EVE J. FUDGE v. GARY FUDGE

Filed 3/5/20 Marriage of Fudge CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of EVE J. and GARY FUDGE.

EVE J. FUDGE,

Respondent,

v.

GARY FUDGE,

Appellant.

G055872

(Super. Ct. No. 09D007656)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Jonathan Cannon, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Minyard Morris, Mark E. Minyard; and Garrett C. Dailey for Appellant.

Stabile & Moshtael, Navid Moshtael; Jeff Lewis Law, Jeff Lewis and Sean Rotstan for Respondent.

* * *

Gary Fudge appeals from the judgment dissolving his marriage to Eve Fudge. Gary challenges two aspects of the court’s ruling: (1) its award of $40,000 per month in spousal support to Eve; and (2) its order requiring that Gary’s separately owned real property—which is adjacent to the community-owned family home and was remodeled to function as a guest house—be listed for sale together with the family home.

With respect to the spousal support order, Gary contends the court erred by failing to make a finding as to Gary’s income, and by misinterpreting the terms “income” and “standard of living established during the marriage” as they are used in Family Code section 4320. We reject both contentions. It was Gary who proposed the court make a finding that he “has the ability to pay any reasonable spousal support”—which invited the court to skip the underlying analysis of his earning capacity, income, assets and standard of living—and thus he waived any assertion that the court was obligated to engage in such an analysis. In any event, after Gary objected to the court’s initial statement of decision, the court issued an amended statement of decision containing sufficient findings relating to his income.

Further, the record does not support Gary’s assertion the court “misinterpreted” the terms “income” and “marital standard of living” (MSL) in making its ruling, as the court stated no conclusions of law demonstrating such error, and we cannot presume the court erred. Likewise, we do not presume the court agreed with every statement or analytical point made by Eve’s accounting expert, Randy Orr, especially when the court’s analysis of the spousal support issue departs from Orr’s opinions in key respects. And even if we did assume the court adopted Orr’s testimony wholesale into its decision, Gary has not established that would necessarily reflect a misinterpretation of the statute.

With respect to the property sale order, Gary contends the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that his separately-owned property be sold together with the community-owned family home and by ordering Gary to restore a strip of land from that separate property back to the community owned property. He further contends the order for a joint sale of the properties failed to ensure an equal division of the community property because it assigned a higher value to the community-owned family home than Gary proposed. Neither claim is persuasive. Again, it was Gary who suggested the court order the two properties be listed for sale as a combined unit; thus he invited the alleged error he complains of. But even if that were not the case, Gary’s real complaint is that the court erred in its determination of what the community-owned property was worth, and his separate interests would be harmed as a consequence of that incorrect valuation. We cannot agree. Since the court’s valuation is supported by substantial evidence, we must presume it is correct. When we do that, there is no basis to conclude the ruling would unfairly devalue Gary’s separate interests.

Finally, we note that although the court’s decision requires the properties to be listed for sale together, it does not require the parties to sell the combined properties for any particular price, let alone a price that would unfairly devalue Gary’s separate interests. Consequently, the harm he complains of is, at best, theoretical.

The judgment is affirmed.

FACTS

Gary and Eve married in September, 1997, and separated in August, 2009. Throughout the marriage, Eve was a stay-at-home parent to the couple’s two daughters, and managed the domestic sphere, while Gary earned substantial wealth by actively managing his investments.

The family home, at 1915 Chubasco, was purchased by Gary in approximately 1988 as “virtually a tear-down,” with the intent that the parties would live there together. It was substantially remodeled before the parties moved in to the house in approximately 1994. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the house became community property following their marriage, subject to a pre-existing lien that secured a debt owed by Gary to his former spouse.

In 2004, when the parties were contemplating selling their home to move to a larger house with a pool, Gary suggested they instead purchase the house next door to extend their property and build a guest house with a pool. The combined properties would operate as a “family compound,” with the two structures intended to provide an “open house situation.”

After Gary purchased the second house, at 1907 Chubasco, Eve agreed to take charge of overseeing the rebuilding of the structure into a guest house. She oversaw all construction on a daily basis, chose the materials, made design suggestions, and worked with the designers and contractors throughout the process.

