Filed 4/20/20 Haehn v. Haehn CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

OKSANA HAEHN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

VLADIMIR KHARCHENKO et al.,

Claimants and Appellants,

v.

TIMOTHY HAEHN,

Defendant and Respondent.

B296170

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BD600620)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mark Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.

Oksana Haehn, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Vladimir Kharchenko and Inna Kharchenko, in pro. per., for Claimants and Appellants.

Timothy Haehn, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.

_____________________________

Oksana Haehn filed a petition to dissolve her marriage with Timothy Haehn. Around the same time, she withdrew more than $150,000 from the couple’s joint bank accounts, which she claimed to be holding in trust for her parents, Vladimir and Inna Kharchenko. The trial court entered judgment of dissolution, found the disputed funds were community property, and ordered Oksana make an equalization payment to Timothy. Oksana and the Kharchenkos appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Timothy and Oksana met in Russia and were married in the United States. They have one child together.

A little less than 10 years after they were married, the couple separated, and Oksana filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. After the separation, Oksana withdrew approximately $153,000 from the couple’s joint bank accounts, which she claimed to be holding in trust for her parents, Inna and Vladimir Kharchenko. Timothy claimed the funds were community property. The court ordered joinder of the Kharchenkos to resolve the issue.

The court conducted a bench trial over the course of two days, at which the parties represented themselves. Oksana requested spousal support and a change to an existing child support order. She also sought credit for, among other things, a car Timothy took, her car rental payments, personal property she left with Timothy’s parents, charges Timothy made to a joint credit card, and two computers.

As to the disputed $153,000, the Kharchenkos testified the funds were their life savings, which they intended to use to leave Russia and retire in the United States. According to Oksana, they gave the money to her and Timothy to hold for tax purposes, on the advice of Timothy’s father. Oksana told the court she kept the Kharchenkos’ money separate and denied that she or Timothy deposited their paychecks into the same accounts.

Timothy acknowledged around $80,000 of the disputed funds came from the Kharchenkos, but claimed the money was a gift to him and Oksana. He said the funds were to be used for a down payment on a house, in accordance with a Russian tradition. Timothy submitted bank records showing numerous deposits and withdrawals from the accounts containing the disputed funds, including deposits of his and Oksana’s payroll checks. He estimated at least $73,000 in other community funds went into the accounts.

Timothy further contested the Kharchenkos’ claim that the disputed funds represented their life savings. According to Timothy, the Kharchenkos told him they had significant savings and owned property in Russia. He also pointed to income and expense declarations the Kharchenkos filed with the court, in which they represented having estimated expenses of $3,750 per month but $0 in income or assets. Timothy agued those numbers did not make sense and the Kharchenkos must have some undisclosed income or assets.

Oksana responded that her parents misunderstood what was being asked of them on the income and expense declarations. She said the numbers did not represent their actual expenses, but rather their “proposed” expenses. The court told Oksana her explanation did not make sense and, in any event, he would have to hear it directly from the Kharchenkos. The Kharchenkos remained silent. Oksana then asked if her mother could correct the form; the court said no.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the disputed funds were presumptively community property and Oksana had to account for them under the “Prentis-Margulis rule.” The court explained that, although there was evidence showing the Kharchenkos’ money went into Timothy and Oksana’s joint accounts, it could not conclude “either by clear and convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence, that any form of trust recognized by California law has been proved.” The court pointed to evidence showing considerable community funds passed through the accounts, as well as the lack of evidence showing where the agreement occurred or its terms.

The court further explained there were credibility issues with Oksana and the Kharchenkos. Oksana, for example, claimed no community property went into the disputed bank accounts when the evidence clearly showed otherwise. The Kharchenkos, moreover, filed income and expense declarations that were impossible—they listed thousands of dollars in expenses each month, yet claimed to have no income or assets.

The court entered judgment of dissolution. It ordered Timothy and Oksana share custody of their child, no spousal support for either party, and Timothy pay Oksana $143 per month in child support. After accounting for all the community property—including the $153,000 in disputed funds—the court ordered Oksana make an equalization payment of $78,687 to Timothy. The court then terminated jurisdiction over spousal support.

Oksana moved for a new trial, which the court denied. Oksana and the Kharchenkos (together Appellants) timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appellants’ opening brief on appeal consists of a meandering recitation of purported errors, without any discernable logical structure. We have attempted to organize the arguments into general categories, which we address in turn.

I. Appellants Received Due Process and a Fair Trial

Appellants contend, for a variety of reasons, they were denied due process and a fair trial. We disagree.

