Filed 12/19/19 Marriage of Grant and Ferreira CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re the Marriage of DANIEL GRANT and ERICA GENEMAE FERREIRA.

DANIEL GRANT FERREIRA,

Appellant,

v.

ERICA GENEMAE FERREIRA,

Respondent.

A153577 & A154363

(Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. HF15754009)

In this dissolution action, Daniel Ferreira (Husband) appeals the trial court’s fair- market rent determination for his post-separation use of the community residence. He further claims the trial court improperly denied his reimbursement requests for property taxes on the community residence that he paid with separate property and his separate property down payment on other real property. Finally, he appeals an order awarding $25,000 in attorney’s fees and costs under Family Code section 2030 and $10,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271 to Erica Ferreira (Wife). We reverse the trial court’s denial of Husband’s request for reimbursement of his separate property down payment but otherwise affirm.

I. FACTS
II.
The parties married on October 4, 1987. Wife filed a petition for dissolution on January 8, 2015.

On July 6 and 7, 2017, a trial was held on “on the issues of property division, . . . [including] reimbursements [for use of the family home and payments for community property from separate property], [Husband]’s separate property claims, income available for support, child and spousal support arrears from January 8, 2015, and permanent spousal support.”

The trial court issued a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision on these issues on August 25, 2017 (the tentative decision). Among other issues addressed, the tentative decision determined the rent Husband owed for living in the community residence after separation and denied his reimbursement requests for paying the community residence’s property taxes and for a separate property contribution to a community property residence.

Husband’s counsel filed a letter objecting to certain portions of the tentative decision on September 11, 2017. The court did not consider Husband’s objections because it appears to have determined they were untimely, and it issued a final statement of decision on September 14, 2017.

After the court issued its final statement of decision, Husband’s counsel refused to confer with Wife’s counsel on the preparation of a final judgment in accordance with the statement of decision. Wife’s counsel had sent the draft judgment to Husband’s counsel but “received no response and [was] unable to distribute the funds in [her] trust account per the [j]udgment without a response or further court order.” Wife’s counsel therefore submitted a proposed judgment to the court and requested a hearing.

The trial court held a hearing on the delayed entry of judgment on November 9, 2017. At the hearing, Wife’s counsel explained she had recently sent the proposed judgment a third time and had finally received a response from Husband’s counsel the day prior; she noted that Husband’s counsel offered substantive objections to the statement of decision rather than to the draft judgment. The court directed Wife’s counsel to provide the court with a copy of her draft judgment and entered judgment approximately a week and a half later.

After the trial court had entered judgment and sent the parties notice of entry of judgment, Husband’s counsel filed a Judicial Council form entitled “Request for Order,” with an attachment in which he purported to move for reconsideration of the judgment but in fact challenged various aspects of the statement of decision. Husband filed this motion months after the court issued the final statement of decision and well after the deadline for filing a motion to reconsider the statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) The court denied the motion to reconsider, in part reasoning that it no longer had jurisdiction to hear the motion after entry of judgment.

On March 20, 2018, the trial court ordered Husband to pay wife $25,000 in attorney’s fees and costs under section 2030 and an additional $10,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271.

Husband appealed. We discuss in greater detail below additional facts and the court’s reasoning as it relates to each issue.

III. ANALYSIS
IV.
A. Epstein Credits & Watts Charges
B.
Husband claims the trial court adopted an unreasonably high rental value for the community residence when it determined how much he owed the community for his post-separation use of the residence. He further argues the court should have credited him for his payment of the community residence’s property taxes with his separate property.

1. Additional Facts
2.
Husband had exclusive use and possession of the last community residence owned by the parties, located on Woodstock Road in Hayward (Woodstock property), from April 2014 until its July 2017 sale.

Both parties provided evidence regarding the fair market rental value for the Woodstock property from 2014 to 2017. Husband submitted a report from an Alameda County database concerning estimated rental values for Alameda County as a whole, which suggested the fair market rental value was $2,704 in 2014, $2,716 in 2015, $3,268 in 2016, and $3,477 in 2017. Wife submitted a Zillow estimate that the Woodstock property could have been rented for $4,100 a month in 2017. Wife also testified that a real estate agent had sent her fair market rental values for the Woodstock property from 2014 to 2017, which stated that the Woodstock property could have been rented for $3,200 in 2014, $3,400 in 2015, $3,800 in 2016, and $4,000 in 2017. Husband did not object to Wife’s testimony.