Gary explained, however, that “when we decided where [the swimming pool] would go, it ended up a little too close to the property line between the two properties in order to satisfy the City Codes, so I talked to the engineer. The engineer said, well, we can do a property line adjustment.” Thus, Gary asked Eve to execute a deed adjusting the lot line in favor of the 1907 property, so that the swimming pool would be legally contained within that property. Gary explained to Eve that it would be beneficial to do so because “if we ever sold the estate it would be more attractive to a buyer to know they could eventually subdivide the properties into two.” Eve testified she signed the deed at Gary’s request, but that she did not really read it.

By signing the deed, it was not Eve’s intent to give up community property without compensation. However, it was not until after Eve filed for divorce that she learned the 1907 property was held solely in Gary’s name; until that time, she did not know how title to that property was held.

During the course of rebuilding the 1907 structure, the parties also undertook a substantial remodel of the 1915 property, which required the family to move out for a time and live in a rental home. It was near the end of that period in the rental home that Gary and Eve separated.

Although Eve and the couple’s two daughters—then 14 and 12—resumed living at 1915 Chubasco when the remodeling of that home had been completed, they had no access to the guest house at 1907 because Gary had locked it.

When the parties separated in 2009, Gary “deposited $40,000 in a joint account.” He thereafter continued paying most family expenses, albeit at a somewhat reduced level than the standard enjoyed by the family during the marriage. Eve testified that “in the beginning he challenged a lot of the expenses or refused to pay a lot of the expenses, and then about halfway through I needed to start showing him photocopies of the check register, so I thought every purchase was being judged or looked at or — just was very uncomfortable.” She said the process was “emotionally debilitating” and “it was just easier to use my own capital and pay those things to avoid the stress.” Consequently, Eve said she “cut back on a lot of things that I would — I did back then. I don’t go out, I don’t shop for clothes, I’m sleeping on the same sheets since 12 years ago, towels. . . . I haven’t bought furniture . . . .” Even testified her daughters left for college in 2014 and 2015, although they continued to return to the family home during their college breaks.

Despite Eve’s complaints about her reduced circumstances, she never sought any orders for temporary child support or spousal support during that lengthy period of separation.

In December of 2015, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a privately compensated temporary judge to preside over the case, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 2.830 and 2.831. The case was bifurcated, and the parties’ marital status was terminated in August of 2016.

The financial aspects of the dissolution were tried over the course of several days, and the evidence consisted largely of expert testimony. There were several issues in dispute, but the evidence focused largely on the determination of spousal support and the disposition of the community-owned family home.

Eve’s accounting expert, Randy Orr, acknowledged it was difficult to determine a traditional “income” figure for Gary because since 2008, when he had sold $20 million worth of shares in Automotive.com, his money had been generated by a complex series of investments in partnerships, loans and brokerage accounts. Thus, Orr explained “there’s a certain amount of deal flow where income is recognized in certain years, and there’s losses recognized in certain years, and there’s a flow of income coming into his accounts, and the tax returns reflect significant activity, contributions made, distributions received, loans made, loans being repaid, and its’s a very, very complex world.” Consequently, Orr assessed Gary’s “income” by “look[ing] at what dollars did he receive from these entities for [a specified] time period, what income did he receive from his brokerage accounts and us[ing] that as a snapshot.”

Given the difficulty of nailing down how much “income” was actually generated by Gary’s investments, Orr also analyzed Gary’s financial situation from the other side, looking at how much money Gary was able to spend “while still maintaining a level estate, not depleting his assets.” Orr noted that Gary’s spending exceeded the income documented on his tax returns, but confirmed that Gary’s wealth was “not dwindling.”

Gary’s accounting expert, Glenn Mehner, hewed more closely to the tax returns and documented income distributions in assessing Gary’s “income,” and opined that Gary’s cash flow or spending patterns were irrelevant in determining his ability to pay spousal support because his wealth gave him flexibility to spend whatever amount he chose to spend within a given period of time. As Mehner explained, “[i]f your estate is worth $30 million, and you wanted to spend $4 million that year, it has no relevance.” However, Mehner did acknowledge that if it were true Gary was spending more than his “income” each month, and yet Gary’s estate was not being depleted, “that could be an issue.”

Eve and Gary both testified about MSL. Eve described it as “luxurious,” including a housekeeper, nannies and babysitters, frequent first-class vacations, fine dining, unlimited spending on clothing, shoes and personal items, extravagant family parties and celebrations, horses, and expensive gifts—including a grand piano, jewelry and multiple automobiles. Gary characterized the MSL as “extremely comfortable,” and did not dispute the facts cited by Eve.