Appellants first complain that the trial court treated them unfairly by, among other things, frequently interrupting them, questioning their evidence, and pressuring them to complete their cases. We have reviewed the entire transcript of the trial and find the court acted appropriately. Appellants, who represented themselves, had great difficulty identifying relevant issues and evidence. It is clear from the record the court’s interruptions and remarks were intended to aid them in presenting their cases in a logical and efficient manner. The court acted well within its broad authority to control trial proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [courts have inherent power to control litigation before them].)

Appellants point out that the court rarely interrupted Timothy, who also represented himself at trial. While that is true, it is because Timothy generally presented his case in a concise and organized manner. As a result, there was less need for the court to intervene. The disparity is not indicative of improper bias. Nor does it show Appellants were denied a fair trial.

Appellants additionally contend the court refused to hear all their evidence, declined to develop the facts of the case, and generally failed to protect their due process rights. Their arguments find no support in the record. Throughout trial, the court repeatedly asked Appellants if they had more evidence to present on a particular issue. If Appellants indicated they did, the court allowed them to present it. The court even allowed Oksana to reopen her case when it became clear she had additional evidence to present.

The court also attempted to assist Appellants throughout trial, instructing them on what they needed to prove and the evidence that would be helpful in doing so. At one point, the court provided Appellants the court’s own notes to assist them in organizing and presenting their cases. There is simply no merit to Appellants’ arguments.

Appellants further contend the trial court erred in refusing their request to consider, as part of trial, whether Timothy had engaged in discovery abuses. According to Appellants, Timothy caused discovery to last for years, provided unreadable papers, and ignored their requests. Appellants, however, fail to explain why they did not seek to resolve these issues earlier. The court was not required to consider them for the first time in the middle of trial. In any event, Appellants do not explain how they were specifically prejudiced by the court’s failure to consider the discovery issues. Therefore, even if there were error, it does not require reversal. (See Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1674 [“Only prejudicial error results in reversal of a judgment.”].)

Appellants’ next claim—that the court failed to review their trial briefs, despite reviewing Timothy’s brief—fails for the same reason. Assuming, purely for the sake of argument, that were true, Appellants have not explained how they were specifically prejudiced. Reversal, therefore, is not warranted. (See Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1674.)

II. Appellants’ Evidentiary Arguments Lack Merit

Appellants raise numerous arguments related to the evidence presented at trial, none of which has merit.

Appellants vaguely contend Timothy’s evidence was improper because it consisted of documents provided to him by Appellants, spreadsheets created by his father, “fabricated statements and allegations,” and unsupported testimony. They also complain they did not have an opportunity to review some of Timothy’s evidence before he submitted it to the court.

To the extent Appellants are claiming the evidence was erroneously admitted, they forfeited the arguments by failing to timely raise objections below. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [a judgement will not be reversed by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there was a timely and specific objection]; In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 [“ ‘As a general rule, issues not properly raised at trial will not be considered on appeal.’ ”].) To the extent they purport to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s orders, they are simply asking us to reweigh the evidence and make credibility determinations, which we refuse to do on appeal. (See In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531 [appellate courts do no reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses].) In either case, the arguments fail.

Appellants next argue the court improperly relied on the Kharchenkos’ income and expense declarations to discredit their testimony. As we understand it, Appellants’ argument is the figures on the forms represented the Kharchenkos’ needs, rather than their current expenses. Therefore, they appear to argue, the numbers were not inconsistent with the claim that the disputed funds represented the Kharchenkos’ life savings.

To support their contention, Appellants rely entirely on the fact that the Kharchenkos checked the box on the declarations stating the disclosures were “estimated expenses,” rather than the box stating they were “actual expenses.” They overlook, however, that the forms included an additional box indicating the expenses represented “proposed needs.” Appellants fail to explain why the Kharchenkos did not check that box if they intended to disclose their needs, rather than their current expenses. Under such circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded the declarations contained falsehoods and were probative of the Kharchenkos’ credibility.

Appellants additionally complain that the court refused to accept undisputed evidence in their favor. They claim, for example, the evidence established Timothy was responsible for $2,253 worth of charges to a joint credit card, but the court found he was responsible for only $1,350. Appellants, however, ignore that the court also credited Oksana with $1,800 in community credit card debt, which effectively held Timothy responsible for an additional $900 in credit card charges. In total, therefore, the court found Timothy responsible for $2,250 in credit card charges, which is consistent with Appellants’ evidence.

Appellants next claim the court failed to credit their evidence showing the disputed funds in the joint accounts came from the Kharchenkos. Not so. The court expressly found at least a portion of the funds in the joint accounts came from the Kharchenkos. The reason it declined to enter judgment in their favor is because they failed to prove those funds were held in trust.

Finally, Appellants complain that the court denied Oksana reimbursement for property Timothy took from her. Once again, the record belies their claim. The court charged Timothy $1,000 for computers, $1,000 for furniture and furnishings, $2,000 for Oksana’s personal belongings, and $5,900 he took from joint accounts. To the extent Appellants are arguing these amounts are too low, they are essentially inviting us to reweigh the evidence, which we decline. (See In re Marriage of Balcof, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531.)

