Filed 1/21/20 Tsang v. Dept. of Rehabilitation CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SUE TSANG et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

E069017

(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1600509)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David S. Cohn, Judge. Affirmed.

Sue Tsang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant Sue Tsang.

Aaron Tsang, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant Aaron Tsang.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer M. Kim, Andrea F. Ventura and Benjamin G. Diehl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

The California Department of Rehabilitation (the Department) provides funding for vocational training and other support services to assist persons with disabilities to achieve employment goals. Those services are provided pursuant to an individualized plan of employment (IPE), which is developed jointly between the eligible individual and the Department.

In 2013, Aaron Tsang was determined to be eligible for vocational rehabilitation services because of a learning disability. An IPE was developed for him in May 2014. In 2015, Aaron twice sought administrative review of various actions taken by the Department related to his services. Both of those administrative appeals were denied for the most part.

Aaron petitioned for a writ of administrative mandamus challenging the second administrative decision, from July 2015. Aaron’s mother, Sue Tsang, also purported to join that petition. The trial court concluded that Sue did not have standing and denied the petition as to Aaron. We agree with both of those conclusions and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. Vocational Rehabilitation Services for Aaron
B.
In April 2013, Aaron applied for vocational rehabilitation services based on a learning disability. He was determined to be eligible for those services in October 2013. He asked for financial assistance for college and for assistance in finding a job.

In November 2013, the Department instructed Aaron that he had to make an appointment for an assessment of his functional capabilities. The case was closed in March 2014 because Aaron failed to attend his appointment. After an informal administrative review, the case was reopened and transferred to a different office in Ontario, California.

C. Aaron’s IPE
D.
In May 2014, a rehabilitation counselor at the Ontario office met with Sue and prepared an IPE for Aaron. Aaron did not attend the meeting. The IPE identified Aaron’s employment goal as being a computer network support specialist. The expected completion date of that goal was December 2017. In pursuit of that goal, Aaron was already admitted to California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB), from which he anticipated earning a bachelor’s degree in “computer systems/gaming development.” (Capitalization omitted.) He was expected to earn that degree by June 2017.

The IPE totals six pages and details the services to be provided to Aaron and Aaron’s obligations to the Department. The Department was to pay for Aaron’s tuition (to the extent it was not paid by financial aid), books and supplies for school, and other related services to assist Aaron in reaching his employment goal. However, the Department’s duties under the IPE depended on Aaron’s full cooperation and participation in the plan by implementing the steps outlined in the IPE. The IPE detailed that by signing, Aaron understood “that the failure to cooperate and/or make a reasonable effort to carry out [his] plan [could] result in the closure of [his] case and the loss of further services.” For amendments to be made to the IPE, Aaron agreed: “If changes need to be made to [my] plan, my counselor and I will discuss the changes and I will sign an amendment.” The counselor signed the IPE on May 23, 2014, and mailed it to Aaron.

Sue “extensively altered the IPE and returned it to” the counselor. Throughout the entirety of the document, there appear typewritten and handwritten additions, deletions, and interlineations. The date on the first page of the IPE was stricken through and replaced with “AMENDED—8/26/2014.” Sue removed standard language from the IPE regarding Aaron’s responsibilities and duties. Aaron and Sue signed the IPE unilaterally amended by Sue on August 25, 2014. Sue signed it as Aaron’s representative.

E. February 2015 Fair Hearing Request and April 2015 Administrative Proceeding
F.
In February 2015, Aaron filed a request for a fair hearing before an impartial hearing officer to review actions taken by the Department. He complained in general about individual Department employees interfering with his provision of services since October 2014 and indicated that he wanted his case transferred to a different office. He also claimed that he had not received school tuition and book payments that he needed before March 1, 2015.

