Case Number: 18LBCV00020 Hearing Date: February 06, 2020 Dept: S27

TENTATIVE RULING

The court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,759.45.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff moves for an order fixing attorneys’ fees against Defendants Mohan Makkar and Crown Investments, LLC, in the amount of $17,685.45, as the prevailing party on the lease contract in this action.

BACKGROUND

On October 23, 2018, Plaintiff Parkview Village, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in this unlawful detainer action against Defendants Mohan Makkar and Crown Investments, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). A first amended complaint was subsequently filed.

It is alleged in the complaint that on September 8, 2017, the parties entered into a written lease agreement whereby Defendants agreed to pay rent of $17,798.00 per month, payable on the first of the month, for a two-year term. Defendants are alleged to be in possession of property at 4115, 4117, 4127, and 4129 North Viking Way, Long Beach, CA 90808 without Plaintiff’s possession and in violation of the lease.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving this action in which, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 578, 579, and 664.6 agreed to the following terms: (1) that Plaintiff shall have a judgment awarding it immediate possession of the premises located at 4115, 4117, 4127, and 4129 Viking Way, Long Beach, California 9080 (the “Premises”); (2) the Defendants’ rights under the subject written lease for the Premises is forfeited; and (3) that Plaintiff shall have a monetary judgment jointly and severally against Defendants for: (a) damages in the total amount of $64,051.15, plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on the entire amount from October 1, 2018 to the date of judgment; (b) additional attorneys’ fees as allowed by the Agreement which shall be set by the Court based on the reasonable fees incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel and not by a court schedule; (c) costs of suit; and (d) post-judgment interest accruing thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.

On June 24, 2019, the court entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.

The motion for attorneys’ fees was filed on August 22, 2019.

ANALYSIS

Overview of Relevant Law

Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1032 and 1033.5(a)(10) provide that a prevailing party may recover its costs as a matter of right, and that those costs may include attorneys’ fees when authorized by statute, law, or contract. Civil Code Section 1717 provides that “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”

Discussion

Prevailing Party

The “prevailing” party is the party who recovered greater relief in the action on the contract. (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) The court determines the prevailing party “only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by a comparison of the extent to which each party has succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876.) As a general rule, the party who obtains judgment is deemed the prevailing party, but the form of the judgment is not controlling. (Lewis v. Alpha Beta Co. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 29, 33.) In unlawful detainer actions, the party awarded possession is normally the prevailing party entitled to costs. (See Strickland v. Becks (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d Supp.18, 21 (right to possession is primary object of unlawful detainer and determines “prevailing party”).)

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff, through the stipulated judgment entered by the court, has been awarded possession of the subject premises in this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff is the “prevailing party” in this action.

Contractual Provision for Attorney’s Fees

The Court finds that the written lease agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, which is the subject of this dispute, specifies for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. When interpreting a contract, the words of the written agreement are to be understood in their “ordinary and popular sense.” (Continental Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mechanics Services, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 500, 504.) Here, the plain language of the agreement provides:

31. Attorneys’ Fees. If any Party brings an action or proceeding involving the Premises whether founded in tort, contract or equity, or to declare rights hereunder, the Prevailing Party (as hereafter defined) in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. Such fees may be awarded in the same suit or recovered in a separate suit, whether or not such action or proceeding is pursued to decision or judgment. . . . (Cheney Decl., Exh.1, pg.18 of 21.)

Timeliness of the Motion

Attorneys’ fees may be recovered by motion served and filed in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1702, which states that a motion to claim attorneys’ fees must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rules 8.104 and 8.108 (i.e., within the earlier of 60 or 30 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment by the clerk or a party, or 180 days after entry of judgment).

Here, judgment was entered on June 24, 2019, and the motion for attorneys’ fees was filed on August 22, 2019. The motion is thus, timely.

Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees Sought

“[A]bsent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee. We explained that the purpose behind statutory fee authorizations – i.e., encouraging attorneys to act as private attorneys general and to vindicate important rights affecting the public interest – will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133-34 (emphasis in original).) “The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id. at 1134.) Other factors to consider in fixing the reasonableness of fees to be considered beyond the fee agreement alone include, but are not limited to “(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in this locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the circumstances; and (6) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.” (Glendora Community Redevelopment Agency v. Demeter (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 465, 470.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks a lodestar amount of $17,685.45. Plaintiff provides support for the requested attorneys’ fees amount with the declaration of its counsel, Brent G. Cheney, Esq. Counsel presents redacted invoices as well as a summary analysis, setting forth the tasks Counsel performed in this matter, the number of hours expended by Counsel in this matter, and the attorneys’ fees incurred by Plaintiff as a result. (Cheney Decl., ¶ 11, Exhs. 3-4.) According to the Summary Analysis of Attorneys Fees, Counsel expended 28.2 hours in connection with this case, resulting in $13,351.95 in attorneys’ fees. (Cheney Decl., Exh. 4.) Counsel is a shareholder in the firm of Parker, Milliken, Clark, O’Hara & Samuelian, and has been practicing law for more than 22 years, with experience handling real estate, environmental and business disputes, including all aspects of litigation. (Cheney Decl., ¶ 12.) Counsel attests to billing in this matter at an hourly rate of $481.40 per hour. (Cheney Decl., ¶ 11.) Additionally, Counsel attests to having expended five hours preparing the attorneys’ fees motion, and expects to spend an additional four hours replying to an opposition, and preparing for and appearing at a hearing on this motion. (Id.)

Defendants have not filed an opposition and have not otherwise argued the award should be reduced in any manner. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 560 (emphasizing that opposing parties “submitted no evidence that the hours claimed by counsel were excessive,” and declining to “declare as a matter of law that the hours were unreasonable”); Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1204 (opposing party “offered no evidence of any kind which might have warranted a reduced fee award.”).) Being that Defendants have not filed an opposition, the requested lodestar amount sought by Plaintiff must be reduced. Accordingly, the court finds a lodestar amount of $15,759.45 to be reasonable for this case.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $15,759.45.