically focusing on what they claim was shown by Viral’s testimony, is only part of the story, as Judge Lee specifically found, beginning with her express finding that Viral’s testimony about Harb’s involvement in the transaction was, as she said in denying the new trial motion, “at best, questionable.” Or as Judge Lee described at another point, it was “inconsistent and vague.” Plaintiffs also ignore another of Judge Lee’s finding adverse to Harb’s position, this: “It is not clear that Harb Jaser was aware that Viral was attempting to pawn high-end watches as the discussion on the phone concerned the weight of the goods and proposed ‘price’ for those goods. At best, the evidence reflects that Harb Jaser may have believed his brother was working on a cash-for-gold transaction but later determined no sale had actually occurred and his brother had concluded some ‘private’ deal with Viral.” In sum, Judge Lee found the transaction between Viral and David was “private,” that David was not acting on behalf of Harb or Goodfellas in the April 18 transaction.

And substantial evidence supports this conclusion, as all material details of the transaction occurred solely between David and Viral, including this:

—Viral texted with David to arrange a time to pawn the items, contacting him directly to conduct the transaction; he did not call the Goodfellas store or Harb to arrange the April 2015 meeting.

—Viral and David were the only persons in the store when the transaction took place.

—David told Viral the loan terms, filled out the receipt, and took Viral’s fingerprints.

—David told Viral that if he did not return to claim the items in time, they would become David’s.

There was also evidence from Harb that he would never have entered into the transaction with Viral.

In light of all this, plaintiffs’ argument is defeated by the rule of conflicting inferences, that we must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of Goodfellas and Harb, the prevailing parties below. (County of Kern v. Jadwin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 65, 72–73). Indeed, the rule of conflicting inferences defeats plaintiffs even if the evidence was, as plaintiffs contend, undisputed. As the Supreme Court has recently confirmed: “[I]t is settled that when conflicting inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, the reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact so long as it is reasonable. (Hamilton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1939) 12 Cal.2d 598, 602–603; Mah See v. North American Acc. Ins. Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 421, 426; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure[, (5th ed. 2008)] Appeal, §376, pp. 434–435; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs[, (The Rutter Group 2016)] ¶ 8:60, p. 8-29.)” (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 913. See also McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1102; Escobar v. Flores (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 737, 752 [“On this record, we cannot say the inferences the trial court drew were unreasonable, and this precludes us from overturning the court’s determination”].)

Judge Lee expressly found credible Harb’s spontaneous statement that the pawn “ ‘was a private transaction between Viral and David,’ ” observing that Harb’s statement “rings true.” And, she found, “[a]t best, the evidence reflects that Harb Jaser was told the weight of the gold and gave a value for it . . . .” The most that can be said for “appellants’ evidence” concerning Harb’s involvement is set forth above: he glanced for five seconds at Viral’s backpack; after Harb left the store he had a one to two minute telephone call with David; and the pawn occurred at the Goodfellas store. That was it. It allowed Judge Lee to find as she did, findings fully supported by the record here.

Were all that not enough, plaintiff’s claim is also defeated by other rules, including a rule of appellate procedure set forth in a case cited by plaintiffs themselves: Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456 (Sonic). There, like plaintiffs here, appellants failed in their proof at trial. Thus, the Court of Appeal held, the governing rule on appeal is this: “ ‘Where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citation.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 466; accord, Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.)

The Supreme Court applied this same principle 75 years ago, in Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, observing as follows: “In substance the trial court found and concluded that the plaintiffs and those equally charged with them in sustaining the burden had not proved payment by a preponderance of evidence. The problem here is not whether the appellants on the issue of payment failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. That was a question for the trial court and it was resolved against them. The question for this court to determine is whether the evidence compelled the trial court to find in their favor on that issue.” (Id. at pp 570–571.) In sum, appellants’ evidence must “compel” the result. Plaintiffs do not even attempt to make such showing here. Indeed, they cannot.

The issue is one of ostensible agency, which, like any issue of agency, is plaintiffs’ burden to establish. (Burbank v. National Casualty Co. (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 773, 781 [the burden of proving the existence of an agency rests upon the party affirming its existence].) And to prove such ostensible agency, plaintiffs had to prove three things: (1) that Goodfellas (or Harb) intentionally or carelessly created the impression that David was their agent; (2) that Viral reasonably believed that he was their agent; and (3) Viral was harmed because he reasonably relied on his belief. (CACI No. 3709.) In the words of the Supreme Court, “ ‘It is elementary that there are three requirements necessary before recovery may be had against a principal for the act of an ostensible agent. The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the agent’s authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; such belief must be generated by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be charged; and the third person in relying on the agent’s apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence. [Citation.]’ ” (Associated Creditors’ Agency v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 374, 399.)

