Defendant Bel Air Mart, Inc.’s (“Bel Air”) motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication of issues, is GRANTED as follows:

This case involves an employment dispute. Plaintiff Jimmy Kuang (“Kuang”) alleges
that Bel Air, his former employer, terminated him for consuming some cough drops
taken from Bel Air before paying for them. Kuang alleges that (1) it was customary for
employees to consume such products before paying for them, (2) his supervisor was
aware he had taken the cough drops and intended to pay for them later, (3) Bel Air had
never before, without having issued a warning, terminated an employee for taking
merchandise without paying for it, (4) Bel Air therefore did not have good cause to
terminate him, and (5) the applicable collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) required
Bel Air to terminate Kuang only for good cause.

Kuang’s complaint contains two causes of action for wrongful termination, one based
upon breach of contract and one based upon breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Although the complaint originally contained a third and fourth
cause of action as well, Kuang voluntarily dismissed those causes of action on
October 17, 2013, after Bel Air filed this motion. Bel Air now moves for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of Kuang’s remaining first and
second causes of action for wrongful termination.

Bel Air’s sole argument with respect to Kuang’s first and second causes of action is
that they are preempted by federal law, and specifically by § 301 of the Labor
Relations Management Act. Section 301, codified at 27 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides:

“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.”

In discussing the preemptive effect of § 301, the Court of Appeal in Levy v. Skywalker
th
Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4 753, quoted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:

“If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the
applicable CBA … it is preempted. … [T]he need to interpret the CBA
must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, however, in order for
preemption to apply. [Citation.] If the claim may be litigated without
reference to the rights and duties established in a CBA … [and] is plainly
based on state law, it is not preempted, even if the defendant refers to
the CBA in mounting a defense. [Citation.] Thus, the touchstone for
section 301 preemption analysis is the nature of the plaintiff’s underlying
claim.”

th th
(108 Cal.App.4 at 762-763 [quoting Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (9 Cir.
2001) 255 F.3d 683, 691] [quotation marks and citations omitted] [brackets added and
omitted] [ellipses in original].) Because the plaintiff in Levy sought to enforce an
agreement between his employer and his union, his contract claims were preempted.
th
(Levy, 108 Cal.App.4 at 763-766.) Levy is not unique. (See, e.g., Kirton v. Summit
Med. Ctr. (N.D. Cal. 1997) 982 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 [“Federal law under section 301
governs suits for breach of a CBA and displaces any state claim based on a CBA, as well as any state claim whose outcome depends on interpretation of the terms of the
CBA”] [citations omitted]; see id. at 1386, fn. 1 [the plaintiff’s claims were preempted
whether denominated breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing].)

In the instant case, Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action turn upon alleged
breaches of his CBA and the interpretation of the term “good cause” as it appears in
the CBA. (See Compl., ¶¶ 7, 14-17, 20-23, 26-33; see also Opp. Sep. Stmt.,
Undisputed Material Facts 1, 22, 23, 30-33.) As a consequence, the causes of action
are preempted, and Bel Air is entitled to summary judgment.

In reaching its conclusion, the court rejects Kuang’s argument that the court may not
enter summary judgment based on § 301’s preemptive effect because preemption is
outside the scope of the pleadings. On the contrary, Kuang’s allegations establish that
the CBA and its interpretation are the crux of his causes of action.

The court also rejects Kuang’s argument that Bel Air’s motion for summary judgment is
the wrong vehicle to resolve the preemption issue. Kuang suggests that, because Bel
Air asserts that Kuang’s causes of action may only resolved in a federal arbitration, Bel
Air was required to move to compel arbitration, not to move for summary judgment. As
Bel Air points out, court routinely address § 301’s preemptive effect in summary
judgment motions. (See Reply at 4, fn. 2.) This court expresses no opinion whether
Kuang is entitled to advance his claims against Bel Air in an arbitration or any other
forum.

Bel Air’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

Pursuant to CRC 3.1312, Bel Air is directed to submit a formal order for the court’s
signature, and a judgment.