Filed 1/7/20 Marriage of Hatzman CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of JUDITH L. and WILLIAM G. HATZMAN.

JUDITH L. JOHNSON-HATZMAN,

Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM G. HATZMAN,

Respondent.

F076156

(Super. Ct. No. VFL265090)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. John P. Bianco, Judge.

James B. Preston for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

-ooOoo-

In this marriage dissolution case, appellant Judith Johnson-Hatzman (Judith) challenges the trial court’s judgment that she must pay spousal support to respondent William Hatzman (William) in the amount of $1,000 per month plus an award of attorney fees. In appealing from said judgment, Judith’s main argument is that the trial court prejudicially erred because, in its assessment of her ability to pay spousal support and attorney fees, the court averaged the annual income of her walnut ranch over the past three years even though the walnut ranch had lost money during its most recent year of operation in 2016. We are not persuaded. The record reflected that the income of the walnut ranch fluctuated from year to year, and the prices Judith received for her walnut crop in 2016 were unusually low. Under such circumstances, the use of an average income over a three-year period was not unreasonable. Additionally, the trial court appropriately weighed and considered other statutory factors, including among other things William’s financial needs and his poor health. On balance, we conclude Judith has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion under all the circumstances. Accordingly, the judgment entered by the trial court on the reserved issues of spousal support and attorney fees is hereby affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married in 1989 and were separated in 2015. Judith filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on April 22, 2016. A status-only judgment of dissolution was entered on December 23, 2016. As the trial court found, “the marriage was of long duration, 26 years, 7 months.” At the time of the trial on spousal support in January 2017, Judith was 76 years of age and William was 72 years of age. William was in poor health. Evidence was presented at trial that he was suffering from cancer and had two strokes during the marriage that have affected his ability to speak.

Judith owned, as her separate property, a home with approximately 43 acres of walnut trees in the Visalia area, known as Lazy J Farms (referred to herein as the walnut ranch). She lives on this property with her 52-year-old son. Her son is involved in running the walnut ranch, and Judith pays him a “management fee” of $30,000 annually out of the proceeds of the walnut sales.

The parties both owned, as a community asset, a wine tasting business by the name of KVC Ranch, Inc., otherwise known as Grizzly Republic Wines. It was generally not profitable, and the parties agreed to sell the wine tasting business. Judith asserted that she had contributed most of the funds for this business from her separate property, and it was ultimately agreed between the parties that she would receive 95 percent of the proceeds of any sale of KVC Ranch, Inc./Grizzly Republic Wines and William would receive 5 percent. William works as a volunteer at the parties’ wine tasting business and intends to continue to do so until the business can be sold.

In his responsive pleading to Judith’s dissolution petition, William requested spousal support. On October 4, 2016, a hearing was held to determine whether temporary spousal support should be ordered until a full trial on the support issue could be held. In its order following the hearing, the trial court ordered Judith to pay William $1,962 per month as temporary spousal support. The issue of attorney fees was reserved.

A trial regarding permanent spousal support and attorney fees was commenced on January 17, 2017. The parties each testified and submitted evidence of their financial condition and relative needs to the trial court. Judith introduced income and expense statements and her 2016 tax return, which documents reflected that in 2016 her walnut ranch had a net loss of $8,708 if depreciation were excluded. She testified that due to the walnut ranch’s net losses in 2016, she was unable to hire labor to prune the trees or conduct other needed work on her walnut ranch. Further, as a result of the same income shortfall in 2016, she had to borrow money on her line of credit to be able to continue to pay her obligations such as the court-ordered monthly temporary spousal support, her attorney fees, and some of her ordinary living expenses. According to Judith, the price of walnuts was the lowest it had been in at least seven years, perhaps longer than that, but her farm expenses were rising. She did not expect to see a profit in 2017, but she hoped to break even.