In support of his request, Aaron submitted 23 exhibits and a document listed in the table of contents of the clerk’s record as the “[p]osition [s]tatement,” which provided a factual summary and arguments about claimed violations. Sue acted as Aaron’s authorized representative in the proceedings. On April 14, 2015, a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Sue testified on Aaron’s behalf. The ALJ issued his decision two weeks later. The appeal was granted in part and otherwise denied. The Department was ordered to reimburse Aaron $62.64 for a schoolbook. Aaron’s request to have his case transferred was denied as moot because the case was transferred between the fair hearing request and the hearing. Aaron did not timely seek judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

G. The Tsangs’ Interaction with the Department After the February 2015 Fair Hearing Request
H.
In a letter dated March 26, 2015, the district administrator for the Ontario office informed Aaron that his case was being transferred to the West Covina office, which was located in a different district, and that he was being reassigned to a different counselor. Once the case was transferred, Aaron would need to meet with his new counselor to discuss his vocational rehabilitation plan. Sue was invited to attend. However, the Department informed Aaron that his authorized representative could not replace him or substitute for him “in regard to [his] role and responsibilities as a consumer of the [Department].” Aaron was required to attend scheduled meetings and otherwise be “a full and active participant in all aspects of the rehabilitation process.” The Department warned Aaron that failure to participate or to cooperate could result in his case being closed.

In a letter dated April 9, 2015, Aaron’s new counselor introduced herself and asked to meet with Aaron to review his IPE. Sue was invited to attend, but the counselor informed Aaron that he needed to sign specific forms (nonmedical and medical releases on forms DR264 and DR264A) from the Department to authorize the counselor to communicate with Sue and to allow the counselor to share any information about Aaron’s case with Sue.

On April 13, 2015, the counselor emailed Aaron about a letter the Department had received from Sue and reiterated that a valid release signed by him was necessary for the Department to communicate with Sue about his case. Aaron responded by email, “Please contact my Authorized Representative, [Sue] directly at [phone number]. She has my full authority.”

Sue responded by sending the counselor and a manager at the West Covina office faxes complaining about the counselor’s lack of responsiveness to Sue and asking to review Aaron’s file. Attached to the fax to the counselor was a document purporting to authorize Sue to act on Aaron’s behalf as his authorized representative. The form is not the DR264 or the DR264A requested by the counselor.

In a letter to Aaron from the counselor dated May 6, 2015, Aaron was informed that he had to contact the Department by May 19, 2015, to schedule a meeting to review his IPE. He was again warned that his case could be closed if he failed to comply.

Over the next two days, Sue faxed the counselor twice with various complaints about the counselor not corresponding with Sue directly and with requests for the Department to pay for numerous expenses due by May 29, 2015, for Aaron’s summer classes. Attached to one of the faxes were Department forms DR264 and DR264A purportedly signed by Aaron and consenting to the Department’s release of nonmedical and medical information about him to Sue, whom he listed as his authorized representative. The forms were signed on March 1, 2015. The nonmedical release form provided that the release would be valid for 30 days unless another date was specified. Typewritten in the box for listing another date was “[u]ntil completion of training at CSUSB.”

In an email sent on May 11, 2015, and a letter dated May 20, 2015, the counselor informed Aaron that the Department approved and authorized payment of the tuition and parking requested for the summer session to avoid delaying his registration. None of the other requested expenses was approved. Aaron was instructed that he needed to meet with the counselor to discuss certain expenses and to provide further documentation for other expenses. He also was asked to provide the Department with a copy of his unofficial transcript for review of his grades and progress.

On May 24, 2015, Sue responded and demanded payment for a list of services that she claimed had not been paid dating back to November 2014. The services included “[s]upplies,” “[i]nternet,” “[f]itness,” and “[a]uto [i]nsurance.” Sue also demanded to review Aaron’s case file. Attached to the letter were receipts.

On June 4, 2015, the counselor wrote Sue directly and informed her that the releases Aaron signed on March 1, 2015, were valid for 30 days and had expired. The counselor suggested that Aaron fill out new release forms at a meeting with both Aaron and Sue present, which would allow Sue to review the file then.