Plaintiffs do not even attempt to demonstrate any, let alone all, of the three requisite elements. And certainly they are not present as a matter of law.

But even assuming that plaintiffs were successful in their “ostensible agency” claim, their argument would fail for yet another reason, as their claimed “respondeat superior” liability would not be present as a matter of law either. Or, to put it in applicable agency law, the evidence does not demonstrate as a matter of law that what David did would have been within the “course and scope of employment.”

Plaintiffs’ burden would require them to demonstrate that what David did was within the course and scope of his employment. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 721.) And the question “of scope of employment is ordinarily one of fact for the jury to determine.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 221.) Judge Lee determined the issue adversely to plaintiffs. Rightly so.

As Judge Lee expressly found, it was “undisputed” that Goodfellas was not a pawn shop, and that “to anyone familiar with pawn shops, Goodfellas does not look like a pawn shop.” In fact, plaintiffs’ own expert witness Davidson testified at length as to industry standards in operating a pawn shop, which are significantly different than operating a cash for gold business, the latter of which involves the outright purchase of items for their metallic value. By contrast, pawn shops are required to write a loan agreement, provide a pawn ticket, assign an interest rate, and establish the length of the loan. A pawn was not within the course and scope of Goodfellas business, certainly not as a matter of law.

Judge Lee’s Ruling on the Penal Code Section 496 Claim Was Correct

Plaintiffs’ other argument is that Judge Lee committed prejudicial error in failing to find that defendants were subject to the civil remedies provided by Penal Code section 496, subdivision (b). Claiming that Judge Lee incorrectly analyzed the claim, plaintiffs specifically contend that she analyzed only whether “defendants committed theft by false pretenses but failed to analyze whether the defendants received property obtained by any form of theft, including embezzlement,” and, the argument apparently runs, there was embezzlement here as a matter of law. We disagree.

Before turning to a demonstration of why, we note, as defendants’ brief points out, that plaintiffs’ claim is late in the game. As quoted above, plaintiffs’ complaint labeled their first cause of action “theft by false pretenses.” And as best as we can tell, that was the basis of plaintiffs’ position at trial, certainly throughout counsel’s opening statement. Defendants’ brief asserts that plaintiffs’ “embezzlement” claim was not made until their motion for new trial, a charge plaintiffs do not dispute in their reply brief. Regardless, plaintiffs claim fails on the merits, not least because Judge Lee specifically addressed the claim in her comprehensive order denying plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.

As quoted above, in denying the new trial motion, Judge Lee found among other things that Viral did not obtain the items “in any manner constituting theft,” in a lengthy analysis that rejected plaintiffs’ new argument of embezzlement. As Judge Lee noted, Pradeep never accused Viral of theft and, in fact, “vehemently denied the accusation,” insisting at trial the Viral did not steal the items. Pradeep’s testimony was consistent with that of Viral, who testified he believed he could use the jewelry “however he wanted,” including that he could pawn it. Asked point blank if he was at all unsure as to whether he had his father’s permission to pawn the items, Viral said, “no.” This is not embezzlement.

“Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been [e]ntrusted.” (Pen. Code, § 503.) To prove embezzlement, the prosecution must establish four elements, the third and fourth of which are these: “3. The defendant fraudulently (converted/used) that property for (his/her) own benefit; AND 4. When the defendant (converted/used) the property, (he/she) intended to deprive the owner of (it/its use).” (CALCRIM No. 1806.) The jury instruction further states, “A good faith belief in acting with authorization to use the property is a defense.” (Ibid.)

A pawn does not support a Penal Code section 496 violation, as expressly held in People v. MacArthur, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 275, a case cited by Judge Lee. Reversing the conviction there, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “Pawning is not selling. One who pawns property does not transfer ownership to a third party. He or she pledges it, transferring temporary possession of the property and a security interest in it. [Citation.] The pledgor still owns the property. [Citation.] Title does not pass to the pawnbroker unless the pledgor fails to redeem the pledge by repaying the loan and any applicable charges within the specified loan period. [Citation.] Thus, pawning property does not transfer ownership or necessarily deprive the owner of possession permanently.” (Id. at p. 281.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Goodfellas, Harb Jaser, and David Jaser shall recover their costs on appeal.

 

_________________________

Richman, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

Khatri v. Goodfellas Cash for Gold, Inc. (A152253)