Filed 1/14/20 Bikkina v. Mahadevan CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PREM BIKKINA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAGAN MAHADEVAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

A156582

(Alameda County

Super. Ct. No. RG14717654)

Jagan Mahadevan appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and his motion to quash post-judgment discovery. He argues the judgment is void and the trial court had no jurisdiction to enforce post-judgment discovery against him. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
II.
Prem Bikkina sued Mahadevan for falsely stating that Bikkina had fabricated various research results and plagiarized several academic works when Bikkina was a doctoral student in engineering at the University of Tulsa in Oklahoma. He alleged claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. A jury returned a special verdict for Bikkina on all counts and awarded $776,000 in damages. In response to Bikkina’s request for punitive damages, the jury found that Mahadevan had engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud.

Immediately after the jury delivered the verdict on liability and compensatory damages, Bikkina offered to waive the punitive damages phase of trial if Mahadevan would waive his right to appeal the verdict. Mahadevan was not in the courtroom so Mahadevan’s counsel, Jeremy Tissot, left the courtroom and phoned Mahadevan to present the offer. Following a 15-minute conversation, Tissot returned to the courtroom and announced that there was an agreement on Bikkina’s proposed stipulation. The clerk entered the stipulation in the minutes and the trial judge dismissed the jury.

Following the trial, Mahadevan returned to his home in Texas. On February 15, 2018, at 4:12 PM Central Standard Time, Mahadevan filed a bankruptcy petition in Texas. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict on the same day. Mahadevan avers, based on his description of a phone conversation with court staff, that the judgment was filed at 4:19 PM Pacific Standard Time (i.e., 6:19 PM Central Standard Time). Mahadevan notified the trial court and Bikkina of his bankruptcy filing the next day. Ten days later, Mahadevan moved to dismiss the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court ordered the case dismissed on March 19, 2018.

The judgment instructed Bikkina to file a memorandum of costs and motion for interest on the judgment from the date of Mahadevan’s offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Bikkina therefore moved to amend the judgment to add an award of costs and to specify the date that interest began to accrue on the judgment. Mahadevan did not oppose the motion and the trial court entered the amended judgment on August 1, 2018.

A short time later, Mahadevan moved to vacate the stipulation, judgment, and amended judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473 and 663. Mahadevan claimed he had not agreed to waive his right to appeal the jury verdict and argued the resulting judgment was therefore void. He attacked the amended judgment on various substantive grounds, such as that the interest was miscalculated, Bikkina’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and there were errors in the jury instructions. Mahadevan also argued the judgment was void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay created by Mahadevan’s bankruptcy filing. The trial court denied the motion.

Around this time, Bikkina served Mahadevan with special interrogatories and requests for production of documents under the procedures for requesting discovery from a judgment debtor under sections 708.020 and 708.030. Mahadevan moved under sections 410.10, 410.30, and 418.10 to quash these discovery requests based on due process and inconvenience of forum. The trial court denied this motion as well.

III. DISCUSSION
IV.
We begin by delineating the scope of Mahadevan’s arguments that we will consider in this appeal. Mahadevan’s notice of appeal indicated he was appealing from (1) the judgment, (2) the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment, (3) the order denying his motion to quash discovery; and (4) an order directing the parties to meet and confer concerning Bikkina’s discovery requests. Bikkina moved to dismiss the appeal because Mahadevan waived his right to appeal the judgment and because the appeal from the judgment was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104 [notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of judgment]. This court granted Bikkina’s motion as to Mahadevan’s appeal from the final judgment but denied it as to the other post-judgment orders. This court ordered the parties to limit their briefing to the post-judgment orders and not to address the merits of the judgment. Mahadevan’s brief nonetheless discusses substantive defects he perceives in the jury’s verdict and the resulting judgment. We will not address such arguments.

