Filed 1/29/20 Moda v. Brivanlou Pacoima CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

KEVIN MODA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BRIVANLOU PACOIMA, LLC et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B285624

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC608383)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Maureen Duffy Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael Shemtoub and Thomas Sands for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Robert P. Wargo and Sharon S. Jeffrey for Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff and appellant Kevin Moda (tenant) appeals from a judgment dismissing his action against Brivanlou Pacoima, LLC (Brivanlou) and Mahin Hakak (Hakak) (collectively “respondents”) after the trial court granted respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

CONTENTIONS

Tenant makes the following contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in declining to issue a settled statement upon request; (2) respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was invalid as they had not filed an answer to tenant’s third amended complaint, and the defense of res judicata had not been raised as an affirmative defense in the original answer to tenant’s complaint; (3) the trial court erred in resolving the action on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel based on its determination that the judgment in a related unlawful detainer action resolved all of the issues between the parties; (4) the trial court erred in sustaining respondents’ demurrers to tenant’s causes of action against them for breach of contract, accounting, and violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code; (5) leave to amend should have been granted to permit tenant to plead a cause of action for self-help eviction; and (6) the trial court erred in striking tenant’s claim for punitive damages.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Background

In late January 2013, tenant entered a lease with Brivanlou’s predecessor for the subject Century Park East, Los Angeles, property. On January 18, 2016, Brivanlou, the successor to the original lessor, sent a letter to tenant through an attorney, stating that tenant was four months behind in rent payments. Tenant was given the opportunity to pay the outstanding amount without the inconvenience of litigation. The letter informed tenant that if the outstanding amount was not paid by January 22, 2016, eviction proceedings would commence against tenant.

Initial pleadings in this matter

Tenant commenced this lawsuit on January 26, 2016. On March 1, 2016, tenant filed his second amended complaint (SAC) against respondents. The SAC alleged causes of action for breach of contract; accounting; declaratory relief; and violations of the municipal code. Respondent Hakak was alleged to be the “sole” and “managing member” of Brivanlou. The SAC referred to respondents generally as “Ms. Hakak and her alter ego Codefendant, LLC.”

Tenant alleged that on January 7, 2016, respondents demanded rents that were not due under false pretenses. Tenant alleged that respondents falsely accused him of not honoring the rental obligations, and served him with a three-day notice of eviction for failure to pay rents when rents had been paid. Further, tenant alleged that the property had fallen into a state of disrepair and respondents had not cured the defects that plagued the property.

On May 13, 2016, respondents filed a demurrer to the SAC. Hakak, as an individual, challenged the sufficiency of all causes of action except the cause of action for declaratory relief. Brivanlou challenged the sufficiency of the second cause of action for accounting, as well as the fifth and sixth causes of action for violations of the municipal code. Respondents also filed a motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages. Respondents argued that the allegations of the SAC did not support tenant’s claim for punitive damages.

Tenant opposed the demurrer and motion to strike. Respondents replied. The motions were heard on October 5, 2016. As to Hakak individually, the demurrer was sustained as to the breach of contract, accounting, and violations of the municipal code causes of action. As to Brivanlou, the demurrer was sustained as to the fifth and sixth causes of action for violations of the municipal code.

As to Hakak, the only remaining cause of action was for declaratory relief. As to Brivanlou, the remaining causes of action were for breach of contract, declaratory relief, accounting, and the fourth cause of action for violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.10 (section 151.10). The court granted respondents’ motion to strike the punitive damages prayer as there was insufficient conduct alleged warranting punitive damages.

Respondents filed an answer on October 28, 2016.

Related unlawful detainer actions

On January 28, 2016, Brivanlou filed an unlawful detainer action against tenant. Brivanlou alleged that tenant had agreed to pay $3,900 in monthly rent, and at the time the three-day notice to quit was served, was in arrears $15,600. On February 22, 2016, Brivanlou dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice. On April 29, 2016, Brivanlou again initiated an unlawful detainer action against tenant.

The unlawful detainer action culminated in a four-day trial. After trial, the court issued a 24-page written decision, dated December 12, 2016. The court found that Brivanlou had established all the elements of unlawful detainer, and that tenant had not established any affirmative defense. The court ordered the lease forfeited, with possession granted to Brivanlou. However, no lockout could occur before December 23, 2016. Tenant was ordered to pay past due rent for February, March, and April 2016, as well as holdover damages of $120 per day from May 1, 2016 to November 3, 2016, with the amount reduced to $13,300.

