Filed 3/16/20 JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Hudson CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GUSTAV HUDSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

D074115

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00023789-CU-OR-NC)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Earl H. Maas III, Judge. Affirmed.

Gustav Hudson, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

McCarthy & Holthus and Melissa Robbins Coutts for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Gustav Hudson (Gustav), appearing in propria persona, appeals a judgment of foreclosure entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (Chase). Chase possesses an equitable lien on certain real property owned and/or occupied at various times by Gustav and his sons, Michael Hudson and Matthew Hudson. Chase filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure requesting seizure and sale of the property after Michael failed to accept a court-ordered plan to repay debt obligations he owed to Chase. Gustav claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Chase on grounds that the equitable lien never should have been issued. Further, he claims a federal bankruptcy court discharged the equitable lien, Chase sold its interests in the property and therefore cannot enforce the equitable lien (to the extent it remains extant), and the action is untimely.

We agree with the trial court there are no genuine issues of material fact as to any of the issues identified by Gustav and, furthermore, Chase is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

II

BACKGROUND

A
B
Prior to May 2005, Michael owned certain real property located in Fallbrook (the Property). On May 23, 2005, a quitclaim deed was recorded in the county recorder’s office purporting to transfer the Property from Michael to his brother, Matthew. On or around the same time as the purported transfer, Matthew took out a loan from Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) in the amount of $423,750, secured by a deed of trust on the Property.

More than two years later, Michael filed an action against WaMu alleging the quitclaim deed that purported to transfer the Property from him to Matthew was a forgery and, by extension, WaMu’s deed of trust was void. He sought: (1) a declaration that the quitclaim deed and deed of trust were void; (2) quiet title; and (3) an injunction prohibiting WaMu from foreclosing on the Property under the deed of trust. WaMu filed a cross-complaint against Michael for equitable subordination, among other claims, alleging he was unjustly enriched by the loan WaMu made to Matthew.

The court granted judgment on the pleadings for Michael on his requests for quiet title and injunctive relief. Then, following a bench trial, it issued an order finding the quitclaim deed was “fraudulent.” However, it also found the WaMu loan was used to satisfy certain loan obligations belonging to Michael. Therefore, on July 22, 2009, it issued a final decision ordering that title to the Property be placed in Michael’s name subject to an equitable lien in the amount of $410,584.56 held by WaMu. On October 28, 2009, the court entered judgment consistent with the final decision.

On May 7, 2010, the court issued a postjudgment order declaring the equitable lien recorded with the county recorder’s office as of February 28, 2005, and setting forth a repayment plan for Michael’s outstanding obligations to Chase, which acquired the assets and liabilities of WaMu. It ordered Chase to offer Michael a repayment plan under specified conditions and directed Michael to accept the repayment plan by executing a promissory note in favor of Chase. If Michael did not accept the repayment plan within 30 days, the balance of the outstanding debt—principal in the amount of $410,584.56, plus interest—would become due and Chase could foreclose on the equitable lien. The court repeated these terms in a second postjudgment order dated June 24, 2010.

Michael did not accept the repayment plan Chase offered to him. Instead, he filed for bankruptcy protection on May 12, 2010. Then, on July 6, 2010, he filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal the October 28, 2009 judgment and the May 7, 2010 postjudgment order. Ultimately, this court determined Michael’s appeal was untimely as to the judgment and, therefore, we had no jurisdiction to review it. (Hudson v. Washington Mutual Bank (Dec. 20, 2011, D057690) [nonpub. opn.].) We also concluded Michael “tendered no argument and ha[d] not met his burden” of showing error in the postjudgment order. (Ibid.) Therefore, we affirmed. The Supreme Court denied review on March 14, 2012, and remittitur issued on March 21, 2012.

In addition to seeking bankruptcy protection and appealing the rulings from the prior litigation, Michael executed a deed of trust purportedly encumbering the Property. The deed of trust identifies Michael as the borrower-trustor and Empire Resources, Inc. (Empire) as the lender-beneficiary. Gustav—Michael and Matthew’s father and the appellant in this case—is the successor trustee for Empire. Years later, on October 27, 2014, Gustav recorded a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Michael’s interest in the Property to Empire. Gustav executed the quitclaim deed on behalf of Empire.