I. May 2015 Fair Hearing Request
J.
On May 8, 2015, Aaron filed another request for a fair hearing before an impartial hearing officer to review actions taken by the Department. Sue was listed on the request form as Aaron’s authorized representative for the proceeding. Aaron complained that the Department was required to pay him “ON TIME” by May 29, 2015, “for tuition/books/parking fee/needed equipment for [Aaron’s] training in college until his completion.” He further claimed that the Department owed him arrearages for payments that he and Sue allegedly had already made. The request did not include any allegations about specific payments or any specific timeframe for when those reimbursements were allegedly owed. Aaron asked that the Department allow Sue to review his file before the hearing.

K. June 2015 Administrative Proceeding
L.
At a hearing with an ALJ held on June 9, 2015, Aaron did not appear. In support of Aaron’s request, Sue acted as Aaron’s authorized representative and submitted 26 exhibits and a statement of facts. Sue testified on Aaron’s behalf. A team manager from the West Covina office testified on behalf of the Department. The Department submitted 17 exhibits and a case summary.

As a preliminary matter, the ALJ addressed Sue’s request and authority to view Aaron’s file. On the day of the administrative hearing, Sue submitted as an exhibit a Department form allowing Sue to act as Aaron’s authorized representative during the administrative proceeding. The form was purportedly signed by Aaron on March 15, 2015. It “authorize[d] the [Department] to release information related to the mediation and/or fair hearing process to [the designated] authorized representative.” Although Sue claimed to have submitted the document before, neither the ALJ nor the Department’s representative had seen it before the hearing. The ALJ ruled that as Aaron’s authorized representative for the hearing Sue was authorized to inspect Aaron’s case file. During a lunch break, Sue was given that opportunity. After the break, Sue argued that all of the case notes were missing from the file.

Sue asked to continue the hearing because she had not received the Department’s position statement 48 hours before the hearing, which she argued was the minimum required by law. Neither the ALJ nor the Department was aware of such a requirement. The ALJ recessed the proceeding to allow Sue to find the authority she claimed existed. Sue returned citing a section from a manual of policy and procedure from the California Department of Health and Human Services Agency. After independently reviewing the manual, the ALJ concluded that the manual was inapplicable because it applied to hearings about benefits for the Department of Social Services. No other authority was presented supporting Sue’s position that the Department was required to submit a position statement at any point in time.

Along with its exhibits, the Department submitted a case summary on the day of the hearing. The Department explained that the case summary was the same thing as a position statement. The Department did not use the term “position statement.” The ALJ took a brief recess to allow Sue an opportunity to review the Department’s case summary. After reviewing it, Sue claimed that she was disadvantaged by not seeing the case summary beforehand because she needed to review the cited law.

The ALJ agreed to hold the record open for two weeks after the hearing to allow both parties to submit written closing arguments without any additional evidentiary material. Both parties submitted written closing arguments. Aaron attached an additional 20 exhibits to his closing argument.

M. July 2015 ALJ Decision
N.
In its July 9, 2015, decision, the ALJ identified the issues presented as: (1) whether the West Covina office should have suspended services to Aaron or continued the suspension of services from the previous office, (2) the validity of releases executed by Aaron, (3) Sue’s right to inspect Aaron’s case file before the hearing, (4) whether sanctions should be issued against the Department, and (5) whether the June 2015 proceeding was conducted fairly, including whether the Department had to submit a position statement to the Tsangs 48 hours before the hearing. The ALJ concluded that any issues that Aaron had with services provided before Aaron’s case was transferred to the West Covina office in April 2015 were not properly presented in the June 2015 proceeding. Those issues either were or could have been resolved in the April 2015 administrative proceeding.

In Aaron’s favor, the ALJ concluded that the March 1, 2015, releases executed by Aaron to allow Sue access to his nonmedical and medical case information remained valid as stated until he completed his coursework at CSUSB. The ALJ consequently concluded that Sue should have been provided an opportunity to review Aaron’s case file before the hearing. However, the ALJ noted that the Department’s interpretation of the releases having expired after 30 days was reasonable, so it therefore also was reasonable for the Department not to have provided Sue access to the file before the hearing. Because Sue reviewed Aaron’s file on the day of the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the issue was moot. Acknowledging that the reviewed file did not include the case notes, the ALJ noted that Sue would have been provided access to the entire file if she had submitted the authorized representative release form for the hearing earlier. Regardless of the validity of the March 2015 releases, the authorized representative form for the fair hearing independently allowed Sue to review Aaron’s case file for the fair hearing specifically.

