Filed 4/23/20 Barefoot v. Jennings CA5

Opinion on remand from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JOAN MAURI BAREFOOT,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

JANA SUSAN JENNINGS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

F076395

(Super. Ct. No. PR11414)

OPINION

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Kate Powell Segerstrom, Judge.

The Singhal Law Firm and Dinesh H. Singhal for Petitioner and Appellant.

Gianelli & Associates, Eric T. Nielsen and Sarah J. Birmingham for Defendants and Respondents.

-ooOoo-

Appellant Joan Mauri Barefoot appeals following the trial court’s decision to dismiss her petition under Probate Code section 17200 to, among other things, set aside the 17th through 24th amendments and declare effective the 16th amendment to the Maynord 1986 Family Trust (Trust). The trial court dismissed the petition on standing grounds. We consider this matter following a remand from the California Supreme Court. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822.) For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the petition, appellant is one of six children of Joan Lee Maynord. Maynord and her former husband, who died in 1993, established the Trust in 1986 and Maynord served as the sole trustor following her husband’s death. Respondents are two more of Maynord’s children, with Shana Wren serving as the current trustee of the Trust. The remaining three children, one of whom predeceased Maynord, are not a part of this litigation.

In or around August 2013 and continuing through 2016, Maynord executed a series of eight amendments to and restatements of the Trust, referred to as the 17th through the 24th amendments. The 24th amendment was the final amendment prior to Maynord’s death. In these amendments and restatements, appellant’s share of the Trust, as set out in the 16th amendment, was eliminated and appellant was both expressly disinherited and removed as a successor trustee. At the same time Wren was provided with a large share of the Trust and named successor trustee.

Appellant’s petition challenged the validity of these amendments on three grounds. In the first, appellant alleged Maynord was “not of sound and disposing mind” and thus lacked the “requisite mental capacity to amend the Trust.” In the second, appellant alleged undue influence on behalf of respondents and included a lengthy factual recitation of the family dispute she believed led to her disinheritance. In the third, appellant alleged fraud on behalf of respondents, relying on similar facts as in the second ground. Appellant further attached the 16th and 24th amendments.

With respect to her standing to file the petition, appellant alleged she was “a person interested in both the devolution of [Maynord’s] estate and the proper administration of the Trust because [appellant] is [Maynord’s] daughter and both the trustee and a beneficiary of the Trust before the purported amendments. She will benefit by a judicial determination that the purported amendments are invalid, thereby causing the Trust property to be distributed according to the terms of the Trust that existed before the invalid purported amendments.”

Respondents filed an answer to appellant’s petition and followed that with a motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 17200 and 17202. As part of their motion, respondents argued appellant lacked standing under section 17200 because she was neither a beneficiary nor a trustee of the Trust as constituted under the 24th amendment. Appellant opposed the motion by arguing she was a beneficiary under the 16th amendment and alleging that later versions of the Trust were invalid. The trial court ultimately sided with respondents and dismissed appellant’s petition without prejudice. Appellant responded by seeking reconsideration of the ruling and attaching a proposed amended petition including additional facts relevant to her claims the later amendments were invalid and additional grounds for setting aside the amendments. The trial court denied appellant’s request and this appeal timely followed. We initially affirmed. The case now returns to us on remand from review by the California Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

In its review of this case, our Supreme Court determined that, if appellant’s contentions are true, the “Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud.” (Barefoot v. Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 827.) Ultimately, to avoid insulating “those persons who improperly manipulate a trust settlor to benefit themselves against a probate petition” the court determined “that claims that trust provisions or amendments are the product of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud, as is alleged here, should be decided by the probate court, if the invalidity of those provisions or amendments would render the challenger a beneficiary of the trust.” (Id. at pp. 829, 828.)

No additional arguments have been presented for consideration on remand. Accordingly, we apply the Supreme Court’s guidance, reverse the trial court’s order dismissing this case, and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion that appellant has standing to raise these issues under section 17200.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s petition is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to appellant.

HILL, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, J.

MEEHAN, J.