Case Number: 19STCV12459 Hearing Date: February 14, 2020 Dept: A

Slort v Hines

Motion for Protective Order

Calendar:

05

Case No.:

19STCV12459

Hearing Date:

February 14, 2020

Action Filed:

April 11, 2019

Trial Date:

May 18, 2020

MP:

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Jennifer Hines

RP:

Cross-Defendant Jan Slort

ALLEGATIONS:

The instant action arises in quiet title, where Plaintiff David Slort, as Trustee of the Jan Leon Slort Irrevocable Trust of 2013 (“Plaintiff”) seeks to quiet the title to the property commonly known as 10600 Johanna Avenue, Sunland, California 91040 (the “Property”) as against Defendant Jennifer Hines (“Defendant”).

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 11, 2019, alleging two causes of action sounding in (1) Quiet Title, and (2) Declaratory Relief.

Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint on June 17, 2019, as against Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Jan Leon Slort (“Jan” and together with Plaintiff the “Cross-Defendants”) alleging six causes of action sounding in (1) Partition, (2) Fraud, (3) Conversion, (4) Account Stated, (5) Money Had and Received, and (6) Declaratory Relief.

PRESENTATION:

The instant motion for protective order was filed be Defendant on December 05, 2019. Jan opposed the motion on January 31, 2020, and a reply brief was received on February 06, 2020.

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Defendant moves for a protective order reducing the number of discovery requests to 35 per device, together with $4,550.00 in sanctions.

DISCUSSION:

Inadequate Notice – The Court has reviewed the moving papers and cannot identify what code section, if any, Defendant is referring to in order to support the proposition that Jan’s Requests for Admission and Requests for Production should be limited. Further, the substance of the protective order appears only to refer to Interrogatories in arguing that discovery should be limited to 35 discovery requests. As such, the Court will deny the motion as applied to Requests for Admission and Requests for Production, as the motion does not provide adequate notice of the legal basis for relief; the Court will otherwise consider the motion on its merits.

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Standard of Review – Protective Order – A protective order may issue under Code Civ. Proc., §§2017.020, 2025.420, 2030.090, 2031.060, and 2033.080. In each case, a protective order should be issued for good cause, such as to prevent unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. Additionally, prior to making such a motion the moving party must attempt to informally resolve the issue and attach a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §2016.040.

Meet and Confer – Code of Civ. Proc. §2016.040 requires that all parties make “a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented” prior to filing a discovery motion. A court reviewing a declaration of compliance with this requirement should evaluate the information provided in order to determine whether the parties have reached an impasse, or whether further efforts will likely bear fruit. Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1294 (quoting Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 424, 432-33).

On review of the Declaration of Peter Levine, the Court finds that Defendant has met the meet and confer requirements prior to filing the instant motion.

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Pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §2030.030, parties are generally limited to “Thirty-five specially prepared interrogatories that are relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” However, the Court permits additional interrogatories to be asked upon filing a declaration pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. §2030.050, on the grounds that either, (1) the complexity or quantity of the issues require more than 35 interrogatories, (2) there is a substantial financial burned in conducting a deposition, or (3) it is most expedient to request additional interrogatories in order to permit the responding party to conduct the required research. Code of Civ. Proc. §2030.040(a). When, as here, the number of interrogatories is challenged by protective order, it is the propounding party that bears the burden of justifying the number of interrogatories requested. Code of Civ. Proc. §2030.040(b).

Prior to providing its analysis, the Court will first note that Jan has not provided the Court with adequate legal citations throughout Jan’s opposition. Notably, Jan’s opposition cites to “C.C.P. §2030” in several portions of the Opposition. As counsel should be aware, Code of Civil Procedure Section 2030 was repealed effective July 1, 2005, by and through AB 3081 (2004) when the Legislature reorganized the Code into its current format. After 15 years, all citations in the Opposition should reflect the modern organization of the Code.

As to the merits, the Court finds that the use of interrogatories to test the opposing party’s legal contentions are the most expedient means to obtain the discovery sought, and, in light of the allegations made in the Cross-Complaint, including allegations of fraud, discovery in excess of the 35 interrogatories generally permitted under the Code is justified under the circumstances. While on reply Defendant argues that the use of interrogatories in excess of 35 to discover contentions is a ‘frivolous’ argument, the Court notes that Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 1255 has held that contention questions are more appropriately posed through interrogatories rather than through deposition. Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1262 (“If the deposing party wants to know facts, it can ask for facts; if it wants to know what the adverse party is contending, or how it rationalizes the facts as supporting a contention, it may ask that question in an interrogatory.”). Further, since filing the instant motion Jan represents that they are willing to stipulate to a reduction in the interrogatories posed. Opposition, 3:5-7. Making the burden on Defendant much lower than the initial motion provides.

On these grounds, the Court will deny the motion for protective order.

Sanctions – Under Code of Civ. Proc. §2030.090(d), the Court is generally required to impose monetary sanctions against a party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a protective order unless the Court finds that the party made or opposed the motion with substantial justification. Here, the Court finds that the motion was made with substantial justification.

Accordingly, the Court will not award sanctions.

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RULING:

In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the court’s records.

ORDER

Defendant/Cross-Complainant Jennifer Hines’s Motion for Protective Order came on regularly for hearing on February 14, 2020, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:

THE MOTION IS DENIED; AND SANCTIONS ARE DENIED.

DATE: _______________ _______________________________

JUDGE