The ALJ decided the remaining issues against Aaron.

O. Trial Court Proceedings
P.
In January 2016, Aaron filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court challenging the ALJ’s July 2015 decision. One month later, Aaron filed a first amended petition in which Sue was added as a petitioner. Sue alleged that she had an “implied contract and contractual relationship” with the Department. The Tsangs named the Department and numerous individual employees of the Department as respondents. Although the first amended petition purported to challenge the July 2015 decision, most of the Tsangs’ complaints were about the April 2015 hearing and the conduct of Department employees occurring in the months before that hearing. The Tsangs complained extensively about the conduct of Thomas Darby, a team manager for the Ontario office, before and during the hearing. Darby was not present at the June 2015 hearing.

In February 2016, the Tsangs filed a document entitled “request for record for review.” (Capitalization omitted.) The Tsangs asked the Department to produce the administrative record and Aaron’s entire case file. That request appears to have been made before the Department was served with the first amended petition for writ of administrative mandate.

At a status hearing in August 2016, the trial court directed Sue to provide the court with information about her role in the matter as a party and as an “advocate on [Aaron’s] behalf in this matter.” In September 2016, the Department lodged and served the administrative record from the April 2015 and June 2015 hearings and the transcript from the April 2015 hearing. The Department lodged and served the transcript from the June 2015 hearing in January 2017.

On September 27, 2016, the Tsangs moved to compel the Department to produce “the complete record of [Aaron’s] file.” The trial court denied the motion and informed the Tsangs that they could move to augment the record if documents were excluded from the administrative record which they believe should have been included. At the hearing, the Tsangs were reminded that they had not filed anything about Sue’s “involvement” as a party or as Aaron’s representative.

In December 2016, the Tsangs again moved to compel the production of documents. Although it is not clear, it appears as though they were complaining about not being able to inspect Aaron’s “entire file records.” The motion was again denied, and the Tsangs were informed that their only remedy was to move to augment the record.

In February 2017, the Tsangs moved to augment the record. They identified nine items that they claimed were not included in either the April 2015 administrative record or the June 2015 administrative record. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety, concluding that the administrative record for the April 2015 hearing was irrelevant and that the allegedly missing documents from the administrative record for the June 2015 hearing were actually included in that record.

At the same hearing, the trial court heard arguments about whether Sue had standing and the merits of the first amended petition. The court concluded that Sue did not have standing and did not allow her to argue on Aaron’s behalf for the remainder of the hearing because she is not a lawyer. The trial court denied the first amended petition for writ of mandate, concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for IPEs
B.
The Department is responsible for providing disabled individuals with programs of vocational rehabilitation designed to prepare them for gainful employment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19000, subd. (b).) Once an individual is determined to be eligible for vocational rehabilitation services, an IPE is developed for that individual. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 19101, 19103, 19104, subd. (a).) The IPE is “designed to achieve the employment objective of the individual, consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities of the individual, and, to the maximum extent appropriate, to include placement in integrated settings.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19104, subd. (b)(1).) The IPE shall be “jointly developed and agreed upon by the eligible individual, or when appropriate the individual’s parent, family member, guardian, advocate, or authorized representative, and the department.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19104, subd. (b)(2).) “Services shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of the IPE.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 7128, subd. (a).)

The individual receiving services from the Department must “[c]ooperate in the assessment process and in developing and meeting the objectives identified in the IPE including, but not limited to, active participation, reasonable effort, regular attendance at scheduled appointments and training, and regular communication with the Rehabilitation Counselor regarding progress toward achievement of the employment outcome.” (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 9, § 7029.9, subd. (b)(4).) “Failure to cooperate, make reasonable effort, lack of regular attendance, or failure to maintain regular communication may result in loss of further services and closure of the record of services.” (Ibid.)

