Filed 1/10/20 Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Blythe CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee, etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
BARRY BLYTHE,
Defendant and Appellant,
E071451
(Super.Ct.No. MCC1601086)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Angel M. Bermudez, Judge. Affirmed.
Barry Blythe, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, Deborah P. Heald and Glenn J. Plattner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this judicial foreclosure action, after a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure and order of sale against defendant and appellant Barry Blythe. Blythe appeals, contending that the judgment should be reversed because the foreclosing bank failed to “produce any evidence that it had standing to file a judicial foreclosure action” against him.
We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2004, Blythe took out a loan in the amount of $800,000, secured by a deed of trust, to purchase a home in Murrieta, California. In 2005, Blythe’s loan was securitized and transferred to a pool of loans named “WAMU 2005-AR2 Group II.”
Blythe did not make the loan payment scheduled for October 1, 2008, and has made no payments since that date.
In 2009, an “Assignment of Deed of Trust” was recorded, assigning the beneficial interest under Blythe’s deed of trust to “Deutsche Bank, N.A., as trustee for WAMU 2005-AR2.” In June 2018, a “Rescission of Assignment of Deed of Trust” was recorded, reciting that the 2009 assignment was “being rescinded as a result of an error in the named Assignee insofar as the Assignee is DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR WAMU MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2005-AR2, not ‘Deutsche Bank, N.A. as trustee for WAMU 2005-AR2.’” On the same date in June 2018, a new assignment of Blythe’s deed of trust was recorded, assigning the beneficial interest to plaintiff.
The bench trial in this action was held in July 2018. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment on August 8, 2018.
II. DISCUSSION
Blythe contends that plaintiff lacks standing to bring a judicial foreclosure action against him, asserting that “[n]o evidence was produced to show that Plaintiff was the owner of the loan,” and that the trial court “presumed that they had standing.” We are not persuaded. Blythe failed to submit an adequate record of the trial court proceedings in support of his appeal. Moreover, the partial record before us tends to show only that his argument is without merit.
“The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “The appellant has the burden of furnishing an appellate court with a record sufficient to consider the issues on appeal. [Citation.] An appellate court’s review is limited to consideration of the matters contained in the appellate record.” (People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.) Among other things, “[i]f an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)
Here, the record that Blythe submitted in support of his appeal is not sufficient to conduct any substantive review of the judgment. He elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings in the trial court, including any record of the oral testimony presented at trial or any record of the arguments of the parties. He failed to include in the record any of the exhibits submitted at trial. Even after Blythe supplemented his initial designations, the entirety of the record he furnished consists of (1) the trial court’s minutes of the trial; (2) the judgment entered after trial; (3) a notice of entry of judgment filed by plaintiff; (4) Blythe’s notice of appeal; (5) Blythe’s notice designating the record on appeal; (6) Blythe’s answer to the complaint; and (7) a copy of the trial court’s register of actions. On such a record, the judgment must be affirmed. (See City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 286; Buckhart v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc., Bd. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1036 [“‘“[If] any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.”’”].)
Plaintiff, recognizing that the record Blythe submitted was inadequate to reach the merits of the appeal, requested and was granted permission to augment the record with copies of some documents that had been submitted in the trial court. These documents tend to show plaintiff has standing. While there was an error in the name of the assignee of Blythe’s deed of trust in the 2009 assignment, this was corrected by the 2018 rescission of the initial assignment and the recording of a new assignment to plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff in this case is the named assignee as of 2018 is reason for us to conclude that plaintiff had standing to foreclose. Further, even if the submitted documents did not constitute conclusive evidence of plaintiff’s standing to bring this action, we would have to presume that the trial court’s ruling was adequately supported by other documents and testimony that still remain absent from our record. (See City of Santa Maria v. Adam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 286; Buckhart v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc., Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036.)
Blythe has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.