Filed 12/23/19 P. v. Tucker CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D’EDWARD TUCKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

F074608

(Super. Ct. No. F15904258)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. James Petrucelli, Judge.

Michael B. McPartland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Marcia A. Fay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

INTRODUCTION

Defendant D’Edward Tucker was charged with two felonies after one or more of the passengers in the vehicle Tucker was driving fired a gun at a person outside the vehicle whose jaw was struck by a bullet. Tucker was convicted by jury for permitting the discharge of a firearm from his vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100, subd. (b)) (count 6). Tucker was found not guilty for assault with a firearm pursuant to an aiding and abetting theory (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 5), but he was found guilty on the lesser offense of acting as an accessory to a felony (§ 32). The jury also found true the gang enhancement allegation attached to count 6 that Tucker’s crime was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Codefendant and minor Eric Major was convicted of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2), and the jury found true that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and found true that Major was 14 years old when the offense was committed (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)).

The trial court sentenced Tucker to the aggravated term of three years on count 6 (§ 26100, subd. (b)) and imposed an additional, consecutive three years for the gang enhancement pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). As to Tucker’s conviction on count 5 for acting as an accessory to a felony, the court imposed the middle term of two years, to be served concurrent with the sentence on count 6. Major was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years: four years for assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) (count 2), and a five-year term for the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).

On appeal, Tucker claims his conviction for permitting the discharge of a firearm from his vehicle (count 6) is not supported by substantial evidence and requires reversal; Tucker also joins any applicable argument advanced by Major. On October 16, 2019, after briefing was complete, Major filed a notice of abandonment of his appeal and requested dismissal. Tucker’s and Major’s appeals were bifurcated, Major’s appeal was separated into case No. F080145, and Major’s request for dismissal of case No. F080145 was granted.

The People maintain Tucker’s conviction on count 6 is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. As to Tucker’s statement of joinder in Major’s appellate arguments, the People maintain this blanket joinder is cursory, not particularized to Tucker, and should be deemed forfeited.

We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support Tucker’s conviction on count 6, and the arguments in which Tucker joins are deemed forfeited. The judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On July 7, 2015, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Fresno police officers were dispatched to the northwest corner of Amador and Plumas Streets in Fresno, where a pedestrian reportedly had been shot by someone in a vehicle. Approximately 12 minutes after being dispatched to the scene, an officer located the suspect vehicle pulling into the parking lot of a nearby apartment complex. Following the vehicle into the parking lot, the officer observed the vehicle parking underneath a carport and then saw four men, later identified as Tucker, Major, Jaishawn Young, and Dejour Clay, exiting the vehicle. Tucker exited from the driver’s seat, and Clay exited from the rear passenger seat directly behind Tucker; Young exited from the front passenger seat, and Major exited from the rear passenger seat behind Young. The four men were detained by the officer, questioned, and ultimately arrested.

Three guns were located in the vehicle: (1) a brown .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle was found in the rear, pouch pocket behind the driver’s seat (a pocket directly in front of the rear, driver’s side passenger); (2) a silver .25-caliber semiautomatic Raven Arms pistol was under the carpet of the footwell on the rear passenger’s side, directly behind the front passenger seat; and (3) a black handgun in the right, front passenger footwell, partially under the front passenger seat. A .25-caliber Raven Arms bullet casing was found at the intersection where the shooting occurred. Gunshot residue (GSR) was found on Tucker, Major, and Clay.

The victim, John Doe, testified he was walking with his cousin, his 8-year-old brother, and another friend to pick peaches from a tree located one apartment complex down the street from where they lived. While the group was walking, a whitish-colored car with four doors and tinted rear windows pulled up and the front passenger leaned out of his window and asked John where he was from. John understood the question to be whether he was in a gang. John responded to the effect that he was not in a gang, and he then tried to walk away, but the front passenger pointed a gun at him and another person stood up in the sunroof and pointed a gun at John too. John immediately froze in place, but when they did not shoot, he again started to walk away. He then heard gunshots and started to run. He could not see specifically who was shooting at him, but he thought he heard three gunshots; on cross-examination, however, he was uncertain how many shots he heard. In the process of fleeing, John discovered he was bleeding around his neck and chin. He ran home, was transported to the hospital, and ultimately recovered from a gunshot wound that had fractured his jaw.