C. Standard of Review
D.
Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs review of a final administrative decision. “Like the trial court, we assess whether the agency abused its discretion in that it failed to proceed as required by law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) We also consider whether the administrative agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the findings support the agency’s legal conclusion or ultimate decision.” (Hoitt v. Department of Rehabilitation (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 513, 521 (Hoitt); Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b), (c).) “It is presumed that an administrative agency regularly performed its duty, and the burden is on the appellant to prove an abuse of discretion.” (Hoitt, supra, at p. 521.)

E. Sue Does Not Have Standing
F.
Nowhere in the opening brief does Sue mention the trial court’s determination that she did not have standing, and that brief does not present any reasoned argument supported by legal authority about why that determination was wrong. Failure to challenge the trial court’s ruling ordinarily results in forfeiture of any claim of error. (Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 275, 282.) In the reply brief, Sue addresses the Department’s arguments about standing. We therefore exercise our discretion to consider this foundational issue. (United Farmers Agents Assn., Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 478, 491, fn. 8.)

“Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 367.) The real party in interest “is the person who possesses the right to sue under the substantive law involved; anyone other than a real party in interest lacks standing.” (City of Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488, 504.)

Section 19704 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that “any applicant for, or client of, the [D]epartment” who is dissatisfied with any action of the Department relating to the provision of services has the right to administrative review and a fair hearing before an impartial officer. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19704, subd. (a).) The “client” is defined as the person receiving vocational rehabilitation services from the Department. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19700.1, subd. (c).) The statutory sections describing the fair hearing process refer to the “appellant.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 19705, subd. (a)(1), 19708, 19709.) As relevant here, the “appellant” is defined as the client who has filed a written request for a fair hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19700.1, subd. (a).) The terms “client” and “appellant” are therefore interchangeable.

At the hearing, “the appellant . . . may designate a representative to appear on his or her behalf.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19705, subd. (b).) After the final administrative decision is issued, “[t]he appellant . . . may file a petition with the superior court, under Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19709, subd. (a).)

We agree with the trial court that Sue does not have standing in this action—that is, she did not have standing to petition the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus based on the ALJ’s decision about services provided to Aaron by the Department. Sue consequently also does not have standing to appeal the trial court’s decision on that petition except with respect to the standing determination against her.

The statutory rights to a fair hearing and to petition the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus are conferred upon the client of the Department. Aaron was the person who was receiving services from the Department and thus was the person who possessed those rights. Sue’s statutory role at the fair hearing was limited to being Aaron’s authorized representative. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 9, § 7355, subd. (a).) As his authorized representative, she had no right to petition the superior court on her own behalf or on Aaron’s behalf. At no point was Sue a client of the Department. She therefore was not a real party in interest with respect to the ALJ’s July 2015 decision about Aaron’s services and did not have standing to petition for a writ of administrative mandamus based on that decision.

Sue contends that standing is irrelevant and that the Department has provided “no evidence to show that the lower court stated Appellant Sue ‘did not have standing.’” Those contentions are incorrect. The trial court expressly found that Sue did not have standing. After entertaining argument from Sue and the Department on this issue, the trial court concluded: “So I do find that you do not have the standing to participate in this litigation. Your son is on his own here. You can certainly stand with him at the table, Mrs. Tsang, and assist him with paperwork if he wishes to speak. But I’m not going to allow you further to participate in this proceeding since you are not—since you don’t have any standing to proceed, and you’re not licensed to practice law.” Sue’s lack of standing and her ineligibility to represent Aaron in court were the only issues that the trial court decided with respect to Sue, so they are the only issues before us with respect to her. Sue is therefore wrong that standing is “irrelevant.” (Capitalization and underlining omitted.)

We also reject Sue’s argument that she has standing because the caption of the case includes her name. The case caption includes Sue’s name because she filed the first amended petition. Filing a lawsuit does not confer standing on a party to pursue a judicial action. The case caption is irrelevant to the standing determination.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that Sue did not have standing to petition the superior court for administrative mandamus based on the administrative determination about the Department’s provision of services to Aaron.