Judith received Social Security income in the amount of $1,238 per month, from which she had a medical insurance cost of $680 per month. Her primary asset was her home and the walnut ranch, which she represented to be valued together at $1.5 million gross fair market value, but a net value of $671,168 after debt was deducted. The trial court found that the total value of Judith’s separate property assets, including her home and the walnut ranch, vehicles, equipment, among other things, was $1.972 million.

William’s income at the time of trial consisted of $1,489 per month of Social Security income and $500 per month from a promissory note he owns, for a total of $1,989 per month. William retired from employment with Southern California Edison in 1996 and had received a lump sum payout for his early retirement, but, according to Judith, the entire sum was lost in the stock market in 2008. William’s separate property assets included a home in Big Creek, California, and a mobile home/trailer in Paso Robles. William indicated that once the wine business is sold, he will be able move to the Big Creek residence and reduce his monthly expenses to $3,000 per month.

After hearing oral argument, the trial court took the matter under submission. On March 27, 2017, the trial court issued its written decision on the issues of spousal support and attorney fees. On the issue of Judith’s ability to pay, the trial court stated that, in determining business income, it was not limited to the party’s last 12 months. Rather, the court explained: “In the instant case, the court does not believe that one year is representative of the Wife’s income. Given the nature [of] the walnut industry, three years is more appropriate. Therefore, the Court finds that the wife has average farm income in the amount of $3,798.00 per month.” This finding of average income from the walnut ranch was obviously important to the trial court’s implied conclusion that Judith had the ability to pay William $1,000 in spousal support per month and was able to contribute $5,000 toward William’s attorney fees. In awarding spousal support and attorney fees, the trial court also properly considered and relied on other circumstances such as William’s financial need, his poor health and the length of the marriage. The trial court’s decision stated, “[i]n balancing the hardships, the court finds that the Husband cannot meet his needs established during the marriage without assistance of Wife in the form of Spousal Support.”

In response to the above decision, Judith filed a motion for a new trial and a request for a statement of decision. In her motion for new trial, Judith argued the trial court erred in averaging the walnut ranch income over three years. She also claimed the trial court made a mathematical error in calculating average income and omitted certain business losses that should have been considered. In her request for a statement of decision, Judith requested the trial court make further or more specific findings, including some findings that would be contrary to the trial court’s prior written decision—such as that she has no current ability to pay spousal support or attorney fees. The trial court denied both the motion for new trial and the request for a further statement of decision.

On June 29, 2017, the trial court issued its notice of entry of judgment on reserved issues, which judgment required Judith to pay $1,000 per month to William in spousal support, beginning as of February 1, 2017, and to pay needs-based attorney fees to William in the sum of $5,000.

Judith filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Spousal Support

A. Standard of Review and Statutory Factors in Awarding Spousal Support

Permanent spousal support is governed by the statutory scheme set forth in Family Code sections 4300 through 4360. (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442.) The statutory factors that must be considered by a court in deciding issues of spousal support are set forth in section 4320 and include, among other things, the following: “(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living. [¶] (d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage. [¶] (e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party. [¶] (f) The duration of the marriage. [¶] (g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment …. [¶] (h) The age and health of the parties. [¶] [and] … (k) The balance of hardships to each party.” (§ 4320, subds. (c)–(h), (k).)

“ ‘In making its spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304.) In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. (Id. at p. 304.) However, “the ‘court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. (In re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1386.) The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s ruling exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 598; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496.) To the extent that a trial court’s exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld as long as the court’s determination is within the range justified by the evidence presented. (In re Marriage of Blazer, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.)