After being taken into custody, Major was interviewed by police later that night. According to Major, he had called Tucker for a ride home around 9:30 to 10:00 that evening; when Tucker picked up Major, Tucker was driving, Young was sitting in the front passenger seat, and Clay was sitting in the backseat, behind Tucker. Major dropped his phone to the floor and when he reached down to grab it, he saw a gun, which he immediately threw back under the seat. Major said they drove to Clay’s house to get gas money, and they stopped to ask three different people where they could find some marijuana. Major said when they stopped at another location, a pedestrian walked up to the car, someone in the car fired a gun in the air, and the pedestrian and the group the pedestrian was with started running away from the car. He denied he fired a gun.

Later in the interview, Major changed his story and said that when John approached the car, he was talking about the Fink White gang; Major recognized him as a person he had an argument with at a bus station about three weeks before. According to Major, he thought John was a member of the Muhammad gang, and he had brandished a gun at Major at the bus stop. When Major recognized John outside the car, he fired three shots in the air—he never stood up in the sunroof. He said the gun under the seat in front of him was one that he had stolen three days before. Major indicated the other three in the car with him knew people had threatened Major and were after him.

At trial, the prosecution pursued a theory Tucker, Young, Major and Clay were members of gangs within the MUG gang alliance (Modoc, U-Boys, and Garrett Street), Major shot at John believing he was a gang rival and intended to kill him, and Tucker facilitated the shooting as the driver of the car. Detective Zebulon Price testified as a gang expert for the prosecution and identified Tucker, Major, Clay, and Young as members of three gangs within the MUG alliance and indicated MUG alliance gang members are frequently found together. He opined Tucker was a member of Garrett Street, Clay and Young were members of Modoc, and Major was a member of U-Boys; when the shooting occurred, they were within Modoc gang territory. Price testified MUG alliance gangs are rivals of the TWAMP alliance, and the Muhammad gang was one within the TWAMP alliance. Price indicated MUG alliance gangs were associated with drive-by shootings and violence against rival gang members; he opined that shooting a rival would elevate a gang member’s status within his gang and observed that shooting a rival inside a gang’s own territory was not uncommon.

Major testified at trial and recanted his police-interview confession, asserting he had been covering for Clay. When they saw the police car pulling in behind them at the apartment building that night, Clay told Major that Major would get less time for the shooting because Major was younger, so Major agreed to take the blame for the shooting. Major testified it was true that he had called Tucker for a ride home that night, and they had driven around looking for marijuana, but it was Clay who was seated in the rear passenger side when Major got in the vehicle (where the silver .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun was recovered), and Major was seated behind Tucker, who was driving. Major had no idea there was a gun in the back pocket of the driver’s seat directly in front of him, and he denied he had ever seen the silver handgun in the footwell where Clay was sitting until Clay grabbed it to go out the sunroof—Major did not know why he told the police he had stolen that silver handgun.

Major thought Tucker might have stopped the car because Clay recognized John, but he did not hear anyone discussing anything about John and he did not know why Clay fired his gun at John. When the car stopped, he saw Clay stand up through the sunroof while holding the silver handgun. He heard someone ask, “where are you from?” but denied he knew to whom that question was directed. He then heard a gun being fired, but he could not remember how many shots he heard. He denied he saw anything from the car’s back windows because they were tinted, it was dark, and he had his head down; he never saw John outside the car that night. He denied having ever seen John before and denied they had been in a fight at a bus stop. He indicated the police were “feeding [him] things” to lie about during the interview, so he made up the story about recognizing John from the bus stop and lied that the Muhammads were out to get him—he did not know they were a gang, he thought the Muhammads were just a family. Major denied standing up in the sunroof and denied firing a gun. Major also denied being a gang member or associating with gangs. He denied having any indication or reason to believe a shooting was going to occur while they were riding around in the car. He denied knowing Tucker was associated with the Garrett Street gang and indicated he had only known Tucker for a few days prior to the shooting.