On February 9, 2017, tenant appealed the judgment in the unlawful detainer action. On October 24, 2018, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed the decision in the unlawful detainer action in full.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings

On February 9, 2017, respondents filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all remaining causes of action in this matter. In their motion, respondents referenced the statement of decision in the concurrently pending unlawful detainer action. Respondents argued that the judgment in the unlawful detainer action resolved each and every cause of action asserted by tenant in this action. Thus, respondents argued, tenant’s claims in the present action were barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

Tenant’s motion for leave to file third amended complaint (TAC)

On February 23, 2017, while respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending, tenant filed a motion for leave to file a TAC, with a hearing date of March 20, 2017, approximately two months before the motion for judgment on the pleadings was set to be heard. Tenant sought leave to add causes of action for breach of warranty of habitability and self-help eviction.

On March 7, 2017, respondents filed their opposition to the motion for leave to file a TAC. Respondents argued that the proposed TAC failed to state valid new claims; that tenant was dilatory and respondents would be prejudiced given that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was already pending; and that the proposed TAC contained causes of action that had already been stricken by the trial court. Tenant filed a reply brief on March 13, 2017. Tenant argued that the viability of a cause of action could not be grounds to deny leave to amend. He further argued, among other things, that he had not been dilatory and respondents would not be prejudiced.

On June 23, 2017, the trial court granted in part tenant’s motion to amend the pleadings, permitting only the addition of a cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability. Tenant’s new cause of action for violations of former Civil Code sections 1159 and 1160 (self-help eviction) were not permitted. The trial court permitted respondents to amend and re-file their motion for judgment on the pleadings to address the newly added cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability.

Amended motion for judgment on the pleadings

On July 6, 2017, respondents filed their amended motion for judgment on the pleadings. As to tenant’s new cause of action for breach of warranty of habitability, respondents noted that the trial court in the unlawful detainer action found that tenant’s evidence “did not establish that any condition of the premises endangered the ‘life, limb, health, property, safety of the public or occupants of the dwelling.’” Thus, all of tenant’s claims, including the newly-added claim, had previously been adjudicated adversely to him in the unlawful detainer action. Tenant opposed the motion, arguing, in part, that due to his pending appeal in the unlawful detainer matter, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were not available to respondents.

On August 14, 2017, the trial court heard and granted respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that all issues between the parties had been determined in the unlawful detainer action, and that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar tenant’s causes of action.

On September 14, 2017, judgment was entered against tenant.

On October 10, 2017, tenant filed his notice of appeal.

Motion for settled statement

On December 8, 2017, tenant filed his motion for settled statements, seeking settled statements for hearings that occurred on August 14, 2017, June 23, 2017, and October 5, 2016. Tenant pointed out that there was no court reporter present for any of these proceedings. Tenant requested the opportunity to present a settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(c) (rule 8.137).

On May 25, 2018, the trial court denied tenant’s motion for settled statements. The court indicated that it had provided detailed minute orders for each of the requested hearings. The court also noted at the hearing, “Way too much time . . . 19 months . . . has passed. You never questioned any of those at the time I made them within any timeframe that any reasonable person could recall their reasoning for the ruling.”

DISCUSSION

Tenant makes several arguments based on various rulings at different stages of the litigation. We address these arguments in the order in which they are presented in tenant’s opening brief.

I. Failure to issue a settled statement

A. Applicable law

A settled statement may be used as a substitute for a record of oral proceedings under specific circumstances. First, a settled statement may be used where the designated oral proceedings in the superior court were not reported by a court reporter (rule 8.137(b)(1)(A)); or where the appellant has an order waiving his or her court fees and costs (rule 8.137(b)(1)(B)). In order to proceed with a settled statement under these circumstances, an appellant must elect in his notice designating the record on appeal to use a settled statement. (Rule 8.137(b)(1).) The appellant must then serve and file a proposed statement in superior court within 30 days after filing such notice. (Rule 8.137(c)(1).)