The court found “both parties [had] used reasonable methods to estimate rental value and that it [was] appropriate, in the absence of expert testimony, to use a mid-point for each year to determine the yearly rental value for the [Woodstock property].” It therefore concluded the fair market rental value was $3,052 for 2014 and 2015, $3,534 for 2016, and $3,738 for 2017.

Husband separately requested reimbursement for property taxes on the Woodstock property that he paid after separation with his separate property. The trial court denied this reimbursement request. However, it considered Husband’s payment of property taxes when calculating child and spousal support in arrears.

3. Legal Framework
4.
“ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive use of a community asset during the period between separation and trial, that spouse may be required to compensate the community for the reasonable value of that use.’ [Citation.] The right to such compensation is commonly known as a ‘Watts charge.’ ” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 978, citing Watts, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 374.) “Where the Watts rule applies, the court is ‘obligated either to order reimbursement to the community or to offer an explanation for not doing so.’ ” (Falcone & Fyke, at p. 978.)

Watts charges can be offset by Epstein credits, or reimbursements to a party who uses his or her separate property to pay down a pre-existing community debt, such as a mortgage on a house acquired during marriage. (Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 84–85.) “Epstein does not mandate full reimbursement in all cases, but allows the trial court discretion to order reimbursement in an amount that is equitable.” (In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272 (Hebbring).) For example, “reimbursement is not appropriate when paying the community obligation amounts to discharging a duty of support.” (In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 617, 624, fn. 5.)

The determinations of Watts charges and Epstein credits are matters addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 318–320 [applying abuse of discretion review for Epstein credits]; In re Marriage of Iredale & Cates (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 321, 329 [the trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of community assets as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented].)

5. Analysis of Watts Charges and Epstein Credits
6.
Husband “strongly disputes any purported equivalence between” his statistical evidence from Alameda County and Wife’s testimony relating her conversations with a realtor. He further contends “there was thus no evidentiary basis” for the court to deviate from the figures he submitted as to rental value except with respect to Wife’s Zillow data for the year 2017.

We disagree with Husband that the court abused its discretion in considering Wife’s testimony. Wife’s contention that Husband underestimated the rental value of the Woodstock property was bolstered by her submission of the 2017 Zillow estimate showing that the rental value for the Woodstock property was likely several hundred dollars higher than the average rent in Alameda County. Moreover, it is common sense that rental values vary depending on location. We therefore conclude that the court acted within its broad discretion when it considered the evidence from both parties concerning rental value and elected the mid-point between each party’s values as the fair market rent. (Watts, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 374 [requiring a court to take into account all the circumstances relevant to the exclusive possession when determining whether reimbursement to the community is required for use of community assets after separation].)

Husband also asserts that he is entitled to additional Epstein credits for the property taxes on the Woodstock property that he paid with his separate property after separation. Although the court awarded Husband Epstein credits for his mortgage and homeowner’s insurance payments on the Woodstock property, the court declined to award Husband either Epstein credits or reimbursement for the associated property taxes that he also paid. We conclude that the court acted within its discretion when it declined to award Husband Epstein credits because the property tax payments were made on account of a debt for the preservation of an asset that Husband exclusively used from April 2014 to July 2017. (Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 84–85.) Moreover, the denial was equitable and within the court’s discretion given that Husband benefitted by deducting these property taxes from his income tax returns. (Hebbring, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272.)

Citing In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808 (Rosen), Husband nevertheless insists that the trial court was required to reimburse him for the property taxes he paid because those taxes were a community debt. (Id. at p. 828.) But Rosen is distinguishable. In Rosen, it was uncontested that husband used his separate property to service a credit card debt incurred by the parties during their marriage. (Ibid.) The trial court simply declined to credit the husband’s payment even though Husband received no benefit from having paid the debt, such as a tax deduction, exclusive use of property, or partial reimbursement from community property. (See ibid.)

In this case, the trial court exercised its discretion and ordered equitable reimbursement for the mortgage and insurance payments but not the property taxes that Husband paid. (Hebbring, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1272.) Therefore, unlike Rosen where the court altogether failed to reimburse the husband, the court here granted Husband equitable reimbursement for some, but not all, expenses associated with the Woodstock property.

