Filed 3/27/20 Lewis v. The Regents of the University of Cal. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MARY ANN LEWIS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B290631

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC502816)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.

Mary Lewis, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Matthew S. Levinson; Maranga Morgenstern and Kenneth A. Maranga for Defendants and Respondents.

______________________

 

INTRODUCTION

California law requires that, absent certain exceptions, an action be brought to trial within five years after it is commenced. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310 [also known as the “five-year statute”].) On March 12, 2013, plaintiff Mary Ann Lewis filed a complaint against Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center and two of its doctors, asserting claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death related to the death of her son. After several amendments to the complaint (which resulted in one of the individual doctors being dismissed), a long period of discovery, and extensive motion practice, trial was set to begin February 13, 2018, shortly before the five-year statute was to expire.

On the first day of trial, the parties reached a settlement. Defense counsel recited the terms of the settlement on the record, and Lewis’s attorney confirmed the terms were correct. The court then asked Lewis if she understood what was happening, if she understood the terms of the settlement, and if the settlement terms were acceptable to her. Lewis told the court she understood what was happening, understood the terms of the agreement, and that the settlement terms were acceptable to her. The court approved the settlement, and set an order to show cause hearing regarding dismissal of the action for April 13, 2018. At that April 13, 2018 hearing, the court stated that “[t]his action, having settled previously, is now ordered dismissed as it has exceeded the 5[-]year statute.”

Lewis now appeals the dismissal of her case. Lewis asserts she misunderstood the terms of the settlement agreement, and believed the parties were not in fact settling but agreeing to postpone the trial to a later date. Lewis further argues the court erred in dismissing her action pursuant to the five-year statute. Because we find substantial evidence Lewis settled her case, requiring its dismissal, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. The Initial Complaints

The procedural history of this matter is extensive, so we recite only those portions pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. Lewis’s son, Jonathan Pierre Lewis, died on March 12, 2012, following a series of surgeries conducted by doctors at the Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center. On March 12, 2013, Lewis filed a complaint in pro. per. against the Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center and doctors John Moriarty and Murray Kwon, asserting claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death.

On October 7, 2013, after obtaining counsel to represent her, Lewis filed a first amended complaint (FAC), substituting the Regents of the University of California (Regents) for Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center. Though Dr. Kwon remained listed as a defendant in the caption of the suit, the substantive part of the FAC listed only “The Regents of the University of California, John Moriarty, M.D., and DOES 1 to 10” as defendants, and omitted all allegations against Dr. Kwon.

The Regents and Dr. Moriarty (Defendants) answered the FAC, asserting a variety of affirmative defenses. The parties thereafter commenced discovery.

On July 24, 2014, Defendants moved for an order compelling Lewis to join both of her son’s potential fathers, Derrick Patterson and Michael Brown, as either plaintiffs or nominal defendants. The court granted the motion.

B. The Second Amended Complaint

Lewis filed a second amended complaint (SAC) in January 2016. As Lewis alleged her son’s father was Derrick Patterson, not Michael Brown, only Patterson was added as a plaintiff; Brown was added as a nominal defendant. Defendants answered the SAC, putting forth affirmative defenses.

In April 2016, Lewis filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint to add Dr. Kwon as a defendant and to add a claim of medical malpractice. Defendants opposed the motion, and the court denied it, ruling that because Dr. Kwon was omitted as a defendant in the FAC, he had been dismissed from the action. Lewis filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.

C. Pre-trial Motions

Following extensive motion practice, trial was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2017. However, on October 11, 2017, Lewis filed a motion to continue the trial citing a variety of reasons, including that her newly-retained expert witnesses needed time to review case materials, neither parties’ expert witnesses had yet been deposed, the recent unavailability of some of Lewis’s expert witnesses for trial, Defendants’ alleged concealment of discovery, and that Lewis’s attorney needed to associate in a trial attorney due to personal circumstances.

The court granted the motion, continuing trial to January 16, 2018, and re-opening discovery for the limited purpose of taking the depositions of the parties’ expert witnesses and the purported witnesses who had information regarding Defendants’ alleged concealment of evidence. The court repeatedly reminded the parties that the five-year deadline was March 12, 2018, and sought to work with the parties to make sure they agreed on a trial date well before the deadline.

On January 5, 2018, the court denied Lewis’s motions for leave to submit a belated expert witness designation and to amend the SAC to add a claim for punitive damages; at the hearing, the court continued trial to January 29, 2018. Lewis filed a writ with this court, challenging the court’s orders regarding experts and punitive damages. While this court was considering the writ, the trial court further continued the trial date to February 13, 2018. On January 22, 2018, the writ was denied.

D. Settlement

On February 13, 2018, Lewis was present in court. The trial court began the proceedings by explaining that the parties had informed the court they had been discussing settlement in the hallway, and asked the parties if they were ready to proceed with a settlement.