DISCUSSION

I. Tucker’s Substantial Evidence Challenge

A. Background

Tucker argues his conviction for permitting another person to discharge a firearm from a vehicle pursuant to section 26100, subdivision (b) (count 6), is not supported by substantial evidence. According to Tucker, for criminal liability to attach under section 26100, subdivision (b), a defendant must either (1) affirmatively assent to, or authorize, the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle he owned and/or was driving; or (2) know that another person intended to discharge a firearm from a vehicle the defendant owned or was driving and had the ability to stop that person from doing so. Tucker contends there is no evidence he affirmatively assented to or authorized Major and/or Clay to discharge a firearm from his car. The victim, John, testified Young was the only person who spoke to him, and John did not hear anyone from the car say anything else. There was no indication in Major’s testimony that Tucker said anything that could be interpreted as authorizing or assenting to the discharge of a firearm from the vehicle.

Tucker also argues there is no evidence he knew anyone intended to discharge a weapon from the car, or that he had the ability to stop him or them from doing so. There is no evidence Tucker knew there were guns in the car or that they would be discharged. The jury acquitted Tucker of aiding and abetting Major in committing an assault with a firearm as to count 5, and Tucker contends this verdict establishes the jury believed the prosecution failed to prove Tucker knew Major and/or Clay intended to discharge a firearm. As such, Tucker maintains, the prosecution likewise lacked evidence Tucker knew anyone intended to discharge a weapon for purposes of count 6. Tucker maintains he had no ability to prevent Major and/or Clay from discharging their weapons: there was no evidence Tucker had any control over what the others did as they were not members of Tucker’s Garrett Street gang.

The People maintain there was ample evidence Tucker knowingly permitted the discharge of a firearm from his vehicle. There was evidence Tucker had familiarity with weapons as he had previously been arrested in a car with a gun; Tucker was a gang member who was driving a vehicle with three other gang members in Modoc gang territory. Even after Young pointed a gun at John, Tucker kept the car in place and allowed his passengers the opportunity to shoot at John. The People assert Tucker was aware by this time that his passengers had loaded guns, and Tucker did not drive away until John was running away after he heard shots fired at him.

B. Standard of Review

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense” (Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265, citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364), and the verdict must be supported by substantial evidence (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357). On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “‘is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.) “The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.)

“In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) “‘[I]t is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt .…’” (People v. Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1055–1056.) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.) However, “speculation, supposition and suspicion are patently insufficient to support an inference of fact.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 951; accord, People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35; People v. Xiong (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1268.)

C. Analysis

Section 26100, subdivision (b), imposes criminal liability on “[a]ny driver or owner of any vehicle, whether or not the owner of the vehicle is occupying the vehicle, who knowingly permits any other person to discharge any firearm from the vehicle .…” The constitutionality of its exactly worded statutory predecessor, section 12034, subdivision (b), was challenged in People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1466–1467. (See Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4.) In concluding subdivision (b) was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness, the court noted this section applies to a defined class of persons who have a duty to act: drivers and owners of vehicles; it imposes a legal duty on such drivers and owners to prevent the discharge of firearms from their vehicles. (People v. Laster, supra, at p. 1467.) Pursuant to the statute’s language, the court observed a driver or owner can be held criminally liable for “affirmatively assenting to[] or authorizing the discharge; but he or she can also be held criminally liable for failing to prevent the discharge (provided, of course, he or she had the power or ability to prevent it).” (Ibid.) By its plain language, the statute imposes criminal liability “only where the driver or owner ‘knowingly’ permits the discharge.” (Ibid.) As such, to find a defendant guilty of permitting another person to discharge a weapon from a vehicle pursuant to section 26100, subdivision (b), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was the driver or owner of the vehicle; (2) the defendant permitted someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle; (3) the defendant knew that he or she was permitting someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle; and (4) the other person shot the firearm from the vehicle. (§ 26100, subd. (b); CALCRIM No. 969.)

Reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is reasonable, credible, and solid evidence based on which a rational trier of fact could have found Tucker guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of permitting another to discharge a firearm from his vehicle. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)

While there was no evidence Tucker affirmatively authorized or assented to the discharge of a weapon from the car, there is substantial evidence he knowingly permitted the discharge of a weapon and failed to prevent it from occurring even though he had a plausible opportunity to do so. Evidence established Tucker was driving the car when the shooting occurred: Major testified it was Tucker’s car and he was driving at the time of the shooting; the officer who stopped the vehicle only a few minutes after the shooting testified Tucker was driving the car at that time. There was also substantial evidence a firearm was discharged from the car. John testified two of the passengers in Tucker’s car pointed guns at him, he heard gunshots as he was attempting to run away, and then he discovered he had been shot. When Tucker’s car was stopped by an officer approximately 12 minutes after police were dispatched to the scene, three guns were recovered from the car, including a silver semiautomatic weapon that matched John’s description of the gun in the hands of the passenger who stood up in the sunroof. A .25-caliber bullet casing found at the scene of the shooting also matched the type of ammunition used by the silver semiautomatic handgun found in the car. Tucker, Clay, and Major all tested positive for GSR. Major testified he saw Clay pick up the silver handgun when Clay stood up in the sunroof, and he heard a gunshot when the car was stopped next to John.

Moreover, there was evidence Tucker knowingly permitted passengers in the car to discharge their firearms. Circumstantially, the evidence strongly suggested this was a gang-related shooting and that Tucker was not merely an unaware, unknowing driver whose passengers suddenly and without any warning happened to shoot a weapon from his car. There was substantial evidence Tucker and his passengers were active gang members. The gang expert testified Tucker was a Garrett Street gang member, that Young and Clay were Modoc gang members, and that Major was a U-Boys gang member—all gangs within the MUG alliance, which is an association of the Modoc, U-Boys, and Garrett Street gangs. Price testified gang members within the alliance are often together, and that the TWAMP alliance, made up of another set of gangs, including the Muhammads, is a rival alliance. The MUG and TWAMP alliances are known to have violent confrontations. Price testified that shooting a rival gang member during a drive-by shooting elevates the status of any gang member in the vehicle, including a driver. He also testified gang members will commit crimes on their own turf—shooting a rival within a gang’s own turf sends a message to rivals the area is not a place they should frequent.

While Major testified the four were driving around to buy marijuana, he also conceded when they stopped the car next to John, Major heard someone in the car ask John where he was from—a question John immediately understood to be about his gang status and which expert testimony corroborated was intended to elicit gang-membership status. There was also some evidence suggesting Major believed John was associated with the Muhammads, although testimony did not reveal whether Major shared this belief with anyone else in the vehicle. As a gang member, Tucker would have understood Young’s question was about John’s gang status, and while Major testified there was no conversation in the vehicle about confronting John, it was nonetheless reasonable to infer Tucker knew he was stopping the car to confront a potential rival gang member. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396 [appellate court “must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence”].)

To enable Young to ask John where he was from, Tucker maneuvered the vehicle and stopped it next to John, physically facilitating the encounter. While there is no direct evidence Tucker knew there were guns in the vehicle at the moment he stopped the car near John, John’s testimony about the encounter was substantial evidence Tucker would have become aware of the guns and that they were about to be discharged. When Young asked John where he was from, John replied and tried to walk away. At that point, Young pointed his gun at John, and another person with dreadlocks stood up in the sunroof and pointed a gun at John. John testified he “kind of like froze up and put [his] hands up, and then they just stayed right there.” He “didn’t know what to do next” and he “kind of like backed up a little bit” and when he felt like they were not going to do anything, he started walking away; at that point, one or both vehicle passengers started shooting, and then John ran.

Given Tucker’s position as driver, it was reasonable to infer he knew Young—the passenger right next to him—had pulled out a gun and pointed it at John. John essentially testified there was a pause between the time the guns were aimed at him and when the guns were discharged. Despite this pause, there is no evidence Tucker moved the car in an attempt to prevent Young or the rear passenger standing in the sunroof from shooting. Tucker argues because John did not think they were going to shoot the drawn weapons, it could not be inferred Tucker knew they intended to shoot. However, Tucker’s knowledge his passengers intended to discharge their drawn weapons was circumstantially supported. The weapons were held by gang members within Tucker’s own alliance, they were pointed at a potential rival within Modoc territory, drive-by shootings were part of the Modoc gang culture, both Young and Clay were Modoc gang members, and shooting a rival elevated a gang member’s status—including that of the driver. As a gang member within the MUG alliance, Tucker would have known all of that and it would have been in his interest to permit the shooting to elevate his own status. (See People v. Gonzales (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1463 [(“‘Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.’”].)