C. Reimbursement of Down Payment as Separate Property
D.
Husband contends the court should have ordered reimbursement for the $12,650 down payment he made on a home the parties call the “Broadway property,” which he purchased before the marriage and the parties later used to acquire community property. We agree.

1. Additional Facts
2.
At trial, Husband requested to be reimbursed $70,279 for a separate property contribution that he claimed was traceable to the sale proceeds from a home called the “Discovery Bay property” that the parties purchased using equity from the Broadway property as a down payment. After the court issued its tentative decision denying Husband’s reimbursement request for $70,279, Husband requested reimbursement for at least the $12,650 down payment on the Broadway property.

To prove that he should be reimbursed for $70,279, Husband testified about the acquisition and sale of both the Broadway and Discovery Bay properties. Husband testified that he had purchased the Broadway property in November 1984, three years before the parties married, by placing a $12,650 down payment and taking out a mortgage to pay the balance of the $126,500 purchase price. He offered no records showing the down payment, the purchase price, the balance of the mortgage when the parties married, or the value of the home at the time the parties married, but it is undisputed that the Broadway property was Husband’s separate property and that he contributed the entire down payment of $12,650.

After the parties married in October 1987, title to the Broadway property remained in Husband’s name. Husband admitted, however, that community property was used to pay down the Broadway property’s mortgage, although the record contains no evidence as to how much community property was used. Husband also testified that in September 1990, he refinanced the Broadway property for $208,000 to withdraw $100,000 of equity. The parties then used $96,387.45 of that equity to purchase the Discovery Bay property for $449,346 (consisting of a $441,500 purchase price plus costs) in 1990. As part of the refinance, Wife signed a quitclaim deed, but the parties agreed she signed it only to refinance the Broadway property and not to terminate her community rights to it. Husband submitted exhibits showing the Broadway property’s refinanced mortgage terms and the quitclaim deed.

The parties sold the Broadway property in 1992 and received $10,263.26 after paying the mortgage and settlement charges. They sold the Discovery Bay property in 1994 for $415,000, resulting in a loss of $34,346 and sales proceeds of $70,279. Husband testified that they used the $70,279 in sales proceeds to buy the Fernside property for $365,000. They later sold the Fernside property and bought the Woodstock property for $485,000 with $148,877.53 from the sales proceeds of the Fernside property.

In its tentative decision, the trial court concluded that Husband had not met “his burden of establishing that the sales proceeds from [the] Broadway [property] were solely his separate property and not the result of the increased equity from the pay down of the mortgage during the marriage, or the increased value to the property due [to] improvements and repairs made to the property during the marriage with community property funds, or increases attributable to general market conditions.”

Husband objected to certain portions of the tentative decision on September 11, 2017 and asserted he should be reimbursed for the down payment on the Broadway property. As noted above, the final statement of decision stated the parties had not timely filed objections and did not address Husband’s alternative request for reimbursement of the $12,650 down payment.

3. Guiding Legal Principles
4.
a. Community Payments on Separate Property
b.
The community is entitled to receive a benefit if community property is used to pay for separate property. For example, “[w]hen community property is used to reduce the principal balance of a mortgage on one spouse’s separate property, the community acquires a pro tanto interest in the property.” (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1421–1422, citing In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366, 371–372 & In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426, 436–440 (Marsden).) A pro tanto interest means that the community acquires a property interest in the ratio that payments on the purchase price made with community funds bear to payments made with separate funds. (Moore, at p. 372.) “ ‘This well-established principle is known as “the Moore/Marsden rule.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1287.) The Moore/Marsden rule applies even “where the parties refinanced a separate residential mortgage during marriage” and used the proceeds from a community loan to pay off the preexisting separate loan. (Bono, at p. 1422, citing In re Marriage of Branco (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1625–1629 (Branco).)

In Marsden, the court used a multistep process to determine a husband’s separate property interest and the community’s interest in a home initially purchased by the husband as his separate property, with the mortgage payments made by the community after marriage. First, the court “calculated the separate property interest as the purchase price less the amount by which the community payments had reduced the principal of the loan, divided by the purchase price of the home; the community interest was calculated by dividing the amount by which community payments had reduced the loan principal by the purchase price. These percentages . . . were then multiplied by the appreciation of the property during the marriage. The husband’s total separate property interest consisted of the down payment, loan payments made before the marriage and after separation, the appreciation of the property before the marriage, [his percentage] of the appreciation of the property during the marriage, and half of [the] percent community share of the appreciation during the marriage. The wife’s share of the community property interest was one-half of the sum of the amount of community payments reducing the loan principal plus the [ ] percent community share of the appreciation during marriage.” (Branco, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1626–1627; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:295.)