III. The Court Did Not Err in Applying the Prentis- Margulis Rule

Appellants assert the trial court erred in applying the “Prentis-Margulis rule” to the disputed funds in the joint accounts. We disagree.

In Prentis-Margulis, the court explained that “once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. If the managing spouse fails to meet this burden, the court should charge the managing spouse with the assets according to the prima facie showing.” (In re Marriage of Prentis–Margulis & Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.)

Appellants contend this rule did not apply to the disputed funds because they were separate property, not community property. The trial court, however, found otherwise. It is also undisputed that Oksana had control over the disputed funds postseparation. The trial court properly applied the Prentis-Margulis rule under such circumstances.

IV. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Terminating Jurisdiction Over Spousal Support

Appellants contend the court abused its discretion in terminating its jurisdiction over spousal support. We disagree.

Under Family Code section 4336, “the court retains jurisdiction indefinitely in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties where the marriage is of long duration.” (Fam. Code, § 4336, subd. (a).) There is a presumption that a marriage of 10 years or more is one of long duration, although nothing precludes a court from determining a marriage of less than 10 years is one of long duration. (Id., subd. (b).) In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction, the court considers, among other factors, each party’s ability to adequately provide for his or her needs, the age and health of the parties, and the length of the marriage. (In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498–499.) The court must rely on evidence in the record and may not engage in speculation. (In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453.)

Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion by terminating jurisdiction without thoroughly examining the issue. Not so. The court discussed the issue at the end of trial and provided several reasons for terminating jurisdiction, including that the marriage lasted less than 10 years, the parties were relatively young, there was no evidence regarding the health of the parties, and both parties were already self-supporting. Under such circumstances, the court explained, it would have to engage in speculation to conclude the parties would become unable to support themselves in the future.

Appellants do not directly contest these findings. Instead, they suggest the court was nevertheless required to retain jurisdiction under Family Code section 4336 because Timothy failed to submit a W-2 form to prove his income. However, they provide no authority even suggesting the failure to submit a W-2 form is a sufficient reason to retain jurisdiction over spousal support. The trial court, in contrast, provided several valid reasons for terminating jurisdiction. (See In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453; In re Marriage of Baker, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 498; see also In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1266–1267 [finding it reversible error to retain jurisdiction over spousal support in a marriage of short duration where the spouse seeking retention of jurisdiction was in good health and able to self-support].) It did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

V. The Nunc Pro Tunc Order Was Proper

Appellants contend it was error for Judge Susan Lopez-Giss—who did not preside over trial—to enter a nunc pro tunc order correcting errors in a May 8, 2018 minute order. We disagree.

“A court can always correct a clerical, as distinguished from a judicial error which appears on the face of a decree by a nunc pro tunc order. [Citations.] . . . ‘The function of a nunc pro tunc order is merely to correct the record of the judgment and not to alter the judgment actually rendered—not to make an order now for then, but to enter now for then an order previously made. The question presented to the court on a hearing of a motion for a nunc pro tunc order is: What order was in fact made at the time by the trial judge?’ ” (Estate of Eckstrom (1960) 54 Cal.2d 540, 544, italics omitted.)

Here, the May 8, 2018 minute order purported to reflect the court’s oral orders made at the conclusion of trial. The minute order, however, did not accurately reflect those orders, something Oksana brought to the court’s attention. The nunc pro tunc order corrects the errors and is consistent with the court’s oral pronouncements at trial. The nunc pro tunc order, therefore, was proper. (See Estate of Eckstrom, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 544.) Moreover, given the errors in the May 8, 2018 minute order were apparent on the face of the record, it is irrelevant that the nunc pro tunc order was entered by a judge who did not preside over trial.

Although far from clear, Appellants seem to argue the nunc pro tunc order erroneously identifies a certain tax return as community property. In support, they point to the fact that, at the conclusion of trial, the court said the tax return was “charged to [Oksana],” but did not specifically say it was community property. We think the record is clear that the court found the tax return to be community property. The court made the statement referring to the tax return while accounting for all the community property. It also would not make sense to “charge” the tax return to Oksana unless it was community property.

We further reject Appellants’ suggestion that the nunc pro tunc order misidentifies the amount of money being held in a trust account and fails to reimburse Oksana for $1,800 in community credit card debt. The order does not even mention a trust account. Moreover, it explicitly states the $1,800 credit card balance is community debt and charged to Oksana, which effectively reimbursed Oksana for half that amount. There is no merit to Appellants’ arguments.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.

BIGELOW, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GRIMES, J. STRATTON, J.