Case Number: 19GDCV01054 Hearing Date: December 13, 2019 Dept: NCD

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 8

Date: 12/13/19

Case No: 19 GDCV01054 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Hu v. Blut

MOTION TO STRIKE

(SLAPP SUIT)

Moving Party: Defendant Monica Artavia Blut

Responding Party: Plaintiff Xiuyuan Hu

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Strike First Amended Complaint

CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended Complaint

1) Defamation (Libel Per Se)

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiff Xiuyuan Hu alleges that he is a recent graduate of UC Berkeley Law School, and that defendant Monica Artavia Blut is an attorney who represented plaintiff Hu’s ex-spouse between August 24, 2018 and November 5, 2018 in a domestic violence restraining order matter, in which Hu’s ex-spouse alleged Hu had harassed her since their divorce in August 2017.

The First Amended Complaint alleges that on August 24, 2018, the Riverside Family Law Court granted Blut’s client a temporary restraining order against Hu, and on November 5, 2018, after a full evidentiary hearing, the court held Hu did not harass Blut’s client, denying her petition for the restraining order.

Plaintiff alleges that on August 27, 2018, while the domestic violence litigation was pending, Blut, without the court’s permission, sent UC Berkeley a letter, prematurely and falsely stating that Hu had harassed Blut’s client. Plaintiff alleges that Blut forwarded the letter to Hu on September 7, 2018, making him aware of the letter. Plaintiff alleges that in the letter, Blut falsely stated that Hu had engaged in “an escalating pattern of bizarre and disturbing behavior,” stated out of context that Hu had engaged in a campaign of offensive, threatening and profanity laced messages to her client and her client’s parents, misquoted an August 15, 2018 correspondence between Hu and Berkeley Law’s Dean of Students Annik Hirshen, that Hu had accused Blut’s client of being a Chinese spy and engaging in espionage and intelligence gathering on behalf of the Chinese government, and that Hu had engaged in actions which appeared to be violations of UC Berkeley’s Student Code of Conduct, and that Blut simply wished “to apprise UC Berkeley of the unfortunate situation between the parties.” Plaintiff alleges that the letter was sent to three UC Berkeley officials the Chancellor, Carol T. Christ, the Dean of Berkeley Law School, Erwin Chemerinsky, and the Dean of Students, Annik Hirshen. Plaintiff alleges the August 27, 2018 letter constitutes libel per se, because any reasonable reader would perceive the letter’s defamatory language on its face that plaintiff Hu is a domestic violence abuser and harasser.

ANALYSIS:

Procedural

Opposition Exceeds Page Limits

Defendant argues in the reply that plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike is over 20 pages long.

Under CRC Rule 3.1113(d), “no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.” Under subdivision (e) a party may apply ex parte with written notice for permission to file a longer memorandum. Absent this permission, “A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper.” CRC Rule 3.1113(g). Under CRC Rule 3.1300(d), the court may, in its discretion, refuse to consider a late-filed paper, so long as it so indicates in its minutes or order.

Excluding the cover and table of contents, the memorandum is 22 pages long, so exceeds the page limit by seven pages. The court may refuse to consider the opposition, or may consider only the first fifteen pages, or consider the opposition as the reply responds to it. However, the court has considered the entire opposition.

Substantive

Defendant Blut seeks an order striking the sole cause of action in the First Amended Complaint for defamation– libel per se pursuant to CCP § 425.16, which provides:

“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

(b) (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”

Subdivision (e) defines “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” to include statements made before an official proceeding, in connection with an issue under consideration by an official proceeding, in a “place open to the public or in a public forum” in connection with an issue of public interest, “or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” The latter two categories require a specific showing the action concerns a matter of public interest; the first two categories do not require this showing. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117-1120.

The California Supreme Court in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 set forth the manner in which the trial court is to apply CCP § 425.16:

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion “requires the court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. The moving defendant’s burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.””

Jarrow, at 733, quoting Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.

The Court summarized it previous decisions addressing the statute, and noted:

“And in a trio of opinions issued last year, we held that the plain language of the “arising from” prong encompasses any action based on protected speech or petitioning activity as defined in the statute (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89–95, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 (Navellier )), rejecting proposals that we judicially engraft the statute with requirements that defendants moving thereunder also prove the suit was intended to chill their speech (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 58, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685) or actually had that effect (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 75, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695).

Jarrow, at 734.

An order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820; Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 845.

Defendant argues here that the libel cause of action here falls within CCP § 425.16 (e)(1), which defines act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech to include “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law…”

It is held that the right to petition includes any litigation related activity, and that the anti-SLAPP statute protects not only litigants, but also their attorney’s litigation related statements and conduct. Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908.