In contrast, when a couple acquires community property using a separate property contribution from a spouse, that spouse will be reimbursed for their contribution “to the extent the party traces the contribution[] to a separate property source.” (§ 2640; see also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:451.) Assuming a party can trace his or her separate property, the party must be reimbursed for a separate property contribution to real property owned by the community even if the community sells the real property and reinvests the proceeds in another real property. (In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 17 Cal.4th 907, 918 (Walrath).) Importantly, “[u]nder section 2640, the separate property contribution is reimbursed prior to the division of community property.” (Id. at p. 913.)

c. Tracing Separate Property
d.
Tracing to a separate property source is the sole method by which a party can establish a right of reimbursement for separate property contributions to community property. (§ 2640, subd. (b).) Courts have explained that the “burden of recordkeeping logically arises out of the very act of commingling funds during marriage so the general community property presumption is not thwarted.” (In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 25.)

A party can “trace” separate property using either “direct tracing” or “family living expense tracing.” (In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797, 823, citing In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 612.) Husband attempted to establish his interest by the “direct tracing” method, which “requires specific records reconstructing each separate and community property deposit, and each separate and community property payment as it occurs.” (Braud, at p. 823.)

“[I]f the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section 760.” (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 823; see also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:525.)

5. Analysis
6.
Husband contends the trial court should have determined whether he was entitled to the $12,650 down payment on the Broadway property because he timely objected to the tentative decision. He further claims the court should have awarded him reimbursement for the down payment. We agree that Husband’s objection was timely pursuant to the time allotted for his response in the court’s tentative decision and that the court was accordingly required to determine whether Husband had adequately traced his $12,650 down payment on the Broadway property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(c)(4).)

As the court erred by failing to address the down payment in its statement of decision, we must consider what relief, if any, Husband is entitled to on appeal. “Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings.” (Nunes Turfgrass, Inc. v. Vaughan–Jacklin Seed Co. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1525.) The possibility of a finding in the complaining party’s favor is necessary for the error in failing to render a timely requested statement of decision on an issue to be reversible. (In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 282 (Ananeh-Firempong).)

Here, Husband had the burden of tracing his separate property interest. (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 823; Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 918 [reimbursement is allowed to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source].) Accordingly, for this court to reverse, Husband must show that he introduced substantial evidence that would have supported a finding that he was entitled to reimbursement of the down payment. (Ananeh-Firempong, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 282.) It is undisputed that Husband made the down payment on and owned the Broadway property as his separate property for years before the parties married and that, after the parties married, the mortgage was paid down with community property.

Although the parties engaged in the purchase and sale of multiple properties after they refinanced the Broadway property to withdraw $100,000 of equity, the record demonstrates that each subsequent property had equity at the time of sale more than sufficient to cover Husband’s undisputed separate property interest in the $12,650 down payment on Broadway. Husband’s $12,650 down payment on the Broadway property is thus a traceable separate property interest that should have been “reimbursed prior to the division of community property.” (Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 913.)

Because the record contains evidence of a “ponderable legal significance” demonstrating Husband’s entitlement to reimbursement of his $12,650 down payment, we reverse the trial court’s order in this respect. (See Conservatorship of Ramirez (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 390, 401; Ananeh-Firempong, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 282.)

E. Attorney’s Fees.
F.
Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay $25,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs under section 2030 and an additional $10,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271. We review the grant or denial of costs and attorney’s fees under both sections for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 933 [section 2030]; In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478 [section 271].)

1. Additional Facts
2.
On March 20, 2018, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $25,000 in costs and attorney’s fees under section 2030 given “the disparity in the part[ies’] income and the ability of [Husband] to pay attorney[’s] fees for both parties.” Although its findings were not restated in the attorney’s fees order, the court had previously analyzed the parties’ respective economic positions in the statement of decision. It concluded that Wife’s monthly income was approximately $2,562 for 2015, $3,126 for 2016, and $3,308 for 2017 and that Husband’s monthly income was approximately $11,474 for 2015, $11,584 for 2016, and $11,214 for 2017. It also noted that Wife had $40,000 in debt from a car payment and credit cards and that she did “not have a high enough income to prevent further credit card debt in the future.”