A. Motion under section 473
B.
1. Automatic bankruptcy stay
2.
Mahadevan argues the judgment is void because it was entered in violation of the automatic stay created by his bankruptcy filing. He contends the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion under section 473, subdivision (d), because that statute allows a court to “set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) We review de novo a ruling based on section 473, subdivision (d). (Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 146.) However, if a trial court resolved conflicting evidence to decide whether a judgment was void, we review that ruling for abuse of discretion. (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441 & fn. 5.)

“The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay of the commencement or continuation of any action against a bankrupt debtor or against the property of a bankruptcy estate. (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4); U.S. v. Dos Cabezas Corp. (9th Cir. 1993) 995 F.2d 1486, 1491.) Actions taken in violation of the stay are void, even where there is no actual notice of the stay. (In re Schwartz (9th Cir. 1992) 954 F.2d 569, 571.)” (Pioneer Construction, Inc. v. Global Investment Corp. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 161, 167.)

Mahadevan asserts it is undisputed that the judgment was entered several hours after he filed for bankruptcy, so that the judgment is necessarily void. He further contends that because the judgment was void, the amended judgment is likewise void. We disagree.

Federal courts have recognized an exception to the automatic bankruptcy stay for ministerial acts. “This exception stems from the common-sense principle that a judicial ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of [Title 11 United States Code] section 362(a) ends once a decision on the merits has been rendered. Ministerial acts or automatic occurrences that entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement do not constitute continuations of such a proceeding.” (McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. North Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit) (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 1072, 1080 (In re Pettit).) Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann (2d Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 522 (Rexnord) applied this exception in circumstances analogous to those here. In that case, the plaintiff moved for entry of judgment based on a defendant’s breach of a settlement. (Id. at pp. 524–525.) At a hearing on the motion, the district court stated orally that it would grant the motion and enter judgment for the plaintiff and endorsed the motion papers to that effect. (Id. at pp. 525, 528.) After the hearing but before the district court’s order was docketed, the defendant filed for bankruptcy. (Id. at p. 525.) The Second Circuit held that the docketing of the judgment did not violate the stay. (Id. at p. 528.) “The judicial proceedings were concluded at the moment the judge directed entry of judgment, a decision on the merits having then been rendered.” (Ibid.)

The ministerial principle applies here. The jury’s verdict rendered the decision on the merits of Bikkina’s claims and the parties’ subsequent stipulation to waive the punitive damages phase of trial (discussed further below) resolved the only other pending issues. At that point, no further deliberation or decision by the jury or the court on those claims was necessary or permitted. Mahadevan is correct that the trial court modified Bikkina’s proposed judgment to instruct him to file a memorandum of costs and motion for prejudgment interest based on his section 998 offer. But precisely because this instruction left the issues of costs and interest for future proceedings, this aspect of the judgment did not embody any judicial decision beyond what the jury verdict already provided.

Mahadevan contends the ministerial exception does not apply here because the Ninth Circuit has not adopted it. This is incorrect, as the Ninth Circuit recognizes the ministerial exception. (In re Pettit, supra, 217 F.3d at p. 1080 [“We now adopt the ministerial act exception for this circuit”].) Mahedevan also argues the doctrine applies only in federal court. The only authority Mahadevan cites for this argument, however, is Musso v. Ostashko (2d Cir. 2006) 468 F.3d 99, which distinguished Rexnord as irrelevant to the question of whether a state court judgment was final for the purposes of determining what property was part of a bankruptcy estate. (Id. at p. 107, fn. 2.) As this case concerns the scope of the federal bankruptcy stay—the same question at issue in Rexnord—we find that decision to be persuasive and Musso v. Ostashko to be inapplicable.

Even if the original judgment were void for violating the automatic bankruptcy stay, the trial court’s entry of the amended judgment cured any violation. If the original judgment were void, as Mahadevan contends, then the amended judgment was the first judgment entered in this case. Because the automatic bankruptcy stay expired in March 2018, the entry of the amended judgment did not violate the stay.