The argument is that defendant Blut, acting in her capacity as a retained attorney who had on August 24, 2018, commenced a lawsuit against Hu by filing a Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order, in order to correct falsehoods which Hu had stated in an email to Dean Hirshen at the UC Berkeley Law School concerning the relationship between Hu and his ex-wife, Blut’s client, Shasha Zheng, sent the allegedly defamatory letter dated September 7, 2018 to the school responding to the statements made about Zheng by Hu, and advising concerning the status of the pending restraining order being sought through judicial proceedings.

The letter was dated September 7, 2019, designated a “PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION,” and sent to Dean Hirshen, UC Berkeley School of Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, and UC Berkeley Chancellor Carol Christ, and stated:

“Dear Deans Chemerinsky, Hirshen, and Chancellor Christ,

Please be advised that this office has been retained to represent the interests of Shasha Zheng, ex-wife of the above-mentioned UC Berkeley, School of Law student. Our client was recently copied on correspondence directed to Dean Hirshen containing false and defamatory statements regarding her by Mr. Hu. Unfortunately, since on or about August, 2017, shortly after our client and Mr. Hu were divorced following a short-term marriage, Mr. Hu has engaged in an escalating pattern of bizarre and disturbing behavior regarding our client, culminating with the recent correspondence to Dean Hirshen by Mr. Hu, falsely accusing her of being a “Chinese spy” and “espionage and intelligence gathering on behalf of the Chinese government.” Mr. Hu sent a similar letter to our client’s employer, the California Baptist University, in Riverside, CA, where she is employed as an Associate Professor. Moreover, he has engaged in a campaign of offensive, threatening, and profanity-laced messages to our client and her parents through the WeChat social media platform. These messages, together with the above, would certainly appear to be harassment and clear violations of UC Berkeley’s Student Code of Conduct.

We have now prepared and filed a request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (Case number FLRI 1800696) in the California Superior Court, County of Riverside, against Mr. Hu with regard to the foregoing, and will be filing a civil action against him for fraud slander, defamation, and intentional interference with contract and potential economic advantage. In the interim, we simply wish to apprise UC Berkeley of the unfortunate situation between the parties, and to address the misrepresentations made by Mr. Hu regarding our client in prior correspondence directed to Dean Hirshen. Please feel free to phone the undersigned with any questions or concerns regarding this matter.”

[Blut Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. D].

Defendant argues that this letter constituted protected activity, as it related to the domestic violence proceeding, a judicial proceeding, and was directed at persons who had received information concerning the alleged harassment, who could ultimately be involved as witnesses in the proceeding. Defendant relies on Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App. 4th 1255, in which the Second District found that an alleged defamatory letter in that case, sent by an employer to its former employee’s customers, although sent to third parties to the litigation between the employer and employee, fell within the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute, as containing information in connection with the issues in the litigation, and as being sent to persons the employer “reasonably could believe had an interest in the dispute as potential witnesses to, or unwitting participants in,” the employee’s alleged misconduct. Neville, at 1267.

Similarly, here, the letter arises directly from issues before the court in the domestic violence protective order proceeding, in circumstances where Hu had potentially involved Dean Hirshen by sending him an email about Hu’s ex-wife, stating:

“Dear Dean Hirshen.

I hope you’ve had a great summer. Since I am not in Berkeley to meet you in person at this point, I can only write you this letter.

I am writing this letter because my ex-wife has repeatedly harassed my family in China, and I am afraid that she will come to Berkeley Law to make a spectacle out of our private life. I worked as an editor and researcher for China Digital Times (CDT), a UC Berkeley based news website covering China’s internet censorship. Since CDT receives funding from the U.S. Department of State for advocating freedom of speech and government transparency, CDT is currently blacklisted by mainland China. For my own safety as an editor and researcher of CDT, I had remained a low profile, and I also did not want my relatives in China to get into trouble with the Chinese government.

She was my wife, so I told her about my work with CDT.

But she reported me to the Chinese government. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party’s National Security Bureau has deployed police to interrogate my grandmother and grandfather, who still reside in China and are 75 years and 82 years of age respectively. Worse is that they are afraid that I would never be able to go back to China. Since the police’s interrogation of my grandparents, I have ceased my work with CDT to trade for my grandparents’ peace with the Chinese government.

She has also accused me being a drug addict, which is completely false, for I just passed a drug test for my externship with Kaiser Permanente this upcoming fall semester.

If she were to come to Berkeley Law or write any damaging letter pertaining to me, please read it with caution and at least give me a chance to refute her points.

ps: I have cc’d this e-mail to my ex-wife Shasha Zheng, so she can read it as well. I am so sorry for the inconvenience.

[Blut Decl., Ex. B].

The letter to the UC Berkeley Deans and Chancellor appears to respond to this email, concern the domestic dispute with Hu, and falls within the holding in Neville. The opposition does not argue otherwise. This accordingly appears to be a matter arising out of protected activity and subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.