The court further awarded Wife $10,000 in attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271 due to Husband’s litigation tactics. In support of its award under section 271, the trial court stated that Husband had failed “to timely object to the tentative decision of Judge Vilardi which eventually became a permanent Decision, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration after failing to meet with [Wife’s] counsel to prepare the final judgment.” It further noted that Wife’s counsel was required to respond to the untimely motion for reconsideration. The court concluded these actions were evidence of Husband’s bad faith.

3. Family Code section 2030
4.
Husband contends the trial court failed to consider either whether Wife reasonably had the ability to pay costs and attorney’s fees and whether her attorney’s representation was reasonably necessary. He claims the section 2030 award was unjustified and should be overturned as an abuse of discretion.

Section 2030 requires the court to “ensure that each party [in a dissolution action] has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party’s rights” by ordering one party to pay to the other “whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) To award costs and fees under section 2030, the court must determine whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel and whether one party is able to pay for the legal representation of both parties. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) An award under section 2030 must be “just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).) “Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” (Id., subd. (b).) Other factors the court may consider include the parties’ earning capacities, obligations, and trial tactics. (§§ 2032, subd. (b), 4320, subds. (a)(1), (e); In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 406 [consideration of current incomes, abilities, and assets]; In re Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 662 [consideration of “other party’s trial tactics”].) Trial courts have considerable discretion in deciding whether to award costs and attorney’s fees under section 2030. (Mooney v. Superior Court (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 523, 535.)

The record, including the trial court’s earlier analysis of the parties’ financial resources and obligations, confirms the trial court’s award under section 2030 was not an abuse of discretion. Husband, who earned around $11,214 a month in 2017, had nearly three times the financial resources of Wife, who earned $3,308 a month that same year, even after his monthly child and spousal support obligations totaling $1,872 (which left Husband with $9,342 a month). The court cited this income disparity to justify its award under section 2030.

Turning to the parties’ obligations, Wife had considerable debt, while Husband did not. And although the court awarded Wife most of the community assets (approximately $312,000), Husband retained ownership of a small business that the trial court valued at $250,000 as well as $69,000 in community assets.

Husband contends the order contained “no showing whatsoever” that it was based on Wife’s ability to pay, the way the parties’ assets were split, or a determination that the work of Wife’s counsel was necessary. This contention lacks merit, as Husband ignores that it is his burden to show the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay $25,000 under section 2030. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) As “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [a judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent,” and as the court had previously addressed the parties’ financial positions, we can reasonably infer that the court was aware of the parties’ resources and ordered Husband to pay costs and attorney’s fees under section 2030 accordingly. (See id. at p. 564.)

In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Husband to pay $25,000 in attorney’s fees under section 2030.

5. Family Code section 271
6.
Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay $10,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees as sanctions under section 271 for delays related to his objections to the statement of decision and filing of the judgment.

Section 271 authorizes the court to impose “attorney’s fees and costs” as a sanction for conduct frustrating settlement or increasing the cost of the litigation. “The purpose of section 271 is ‘ “to promote settlement and to encourage cooperation which will reduce the cost of litigation.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘Family law litigants who flout that policy by engaging in conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction.’ ” (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1176.)

The present record confirms that the trial court acted within its discretion because Husband increased litigation costs by not responding to Wife’s counsel regarding the draft judgment until one day before the November 9, 2017 hearing to address the delay in entry of judgment, and nearly two months after the trial court had ordered Wife to prepare a judgment, confer with Husband’s counsel, and submit it to the court. Husband further increased costs by forcing Wife to respond to what was effectively a motion to reconsider the statement of decision, which he filed nearly three months after the statement of decision and more than a week after the notice of entry of judgment.

On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Husband to pay $10,000 under section 271.

V. DISPOSITION
VI.
The court’s order denying Husband’s claim for reimbursement of his separate property contributions to the parties’ real property is reversed, as Husband is entitled to reimbursement of his $12,650 separate property down payment on the Broadway property. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

_________________________

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

STREETER, ACTING P. J.

_________________________

TUCHER, J.

Ferreira v. Ferreira (A154363)