Further, the moment the weapons were drawn, Tucker—as the driver—had the ability to prevent the weapons from being discharged by simply driving away from the intersection. But, Tucker did not do that; instead, he facilitated the entire interaction by stopping his car next to John for the duration of the interaction and doing nothing to drive away when the weapons were drawn and before they were fired. To reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that under no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790). We are not persuaded Tucker has made such a showing. In our view, the evidence discussed above and the inferences that reasonably could have been drawn from it were sufficient to permit a jury to conclude Tucker knowingly permitted someone to shoot a firearm from his vehicle, which he had an opportunity to prevent but did not do so.

This conclusion is not undercut by the jury’s not-guilty verdict as to count 5 against Tucker for aiding and abetting an assault with a firearm. Tucker argues the not-guilty verdict on count 5 indicates the jury determined the prosecution failed to establish Tucker had knowledge that any of the passengers intended to discharge a firearm. Without evidence Tucker knew others were planning to discharge a firearm from the vehicle as to count 5, Tucker maintains he could not have knowingly permitted someone to discharge a weapon from his vehicle as to count 6. Tucker’s argument in this regard is tantamount to asserting the jury’s verdict on count 5 and count 6 are inconsistent. One of the reasons purported inconsistencies in a jury’s verdict are not generally challengeable is because an individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency “‘would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will not undertake.…’” (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 863, quoting United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 66–67 [considering a case where a single jury inconsistently found a single defendant guilty of some counts and not guilty of others].) A criminal defendant’s protection against jury irrationality or error is provided through the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence, and this review “‘should be independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.’” (Ibid., discussing the reasoning of United States v. Powell, supra, at p. 67.)

As the jury was instructed here, to establish a defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime, the prosecution must prove (1) the perpetrator committed a crime; (2) the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; (3) before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; and (4) the defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. (CALCRIM No. 401; see People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.) Of those elements, it is impossible to know which the jury found the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed in United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at page 67, we cannot divine the jury’s basis for its not-guilty verdict as to Tucker’s aiding and abetting an assault with a firearm (count 5) and then superimpose that conjured reasoning onto our consideration of the sufficiency of evidence as to count 6. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction on count 6 must be considered independently from the jury’s verdict as to count 5. (People v. Palmer, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.) For the reasons discussed above, we find substantial evidence supports Tucker’s conviction on count 6.

II. Joinder in Codefendant’s Applicable Arguments

At the conclusion of his opening brief, Tucker notes he joins “in any arguments made by the [codefendant], Eric Major, in his opening brief that are applicable to [Tucker].” The People object to this blanket joinder for failing to provide a particularized argument of Tucker’s ability to seek relief on the grounds articulated by Major and urges the court to deem the purportedly joined arguments forfeited.

Joinder is broadly permitted (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5)), “but each appellant has the burden of demonstrating error and prejudice .…” (People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 510, fn. 11.) As such, if a party’s briefs do not provide legal argument and citation to authority on each point raised, “‘the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Tucker joined any applicable arguments raised by codefendant Major, but at the time of this blanket joinder, Major had not yet filed his opening brief. When Major filed his opening brief in February 2018, his assertions of error were predicated on his age and the ineffective assistance of his counsel in failing to move to suppress his police-interview confession. Tucker filed a reply brief in July 2018, but never mentioned Major’s arguments or responded to the People’s assertion his joinder in Major’s arguments was improper without any particularized argument. Absent any assertion how Major’s contentions of error apply specifically to Tucker, we deem the joined arguments forfeited and decline to consider them. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363 [“party purporting to join some or all of the claims raised by another are obligated to thoughtfully assess whether such joinder is proper as to the specific claims and, if necessary, to provide particularized argument in support of his or her client’s ability to seek relief on that ground”].) Moreover, Major’s claims of error do not appear applicable to Tucker: Tucker was not a minor at the time of the shooting, and it is not clear how suppression of Major’s confession would undercut the jury’s verdict as to Tucker on counts 5 and/or 6.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P.J.

PEÑA, J.