G. Motion to Augment
H.
Throughout the opening brief, Aaron’s primary complaint appears to be that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to require the Department to produce his entire or complete administrative file. We construe this as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of the motion to augment the record and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion.

“‘The general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency.’” (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101 (Pomona Valley).) However, subdivision (e) of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure “permits the introduction of additional evidence that is relevant to a challenge to the administrative action if the evidence ‘could not have been produced or . . . was improperly excluded at the hearing before’ the administrative agency.” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 15.) We review the trial court’s determination of whether one of these exceptions applies for an abuse of discretion. (Pomona Valley, supra, at p. 101.)

In Aaron’s motion to augment the record, he identified nine items that he claimed were not included in either the April 2015 administrative record or the June 2015 administrative record. The Department conceded that two of the documents were improperly omitted and attached copies of those documents to its opposition. Those documents were (1) the cover page of the Department’s June 9, 2015, case summary included as one of the Department’s exhibits in the June 2015 administrative record and (2) a September 23, 2014, internal Department case note about the status of equipment ordered that was not included in the copy of the April 2015 administrative record submitted to the trial court. Most of the other documents Aaron complained about involved the April 2015 hearing. Of the remaining requests relevant to the June 2015 hearing, Aaron alleged that the omitted documents included the parties’ position papers and exhibits and an email from Aaron to the Department stating his preference that the Department contact his mother exclusively about his services. A copy of the email message was attached to the motion but copies of the position statements and supporting exhibits were not attached.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to augment the record. The petition for writ of administrative mandamus sought review of the July 2015 administrative decision. As to that administrative record, Aaron argues that the parties’ position statements and exhibits were not included in the record for that hearing. The only exhibit he specifically identified from the June 2015 administrative record is one email from him to the Department concerning whom he wanted the Department to communicate with about his services. However, as the trial court concluded, that email was actually included in the June 2015 administrative record as one of the Department’s exhibits. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to augment the record with that document.

Aaron’s contention about the position statements being missing from the June 2015 administrative record is equally unavailing. In the June 2015 hearing Sue, acting as Aaron’s authorized representative, complained about not being provided with the Department’s position statement at least 48 hours before the hearing. The Department explained that it did not use the term “position statement,” but it had introduced a case summary at the hearing along with its exhibits. The Department described its case summary as being the same thing as a position statement. Sue was given the opportunity to review the case summary during a break in the proceeding. After conducting that review, Sue did not complain that the case summary was not the functional equivalent of a position statement or was somehow insufficient as a position statement. Rather, she claimed that she needed time to review the legal citations in the case summary, so the ALJ kept the record open for two weeks after the hearing to allow both parties to submit written closing arguments. The Department’s case summary—i.e., the position statement—is included in the June 2015 administrative record along with all of the supporting exhibits. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Aaron’s motion to augment the record to include those documents.

Similarly, for the June 2015 hearing Aaron submitted a document that included a summary of the facts, citations to his exhibits, the issues presented, and argument about those issues. That document is not entitled “position statement” and is included in the June 2015 administrative record along with all of the cited exhibits. Like the Department’s case summary, it appears to serve the same purpose as a position statement. Aaron does not provide any additional information about what the allegedly missing “position statement” could otherwise be. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to augment the June 2015 administrative record with Aaron’s position statement and supporting exhibits.

Although the first amended petition for writ of administrative mandate was taken from (and timely as to) the July 2015 decision only, the Department submitted to the trial court the administrative record from the April 2015 proceeding also for the purpose of providing context about Aaron’s history with the Department. Aaron complained that the April 2015 administrative record also was incomplete and that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence submitted by the Department. Specifically, he claimed that the April 2015 administrative record did not include the parties’ position statements and that several pages of the allegedly “Amended IPE dated 8/26/2014” were missing. He further claimed that the ALJ from the April 2015 proceeding wrongly did not allow Aaron to submit unspecified documents concerning the cost of school supplies. These complaints do not have any merit.