B. No Abuse of Discretion Shown in Averaging of Walnut Ranch Income

Here, it is clear from the trial court’s written decision that it carefully weighed and considered all of the applicable factors set forth in section 4320, including Judith’s ability to pay support and William’s financial needs, age, poor health, the balance of hardships and the long duration of the marriage. In claiming the trial court erred in awarding spousal support, Judith focuses on the trial court’s analysis of her ability to pay. She argues that in determining her income, the trial court was required to look solely to her 2016 tax return (showing the walnut ranch had a net loss), rather than averaging the walnut ranch’s income over the past three years. In its decision below, the trial court explained why it rejected that approach: “[T]he time period on which income is calculated must be long enough to be representative. [Citation.] It is a manifest abuse of discretion to take so small a sliver of time to figure income that the determination essentially becomes arbitrary. [Citation.] In the instant case, the court does not believe that one year is representative of the Wife’s income. Given the nature [of] the walnut industry, three years is more appropriate. Therefore, the Court finds that the wife had average farm income in the amount of $3,798.00 per month.” As we proceed to explain, the trial court’s decision to average the income for the walnut ranch over three years did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

The difficult task of how to reasonably determine a party’s income for purposes of ascertaining ability to pay support when his or her income level fluctuates significantly from year to year was discussed in In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Riddle). After surveying the case law, Riddle concluded that in such circumstances a trial court may estimate a supporting party’s prospective income by looking at a representative sample of past income. (Id. at pp. 1082–1084.) “The theory is that the court is trying to predict likely income for the immediate future, as distinct from extraordinarily high or low income in the past.” (Id. at p. 1082.) Thus, “the time period on which income is calculated must be long enough to be representative, as distinct from extraordinary.” (Ibid., citing In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 821.) Riddle observed that, as a general rule, the most recent 12-month period is an appropriate sample. (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) However, Riddle also recognized that in some cases, a longer period might be utilized where a larger time frame would reasonably be more representative of the party’s prospective income. As an example, the court noted in dicta that “a two- or three-year average” might yield a more representative overall income figure for certain industries. (Id. at p. 1084 [citing book royalties as example].) The court warned, however, that caution is needed in using longer periods than one year because going back too far might simply yield figures reflective of past economic conditions, rather than fairly representing what the party’s income will likely be in the immediate future from which to pay support. (Ibid.) On the other hand, “time periods that are too short may unrealistically exaggerate economic micro-trends that may, over longer periods, smooth themselves out.” (Ibid.) “[S]amples must be representative, not selected to skew results one way—or the other.” (Id. at p. 1086.)

In Riddle, the trial court had selected a period for estimating income that was too short to be representative—a mere two months. Moreover, the two months in question involved exceptionally high earnings in comparison to the party’s annual income over the past one to two years. The appellate court found this was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, explaining as follows: “It is a manifest abuse of discretion to take so small a sliver of time to figure income that the determination essentially becomes arbitrary.… A mere two months is an embarrassingly short period on which to predict the annual income of a commissioned salesperson who works in the financial markets.… [¶] We are forced to conclude that the trial court chose an unrealistic time sample in order to, as the Rosen court might have put it, ‘inflate’ the supporting spouse’s monthly income.” (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.)

The principles summarized in Riddle, which require a trial court to utilize an income sample over a period of time that is fairly representative and thus a reasonable estimate of the party’s prospective income from which to pay support moving forward, continue to be cited with approval in subsequent appellate cases and applied where fluctuating levels of income were involved. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 105 [while observing that although a party’s annual income in the prior calendar year as shown on his or her tax return is usually an adequate benchmark, the court noted based on Riddle that a longer period might be more appropriate in cases where a spouse’s annual income fluctuates]; In re Marriage of Cohen (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1021–1022 [Riddle’s requirement that income calculations be “fair and representative” was held satisfied where the trial court amortized over a two-year period a huge signing bonus received by a party from his employer where the bonus was meant to cover the entire two-year period in the sense it was predicated on certain results from the employee over subsequent two years]; In re Marriage of Mosley, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1385–1386 [applying Riddle’s principles, concluding that the trial court erred in assuming from mere one-year history that a six-figure bonus received by a party over and above his base salary would likely recur in the subsequent year]; In re Marriage of Henry (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 111, 121 [noting that under Riddle, past earnings may be used to determine a support order where they are a reasonable predictor of future earnings].)