If an appellant intends to use a settled statement for reasons other than those specified in rule 8.137(b)(1), the appellant may file a motion to use a settled statement under rule 8.137(b)(2). In the motion, the appellant must make a showing that: (1) a substantial cost saving will result and a statement can be settled without significant burden; (2) the designated proceedings cannot be transcribed; or (3) although the appellant does not have a fee waiver, the appellant is unable to pay for a reporter’s transcript. (Rule 8.137(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).) If the motion is granted, the appellant must serve and file a proposed statement within 30 days after the superior court sends, or a party serves, the order granting the motion. (Rule 8.137(c)(1).)

B. Tenant did not properly challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion for settled statements

In this matter, tenant elected to proceed with a motion under rule 8.137(b)(2). Tenant filed his notice of appeal from the judgment on October 10, 2017. Two months later, on December 8, 2017, tenant filed his motion for settled statements of three hearings dated August 14, 2017, June 23, 2017, and October 5, 2016.

On May 25, 2018, the trial court denied tenant’s motion for the settled statements. Tenant did not file a second notice of appeal, nor did he take a writ from the trial court’s May 25, 2018 denial of his motion for settled statements.

We asked the parties for supplemental briefing on the issue of whether we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s May 25, 2018 order denying tenant’s motion for settled statements. The order denying the motion, which was entered over six months after tenant filed the notice of appeal in this matter, is not referenced within tenant’s notice of appeal. Generally, we do not have jurisdiction over orders that are not specifically identified in the notice of appeal. (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239-240 (Sole Energy) [Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider order granting motion for new trial because plaintiffs failed to appeal from that order].)

Tenant cites Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935-936 (Randall), which states, “To preserve the issue of the denial [of a motion for settled statement] for appeal, the appellant may seek writ review at the time of the denial, or raise the denial in the opening brief on appeal. [Citations.]” However, both cases cited as support for this statement in Randall were writ proceedings, and neither case endorses the position that an appellant may simply raise the issue in his opening brief without appealing from that order. (See Western States Constr. Co. v. Municipal Court of San Francisco (1951) 38 Cal.2d 146, Keller v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 231.) Further, in Randall, the appellant failed to timely seek review of the denial of her motion for settled statement. Thus, the above-quoted statement is dictum. Randall does not suggest that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s denial of tenant’s motion for settled statements under the circumstances before us.

Because tenant failed to seek writ review or otherwise properly bring the issue before this court, we decline to consider whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for settled statements. However, the absence of settled statements for the hearings in question does not entirely preclude us from considering the other issues raised by tenant on appeal. (See Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 933.) The appellate record includes the trial court’s detailed written orders as well as the parties’ briefs. We therefore proceed to consider the issues on their merits based on the record available to us.

II. Motion for judgment on the pleadings

Tenant challenges the trial court’s order granting respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings in several ways. From a procedural perspective, tenant argues that the motion was improper as there was no answer to the TAC on file, and the defense of res judicata had not been raised in the answer to the SAC. Tenant also argues that the causes of action pending in this matter were not related to the ones determined in the unlawful detainer action, and for that reason the motion should not have been granted. We discuss each argument separately below, and find that the trial court did not err in granting the motion.

A. Applicable law

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when the complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’ [Citation.] ‘All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law . . . .’ [Citation.] Courts may consider judicially noticeable matters in the motion as well. [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.)

B. Alleged procedural infirmities

Tenant first attacks the court’s order on procedural grounds. He points out that the TAC was filed on July 3, 2017, and the amended motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed three days later. Tenant argues that without an answer on file, the judgment on the pleadings cannot be recognized.

Tenant asserts that he made this argument to the trial court, but a review of the citation provided by tenant reveals no legal authority or reasoned argument on this point. Under the circumstances, the claim is forfeited. (Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670.) In any event, respondents had previously filed an answer to the SAC, as well as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In allowing tenant to file a TAC, the trial court specifically granted leave for respondents to file an amended motion for judgment on the pleadings to avoid prejudice. The trial court’s actions were well within its power and discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3), (a)(8) [granting courts the power to control the proceedings and process].)