Defendants’ attorney responded, “We are ready to put a settlement on the record. . . . As I understand the terms of the settlement, the case is being resolved for a waiver [of] any costs incurred by the defense thus far, a waiver of any malicious prosecution claims. Each party will bear their own attorneys fees and costs. The plaintiffs [Lewis and Patterson] will sign a full release of all claims, including a release of any and all attorney fee claims, including by plaintiff’s co-counsel, and any liens that may or may not exist now or in the future by any healthcare provider or insurer, including, but not limited to, Medicare, Medicaid, Medi-Cal.” Lewis’s counsel confirmed those were the terms the parties had agreed to, and added, “I believe also Tri-Care should be in there.”

The court asked Lewis to come forward, and asked her, “Do you understand what is happening here?” Lewis replied, “Yes, I do.” The court told her, “Today was to be the trial in your case and [Defendants’ counsel] has just recited some terms of the settlement. Do you understand those terms?” Lewis again responded, “Yes, I do.” The court then asked, “Are they acceptable to you?” and Lewis said, “Yes.”

The court then said, “Okay, the court does approve the settlement, the terms of the settlement, and orders each party to comply with the terms of the settlement. The settlement is enforceable to the extent it needs to be enforceable under [section] 664.6. The trial date is vacated and I am going to set an order to show cause re confirmation of the dismissal . . . .”

On April 13, 2018, the court dismissed the case pursuant to section 583.310 for failure to bring the action to trial within five years. No court reporter was present for the hearing. The minute order, titled “ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE DISMISSAL AFTER SETTLEMENT,” reads, “The Court hears from counsel and plaintiffs Mary Ann Lewis and Derrick Patterson, who are present in Court. [¶] This action, having settled previously, is now ordered dismissed as it has exceeded the 5[-]year statute.”

Lewis timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the correctness of the court’s ruling dismissing the action, and not the reason for that ruling. (Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 906-907.)

An order dismissing an action for exceeding the five-year statute is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 731.) The trial court’s finding that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement is “ ‘subject to limited appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) When a case settles, “the court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b).) An order dismissing a settled action pursuant to rule 3.1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Irvine v. Regents of University of California (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 994, 1000; Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 498.)

B. The Parties Entered an Enforceable Settlement Agreement That Required Dismissal

There is a strong public policy in favor of the voluntary settlement of litigation. (Osumi v. Sutton, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359.) Accordingly, in reviewing a court’s approval of a settlement, “[c]onsistent with the venerable substantial evidence standard of review, and with our policy favoring settlements, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences to support the trial court’s finding that the[ ] parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement . . . .” (Id. at p. 1360.)

Section 664.6 provides that “[i]f [the] parties to pending litigation stipulate, . . . orally before the court, for settlement of the case, . . . the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1385(b) provides that “the court must dismiss the entire case 45 days after it receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.” Here, the parties notified the court of the settlement on the record at the February 13, 2018 hearing. The action was dismissed more than 45 days after that notice of settlement.

Lewis asserts she did not understand the settlement agreement resolved the entire case, but rather understood it was only an agreement to postpone the trial date to a date beyond the five-year statutory period. She also asserts her attorney bullied her into agreeing to it, that her personal background trained her not to ask questions, and that she did not intentionally waive her right to jury trial.

We reject Lewis’s claims that she did not voluntarily enter into the settlement agreement. Defendants’ counsel recited the terms of the settlement in open court, with Lewis present. The explanation of the settlement terms was clear, informed Lewis the trial date was vacated, and that the next step was dismissal of the case. The court asked Lewis whether she understood what was happening, whether she understood the settlement terms just recited, and whether they were acceptable to her. Lewis responded to all three questions in the affirmative. There was no mention of continuing the trial, setting a future trial date, or waiving the five-year statute. Nor does the record indicate that Lewis objected to dismissal at the April 13, 2018 hearing, or provided any good cause why dismissal should not be entered. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement that required dismissal of the action. (See Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1300-1301 [where evidence leads to the conclusion the plaintiff understood a stipulated settlement, a plaintiff’s claim that she did not understand the terms of the settlement fails].)

While it is true that a party must knowingly waive his or her rights to a jury trial (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1466), there is nothing in the record indicating Lewis did not understand the settlement or was bullied into agreeing to it, and thus nothing indicating she did not voluntarily waive her right to a jury trial. Instead, the uncontroverted evidence shows Lewis confirmed her agreement to the terms of the settlement, and made no objection or inquiry when the court indicated that as a result of the settlement it was vacating the trial date, with the next step being dismissal of the case.

Because the parties entered into a voluntary and binding settlement agreement, the court was required to dismiss the action pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 3.1385. As affirmance on that ground alone is proper (Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 906), we need not reach Lewis’s arguments regarding application of the five-year statute.

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing the action is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.