The parties’ position statements were included in the April 2015 administrative record. Although there are no documents bearing the title “position statement” in the April 2015 administrative record, the index of the clerk’s record does list “position statement” as appellant’s exhibit 24 and respondent’s exhibit 35. (Initial capitalization omitted.) Both exhibits are included in the record. They are both documents that summarize the facts and the parties’ legal positions and thus appear to be what Aaron is referring to as a “position statement.” As with the June 2015 administrative record, Aaron does not provide any additional information about what these allegedly missing “position statements” could otherwise be. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to augment the April 2015 administrative record with the parties’ position statements.

As to the missing pages in the purportedly amended IPE, all six pages of that document are included in the April 2015 administrative record. There are duplicates of pages three and four, and pages five and six are out of order, but all of the pages are included. In any event, all six pages of the same document are also included in the June 2015 administrative record, though the pages are also out of order.

Aaron also complains about evidentiary decisions that the ALJ made in the April 2015 proceeding. With respect to the documents that Aaron claims that the ALJ did not allow him to submit in the April 2015 proceeding, it is not clear to which documents he is referring. It seems as though he is challenging the ALJ’s decision not to allow Sue to submit receipts for reimbursements for supplies that were not listed in the fair hearing request or the ALJ’s initial summary of the issues presented in the case.

Aaron cites a portion of the reporter’s transcript in which the ALJ is explaining to Sue that she cannot raise new issues and submit new evidence at the end of the hearing beyond the scope of the fair hearing request and the issues that the ALJ summarized at the beginning of the hearing.

Similarly, in the motion to augment, Aaron claims that “ALJ Levy overruled an authorization form that the [authorized representative] objected [to].” The ALJ allowed the Department to submit a fax cover sheet from Sue to a counselor at the Department with the subject “[a]uthorization” along with a form to purportedly designate Sue as Aaron’s authorized representative. The form was not one of the designated forms from the Department. Sue objected to its admission because “the rehab never provided any form for authorization.” The ALJ overruled the objection because Sue was going to have an opportunity to testify.

In any event, Aaron did not argue in the motion to augment or in his briefing on appeal how these evidentiary rulings in the April 2015 administrative proceeding affected the trial court’s decision on his first amended petition for writ of administrative mandate from the July 2015 decision. Any error in denying the motion to augment the record on these grounds was therefore harmless.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to augment the record.

I. Certification of the Administrative Record
J.
Aaron contends that the Department failed to include a sworn statement certifying the administrative record, which he argues constitutes perjury. This argument is not supported by the record. The last page of the clerk’s record for the June 2015 hearing includes a “certification of the office of administrative hearings clerk’s record” dated April 27, 2016, and signed by the administrative record coordinator. (Capitalization omitted.) The coordinator swore that the documents contained in the administrative record were “to the best of [his] knowledge, a full, true, and correct copy of the Office of Administrative Hearings Clerk’s Record retained by OAH” for Aaron’s May 2015 petition. Similarly, the reporter’s transcript from the June 2015 hearing includes a certificate signed under penalty of perjury by the reporter. Aaron does not argue that these certificates are incomplete or defective in any specific way, nor does he cite any authority for the proposition that anything more was required of the Department. We therefore reject this argument as meritless.

K. Trial Judge’s Alleged Bias
L.
Aaron makes various claims that the trial judge was biased against Aaron based on Aaron’s race, disability, and status as a self-represented litigant. He contends that this putative bias against him resulted in the trial judge “deny[ing] everything requested by the [Tsangs], deny[ing] their right to speak at hearings, and prohibited them from presenting their case in court.” He further claims that the trial judge was prejudiced in favor of the Department because the attorney representing the Department was from the Los Angeles office of the Attorney General. Because of this alleged favoritism, Aaron claims that the Department’s attorney received special privileges, such as filing untimely pleadings, submitting certified documents without a sworn statement, and producing an incomplete record.

In contravention of the California Rules of Court, none of these accusations is supported by any citation to the record to demonstrate how the trial judge acted with bias against Aaron or in favor of the Department’s attorney. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [an appellant’s opening brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”].) Arguments not supported by citations to the record are generally considered forfeited. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (Malibu Hillbillies).)

In any event, the only substantive complaints that Aaron makes supporting his claim of bias are that the judge “den[ied] everything requested by the [Tsangs], den[ied] their right to speak at hearings, and prohibited them from presenting their case in court.” “The mere fact that the trial court issued rulings adverse to [Aaron] on several matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual bias.” (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674.)

Similarly, rulings in favor of the Department by themselves do not demonstrate any prejudice in favor of the Department or its lawyer. Moreover, we have already concluded that some of Aaron’s claims of favoritism are not supported by the record—the June 2015 administrative record was complete, and Aaron failed to demonstrate that the certifications for the June 2015 administrative record were deficient. Aaron does not support his assertion that the Department was allowed to file documents untimely with any citation to the record, and it is not readily apparent, so we deem this claim forfeited. (Malibu Hillbillies, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 146.) However, even if it were true that the Department filed something late, that fact alone would not necessarily demonstrate that the trial judge favored the Department or its lawyer in some way that prejudiced Aaron.

Although we are not obliged to search the record for error (Haynes v. Gwynn (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 149, 151), our independent review of the reporter’s transcript reveals that the trial judge never stopped Aaron from speaking at any hearing. Rather, after the judge determined that Sue did not have standing at the hearing on the merits of the petition, the judge did not allow her to speak further in the hearing. However, Sue was allowed to continue to sit at the table with Aaron and to assist him with paperwork. When she attempted to speak on Aaron’s behalf, the trial judge admonished her that she would have to move to a seat in the gallery if she continued. Nevertheless, when Sue spoke again, the trial judge allowed her to finish her argument before asking her to take a seat. The court then ordered a recess to allow Aaron to confer with Sue before Aaron argued about the merits. Not allowing Sue to speak at the hearing on the merits does not demonstrate that the trial judge acted with prejudice against Aaron.

In sum, we conclude that Aaron’s complaints about the trial judge’s alleged bias are not supported by the record and have no merit.

M. Claims of Discrimination by Employees of the Department
N.
The opening brief is replete with claims that employees of the Department discriminated against Aaron because of his race and disability. Although those claims were not included in Aaron’s May 2015 fair hearing request, in the June 2015 administrative proceeding Aaron complained of alleged discrimination by Department employees in his statement of facts (in other words, his position statement) and the written closing argument he submitted to the ALJ. The ALJ concluded that the “alleged civil rights violations” were “beyond the scope of the present proceeding” and did not address the merits of any such claims. Aaron does not present any argument for the conclusion that the ALJ’s determination was erroneous. Any argument about the issue is therefore forfeited. In any event, the ALJ’s decision was supported by the law and therefore not an abuse of discretion.

The Department has set up a separate administrative process for clients seeking redress for discrimination by employees of the Department. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 7350, subd. (a)(4)(B), 7351, subd. (b).) Administrative review of complaints of discrimination is conducted by “supervisory staff, or, as appropriate, by a contractor or grantee, and/or an informal Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor review, followed, when necessary, by a formal investigation by the Department’s Office of Civil Rights and Affirmative Action.” (Ibid.) By contrast, the administrative process that Aaron invoked—that is the subject of this appeal—covers issues other than discrimination that a client has with the Department’s provision of services. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, §§ 7351, subd. (a), 7353, subd. (a).) The ALJ therefore properly concluded that Aaron’s complaints of allegedly discriminatory conduct by employees of the Department were beyond the scope of the administrative proceeding initiated by Aaron.

O. Arguments Raised for the First Time in the Reply Brief
P.
The Tsangs raise a number of new issues in their reply brief that they did not raise in their opening brief. Arguments ‘‘“‘raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them before.’”’’ (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) The Tsangs have provided no excuse for not making those arguments in their opening brief, so we decline to address them.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment. Respondent shall recover its costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.