Mahadevan contends the amended judgment was still void because courts cannot make substantive amendments to a judgment to correct judicial error. (See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228.) But if the original judgment were void and of no legal effect, then the amended judgment was not correcting a judicial error so much as entering a judgment for the first time. Mahadevan also asserts that the amended judgment contains substantive errors and that Bikkina’s motion for entry of the amended judgment was unopposed only because his counsel, Tissot, failed to file an opposition or even inform Mahadevan that the motion was pending. Mahadevan has cited no authority holding that either of these assertions, even if true, would make the amended judgment void.

3. Stipulation waiving right to appeal
4.
Mahadevan separately argues the original judgment was void because it was based on his attorney’s unauthorized stipulation waiving his right to appeal. “As a general proposition the attorney-client relationship, insofar as it concerns the authority of the attorney to bind his client by agreement or stipulation, is governed by the principles of agency. [Citation.] Hence, ‘the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client.’ ” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 403 (Blanton).) While an attorney has authority, either apparent or implied in law, to take certain actions in litigation simply by virtue of his relationship with a client, that authority does not allow the attorney to “to ‘impair the client’s substantial rights or the cause of action itself.’ [Citation.] For example, ‘the law is well settled that an attorney must be specifically authorized to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise settlement of pending litigation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 403–404.) In addition, an attorney does not have authority to prevent a party from appealing a judgment by waiving findings. (Id. at pp. 404–405.)

We agree with Mahadevan that under Blanton, his right to appeal the jury verdict was a substantial right that Tissot could not settle, compromise, or waive without Mahadevan’s authorization. To that extent, we conclude the trial court erred by ruling, based on Blanton, that Tissot had apparent authority to waive Mahadevan’s right to appeal merely because Tissot represented Mahadevan in the litigation.

However, that is not the end of the matter. The trial court also found that Tissot had actual authority to agree to the stipulation waiving the right to appeal. It rejected as “self-serving” Mahadevan’s declaration to the contrary submitted in support of his motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding. Tissot’s declaration in support of Mahadevan’s motion to set aside the judgment stated that after receiving Bikkina’s offer to stipulate, Tissot spoke to Mahadevan for 15 minutes and then returned to court and announced there was an agreement. The trial court could reasonably read this as implying that Mahadevan had agreed over the phone to the proposed stipulation. Emails between Tissot and Mahadevan during the days after the entry of the stipulation confirm this reading. They show that Mahadevan was aware of the appellate waiver and wanted to evade it because he still disagreed with the jury’s verdict. However, nowhere in those emails did Mahadevan complain that Tissot acted without authority or contrary to Mahadevan’s wishes. Even if we were to review this evidence de novo, as Mahadevan urges, we would reach the same conclusion as the trial court.

Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Tissot had actual authority to agree to the waiver, the authorities Mahadevan cites regarding the invalidity of attorneys’ actions taken in excess of actual or implied authority are inapposite. (See, e.g., Blanton, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 403 [noting that it was undisputed in that case that the attorney “acted not only without his client’s express authority but contrary to her express instructions”]; Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1237 [allowing parties to vacate an attorney’s mistaken dismissal with prejudice because parties did not authorize it].)

Mahadevan attacks the trial court’s finding that Tissot had actual authority to agree to the stipulation by arguing based on section 664.6 that if a party is not personally in court, the party must personally sign any settlement of litigation for it to bind the party. Section 664.6 states, “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” A settlement is only enforceable under section 664.6 if a party personally signs it or agrees to it in court. (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.) But section 664.6 does not provide the exclusive mechanism to enforce a settlement. (See id. at p. 586, fn. 5.) Because Tissot had actual authority to agree to the stipulation, it is still valid and otherwise enforceable even though it could not be enforced under section 664.6.

5. Trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
6.
As independent bases for setting aside the judgment as void, Mahadevan contends the trial court never had subject matter jurisdiction over Bikkina’s suit in light of workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions, federal research misconduct policy, and copyright law preemption. None of these contentions has merit.