In applying the principles outlined in Riddle to the present case, we conclude the trial court’s decision to average the income for the walnut ranch over three years did not exceed the bounds of reason under the circumstances but was within the range of the court’s sound discretion. It was undisputed that Judith’s net income from walnut farming was “cyclical, meaning it can go up and down on a year-to-year basis.” Despite that general volatility, the walnut ranch achieved net income levels ranging from approximately $60,000 to $68,000 in the years 2014 and 2015 if depreciation is not deducted. It is true that in the most recent year, 2016, the walnut ranch experienced a net income loss of approximately $8,708, excluding depreciation. However, there was also evidence that the prices Judith received in 2016 for her four varieties of walnuts were the lowest in the past seven years or longer, and therefore abnormally low. Under such circumstances, the trial court was not outside the bounds of reason when it concluded that looking to 2016 alone would not be an adequately representative slice of time for estimating Judith’s prospective income. Moreover, Judith has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s use of an average over the past three years would not have provided a more reasonable forecast of ranch income moving forward, as opposed to isolating the apparently abnormally low income figures from 2016. We conclude that no clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion has been shown.

In claiming the trial court erred by averaging the past three years of the walnut ranch’s income, Judith refers us to the case of In re Marriage of Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 808 (Rosen). We disagree with Judith’s suggestion that Rosen supports her position or requires us to reverse the trial court here. In Rosen, the trial court had to ascertain the income of a party for support purposes. The party in question was an attorney whose law practice resulted in fluctuating income from year to year. (Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) At the trial of the support issues in 1999, the trial court relied solely on the attorney’s cash flow in 1996 to decide his current income in 1999, despite more recent evidence of income during the two years prior to trial which showed a marked decline in income. Rosen concluded the trial court’s selection of the 1996 income level was an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 825.) We view the result reached in Rosen as being entirely consistent with Riddle. In essence, Rosen simply held that the trial court’s use of the 1996 cash flow figure alone, without considering the intervening two years of income prior to the 1999 trial, was not a representative sample from which to decide the attorney’s current or prospective income.

We would also point out that nothing in Rosen forbids the use of averaging income. Elsewhere in the opinion, Rosen held that an expert’s valuation of the “goodwill” of the attorney’s law practice was improper because it relied on a single year (i.e., 1995), rather than using an average of net income over a period of time that was reasonably illustrative of the current rate of earnings, in accordance with the usual methodology for such goodwill valuations. (Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 819–821.) Rosen explained: “Bruce’s net income for 1995 alone is neither an average nor ‘reasonably illustrative’ of his earnings. A reasonable trier of fact could not help but conclude the expert chose to use Bruce’s net income from 1995—one of Bruce’s highest earning years—solely to inflate the value of goodwill.” (Id. at p. 820.) The Riddle court discussed this portion of the Rosen case, and while Riddle expressly recognized the distinctions between determining goodwill and ascertaining immediately prospective earnings on which support must be paid, it held that Rosen’s analysis clearly applied the basic principle that “[a] sample must be representative of what is being sampled.” (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.) In conclusion, nothing in Rosen alters our conclusions expressed hereinabove that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the present case when it averaged the walnut ranch’s income over the prior three-year period of operations, rather than relying solely on the abnormally low income or net losses shown in 2016.

C. No Prejudice Shown as to Other Alleged Income Calculation Errors

We briefly address Judith’s additional arguments in support of her contention that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support. In this regard, Judith argues (i) the trial court made a mathematical error in calculating the three-year income average, and (ii) the trial court left out certain “wine shop” business losses. According, to Judith, if the trial court had done the math correctly, it would have resulted in annual walnut ranch income of $3,314, rather than $3,798, a difference of $484 per month. A further reduction of income would allegedly have resulted if average wine shop business losses had been factored in. We conclude that these arguments fail to show reversible error.