C
D
On July 14, 2016, Chase filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure against Gustav, Empire, Michael, and Matthew, among other defendants. Chase alleged WaMu prevailed on its equitable subrogation claim against Michael, Chase acquired the equitable lien on the Property and other assets from WaMu, and the entire principal and interest Michael owed to Chase was due and payable based on his failure to accept the court-ordered repayment plan. Chase requested: (1) a declaration that its equitable lien was senior to all other claims of ownership over the Property; and (2) foreclosure of the Property.

Chase filed a motion for summary judgment on its judicial foreclosure claim against Gustav and Empire. It claimed no triable issue of material fact existed because it had an enforceable right to foreclose on the Property pursuant to its equitable lien. In support of its motion, Chase filed a request for judicial notice of, among other documents, the quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the Property from Michael to Matthew, the deed of trust for the WaMu loan, court orders from the prior litigation, and the quitclaim deed purporting to transfer Michael’s interest in the Property to Empire.

Proceeding in propria persona, Gustav opposed summary judgment on several grounds. First, he argued the court in the prior litigation relied on false or misleading evidence when it granted the equitable lien. Second, he argued the court in the prior litigation had no jurisdiction to grant the equitable lien due to the pendency of Michael’s bankruptcy proceedings. In the alternative, he argued the bankruptcy court discharged the equitable lien (to the extent it existed before the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted). Finally, he argued Chase approached the court with unclean hands.

Gustav appended exhibits directly to his opposition brief consisting of many of the same documents Chase filed with its request for judicial notice, documents purportedly filed in the bankruptcy case, and the court docket for the federal bankruptcy case. He also appended a notice of sale indicating Chase sold its interest in the Property to LSF10 Master Participation Trust c/o Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber), although he made no reference to the notice of sale in his opposition brief.

The trial court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that Gustav failed to “focus on the issues” presented in the motion for summary judgment and instead “repeatedly attack[ed] the judgment” from the prior litigation, which was “final and [could not] be challenged” in the instant litigation. Further, while Gustav claimed he “disputed” Chase’s alleged undisputed facts, the court concluded he “failed to submit any admissible evidence in support of his opposition ….” The court thereafter entered judgment in favor of Chase.

III
II
DISCUSSION

A
B
A plaintiff may move for summary judgment to establish “there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) A plaintiff meets its initial “burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action” when it “has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id., subd. (p)(1).) We review a summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 972.)

C
D
Gustav challenges the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Chase. He does not specifically address whether Chase satisfied its initial prima facie burden of showing the nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact or, assuming Chase met its burden, whether he established a triable issue of material fact either as to an element of Chase’s judicial foreclosure claim or an applicable affirmative defense. Instead, he raises a scattershot of arguments untethered to the parties’ summary judgment burdens.

As best we can discern, these arguments fall into four categories. First, Gustav contends the trial court in the prior litigation erred in granting the equitable lien subject to enforcement in this action. Second, he claims the equitable lien was discharged during Michael’s bankruptcy proceedings. Third, he argues Chase has no authority to enforce the equitable lien because it sold its interests in the Property to Caliber in December 2017. Finally, he alleges Chase’s judicial foreclosure claim was untimely.

In assessing these claims, we conclude at the outset that Chase satisfied its initial prima facie burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Together with the motion for summary judgment, it filed, among other documents, orders from the prior litigation compelling Michael to accept a repayment plan, declaring the equitable lien recorded as of February 28, 2005, and ordering Michael to accept a plan to repay his debt obligations or else the outstanding balance of the debt would become immediately due. Further, it is undisputed Michael did not accept the repayment plan offered to him and Chase acquired the assets of WaMu. Chase’s evidence and the undisputed facts established a prima facie case for judicial foreclosure. (See Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 672 [judicial foreclosure plaintiff “must prove that ‘the subject loan is in default and the amount of default’ “].)

Therefore, we construe Gustav’s arguments as pertaining to whether he established a triable issue of one or more material facts after the burden of production shifted to him. Viewed in this context, we now turn to each of Gustav’s contentions.

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2
Gustav devotes most of his appellate briefing recounting alleged flaws he believes tainted the prior litigation during which the trial court granted an equitable lien on the Property. He contends the court relied on false or incomplete evidence as the basis for its ruling, was unfamiliar with the facts of the case, and failed to provide Michael sufficient notice of its orders. Further, he claims an equitable lien was unwarranted because Michael did not receive any benefit from the loan WaMu provided to Matthew.