Mahadevan first asserts that Bikkina’s claims concerned workplace injuries, which under Oklahoma or California law are committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation system. Under Oklahoma law, workers’ compensation rights and remedies are “exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee.” (Okla. Stat., tit. 85A, § 5(A).) But this statute and cases interpreting it describe its protections as conferring an immunity from suit, not as depriving trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction over civil suits. (See, e.g., id. § 5(C); Davis v. CMS Continental Natural Gas, Inc. (Okla. 2001) 23 P.3d 288, 296 [referring to “[t]he immunity afforded employers under” the predecessor statute].)

Mahadevan relies in the alternative on California workers’ compensation law. Although some of Mahadevan’s alleged actions took place in California, Mahadevan has not shown that Bikkina and Mahadevan ever worked for the same employer in California, so we fail to see how California law could apply. (See Lab. Code, § 3601, subd. (a) [workers’ compensation is “exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her employment,” italics added].) Additionally, “[w]here a complaint indicates that an employment relationship exists between a plaintiff and a defendant, it is the defendant’s burden to plead and prove that the [workers’ compensation] act applies. The trial court has jurisdiction ‘unless and until’ the defendant proves otherwise. (Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 98; see Lucich v. City of Oakland (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 494, 498–499.)” (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 265–266.) Mahadevan tried the case to a verdict without proving that Bikkina’s claims were barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions, so he cannot now seek to set aside the judgment on this basis.

Mahadevan next argues that Bikkina’s claims were beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction because the veracity of his statements that Bikkina had fabricated various research results and plagiarized several academic works turns on issues of federal law. Mahadevan’s federal law argument relies mostly on authorities concerning federal policies and procedures for investigations of plagiarism and fabrication of results in federally-funded research. None of those authorities, however, establishes that the procedures relating to federally-funded research deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over related common law claims between employees. At most, Mahadevan’s authorities indicate that when an institution is investigating someone for fabrication, the target must exhaust administrative review of that investigation before challenging its propriety. (See Anversa v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. (D.Mass. 2015) 116 F.Supp.3d 22, 31–32.) This principle has no application here, where Bikkina is not challenging any institution’s investigation and there is no indication the investigations are under administrative review.

In asserting the trial court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Bikkina’s claims involved copyrighted materials, Mahadevan relies on the principle that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims that arise under federal copyright law. (28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); Durgom v. Janowiak (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 178, 182.) The test for whether a claim falls within federal courts’ exclusive copyright jurisdiction is the well-pleaded complaint rule, which examines whether the copyright issue arises from the face of the complaint and does not examine potential defenses to an action. (Id. at pp. 182–183.) Additionally, under the doctrine of complete preemption, any claim preempted by federal copyright law should be treated as arising under copyright law for the purposes of exclusive federal court jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 186; Ritchie v. Williams (6th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 283, 286–287.) A state law claim is preempted if it concerns a copyrightable work and asserts rights equivalent to those provided by copyright law. (Kabehie v. Zoland (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 513, 520.) By contrast, a state law right is not equivalent to rights under copyright law if, to assert it in court, a plaintiff must prove some “extra element” beyond mere reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of a copyrighted work. (Id. at pp. 520–521.)

Mahadevan asserts that copyright law is relevant here because two of the defamatory statements that the jury found he made related to Bikkina’s plagiarism of two academic papers. However, Mahadevan does not address how copyright issues necessarily arise on the face of those claims or how they assert rights equivalent to those provided by copyright law. Indeed, Bikkina’s claims are premised on the absence of copying from other research, which makes them the antithesis of copyright claims. Bikkina’s defamation claims also included extra elements such as publication of statements about the alleged copying, failure to exercise due care, and harm to reputation that took them outside the realm of copyright law. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [reciting elements of defamation].) Mahadevan may have tried to defend this action by proving the truth of Bikkina’s alleged plagiarism, thereby perhaps indirectly proving copyright infringement. But he cites no authority establishing that such a defense would support federal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule or principles of complete preemption. (See Durgom v. Janowiak, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.)