As to the alleged wine shop losses, it appears that Judith is arguing that if a three-year average were applied to that distinct business, Judith’s income would have to be adjusted downward. Apparently, the wine shop or wine tasting business had net losses in 2014 and 2015 and earned a small profit in 2016. The problem with Judith’s theory is there is no indication the trial court found it would be reasonable or appropriate to average income for the wine shop business. The trial court did so for the walnut ranch under the unique circumstances before it relating to that particular farming enterprise, but nothing in the record indicates that any other sources of income were averaged, nor has Judith offered any legal authority that the trial court was required to do so. Therefore, no error is shown regarding the alleged failure to average wine shop income and/or losses over three years.

Furthermore, the claimed mathematical error and its alleged impact on the income calculation (as well as the argument relating to wine shop losses) were specifically brought to the trial court’s attention in the motion for new trial, which was denied. It is clear to us that the trial court, in denying the motion for new trial, implicitly concluded that even if the purported mathematical error or other minor error had been made, the impact was not material to the outcome—that is, the trial court would still make the same spousal support order. Similarly, on appeal, Judith has failed to demonstrate the purported errors were prejudicial. A judgment may not be set aside unless an error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) An appellant’s brief must spell out exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice by showing that it would be reasonably probable he or she would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 939; County of Los Angeles v. Nobel Ins. Co. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 939, 944–945.) That is, an appellant must show that the error prejudicially affected his rights and the outcome. Prejudice is not presumed. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.)

Here, regarding the trial court’s alleged mathematical error and purported failure to average out the wine shop income and losses, Judith has failed to demonstrate such error or errors, if any, were prejudicial. Additionally, as stated hereinabove, Judith failed to establish any error occurred in regard to the trial court’s failure to average the wine shop income and losses. Accordingly, these additional arguments on Judith’s part failed to indicate any reversible error in this case.

In conclusion, since no clear or prejudicial abuse of discretion has been shown as to the trial court’s determination of Judith’s ability to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month, we affirm the trial court’s support judgment.

II. Attorney Fees

Next, Judith challenges the propriety of the trial court’s award to William of need-based attorney fees. After the trial on the issues of spousal support and attorney fees was completed and the case was taken under submission, the trial court issued its written decision holding, among other things, that Judith must pay William the sum of $5,000 for need-based attorney fees. The trial court explained the basis for the award: “In awarding Attorney’s Fees, the Court must consider whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. The Court finds based [on] Family Code section 2030 there is a disparity in access warranting Attorney’s Fees payable by Wife to Husband.” We note the parties’ relative financial positions, incomes, assets and needs were discussed and evaluated in the same written decision by the trial court in addressing the issue of spousal support. On appeal, Judith challenges the attorney fee award on similar grounds to her challenge of the spousal support order; namely, a lack of income or assets with which to pay the award of attorney fees. Because the trial court’s finding of economic disparity was supported by substantial evidence, we shall affirm the trial court’s award of need-based attorney fees.

“Need-based fee awards in dissolution proceedings are governed by sections 2030 and 2032, as well as section 4320 (as incorporated by § 2032, subd. (b)).” (In re Marriage of Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.) Under section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), “the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation … to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party … to pay to the other party … whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding .…” Under subdivision (a)(2) of section 2030, “[i]f the findings demonstrate disparity in access [to funds] and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney fees and costs.” The word “shall” in the above provisions reflects the mandatory nature of these provisions where a finding of relative disparity is made. (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.) Where, as here, the trial court’s award may be interpreted as making the requisite findings of relative financial disparity and the ability of one party to pay, the award of attorney fees will be upheld if such findings were supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.)

In assessing one party’s relative need and the other party’s ability to pay, “the family court may consider all evidence concerning the parties’ current incomes, assets, and abilities, including investment and income-producing properties.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1313–1314; In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1167.) The amount of the award, as determined in the trial court’s discretion, should be what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the parties (§ 2032, subd. (a)), but not more than what is reasonably necessary for attorney fees and costs in the subject proceedings. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).)