Tenant further claims that the affirmative defense of res judicata was not raised in the answer on file. Tenant argues that this affirmative defense must be specifically pled in order to avoid waiver. In support of this argument, tenant selectively quotes Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 88. The case does not support his position. It states: “[T]he preclusion of relitigation of claims pursuant to the principle of res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be pled or otherwise raised in the trial court to avoid waiver. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Respondents raised the issue in the trial court, in their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, we reject tenant’s position that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was improperly granted for this reason.

C. Res judicata/collateral estoppel

1. Applicable law

The trial court granted respondents’ motion on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. “The doctrine of res judicata bars a party and persons in privity with that party from relitigating a claim following a final judgment on the merits of the claim.” (Roberson v. City of Rialto (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1510.) The doctrine of res judicata “‘“has a double aspect.”’” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797 (Boeken).) In its primary aspect, res judicata, or claim preclusion, “‘“operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)

“‘“In its secondary aspect,” commonly known as collateral estoppel,’” this doctrine may apply in a second suit based on a different cause of action “‘“‘as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” (Boeken, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 797.) “‘“The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Both res judicata and collateral estoppel are based on the principle that a litigant is only entitled to one bite at the apple.” (Colombo v. Kinkle, Rodiger & Spriggs (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 407, 416 (Colombo).) “‘The doctrine of res judicata, whether applied as a total bar to further litigation or as collateral estoppel, “rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.”’ [Citations.]” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 185.)

2. The issues raised in this litigation were previously litigated and decided in the unlawful detainer action

At the time of the motion for judgment on the pleadings the causes of action remaining in this litigation were breach of contract, declaratory relief, accounting, violation of section 151.10, and breach of warranty of habitability. In the breach of contract cause of action, tenant alleged that respondents demanded and obtained rents that were not due, when respondents had in fact already obtained the money. In the declaratory relief cause of action, tenant sought a declaration that he had performed all of his obligations under the terms of the lease, and that respondents had acted in derogation of the terms of the lease. In the accounting cause of action, tenant sought an accounting of all of the payments respondents had received under the lease, including the security deposit, during the time of tenant’s tenancy. In the fourth cause of action for violation of the municipal code, tenant cites section 151.10, which provides that a person may not demand, accept or retain any payment of rent in excess of the “maximum rent or maximum adjusted rent in violation of the provisions of this chapter.” In the late-added breach of warranty of habitability cause of action, tenant alleged that he had put respondents on notice of “many problems with the property” that were not resolved. Such problems included a non-operational kitchen sink, inoperable door locks, broken kitchen cabinets, kitchen knives that were a danger, mold growth, and an infestation of “vermin and moth.”

All of the above issues were litigated in the four-day unlawful detainer trial. The trial court in the unlawful detainer action analyzed in great detail the payments made and concluded, despite tenant’s confusing accounting method, that tenant “did not tender a sufficient number of good checks to [respondents] by which he paid all rent due through February 2016.” The court concluded that respondents’ method of applying checks to the first month following which rent had previously been paid was proper. Following that calculation, rent for the months of February, March, and April 2016 was not paid. The trial court in the unlawful detainer action carefully considered each of tenant’s arguments on these issues, and concluded that tenant was in fact in arrears on the rent. Thus, the breach of contract, declaratory relief, accounting, and violation of section 151.10 causes of action were thoroughly litigated and resolved in favor of respondents. Respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly granted on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

Further, although the court did not formally permit tenant to rely on a breach of warranty of habitability defense in the unlawful detainer action, tenant was “permitted to adduce all, or substantially all, of that same evidence to show a reduced value of the post-termination rental value.” Having considered such extensive evidence during the four-day trial, the unlawful detainer court stated, “assuming . . . that both the habitability and [Civil Code section] 1942.2 defenses had been permitted, the Court finds that the evidence does not establish such a defense under either.” The unlawful detainer court noted that while certain problems with the premises may have been unsightly or inconvenient, the problems asserted by tenant did not rise to a level of endangerment permitting tenant to rely on them as a defense to his eviction.