Plaintiff in opposition in connection with the first prong primarily argues that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply here because plaintiff’s claims fall within the illegality exception, as there were extortionate communications made by Blut here. Plaintiff relies on Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, in which the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the Second District denying a special motion to strike where the alleged conduct constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law, finding that since extortionate speech was not constitutionally protected, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. Flatley, at 328. (“Extortion is not a constitutionally protected form of speech.”). The Court found that in that case, where defendant did not deny that he made the extortionate statements, and “based on the specific and extreme circumstances of this case,” the activity was extortion as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in denying the special motion to strike. Flatley, at 332-333.

The California Supreme Court recognized a civil cause of action for extortion, based on the criminal statutes:

“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent … induced by a wrongful use of force or fear … .” (Pen. Code, § 518.) Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be induced by a threat, either: [¶] … [¶] 2. To accuse the individual threatened … of any crime; or, [¶] 3. To expose, or impute to him … any deformity, disgrace or crime[.]” (Pen. Code, § 519.) “Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in Section 519, is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat.” (Pen. Code, § 523.)

Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be illegal. “[I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a demand for money.” (Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1079 [267 Cal. Rptr. 457].)”

Flatley, at 326.

The opposition appears to reach outside the defamation claims based on the letter to UC Berkeley, and argue that Blut sent another letter to Hu on September 7, 2018, which was evidently not sent to any third parties, in which Blut referred to the email to Dean Hirshen, and yet another communication by Hu sent to Zheng’s employer, California Baptist University, accusing Zheng of being a Chinese spy and of espionage on behalf of the Chinese government, and indicated that the messages and Hu’s behavior “constitute harassment,” and informed Hu that a request for a domestic violence restraining order had been filed against him, and a civil action would be filed for marriage fraud, libel, slander, defamation, physical and emotional abuse, and intentional interference with contract and potential economic advantage. [See Hu Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. C]. The letter indicated that to avoid the civil action, the client demanded return of funds wrongfully withdrawn from Zheng’s accounts following separation, reimbursement of various costs, and taxes, a letter of apology, $5 million in damages, and reimbursement of attorney fees. [Ex. C, p. 2].

As argued in the reply, the Court in Flatley held that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply “where either the defendant concedes the illegality of its conduct or the illegality is conclusively shown by the evidence…” Flately, at 316.

This is clearly not a matter where defendant has conceded the illegality of her conduct in directing a demand letter to plaintiff on behalf of her client in anticipation of litigation. The issue remains is whether illegality is conclusively shown by the evidence here.

Plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to establish the illegality exception. Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 286-287. Plaintiff’s argument here is essentially that Blut went too far in her conduct toward Hu by threatening to accuse Hu’s mother of marriage fraud and other unspecified criminal misdeeds. This is not clear from any Blut correspondence presented, which threatens to sue “you,” in effect, Hu. [Ex. C].

Defendant in reply argues that this case is like Malin v. Singer (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1283, in which the Second District reversed the trial court’s order denying a special motion to strike as to an extortion claim based on a demand letter written by a lawyer, finding that the trial court had incorrectly determined that the letter in that case fell within the illegality exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, as it showed on its face extortion as a matter of law.

In Malin, the demand letter had included a threat to include in a complaint, allegations concerning a partner in a business accused of embezzling company funds using those funds to arrange sexual liaisons with older men. The Second District found that the letter in that case did not support an extortion claim, as it did not expressly threaten to disclose wrongdoings to a prosecuting agency or the public at large, and also failed to sufficiently show that exposure of a secret would expose plaintiff to disgrace, or that the third party which plaintiff argued would be affected was a relative or family member of plaintiff’s, as required under Penal Code section 509, subdivisions 3 and 4. Malin, 1299.

Similarly, here, the letter Hu relies on was directed at Hu, threatening to sue him, not a third party, and made no threat to disclose wrongdoings to a prosecuting agency or the public at large. Plaintiff has failed to establish any extortion exception, and the case remains subject to the anti-SLAPP statute.

Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the statute, so that the burden shifts to plaintiff Hu to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claim.

In making its determination as to the probability of the plaintiff prevailing on its claim, the court does not weigh the evidence, or determine questions of credibility. It merely determines whether plaintiff has established by admissible evidence, a prima facie case, which, if believed by the trier of fact, would result in judgment for the plaintiff. Mattel, Inc. v. Lude, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2002, 2nd Dist.) 99 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1188; Nagel v. Twin Laboratories (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, 45-46.

In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, “plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006, 2nd Dist.) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476, italics omitted, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548. In deciding the issue of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant but does not weigh the credibility or the comparative probative strength of competing evidence. Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidestar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821. Such a showing “must be based on admissible evidence.” Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004, 2nd Dist) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147.