In the present case, the trial court’s finding of disparity of access to funds or assets with which to pay attorney fees was supported by the trial court’s other findings within the same written decision, wherein the court considered the factors relevant to spousal support under section 4320. Among other things, those findings reflected there was a considerable income disparity in Judith’s favor once Judith’s prospective walnut ranch income was considered, which the court estimated at $3,798 per month. In terms of income-producing assets and ability to earn income, the findings showed that Judith owned the walnut ranch, a productive ongoing business enterprise, whereas William was apparently unemployable due to health issues and was limited to Social Security income and $500 per month from a promissory note. Additionally, the parties’ relative economic disparity was further shown by the comparative value of their assets and property holdings. As the trial court found: “The Wife’s separate property consists of a home and forty three (43) acres of walnuts, two vehicles, miscellaneous farm equipment, art, and jewelry valued at $1.972 million. [¶] The Husband’s separate property consists of a home, mobile home, motorcycle, one share of SCE stock, and a note payable valued at approximately $262,000.00.”

On this record, we conclude the trial court’s finding of disparity of access to income or assets to pay attorney fees was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of need-based attorney fees.

Judith makes one last attack on the attorney fee order. She argues there was no evidence before the trial court, such as an attorney declaration, to substantiate the reasonableness of the amount of fees. It does not appear this argument was addressed to the trial court, where it might have easily been corrected, and therefore we deem the argument forfeited on appeal. An appellate court generally will not consider a matter presented for the first time on appeal (Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 31 Cal.3d 124, 143), and a failure to raise an issue or argument in the trial court will result in it being forfeited on appeal (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226; Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1381). But even if the issue had not been forfeited, we would conclude that no prejudicial error has been shown. William testified during trial that he presently owed his attorney $7,000 concerning this case. The trial judge was presumably in a good position to know the reasonable value of attorney services for matters occurring in the context of the litigation before him. Moreover, Judith has failed to present any reason to conclude the amount was more than was reasonably necessary or was otherwise prejudicial.

For the reasons discussed above, the trial court’s award of need-based attorney fees to William in the amount of $5,000 is hereby affirmed.

III. Statement of Decision

On March 27, 2017, the trial court issued its written decision after trial. On April 3, 2017, Judith filed a request for a statement of decision, which apparently sought additional or more specific findings from the trial court. The trial court declined to provide a more specific statement of its findings. In the present appeal, Judith contends the trial court reversibly erred in failing to comply with her request. We disagree, for two reasons.

First, the trial court did issue a written decision that substantially set forth the factual and legal explanation for its decision on the principal controverted issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) Judith’s appeal fails to meet her burden of affirmatively demonstrating error by showing why the trial court’s written decision was legally inadequate. (See In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1530–1531 [statement only requires an explanation of the factual and legal basis of the court’s decision on the principal controverted issues at trial; court is not constrained to address every question]; Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf & Country Club (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230 [in rendering a statement of decision, trial court only required to state ultimate, not evidentiary facts].) Second, even assuming the trial court potentially erred by failing to issue a more specific decision explaining in further detail its legal and factual findings, we would decline to reverse. An error “in failing to issue a requested statement of decision is not reversible per se, but is subject to harmless error review.” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) We do not presume injury from error, but rather the appellant must show that the error resulted in prejudice. (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) Judith has not attempted to make such a showing, but instead appears to be under the mistaken impression that any such error is reversible per se. It is not, as F.P. v. Monier recently clarified. (3 Cal.5th at pp. 1108–1116.) Therefore, even assuming error occurred for the sake of argument, Judith has not carried her burden on appeal of demonstrating prejudice.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court on the issues of spousal support and attorney fees is affirmed. Since William did not file a respondent’s brief, there is no need to award him costs on appeal. Judith shall bear her own costs on appeal.

LEVY, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

PEÑA, J.