Tenant argues that because he was expressly barred from raising the affirmative defense of breach of warranty of habitability in the unlawful detainer action, this affirmative defense was not adjudicated nor was it necessarily included in the prior judgment. (Citing Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725, 734 [issues necessarily decided in prior litigation are conclusively determined as to the parties and their privies in a subsequent lawsuit].) However, as the unlawful detainer court pointed out, tenant was permitted to use the same evidence that he would have presented for a breach of warranty of habitability defense to show reduced post-termination value for the lease. During the unlawful detainer trial, tenant had “experienced UD counsel handling his defense.” He was “given great latitude and time to put on evidence of the condition of his apartment for the purposes of showing reduced rental value and he did not skimp on that evidence.” The unlawful detainer court held that such evidence did not render the premises unfit for human habitability under any of the statutory provisions raised by tenant. The finding was necessary to the judgment, based on tenant’s permitted defense of reduced value of the property.

Notably, the Superior Court Appellate Division found that the trial court in the unlawful detainer action did not err in excluding tenant’s breach of warranty of habitability defense because tenant could not show that a different ruling would have changed the outcome of the case. The appellate division noted that tenant presented extensive evidence at trial “regarding the defective conditions of the property” such as “defects concerning the windows, cabinets, sink, garbage disposal, mold, and vermin, and he presented photographic evidence in support of his testimony.” Thus, “the court clearly considered the evidence in support of the defense and made credibility and factual determinations that did not favor [tenant].”

Tenant cites case law suggesting that the scope of an unlawful detainer action is narrow, thus should not be given res judicata effect. (Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 491 [“‘a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations] or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties’”].) However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that not all unlawful detainer litigation is narrow in scope. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-257 [“‘full and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense — even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful detainer . . . will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense”].) The unlawful detainer action between the parties here was broad in scope. As the court noted, “The parties’ three hour trial estimate exploded into nearly four full days of trial over a month’s duration.” During the trial, tenant was given “great latitude” to describe the condition of the rental property. Tenant’s complaints as to the condition of the property were material to tenant’s claim for reduction in value. The court considered the evidence and determined that it did not render the premises unfit for human habitability. Under the circumstances of this case, tenant is not allowed another bite at the apple. (Colombo, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)

The causes of action in tenant’s TAC were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Tenant was permitted a four day “fair adversary hearing” on these same issues, which resulted in a 23-page written decision which was affirmed by the appellate division. Tenant may not again draw them into controversy and subject respondents to further litigation. (Bucur v. Ahmad, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.) The trial court properly prevented such further litigation by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Further, had the trial court erred, tenant has not shown that any such error would be prejudicial, given the previous factual findings against him. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.)

III. Demurrers

Tenant challenges the trial court’s ruling sustaining demurrers to several causes of action in the SAC. The trial court sustained demurrers to the following causes of action as to Hakak individually: breach of contract, accounting, and violations of the municipal code. As to Brivanlou, the trial court sustained demurrers as to two of the causes of action for violations of the municipal code.

Tenant argues that Hakak should not have been shielded from personal liability due to his alter ego allegations and his allegations that Hakak as an individual was the landlord. Tenant further argues that the trial court improperly sustained the demurrers to the causes of action for violations of the municipal code on the ground that tenant had failed to identify the municipal code provisions that had allegedly been violated. Tenant argues that he cited section 151.10 as well as Civil Code section 1954 et seq. Tenant claims these causes of action could have been amended.

We discuss each of tenant’s arguments separately below, and conclude that no error occurred.

A. Applicable law and standard of review

On appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer, we undertake de novo review. (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for this purpose. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

The granting of leave to amend involves the trial court’s discretion. (Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 853.) “‘Where a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. [Citation.]’” (Id. at pp. 853-854.)

B. Allegations against Hakak in her individual capacity

The trial court sustained Hakak’s demurrers to all causes of action except the cause of action for declaratory relief. The trial court’s rationale was the same for all causes of action — Hakak had no contractual relationship with tenant, and was not the landlord. Thus, these causes of action did not state claims against her as an individual.

Tenant argues that it was Hakak who unfairly demanded rents from him when no rent was due. Tenant also points out that his allegations referred to respondents as “Ms. Hakak and her alter ego Codefendant, LLC.” Tenant asserts, without citation to the record, that Hakak is “undeniably” the alter ego of Brivanlou.