” ‘ “If a judgment, no matter how erroneous, is within the jurisdiction of the court, it can only be reviewed and corrected by one of the established methods of direct attack.” ‘ ” (Estate of Buck (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1846, 1854.) The judgment from the prior litigation is final, as no party timely appealed it. Likewise, the postjudgment orders from the prior litigation are final, as we affirmed the only postjudgment order subject to a timely appeal (the May 7, 2010 order), and the Supreme Court denied review of our decision. (North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2017) 147 Cal.App.4th 762, 769 [once review petition is denied by our Supreme Court, “the judgment of the trial court is final for all purposes”].) Further, none of the arguments discussed ante concern the jurisdiction of the trial court or its power to issue an equitable lien. Accordingly, they are improper collateral attacks on a final judgment and final postjudgment orders (Buck, at p. 1854), and do not establish a triable issue of material fact.

In addition, Gustav contends the trial court in the prior litigation had no power to issue an equitable lien because Michael filed for bankruptcy protection. This is a collateral attack on the validity of a final judgment and final postjudgment orders as well. However, ” ‘[c]ollateral attack is proper to contest [a judgment void on its face for] lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or the granting of relief which the court has no power to grant [citations omitted].’ ” (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492.) Assuming the argument is a proper collateral attack, we conclude there is no merit to the argument. The trial court issued the equitable lien as part of its judgment dated October 28, 2009. However, Michael did not seek bankruptcy protection until May 12, 2010—well after the court granted the equitable lien. Because the bankruptcy proceedings had not yet been instituted at the time the trial court issued the equitable lien, the proceedings could not have impaired the trial court’s power to grant the equitable lien.

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude the alleged errors in the prior litigation did not establish a triable issue of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment.

3
4
Next, Gustav contends the bankruptcy trustee avoided and the federal bankruptcy court discharged the equitable lien on the Property. Based on the alleged avoidance and discharge of the equitable lien, Gustav claims Chase cannot rely on the equitable lien as the basis for its judicial foreclosure claim in this case. However, Gustav filed no admissible evidence to support these arguments. He appended documents to his trial court briefing, including the bankruptcy court docket and excerpted filings from the bankruptcy proceedings, but these documents do not reflect any avoidance or discharge of the equitable lien. On the contrary, the only document referencing the equitable lien is a trustee filing disclaiming any intention of avoiding the equitable lien. Thus, the evidence presented to the trial court either refuted, or simply did not address, the assertions Gustav makes on appeal. Such evidence did not create a triable issue of material fact. (Miller v. American Greetings Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1061 [” ‘It is not enough to produce just some evidence. The evidence must be of sufficient quality to allow the trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.’ “].)

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6
Gustav also claims Chase cannot maintain a judicial foreclosure action because it purportedly sold its interest in the Property to Caliber in December 2017, after it moved for summary judgment and before the trial court ruled on the motion. We reject this contention on forfeiture grounds. Although Gustav attached to his trial court briefing a copy of a notice of sale purporting to transfer Chase’s interest in the Property to Caliber, he presented the trial court no cogent argument about the effect of the notice of sale or its impact on Chase’s ability to litigate the judicial foreclosure claim. Likewise, the assertion he now makes on appeal is lacking in reasoned argument, appropriate argument headings, case law support, and legible citations to the appellate record. For all these reasons, the argument is forfeited. (See Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 275, 281–282 [borrower’s failure to present reasoned argument forfeited challenge to assignee’s ability to enforce deed of trust].)

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Finally, Gustav claims summary judgment was improper because the action is time-barred. However, Gustav forfeited any statute of limitations defense by failing to adequately raise it in the trial court. (Zubarau v. City of Palmdale (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 289, 306 [statute of limitations defense forfeited by failure to raise it in trial court].) Further, he fails to support his perfunctory timeliness argument with reasoned discussion, including any indication of when he believes the statute of limitations began to run, whether the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of Michael’s bankruptcy proceedings, and when he believes the statute of limitations expired. “We deem the failure to support [the timeliness] statement with reasoned argument a forfeiture.” (Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514, 521.)

IV

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

AARON, J.