Both Orr and Mehner shared their opinions about the MSL, based on their analyses of the parties’ spending. The two accountants agreed that the total expenditures—including business expenditures—made from Gary’s accounts during the last three years of the marriage averaged $454,089 per month. Starting with that number, Orr subtracted the amounts he concluded had been spent on Gary’s business ventures and concluded the remainder, an average of $149,000 per month, represented “lifestyle expenses” that equated to the MSL. Orr then divided that number into thirds, assuming one-third was attributable to Gary, one-third was attributable to Eve, and one-third was attributable to the couple’s daughters. Based on that analysis, Orr concluded that the share of the MSL attributable to Eve was $49,700 per month after taxes, which equated to $76,590 per month before taxes.

By contrast, Mehner did not consider Gary’s total monthly expenditures to be relevant in assessing the MSL. Instead, based on discussions with Gary, Mehner developed a list of average monthly personal expenses over the final three years of the marriage—attributable to things like automobiles, groceries, insurance, maid service and other household expenses, clothing, jewelry, and each vacation taken—and he then allocated a share of each of those monthly averages to Eve and added up her shares to arrive at a monthly total. Using that method, Mehner concluded that Eve’s “needs,” (which he acknowledged did not include the cost of housing, utilities, or other expenses attributable to having a separate home) added up to about $13,000 per month in net expenditures. He acknowledged that number amounted to 4.4% of the total monthly expenditures.

Mehner calculated that the total amount spent on the categories he found relevant in establishing the MSL, for the entire family, averaged $44,000 per month during the last three years of the marriage (after adding in a theoretical housing cost of $10,000 per month), and he opined that the court should ignore the other $400,000 Gary had been spending per month during that period.

The two experts also differed on their assessment of Eve’s own available cash flow, generated from her separate assets that included shares of a family-owned business in Australia. Orr estimated Eve’s cash flow was approximately $10,000 per month, while Mehner testified it was approximately $20,000 per month.

After accounting for what he believed was Eve’s cash flow, and assuming her purchase of a new home worth approximately half the value of the family home at 1915 Chubasco, it was Mehner’s opinion that Eve would require monthly spousal support in the range of $0 to $4300 to replicate the MSL.

With respect to the marital home, Eve’s real estate expert, James Willard, estimated that the 1915 Chubasco house had a fair market value of $5 million as of the time of trial, whereas the 1907 house, if sold separately, would have a value of $2,250,000. Willard described the 1907 house as having only “fair . . . functional utility . . . as a separate single family home” because “the house is built in such a way that there is no front door. There’s several garage doors. There is no front door to that house. Then when you get inside, there’s only two bedrooms. One of the bedrooms you have to walk through the other bedroom to get to it, what we call functional obsolescence.” In his view, “it just doesn’t meet the criteria of what people want today to buy a home in that area.” Given those limitations, Willard opined that “the 1907 property is not designed . . . to wherein it would be a huge factor in selling them both together.” He believed “they would sell for more individually, even if you had to take 1907 and tear the house down.”

Gary’s real estate expert, John Aust, estimated that the 1915 home had a somewhat lower fair market value than Willard had estimated—$4,141,000—while the 1907 house was worth $2,379,000, somewhat more than Willard’s estimate. Aust largely agreed with Willard about the limited appeal of the 1907 house as a stand alone property, characterizing it as a “big guest house” on the combined property. However, he believed that with enough time to sell the properties as a “compound,” it would be a “unique property” and “somebody might pay a lot of money for it.” Thus, Aust thought that “would be a nice thing to be able to do.” But if a quick sale were desired, he agreed with Willard that the houses would probably sell individually for a combined higher price than they would sell for as a compound.

Gary himself complained it would be “very inequitable” to sell the properties separately because the 1907 house “was never designed as a stand-alone” and “a buyer would not be very anxious to buy a house with the flaws.” He noted that the only street entrance to the 1907 home was through the garage doors, and that if anyone were going to visit people staying in that house, they would probably enter through the 1915 house. Gary believed it would be impractical to try to put a front door on the 1907 house, given its layout.

Gary also believed “there was a bonus value to having the two lots together because properties of that size with a very nice guest house are very, very uncommon in Newport Beach, Corona del Mar, so I have always thought there was a bit of a premium for the right kind of buyer buying the two properties that probably will . . . pay 110% of what the value might be if you bought them separately.” He stated that if the properties were sold together at a premium, he would split the excess with Eve after deducting the real estate agent’s commission.

Eve’s hope was to remain in the 1915 house and not be required to rent or buy a new home.

At the conclusion of trial, Gary submitted a proposed statement of decision in which he urged the court to make some of the rulings he now challenges on appeal. With respect to the spousal support issue, Gary proposed that the court make a finding that he “has the ability to pay any reasonable spousal support to [Eve],” while omitting any specific findings relating to his income or the extent of his wealth.

Gary also proposed a finding that Eve, then age 64, had no need for transitional spousal support, while acknowledging that “[such] support will further ease . . . [Eve] into the next phase of life,” during which “she can explore a minimum wage job, freelance writing and photography.” During that period of exploration, Gary proposed that the court order spousal support to Eve in the amount of $10,000 per month until September 2021, and thereafter continuing at “the jurisdictional level.”

With respect to the house, Gary proposed, in accordance with his expert’s opinion, that the house had a fair market value of $4,141,000. He requested the court order that “The property shall be listed for sale together with [Gary’s] separate property at 1907 Chubasco . . . for up to twelve (12) months with realtor, Nancy Barfield.” Further, Gary proposed that “The sales proceeds generated by the sale shall be divided in a manner that” first reimburses him for “all sums [he] advanced . . . relative to the preparation of the house for sale [as] agreed to in writing by the parties and/or pursuant to a Court Order,” and second pays Eve “a sum equal to the net sum she would have received had the house sold at $4,141,000 less Family Code § 2640 reimbursement and less any sums advanced by [Gary] to assist her in purchasing a new house.” After that, the proceeds would go “to [Gary in] a sum equal to the sum he would have received had the house sold at $4,141,000 plus Family Code § 2640 reimbursement and plus any sums [he advanced to Eve] to assist her in purchasing a new house,” and finally, any “remaining sums shall be divided equally between the parties.”

Gary also proposed that the court retain jurisdiction to address any additional issues related to the sale of the two houses, and agree to entertain ex parte petitions if the parties could not resolve ongoing disputes.

The court issued its statement of decision in May 2017. The decision adopted Gary’s proposed finding that he “has the ability to pay any reasonable spousal support to [Eve]” and concluded, consistent with Gary’s proposal, that Eve “does not have job skills that would command significant compensation.”

The court also found that the parties “lived at an extremely comfortable standard of living per the testimony of [Gary],” and cited Orr’s testimony that the monthly family expenditures for the years of 2007-2009 averaged $149,000 per month. The court relied upon other evidence, including a myriad of photographs, demonstrating that the family’s lifestyle was “extremely luxurious.” The court concluded Eve had approximately $20,000 per month in controllable cash flow from her own assets, and that Gary had “in effect, prepaid a portion of [her] housing needs” by transmuting the family residence to community property when the parties married. Considering all those factors, the court ordered that Gary pay Eve spousal support of $40,000 per month, beginning in June 2017.

With respect to the disposition of the house, the court’s statement of decision adopted Gary’s proposal that the two properties be listed for sale together and how the sale proceeds would be divided, with two alterations that favored Gary: first, the court specified that after both Eve and Gary had been paid their respective shares of the proceeds attributed to the community property, the next share of proceeds would go to Gary, up to the value of the 1907 Chubasco separate property; and second, that any proceeds still remaining after that would be divided two-thirds to Gary and one-third to Eve, rather than the 50-50 split proposed by Gary. However, the court concluded the family home at 1915 Chubasco had a fair market value of $5 million, in accordance with the opinion of Eve’s expert, rather than $4,141,000, and it consequently substituted that number into the dispersal formula.

Gary filed objections to the court’s statement of decision, which largely restated the arguments made in his proposed statement of decision. However, he also pointed to specific alleged flaws in the decision, including that “The findings are incomplete. All Family Code § 4320 factors must be addressed. [¶] The spousal support order itself is incomplete and exceeds [Eve’s] needs. [Gary] requests a statement of calculations relative to [his] income and [Eve’s] marital standard of living.” He additionally noted the statement of decision “does not reflect an end date for spousal support.”

With respect to the order for disposition of the family home, Gary objected that the $5 million valuation effectively required him to “guarantee[] an inflated value to the community to the significant detriment of his separate property.” He noted that “[i]f the market crashed, [he] could end up receiving far less than fair market value of 1907 Chubasco (or even zero if the market decreased enough), while the community could receive one hundred percent (100%) of the inflated value.” Gary suggested that if the court were not willing to alter its finding on the fair market value of 1915 Chubasco, a reasonable alternative would be to “simply sell the properties separately.”

In July 2019, the court issued a more detailed amended statement of decision. While retaining Gary’s proposed finding that he could pay any reasonable amount of spousal support, the court addressed the evidence pertaining to Gary’s “income.” The court noted that Gary’s tax returns reflected an adjusted gross income of between $43,000 and $107,000 per month, but also that “[t]he parties spent far in excess of [Gary’s] ‘income’ to support their marital standard of living, and yet [Gary] was able to increase his net worth from approximately $10,000,000 at the start of the marriage to approximately $30,000,000 at the time of the trial, not including several million dollars set aside in trust for his four children (two from a previous marriage) and the money put into his Foundation.” Because that remarkable wealth accumulation could not be entirely explained by Gary’s “income,” the court concluded it “would not be fair and equitable” to base an award of spousal support on that “‘income.’”

The court’s amended statement of decision did not alter its conclusion that Eve was entitled to $40,000 per month in spousal support, but it did specify that the award would “terminate upon the death or remarriage of the Petitioner or upon the further order of the Court.”

With respect to the disposition of the home, the court’s amended statement of decision retained its finding that the family home had a fair market value of $5 million, but added a provision stating that if Gary “does not want to sell both 1907 and 1915 as a ‘unit’ under these terms, then at his sole expense the “200” foot strip [of property that was transferred from the 1915 property to the 1907 property to accommodate the swimming pool] should be returned to the 1915 property, a new fence erected between the properties, and the pool removed in so far as it encroaches on the 1915 property and the 1915 property should then be sold in accordance with this order.”

DISCUSSION

1. The Spousal Support Order

Gary contends the court’s award of $40,000 per month in spousal support to Eve is flawed and must be reversed. Although the purpose of spousal support varies from case to case, depending on the circumstances (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480-481), the Legislature has set forth various factors courts must consider. (Family Code, § 4320.) Those factors include “[t]he ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living”; “[t]he needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage”; and “[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320, subds. (c), (d) & (n).)

A trial court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord each factor. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302 (Cheriton).) “In awarding spousal support, the court must consider the mandatory guidelines of section 4320. Once the court does so, the ultimate decision as to amount and duration of spousal support rests within its broad discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] ‘Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders.’” (In re Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87, 93, fn. omitted.)

In this case, Gary acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard. He then maintains that he is not challenging the court’s exercise of discretion, but is instead raising pure issues of law. First, he contends the court failed to make a required finding “as to his income and/or controllable cash flow available for spousal support” despite his request that it do so. And second, he contends the court “misinterpreted” the terms “income” and “standard of living established during the marriage,” as they are used in section 4320. We are unpersuaded by either contention.

A. Alleged Failure to Make a Finding on Income

Gary contends that not only is a determination of the supporting party’s “income” a necessary element of any spousal support order, but that the question of his income was a “major contested issue[] at trial,” and thus the court erred by failing to address the point specifically in its statement of decision. Gary acknowledges the court made a finding that “he could pay ‘any reasonable spousal support order,’” but complains that finding “leav[es] it up to everyone’s imagination what [his] level of income was.”

Gary’s complaint is accurate, as far as it goes. The problem is it doesn’t go very far. Stated simply, we cannot agree that determining Gary’s “income” was a principal disputed issue in the case. It would be more accurate to say that the “income” issue was a source of some confusion and mystery, which neither party apparently felt the need to entirely resolve.

Eve’s position, as reflected in the opinion of her accountant, Orr, was that Gary had continued to accumulate wealth during the course of the marriage, attributable to a complex series of investments and business transactions which appreciated over time. Gary’s accumulation of wealth could not be explained by adding up the traditional sources of income reflected on his tax returns; he routinely spent more than that income. Thus, Orr focused more on Gary’s wealth and his spending to assess his ability to pay support. That approach is consistent with section 4320, which obligates the court to consider the supporting party’s “assets as well as income” in determining the “‘ability to pay.’” (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.)

Gary’s accountant, Mehner, assumed that Gary’s “income” could be accurately assessed by reviewing his tax returns. He opined that Gary’s ability to spend large sums of money—a consequence of his wealth—was essentially irrelevant in determining his ability to pay spousal support. He instead focused on establishing that Eve’s share of the MSL was relatively small, and that she would need little or no support to maintain that standard.

Gary conceded that he did “ha[ve] the ability to pay any reasonable spousal support to [Eve]” by proposing the court make that very finding. When an extraordinarily high earner stipulates that he or she can pay any reasonable amount of support, that concession relieves the court of any obligation to undertake a detailed examination of the issue. (Estevez v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 423, 431.)

Rather than disputing his ability to pay, Gary argued the trial court should focus on the public policy that encourages spouses to become self supporting, that the MSL “becomes less relevant with the passage of time,” and that Eve’s current standard of living could be sustained without any large award of spousal support.

It was only after the court adopted Gary’s proposed finding that he had the ability to pay any reasonable spousal support award, but largely rejected his other arguments, that Gary switched tactics, requesting “a statement of calculations relative to [his] income . . . .” He also began to argue the court was required to limit the spousal support award to an amount that could be paid out of the income reported on his tax returns. However, Gary’s last-minute strategic change does not retroactively transform his income into a “major contested issue” at trial. Having conceded his ability to pay at the trial level, Gary cannot revive it as a disputed issue on appeal.

In any event, the court’s initial decision made clear it had been more persuaded by Eve’s spousal support arguments than Gary’s. Gary then protested the court’s failure to include “a statement of calculations relative to [his] income.” In response, the court issued an amended statement of decision which included findings addressing how Gary’s reported income related to the award of spousal support.

In those findings, the court noted Gary’s tax returns demonstrated his reported income varied from $43,667 to $107,133 per month during the years from 2013 to July 31, 2016, and that it “was so even during the time the parties lived together as man and wife.” The court went on to observe that “[t]he parties spent far in excess of [Gary’s] ‘income’ to support their marital standard of living, and yet [Gary] was able to increase his net worth from approximately $10,000,000 at the start of the marriage to approximately $30,000,000 at the time of the trial.” Based on the parties’ marital standard of living, as well as Gary’s ever increasing wealth—which far outpaced the amounts of his reported income—the court concluded it would not be fair or equitable to base the award of spousal support on the “income” reported on his tax returns.

Those findings were sufficient to explain both the court’s assessment of Gary’s tax reportable “income” and its reasons for concluding that “income” was not dispositive in determining the proper level of spousal support. Because a statement of decision requires only that the court fairly disclose “determinations as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case” (Central Valley General Hospital v. Smith (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 501, 513), nothing further was required. “Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result.” (Nunes Turfgrass, Inc. v. Vaughan-Jacklin Seed Co. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1525.)

Gary also contends the court erred by misinterpreting the terms “income” and “standard of living during the marriage,” as used in section 4320. But as Eve points out, the court’s statement of decision contains no provisions defining either term and Gary never requested any. Thus, Gary is asking us to infer the court misinterpreted the law without any clear showing that it did. We decline to do so, as we are obligated to draw all available inferences in favor of the judgment. We can reverse only if the court’s error is affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Gary has not done that here.

In any event, Gary’s claim that the court misinterpreted the meaning of “income” is clearly belied by the record. As we have already explained, the court acknowledged that Gary’s reportable “income” for tax purposes varied between $43,667 to $107,133 per month—thus demonstrating its understanding of how a traditional “income” is determined—but then explained that Gary’s much higher spending levels and ever-increasing wealth demonstrated that his reportable income was not a proper measure of how much support he could afford to pay. The court then adopted Gary’s proposed finding that he could afford whatever reasonable support award was ordered. To the extent there was any misunderstanding about the role “income” plays in establishing a proper award of spousal support, it appears to be Gary’s belief that the award must always be payable from current income. In cases such as this one, where the supporting spouse has great wealth, that is not the case.

Gary’s assertion that the court misinterpreted the term “standard of living established during the marriage” is also flawed. In making that argument, Gary acknowledges that other courts have equated the MSL to the level of family spending during the marriage (citing Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 269), much in the way that Eve’s expert did here. However, he claims the court in this case misinterpreted the phrase in “adopt[ing]” Orr’s analysis because Orr included expenditures in his total that should not have been viewed as normal family expenses. We disagree.

While the court did cite Orr’s testimony regarding the average monthly spending by “the community” in its analysis of the MSL, it did not expressly adopt that number as establishing the MSL. Instead, it cited the photographic evidence depicting the family’s lifestyle, which included many “first class vacations,” as well as the fact that Gary described the family’s life as “‘extremely comfortable’” and Orr repeatedly described the family’s lifestyle as “luxurious” and characterized the “family residence” as a “‘beautiful, beautiful compound.’”

Moreover, while Orr opined that Eve would require $76,590 per month (before taxes) to achieve what he believed to be the MSL, the court concluded she required $70,000 to meet the MSL, and made its support award accordingly. Based on that difference, it appears the court did not simply “adopt” Orr’s spending number as the MSL, as Gary contends. Instead, the court engaged in its own analysis of the issue and reached conclusions that were not entirely consistent with Orr’s. We can only speculate as to which aspects of Orr’s analysis the court agreed with and which parts it discarded.

Finally, even if we did assume the court had adopted Orr’s family spending analysis of the MSL wholesale into its decision, Gary has not established that would necessarily reflect a misinterpretation of the statutory term “standard of living established during the marriage.” Significantly, Gary makes no effort to demonstrate what the proper interpretation of that term would be—acknowledging instead that courts have “wrestled with [it]”—let alone explain how the court’s application of it here would be incompatible with that proper interpretation. His statutory interpretation argument fails on that basis alone.

As we have already noted, Orr based his assessment of the MSL on the fact the family expenditures averaged $149,000 per month during the last three years of the marriage, a sum that included various categories of expenses Gary contends were either outdated (i.e., childcare expenses), not representative of the parties’ regular living expenses (i.e., the cost of construction and remodeling to create the family compound), nonexistent (i.e., expenses relating to horses and a piano), or unrelated to Eve specifically (i.e., Gary’s legal expenses or charitable donations).

In challenging the inclusion of childcare expenses, however, Gary ignores the fact that Orr apportioned one-third of the average monthly expenditures to the children, and excluded that portion from his calculation of the amount Eve would require to maintain the MSL. While that apportionment might not reflect the children’s precise share of each and every expenditure included in the overall monthly average, it appears to be a reasonable overall deduction. Thus, there is no indication Eve’s support was improperly inflated based on past childcare expenses.

Regarding the inclusion of the renovation costs in the calculation of overall family expenditures, Gary acknowledges the expenditure was not intended to be merely a financial investment to benefit his separately owned property, but was instead an expenditure made to enhance the family’s lifestyle. He complains that the construction cost—which averaged about $73,000 per month over three years—was, by definition, not a “recurring” expense, and thus could not properly be considered part of the MSL. Gary does not point to any evidence suggesting the family’s overall spending was significantly lower during other years, or that the construction expense was so extraordinary that Gary was unable to pay it from his regular cash flow. Moreover, there is other evidence suggesting the spending figure is not wildly off the mark as a starting point in assessing the parties’ standard of living. Gary’s income and expense report for 2015 demonstrated his gross monthly expenses, without including any mortgage or rent payment, were over $62,000. That figure aligns closely with what the court concluded was proper for Eve.

Gary also challenges the inclusion of “non-existent” spending in the calculation of the MSL, and he specifically identifies expenses attributable to horses and pianos Eve never had. But if the expenditures did not exist, they were necessarily not included in Orr’s calculation of the $149,000 per month in family spending, which is the figure he equated to the MSL. And to the extent the expenditures existed and were attributable to the children (which seems to be Gary’s complaint about the horses), it falls under the one-third deduction of overall spending for expenses attributable to the children. We reject Gary’s assertion that Eve’s marital lifestyle never included a piano. She testified that Gary bought one for her and she enjoyed playing it.

Gary’s suggestion that Orr—and by extension the court—also erred by incorporating Gary’s payment of attorney fees during the marital dissolution proceedings into his assessment of the MSL is mistaken. Gary’s argument confuses two separate analyses conducted by Orr.

Orr estimated the MSL by analyzing the family expenditures for the period from 2007 through 2009—the last three years of the marriage. Orr separately evaluated Gary’s overall spending for a period closer to trial “to demonstrate to the Court the extent to which [Gary] is able to spend money,” and thus to pay future spousal support. It is the latter analysis that includes Gary’s expenditures for attorney fees during the dissolution proceeding. Those fees—which had not yet been incurred or spent during the years Orr considered in analyzing the MSL—were not a factor in determining the MSL.

Gary next contends that Orr—and thus the court—erred by including Gary’s charitable donations in its calculation of the family spending that amounts to the MSL. He cites no authority for the idea that charitable spending cannot be considered part of the MSL merely because the donated money is earned by one spouse and not the other.

Gary’s final argument is more abstract; it essentially assumes we have agreed with his prior assertions. He suggests that Orr’s testimony was so riddled with flaws that it cannot qualify as substantial evidence supporting the court’s decision. Gary does allow that Orr’s analysis provided a proper “starting point,” but he argues “it was incumbent upon the court to critically examine his methodology to ascertain whether it produced figures that reasonably represented the marital standard of living.” As we have already explained, it appears the court did exactly that, and ultimately concluded the MSL was different than the figure Orr proposed. We find no error in its ruling.

2. Disposition of the Family Compound

Gary also contends the court “exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the sale of [his] separate property residence” in conjunction with the community owned family home.

As Eve points out, it was Gary himself who argued that the properties should be listed for sale as a combined unit; he asserted it would be inequitable to require him to sell his separately owned property as a stand-alone, since it had been completely redesigned to function as an auxiliary unit for the family home. Having asked the court to do what it did, Gary cannot be heard to complain of it on appeal.

“Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212.) “The ‘doctrine of invited error’ is an ‘application of the estoppel principle’: ‘Where a party by his conduct induced the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal’ on appeal. [Citation.] . . . At bottom, the doctrine rests on the purpose of the principle, which is to prevent a party from misleading the trial court and then profiting therefrom in the appellate court.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403.)

Gary claims the doctrine of invited error does not apply because his proposal to list the properties for sale together was conditioned on the court agreeing with his proposed valuation of the family residence, thus ensuring that his separate property would be credited with a higher share of the combined sale price.

Gary’s argument for why the properties should be sold as a combined unit had little to do with the valuation placed on either one. Instead, his contention was that the combined properties would likely fetch a premium price as compared to the total price they would sell for individually. Moreover, Gary’s proposed finding that the properties be listed together was not stated in a conditional fashion, despite the fact he was fully aware that the value of the family home was a disputed factual issue that the court might resolve against him. There is nothing in either his testimony or his proposed findings that suggested his request to list the properties for sale together was conditioned on it.

Gary’s challenge to the property sale order is fatally flawed for another reason as well. Gary’s real complaint is not that the court ordered his separate property to be listed for sale in conjunction with the family home, but that the court overvalued the family home. It is that assertion which lies at the heart of all his arguments relating to this issue. In addition to challenging jurisdiction on the basis that he never intended to become “the guarantor of . . . a fictive sales price,” Gary contends that selling the properties together, with the family home valued at $5 million, “will likely result in an . . . unequal division of community property” because he “believes the fair market value of [the home] is $4.1 [million].” He contends the order will effectively devalue his separate property reimbursement rights under section 2640 because “it orders the sales proceeds divided as if the residence sold for $5 [million]” even though “it likely will not.”

None of those assertions are cognizable on appeal, however, because we are obligated to assume the court’s factual findings are correct. Where, as here, the court’s finding as to the fair market value for the family home is supported by substantial evidence, we have no authority to second guess it. (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 [“we are bound by the ‘elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below”].) Consequently, Gary cannot obtain relief on appeal by suggesting the community-owned family residence is not actually worth the amount the trial court concluded. For our purposes, it is worth exactly what the court concluded it was worth.

Finally, we note that Gary’s concern about the court’s order appears to be an inchoate one in any case. What’s missing in Gary’s analysis is the fact that the court’s order does not obligate the parties to sell the combined properties at any particular price, let alone at an unreasonably low price. It requires only that they list the properties for sale together, for a period of up to 12 months, and that the court retains jurisdiction to resolve “any issues related to the residence . . . .” If there are no reasonable offers made to purchase the combined properties during a reasonable listing period, the issue can be revisited.

3. The Lot Line Adjustment

Gary also challenges the court’s authority to “order . . . the return of the 200 sq. ft. strip [of land], which it found had been transmuted [from the family residence] to his separate property” when Eve agreed to the lot line adjustment to accommodate the installation of the swimming pool. However, the court issued no such order. Instead, the court offered Gary the option to back out of his proposed order requiring that the family residence be listed for sale together with his separate property, and conditioned that option on his restoration of the community-owned property to its original condition. Nothing in the court’s order required Gary to do that; it would happen only if he chose to exercise that option.

Because Gary has failed to accurately acknowledge the nature of the court’s optional provision, he has failed to demonstrate that it was improper. We consequently reject the assertion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Eve is to recover her costs on appeal.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

MOORE, J.

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