Filed 12/24/19 P. v. Taylor CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

—-

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM RILEY JAMES TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

C087180

(Super. Ct. Nos. 17F5792, 15F2756)

Defendant William Riley James Taylor appeals his conviction for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). He contends the trial court’s denial of his request to admit third party culpability evidence resulted in reversible error. The trial court did not err. We affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

John Honeycutt was completing the process of moving from his condominium. He parked next to the garage, with the garage door half open, and went into the home, leaving his wallet and phone in the car. When he returned to the car, it did not unlock normally, and defendant came from behind the vehicle. Honeycutt yelled at defendant, and told him to “Get out of here.” Defendant replied he had just been trying to stay warm in the car. Honeycutt continued yelling at defendant, then noticed his driver’s side door was ajar, and his wallet and phone were missing. Defendant started running away. Honeycutt chased him, yelling at him to return his property. Defendant turned around, reached into his pocket, pulled out clippers, and said “I will shoot you.” Then defendant turned and ran away. Honeycutt stopped chasing defendant and went home to report the matter to the police.

The next day, Redding Police officer Taylor Braud encountered defendant, who was riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, and searched him. In the search, Braud found three bank cards in the names of three different people, none defendant’s. Braud ran a check and learned that one of the cards, Honeycutt’s, had been stolen the day before. Defendant matched the description provided earlier by Honeycutt. Braud contacted Honeycutt, who came to the officer’s location and positively identified defendant as the person he chased the night before. Honeycutt also verified that the credit card Braud had recovered from defendant was one of Honeycutt’s credit cards, and had been in his wallet when it was taken.

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery (§ 211), and not guilty of criminal threats (§ 422) and second degree burglary of a vehicle (§ 459). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true the allegation that defendant had committed the offense while on probation. The trial court also sustained a petition for probation violation. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of three years eight months, ordered defendant to pay victim restitution, fines, and fees, and awarded presentence custody credits.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to admit evidence of third party culpability. Specifically, defendant sought admission of: (1) his statement to Officer Braud upon being arrested that he had gotten stolen property from “Jacob”; and, (2) Jacob Adkison’s criminal history including his plea and conviction for a similar burglary from a car in a garage, committed approximately nine days after the Honeycutt offense.

Background

Defendant moved in limine to admit third party culpability evidence. Specifically, he sought to introduce evidence that during Officer Braud’s questioning of him, he: (1) denied any involvement in the Honeycutt robbery; (2) claimed he had found all bankcards “a couple of days ago” in a dumpster; and (3) had received a stolen laptop, also in his possession at the time of the arrest, from “a friend, Jacob.” Defendant also sought to introduce evidence of a burglary committed by Adkison approximately nine days after the Honeycutt robbery. In that burglary, as Robert and Paul Bennett were getting ready to leave on a trip, they saw someone taking items out of their cars in the garage. The person ran away. The Bennetts searched the area and found the person, Jacob Adkison. After looking through Adkison’s backpack, they found one of their wallets. When they said they were going to call the police, Adkison reached toward his waistband and threatened Paul he would never see his father, Robert, again. Adkison ultimately pleaded guilty to burglary and assault arising from the Bennett theft. Defense counsel indicated he intended to introduce this evidence through the testimony of Adkison, and possibly Robert Bennett.

The trial court asked for clarification on the link between Adkison and the Honeycutt robbery. Defense counsel argued the link was defendant having allegedly received some property from “Jacob.” The prosecutor noted the statement to Officer Braud on defendant’s arrest was hearsay without any identifiable exception, as he was not intending to elicit any of the statements defendant made when he was arrested. The prosecutor also argued the Adkison burglary was not sufficiently distinctive to give rise to a connection between the two offenses or an indication that they were committed by the same person. Both cases involved a person stealing from a car who is interrupted by the property owner, and then threatened the owner when confronted. The prosecutor acknowledged that if defendant testified, he could testify as to his statement to the officer upon arrest, and his relationship with Adkison.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The trial court found there was not sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence linking Adkison to the actual perpetration of the crime. The trial court also noted that defendant could himself testify as to this evidence.

Analysis

Third party culpability evidence is treated like any other evidence in determining its admissibility. (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 (Hall); People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 921, overruled on other grounds in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6.) Third party culpability evidence is admissible if the evidence is “capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” (Hall, supra, at p. 833.) But, the court is not required to admit any and all evidence offered by a defendant of a third party’s possible culpability. (Ibid.) The proffered evidence “must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325.) The proffered evidence must also be otherwise admissible. Incompetent and inadmissible evidence remains inadmissible. (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745-746.) We review a trial court’s ruling excluding third party culpability evidence for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 581 (Elliot).)

Hearsay Statements

Inadmissible hearsay statements cannot form the basis for a third party culpability defense. (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1324-1325.) “Hearsay evidence is ‘evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.’ (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Unless an exception applies, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. (Id., subd. (b).)” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 336.)

Defendant’s statement to Braud that he received the stolen property from “Jacob” was offered for its truth, and is therefore hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a); People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610.) Defendant does not claim the statement comes within any hearsay exception or that it was offered for any purpose other than for its truth, to establish a link connecting Jacob to the perpetration of the crime. The statement was inadmissible hearsay, and as such, it was not admissible as third party culpability evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this statement.

Propensity Evidence

Evidence of a third party’s crimes is inadmissible to establish the third party’s criminal propensity to commit crimes or to show the third party is more likely the perpetrator of the crime. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 500-501 (Davis).) Such evidence is only admissible if offered to show a fact other than the third party’s criminal disposition, such as identity or common plan or scheme, not “merely to show that the third party was the more likely perpetrator because” of his or her criminal history. (Davis, supra, at p. 501.) “For evidence of an uncharged offense to be admissible to establish the third party’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, ‘ “[t]he pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” ’ [Citations.] A large number of common marks may, when viewed in combination, establish the required distinctive pattern.” (Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 581.) In addition, “[s]uch evidence does not amount to direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (Davis, supra, at p. 501.)

Both offenses involved a person stealing items from a car parked in or near the owner’s garage, the perpetrator fleeing the scene when seen, and threatening violence when confronted. But these “common features, whether considered separately or together, are not so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” (Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 581; see also People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1289.) Thus, this propensity evidence was not admissible to show identity or common scheme. Nor does this evidence amount to direct or circumstantial evidence linking Adkison to the actual perpetration of the charged crime. (See Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 501.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. (Elliott, supra, at pp. 580-581; In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 1008.)

II

Defendant contends that the holding of Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826 that third party culpability evidence can be excluded unless it is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about his guilt is unconstitutional. We are bound by the holding in Hall. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

III

Defendant contends the exclusion of the third party culpability evidence violated his federal due process right to present a defense. As our Supreme Court has done repeatedly in similar cases, we reject defendant’s claim. “ ‘There was no error under state law, and we have long observed that, “[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right to present a defense.” ’ ” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1243.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/

RAYE, P. J.

We concur:

/s/

BLEASE, J.

/s/

MAURO, J.