Tenant’s allegations were insufficient to proceed on an alter ego theory. “‘The allegation that a corporation is the alter ego of the individual . . . is insufficient to justify the court in disregarding the corporate entity in the absence of allegations of facts from which it appears that justice cannot otherwise be accomplished.’ [Citation.]” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 414.) Tenant’s allegations included no such facts. Thus, the trial court properly disregarded tenant’s incidental references to an alter ego theory. The trial court correctly concluded that Hakak was not a party to the contract, thus was not the landlord, was not responsible for an accounting, and was not the proper defendant under the municipal code.

C. Causes of action for municipal code violations against Brivanlou

The trial court also sustained the demurrers to two of the causes of action for violation of the municipal code against Brivanlou. The trial court’s stated reasoning was that tenant failed to specify the municipal code sections that had purportedly been violated. Tenant argues that he did cite a specific municipal code section, as well as a Civil Code section. Tenant argues that sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend “for technical trivialities” is error.

1. Fifth cause of action for municipal code violations

Tenant’s fifth cause of action is very short, and simply states that he “paid monies” to respondents “under false pretenses for services and benefits that he had not received in the last two years and requests that the monies be returned to him.” The cause of action cites no municipal code section and fails to elaborate on the services and benefits to be provided to tenant. In the absence of a specific code violation, and a description of the specific acts which should have been provided, the cause of action fails to state a claim. Demurrer was properly sustained as to this cause of action.

2. Sixth cause of action for municipal code violations

The sixth cause of action is long and confusing. It does not adequately describe any violations of the municipal code.

In the sixth cause of action, tenant described respondents’ actions in commencing unlawful detainer proceedings against tenant and using “the master key to break into [tenant’s] private residence and put him in the fear [sic] so that [tenant] was forced to summon the assistance of law enforcement,” and that respondents had done so “without ever complying with Civil Code [section] 1954 et seq., which requires notice from a landlord at least 24 hours in advance before the landlord can make entry for any type of inspection and to the property.”

In the sixth cause of action, tenant also described in detail respondents’ actions in filing the initial unlawful detainer, and ultimately voluntarily dismissing that action without prejudice after the Los Angeles Housing & Community Investment Department, Rent Stabilization Division, Investigation & Enforcement sent a February 18, 2016 letter notifying respondents of the inadequacies of the three-day notice to quit.

The sixth cause of action also identifies an attorney referred to as Mr. Aronoff, whom tenant described as a co-defendant. Tenant describes various provisions of Civil Code section 1788 et seq., which describe debt collector responsibilities. Tenant alleges that the collection of debts via the judicial process created “per se liability against Mr. Aronoff and his law office.”

The sixth cause of action does not adequately describe any violations of the municipal code. Therefore, respondents’ demurrer to this cause of action was properly granted.

3. Leave to amend

Tenant asserts that it was error for the trial court to deny him leave to amend the above allegations of municipal code violations. We review tenant’s pleading to determine whether a reasonable possibility exists that amendment may cure the defects. It is tenant’s burden on appeal to show such a reasonable possibility. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43 (Rakestraw).)

Tenant cites Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 8, for the general proposition that it is error for a trial court to deny leave to amend unless disclosures on the face of the complaint point to its being incapable of amendment. However, tenant has an obligation to show “‘in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.]” (Rakestraw, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) “The assertion of an abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Instead, tenant must “clearly and specifically set forth the ‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and the legal basis for amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and authority for it.” (Ibid.) Tenant must “sufficiently state all required elements” of his cause of action. (Ibid.)

Tenant has failed to meet this burden on appeal. While tenant complains that the failure to permit amendment was erroneous, tenant fails to set forth any new provisions of the municipal code or explain how those codes were violated. Nor does tenant attempt to elaborate on his allegations to show how the noted municipal code sections were violated. Tenant fails to provide a citation to the record showing that he met this burden at the trial court level. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in declining to grant tenant leave to amend these causes of action.

IV. Punitive damages

In his final argument, tenant challenges the trial court’s order granting respondents’ motion to strike tenant’s claim for punitive damages. The trial court granted the motion based on its conclusion that there was insufficient punitive conduct alleged. We review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.)

Tenant acknowledges that his claim for punitive damages can only survive if this court reverses the demurrers without leave to amend. As we have affirmed the trial court’s decisions in full, we need not address tenant’s challenge to the trial court’s grant of the motion to strike punitive damages. (See, e.g., Brunius v. Parrish (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 838, 859.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

__________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT