Filed 3/16/20 Miles v. Rosa-Bienenfeld CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MICHAEL MILES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLAUDIA ROSA-BIENENFELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

B294218

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. ES019109)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.

David D. Diamond for Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Miles, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

INTRODUCTION

Claudia Rosa-Bienenfeld appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion to dissolve a civil harassment restraining order renewed under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (j). She contends that service requirements for the renewal were not satisfied and that the trial court erred in awarding costs and fees. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Rosa-Bienenfeld’s Neighbor Obtains and Renews a Restraining Order

In August 2015 Michael Miles obtained a civil harassment restraining order under section 527.6 that prohibited his neighbor Rosa-Bienenfeld from harassing, contacting, or coming within five yards of him, his wife, or his sister for a period of two years. On August 17, 2017, citing Rosa-Bienenfeld’s continued harassment, Miles filed a request to renew the restraining order for five more years, as provided by section 527.6, subdivision (j). On September 1, 2017 Miles filed a proof of service stating that, on the previous day, a person named Greg Tiller personally served Rosa-Bienenfeld with copies of Miles’s request to renew the restraining order, printed on Judicial Council Form CH-700, and the notice of hearing on the request, printed on Judicial Council Form CH-710.

On September 7, 2017, the date specified in the notice of hearing, the trial court heard Miles’s request to renew the restraining order. Rosa-Bienenfeld did not appear. The trial court granted Miles’s request for a five-year renewal, and Miles served Rosa-Bienenfeld by mail with notice of the renewal order.

B. Rosa-Bienenfeld Tries and Fails To Dissolve the Restraining Order

A year later, in July 2018, Rosa-Bienenfeld filed a “motion to quash” the restraining order on the ground “[s]he never received notice of intent by [Miles] to renew the restraining order.” She also contended that, even if Tiller served the documents described in the September 1, 2017 proof of service, service was defective because it included only Forms CH-700 and CH-710. The latter form states that the person to be restrained must also be served with Judicial Council Form CH-720, which is a form for writing a response to the request to renew the restraining order, and Form CH-130, which is a copy of the restraining order the applicant is asking the court to renew. Miles opposed the motion.

At the October 31, 2018 hearing on Rosa-Bienenfeld’s motion, Tiller testified that he worked for a water delivery service and that, at Miles’s request, he personally served Rosa-Bienenfeld as described in the September 1, 2017 proof of service while delivering water to her on August 31, 2017. Ryan Pryde, a contractor who was working at Miles’s home on August 31, 2017, provided testimony corroborating Tiller’s story in several respects. Rosa-Bienenfeld, on the other hand, testified that no one served her with any papers relating to the renewal of the restraining order and that the events Tiller described never occurred. Rosa-Bienenfeld’s husband testified he had no knowledge she was ever served.

Finding Tiller and Pryde credible and Rosa-Bienenfeld and her husband not credible, the trial court found the September 1, 2017 proof of service was “corroborated.” In response to Rosa-Bienenfeld’s argument that the service described in the proof of service was deficient, the court found that the purportedly omitted forms—Forms CH-720 and CH-130—were not “integral” and that Rosa-Bienenfeld had sufficient notice of the hearing. Stating it did not “find sufficient evidence to set [the renewed restraining order] aside and reset it for a hearing,” the court denied Rosa-Bienenfeld’s motion. She timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Rosa-Bienenfeld contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dissolve the renewed restraining order. That order is appealable as an order refusing to dissolve an injunction. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6); see R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [order granting renewal of restraining order under section 527.6 is “appealable as an appeal from an order granting an injunction”].) We review such orders for abuse of discretion. (Global Protein Products, Inc. v. Le (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 352, 366; see Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 850 [an order “‘“refusing to dissolve a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case”’ and ‘will not be modified or dissolved on appeal except for an abuse of discretion’”].) “To the extent we review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. [Citation.] In general, ‘[w]e presume that the trial court[’s] order is correct, and imply findings that are necessary to support the judgment.’” (Global Protein, at p. 367.)

Rosa-Bienenfeld continues to maintain Tiller did not serve her with anything on August 31, 2017. The trial court, however, decided that factual question against her, and the testimony by Tiller and Pryde was substantial evidence to support the court’s ruling. Rosa-Bienenfeld also continues to argue Tiller’s service was “defective” because it did not include Judicial Council Forms CH 720 and CH-130. But Rosa-Bienenfeld has not demonstrated the trial court erred in determining those forms were not “integral” and finding she had sufficient notice of the proceeding.

As an initial matter, Rosa-Bienenfeld cites no legal authority to support her argument. She has therefore forfeited it. (See Taniguchi v. Restoration Homes LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 478, 486, fn. 6 [arguments not supported by citation to legal authority are forfeited]; People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 38 [“appellants forfeit this point by failing to present any legal authority”].)

Moreover, even assuming Miles was statutorily required to serve Rosa-Bienenfeld with both supposedly missing forms, “[i]t is well settled that strict compliance with statutes governing service of process is not required. Rather, in deciding whether service was valid, the statutory provisions regarding service of process should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has been received by the defendant. [Citations.] Thus, substantial compliance is sufficient.” (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313; see Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1442 [it is “axiomatic” that strict compliance with service provisions is not required].) The trial court effectively ruled that, even if Miles did not serve Rosa-Bienenfeld with Forms CH 720 and CH-130, he substantially complied with the applicable statutory service requirements. Rosa-Bienenfeld makes no attempt to explain how that ruling was error, and we will not develop any such arguments for her. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [“[t]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record,” and “[w]e are not obliged to make . . . arguments for” her]; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.”].)

Rosa-Bienenfeld also contends the trial court “abused its discretion by awarding excessive costs and fees.” But there is no such award in the record. Miles’s brief suggests Rosa-Bienenfeld is referring to an award of costs and fees made in connection with the original restraining order in 2015. The time to appeal that award is long past. In any event, Rosa-Bienenfeld has not demonstrated any error by the trial court in awarding costs and fees.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s October 31, 2017 order denying Rosa-Bienenfeld’s motion is affirmed. Miles is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

DILLON, J. *