7. Extrinsic fraud
8.
Mahadevan also argues the judgment is void based on extrinsic fraud, in light of discovery misconduct and various misrepresentations made by Bikkina or his witnesses during trial. We reject this contention as well.

A judgment is void if procured by extrinsic fraud. “Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party has in some way fraudulently been prevented from presenting his or her claim or defense.” (Department of Industrial Relations v. Davis Moreno Construction, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 560, 570.) Mahadevan claims there was extrinsic fraud because Bikkina presented false testimony that the University of Tulsa investigated Mahadevan’s claims that Bikkina fabricated results and plagiarized two papers. There is no reporter’s transcript of the trial to support these assertions, and Mahadevan’s citations to the complaint and a settlement conference brief are insufficient. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [trial briefs in the record are no substitute for reporter’s transcript showing actual testimony].) This argument therefore fails. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Moreover, even if Bikkina’s witnesses’ testimony were false as Mahadevan asserts, such falsity did not prevent Mahadevan from offering contrary testimony or otherwise presenting his case.

Mahadevan also contends he was hampered by Bikkina’s failure to timely produce documents and the University of Tulsa’s failure to respond to a subpoena or allow a witness to appear for a deposition. The solution to these problems would have been motions to compel discovery and to enforce the subpoena. These issues do not demonstrate there was any extrinsic fraud in the trial.

There is thus no merit to any of Mahadevan’s arguments that the court erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment as void.

C. Motion to quash
D.
The trial court denied Mahadevan’s motion to quash Bikkina’s post-judgment discovery requests under sections 418.10, 410.30, and 410.10 because Mahadevan did not dispute that the court had jurisdiction over him during the trial and the court found that jurisdiction extended to Bikkina’s efforts to enforce the judgment.

Mahadevan argues the trial court should have granted his motion to quash because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enforce its judgment against him. He moved to Texas during the litigation and asserts that due process principles under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution require that efforts to enforce the judgment must take place in Texas courts.

When a challenge to jurisdiction arises from undisputed facts, as here, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo, with the party asserting jurisdiction bearing the burden of establishing jurisdiction. (As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859, 1866.)

While Mahadevan argues the trial court’s assertion of jurisdiction violated due process, the substance of his argument and the authorities he cites concern only the full faith and credit clause in article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we restrict our analysis to the full faith and credit clause. Under that constitutional provision, a “final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.” (Baker v. General Motors Corp. (1998) 522 U.S. 222, 233.) “Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law.” (Id. at p. 235.)

Mahadevan contends this principle means Bikkina must domesticate his judgment in Texas and conduct discovery according to Texas law if he wants to enforce it. If Bikkina wanted to file an action in Texas to execute the judgment against Mahadevan’s assets located in Texas, Mahadevan would likely be correct that Bikkina would have to follow Texas procedures. But that is not this case. Bikkina is trying to use California’s judgment enforcement measures to enforce a California judgment, so the discovery requests do not implicate the full faith and credit clause.

In addition to attacking the denial of his motion to quash, Mahadevan also contends the trial court erred in entering two orders directing the parties to meet and confer regarding Bikkina’s discovery requests and continuing the hearing on those requests. He contends the orders are invalid because they were entered before finality of rulings on his petition for writ of mandate challenging the denial of his motion to quash and petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (See § 418.10; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.491.)

We will not consider this argument because the challenged orders are not appealable. Although post-judgment orders are generally appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), such orders must themselves still be sufficiently final. (In re Marriage of Olson (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462.) Orders that are preparatory to later proceedings are not sufficiently final. (Ibid.) The trial court’s orders merely direct the parties to meet and confer and do not finally resolve any issues about Bikkina’s discovery requests. The orders explicitly contemplated future action in that they continued the hearing on Bikkina’s motions to compel until a later date.

V. DISPOSITION
VI.
The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

 

_________________________

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

POLLAK, P. J.

_________________________

TUCHER, J.

Bikkina v. Mahadevan (A156582)