Filed 3/30/20 Mann v. Mann CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RENEE MANN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.

ALEX MANN, as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

G058810

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00832674) O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David L. Belz, Judge. Motion to dismiss appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.

Oldman Cooley, Sallus, Birnberg, Coleman & Gold, Marc L. Sallus, Susan

B. Rosenblat; Garrett Carchidi, Jeff G. Carchidi; Arnold LaRochelle, Matthews, Vanconas & Zirebell, and Dean W. Hazard for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Murtaugh Treglia Stern & Deily, Thomas N. Fay; Neil W. Knuppel, Inc., Neil W. Knuppel; Muscarella & Associates and Frederick Muscarella for Defendant and Appellant.

* * *

THE COURT:*

On January 30, 2020, appellant filed a notice of appeal from a

minute order denying appellant’s motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6).1 On February 28, respondent Renee Mann filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and a request for judicial notice. On March 16, appellant filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and declaration in support thereof.

“The existence of an appealable judgment [or order] is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marrelle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) “A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by statute.” (Griset v. Fair Political

Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696; see §§ 904, 904.1.) “[E]xceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be allowed unless clearly mandated.” (Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967.) Appealability “is not a matter of shades of grey but

rather of black or white.” (Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1550.)

Generally speaking, an order denying a motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement (§ 664.6) is not appealable. (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1290.) An order denying such a motion is not a final judgment (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1)), as further proceedings are called for by the denial of enforcement of the purported settlement. (Doran, at pp. 1292-1294; cf. Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 205 [order enforcing settlement can be appealable if it amounts to a final judgment, disposing of the entire action].) Moreover, no statute explicitly authorizes the appeal of interlocutory section 664.6 orders.

Appellant acknowledges the foregoing, but argues there is authority for his appeal under the particular circumstances of this case.

* Before O’Leary, P. J., Moore, J., and Aronson, J.

1 All further references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

First, it is conceptually possible that an order denying enforcement of a settlement can fit into a broader and nonspecific category of appealable orders. (Walton

v. Mueller (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 161, 167.) In Walton, a case in which the purported settlement and enforcement efforts came after entry of judgment, the order was appealable as a postjudgment order (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2)). The order in the instant case is clearly not a postjudgment order, but Walton illustrates appellant’s thesis, i.e., sometimes an order denying a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is appealable.

Second, because this is a trust dispute, appellant contends that the Probate Code allows this appeal. Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(10) authorizes appeals from orders “made appealable by the Probate Code . . . .” (See also Varney v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1098 [“Generally, rulings in probate proceedings are not

appealable unless expressly made so by statute”].) Appellant points to Probate Code section 1300, subdivisions (a) and (c). Subdivision (a) authorizes appeals from orders (or a court’s refusal to make orders) “[d]irecting, authorizing, approving, or confirming the sale, lease, encumbrance, grant of an option, purchase, conveyance, or exchange of property.” Subdivision (c) similarly authorizes appeals from grants or refusals of orders “[a]uthorizing, instructing, or directing a fiduciary, or approving or confirming the acts of a fiduciary.”

The underlying dispute in this case involves the disposition of trust

property amongst the parties (several of whom are beneficiaries and co-trustees of the trust). Certainly, had the settlement agreement been enforced, a judgment would have been entered compelling the parties to proceed with the exchange and distribution of various trust properties in dispute. Instead, the court determined that no agreement had been reached because one of the respondents had withheld approval of the settlement terms until he could perform an inspection of real property involved in the settlement, and that inspection proved to be unsatisfactory.

According to appellant’s argument, an order ruling on the enforceability of the settlement agreement, in these circumstances, was essentially an order ruling on the disposition of property pursuant to Probate Code section 1300, subdivisions (a) and (c).

There does not appear to any case authority directly on point. Given the lack of clear authority authorizing this appeal, it must be dismissed. The court was not directly resolving the appropriate disposition of trust property (by, e.g., considering the language of the trust and facts pertaining to the properties in dispute). Rather, the court was focused on the question of whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement. Neither the Probate Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly authorizes an appeal from an order denying enforcement of a settlement agreement.

Expanding the reach of Probate Code section 1300 into the “grey area” represented by this case would not be consistent with this court’s duty to entertain only appeals of

interlocutory orders for which we clearly have jurisdiction. This holding accords with the need for clear, bright-line rules in the realm of appealability jurisprudence.

DISPOSITION

The request for judicial notice is granted. The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The appeal is dismissed. Respondents shall recover costs incurred on appeal.