An order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo. Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820; Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 845.

To establish a claim for libel, the following elements must be established:

a. False and unprivileged publication which

a. Charges plaintiff with a crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime, or

b. Imputed in victim the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease, or

c. Tends to directly injure victim in respect to office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to victim general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to the office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits, or

d. Imputes to victim impotence or a want of chastity.

b. Actual damage

Civil Code § 46.

With respect to libel, under Civil Code §45:

“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing…which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.”

Under Civil Code section 45a, libel on its face is defined as follows:

“A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damages as a proximate result thereof. Special damage is defined in Section 48a of this code.”

The moving papers argue briefly that plaintiff will be unable to establish a defamation claim here, as plaintiff cannot establish that any statements which he claims to have constituted defamation were false. A review of the letter allegedly published to third parties at UC Berkeley basically makes the following statements:

-That the client had been copied on correspondence directed to Dean Hirshen containing false statements regarding Zheng, including false accusations that the client was a Chinese spy and engaged in espionage.

-Hu has engaged in an escalating pattern of bizarre and disturbing behavior toward the client

-Hu sent a letter similar to the Hirshen correspondence to Zheng’s employer

-Hu has “engaged in a campaign of offensive, threatening, and profanity-laced messages,” to the client and her parents, via WeChat.

-Zheng has filed a restraining order action and intends to file a civil action.

The moving papers include a declaration from Blut repeating these facts as true. [See Blut Decl. ¶¶ 1-9].

In opposition to the motion, Hu submits his own declaration which nowhere indicates that any of the facts stated in the letter or in any communication were in fact false. The declaration admits that Hu continued to have communications with Zheng “via WeChat,” and, at best, states that since the restraining order hearing, Blut has not brought a lawsuit against Hu. [Hu Decl. ¶¶ 17, 20]. This fails to show that Zheng did not at the time of any correspondence intend to file such an action, or that any of the alleged defamatory statements concerning Hu’s conduct were false. Hu has failed to establish an essential element of a defamation claim, and the motion is accordingly be granted.

In addition, the Berkeley letter, the only communication here published to third parties, appears to be protected by the litigation privilege.

Civil Code § 47 provides that “a privileged publication or broadcast is one made:…(b) In any …(2) judicial proceeding.” This privilege extends to all communications made by the litigants or their attorneys in furtherance of the objects of the litigation which have some logical relation to the action. Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 205, 214. The privilege is absolute; it applies regardless of whether the acts falling within it were done with malice or intent to harm others. Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 796, 810. The California Supreme Court has held that “section 47(b) operates to bar civil liability for any tort claim based upon a privileged communication, with the exception of malicious prosecution…” Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 375.

The letter here appears to be in furtherance of the domestic restraining order proceeding, addresses the facts being relied upon in that proceeding concerning Hu’s alleged harassment of Zheng, and events to which Hu had made Dean Hirshen a potential witness with respect to Hu’s alleged harassment. The letter appears to be a communication in furtherance of the objects of the then existing litigation.

The opposition argues that the letter was not in furtherance of any pending litigation, but served no purpose in the pending litigation, merely restating Blut’s client’s allegations against Hu. The opposition appears to sidestep the circumstance here that the letter addressed a communication from Hu to Dean Hirshen upon which Zheng’s claims of harassment were partly based, making Dean Hirshen a potential witness in that litigation. The motion is also granted on the ground that plaintiff has failed to establish the essential element of his defamation claim that defendant Blut made a statement without privilege.

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case against defendant or a probability of prevailing on his sole cause of action, and the motion is granted.

RULING:

The court in its discretion has considered the opposition to the demurrer, despite the fact that it is 22 pages long, a full 7 pages over the 15-page limit imposed under CRC Rule 3.1113(d) (“no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages”), only because the reply addresses the entire memorandum. Plaintiff has failed to obtain permission to file a longer memorandum and is cautioned that the court may in the future refuse to consider pleadings which do not comply with the applicable rules, statutes and orders governing this action.

Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 is GRANTED.

The moving papers have sufficiently established that the First Amended Complaint arises out of protected activity, an act in furtherance of defendant’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution, as the September 7, 2018 letter to UC Berkeley constitutes a written statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body.

This shifts the burden to plaintiff to establish a probability that plaintiff will prevail on plaintiff’s claim for defamation-libel per se as alleged in his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff in opposition has failed to meet this burden, as plaintiff submits no evidence which would tend to show that any of the statements upon which plaintiff bases his claim were in fact false. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant engaged in any communications which were not privileged. The First Amended Complains is accordingly ordered dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant Monica Artavia Blut’s Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Xiuyan Hu:

Objections Nos. 1-8 are SUSTAINED.

Objections Nos. 9 and10 are OVERRULED.