EVIS DESHA BURGOS v. ELIAS GEORGE RAAD

Filed 3/25/20 Marriage of Raad CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re Marriage of EVIS and ELIAS GEORGE RAAD. B289985

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BD588626)

EVIS DESHA BURGOS,

Appellant,

v.

ELIAS GEORGE RAAD,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County; Michael Rolf Treu, Judge. Affirmed.

Evis Desha Burgos, in pro. per, for Appellant.

Law Office of George N. Seide and George Seide for Respondent.

Appellant Evis Desha Burgos (Burgos) appeals in propria persona from the trial court’s order directing her to pay child support to her ex-husband, Elias George Raad (Raad), and terminating Raad’s spousal support obligations. Burgos claims she did not receive notice of Raad’s request to modify their support obligations, and she challenges the trial court’s support calculations. Raad did not file a respondent’s brief.

Burgos has failed to provide an adequate appellate record to demonstrate error. The record does not contain a reporter’s transcript or other record of the relevant hearing. We cannot discern if Burgos raised her challenges below, or whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling as it did.

Accordingly, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2017, Raad filed a request for order seeking child support from Burgos and termination of his spousal support obligations towards her. Raad asserted he had full custody of their daughter and wanted child support payments from Burgos to offset his own spousal support arrearage. He asserted that Burgos had “made no effort to become self-supporting.” Raad also filed an income and expense declaration. The request for order noticed the hearing for March 12, 2018.

A proof of service dated January 5, 2018 and signed by Raad’s counsel indicated that counsel on that date had mailed Burgos the December 1, 2017 Request for Order, the income and expense declaration, a blank responsive declaration, and a blank income and expense declaration. The proof of service was filed with the trial court only on March 12, 2018, the date noticed for the hearing on the request for order.

The trial court held a hearing on March 12, 2018, with Burgos appearing self-represented and Raad appearing with counsel. The record does not contain a reporter’s transcript or other record of the proceedings. The trial court’s order issued following the hearing referred only to a separate request for order concerning Raad’s ability to travel with their daughter, and did not address the December 1, 2017 request for order. A later order, however, indicated the trial court took the December 1, 2017 request for order under submission at the hearing.

On March 28, 2018, the trial court issued a written order ruling on the December 1, 2017 request for order. The order states, “Although timely served with [Raad’s] 12-1-17 filed [request for order], [Burgos] has not filed a Responsive Declaration, nor an Income and Expense Declaration.” The trial court found “that the custody situation has significantly changed” and Raad’s “financial responsibilities have increased as well. Petitioner has shown the Court no need for continued child or spousal support.”

The trial court terminated all existing child and spousal support orders and ordered Burgos to pay $712 per month in child support, with any failure to pay credited against Raad’s spousal support arrearage. The trial court attached a Dissomaster printout in support of its findings.

Burgos timely appealed from the order.

DISCUSSION

In her appellate brief, Burgos complains of purported errors by the trial court and misconduct by Raad and Raad’s counsel throughout family court proceedings dating back to 2013. We focus here, as we must, on the only order before us, the March 28, 2018 order ordering her to pay child support while terminating Raad’s child and spousal support obligations. We do not address Burgos’s arguments not relevant to that order.

As to that order, Burgos claims she never received notice of the December 1, 2017 request for order, “and the trial court refused to continue the hearing to allow [Burgos] to prepare and to file an income/expense declaration.” Burgos also challenges the validity of the trial court’s support calculations, claiming she is on welfare, and questioning the source of the data relied upon by the trial court. We review a denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. (People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 153―154.) The same standard applies to child support awards. (S.C. v. G.S. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 591, 598.)

We note that Raad’s filing of the proof of service of his request for order and accompanying documents and notice of the March 12, 2017 hearing was untimely, having been filed with the trial court only on the day of that hearing. (See Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(c) [“Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing”].) Without a reporter’s transcript or other record of the March 12 hearing, however, we cannot discern if Burgos objected to the proof of service or otherwise claimed a lack of notice or whether she requested a continuance. Nor can we determine whether she challenged the support calculations. Absent indication in the appellate record that she raised those issues in the trial court, she cannot now raise them on appeal. (Avalos v. Perez (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 773, 776 [“As a general rule, a claim of error will be deemed to have been forfeited when a party fails to bring the error to the trial court’s attention by timely motion or objection”].)

Even if Burgos had not forfeited her challenges, without a record of the proceedings we cannot assess why the trial court ruled as it did, including forgiving the late filing of the proof of service, and whether it was an abuse of discretion to do so. (Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 [“The absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the hearing precludes a determination that the court abused its discretion.”].) On this record, therefore, we must assume the trial court properly ruled on the request for order. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608―609 [trial court judgment is presumed correct and appellant must provide adequate record demonstrating otherwise].)

Burgos argues the trial court failed to consider the factors under Family Code section 4320 when granting Raad custody of their daughter, and wrongly found Burgos to be an “unfit parent.” Family Code section 4320 pertains to spousal support orders, not custody. To the extent Burgos is arguing that the trial court failed to consider the Family Code section 4320 factors when issuing its support order, again, we cannot discern from the record that she raised this objection in the trial court, and if she did, why the trial court ruled as it did.

To the extent Burgos is challenging the trial court’s custody rulings, those rulings are not before us in this appeal, which concerns a spousal and child support order.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

WHITE, J.*

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