Filed 4/24/20 Muhammad v. Bronstein CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

AMIRAH MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PAUL BRONSTEIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

B297082

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SC129200)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles, Gerald Rosenberg and Lawrence Cho, Judges. Affirmed.

Peter D. Gordon & Associates, Peter D. Gordon and Andrew Schoettle for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hartsuyker, Stratman & Williams-Abrego, Vanessa L. Vinje; Veatch Carlson and Serena L. Nervez for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________________

Plaintiff and appellant Amirah Muhammad filed a civil action against three defendants, including defendant and respondent Paul Bronstein, an individual who owns a company that manages a multi-unit building at which Muhammad used to reside. Her first amended complaint (FAC) alleges claims for breach of contract, conversion, housing discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and various other torts and statutory violations. Muhammad seeks relief for two categories of misconduct: “(a) damage and waste of [her] personal property and (b) invidious discriminatory conduct” that “result[ed] from [Bronstein’s] unlawful actions in using self-help to evict [Muhammad].”

Bronstein filed a demurrer to the FAC, arguing that res judicata barred Muhammad’s claims against him. In particular, he contended that Muhammad signed a stipulated judgment entered in a prior unlawful detainer action, which released “all claims re [Muhammad’s] ‘tenancy’ to the fullest extent allowed by law.” The trial court sustained Bronstein’s demurrer to Muhammad’s FAC without leave to amend, and later entered a judgment dismissing Bronstein from the action with prejudice.

On appeal, Muhammad has not shown that any of her causes of action are not “claims re [her] ‘tenancy’ ” that are released by the stipulated judgment, and she otherwise fails to overcome the presumption that the trial court’s ruling is correct. We therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We summarize only those facts that are relevant to the instant appeal.

1. The original complaint and the FAC
2.
On April 27, 2018, Muhammad filed a complaint against Bronstein “dba K & B Property Management”; Steve Kelman (Kelman); and 8747 Clifton Way II, LLC for breach of contract and certain torts and statutory causes of action. (Capitalization omitted.)

On August 6, 2018, Muhammad filed a FAC against the same three defendants, alleging the following 12 causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of Civil Code section 789.3; (3) general negligence; (4) premises liability; (5) housing discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51; (6) housing discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51.7; (7) housing discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51.9; (8) trespass to chattels; (9) unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (10) conversion; (11) elder financial abuse; and (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant 8747 Clifton Way II, LLC owns a 24-unit building located at 8747 Clifton Way in Beverly Hills. In or around 2012, Muhammad, an African-American Muslim woman, moved into Unit 106 of that building, which was occupied by the building manager, Ronald H. Henry. Muhammad assisted Henry with his duties as manager for the building and “would often take messages from the various tenants” (e.g., requests for service and remedial repairs). Muhammad claims that “at all relevant times,” Unit 106 had numerous “unhealthful and uninhabitable deficiencies,” including a “[c]ockroach and vermin infestation in the kitchen” and “[i]ntermittent electrical power to [the] stove, lights and wall outlets.”

Henry gave Muhammad access to three storage units located in the building. Two of these storage units were in the garage, and the last one was on the roof garden level of the building. Muhammad kept many of her personal belongings in these storage units, including 10 to 15 paintings, “a wardrobe collection,” multiple books, a 42-inch flat screen television, and a stemware set.

On October 10, 2017, Henry had a heart attack and died that evening. While Muhammad was in the shower the following morning, “she heard noise from the front door and came out to discover that a locksmith was there trying to change the lock.” She then “encountered” Kelman, “the co-manager of the property as part of K & B Property Management[,] who ordered her to leave” by telling her: “ ‘Get out, Ron is dead and you have no reason to be here now.’ ” “Kelman then threatened [Muhammad] by saying, ‘If you do not leave instantly now, I am going to call the police.’ ” “Kelman acted in a hostile and aggressive manner, placing [her] in fear.” It appears that at an unspecified point in time thereafter, Muhammad contacted the police, and police officers: (a) arrived at the scene, (b) told Kelman that he could not eject Muhammad as a trespasser, and (c) ordered Kelman to provide Muhammad with a key to the apartment.

When Muhammad was in the garage emptying trash on October 31, 2017, she noticed that several of her encyclopedias and other books had been discarded in a dumpster. Muhammad walked over to the storage unit at the rear of the garage, and discovered that her key could not open the unit; she concluded that the lock to the unit had been changed. Muhammad then called Bronstein, who “roughly stated” the following to her: “ ‘This is my building and you have nothing there.’ ”

Muhammad later attempted to gain access to the storage unit at the front of the garage, and determined that the lock to that unit had been changed as well. Thereafter, Muhammad reported to the police that the locks to both of the units in the garage had been changed. Approximately one week later, she discovered that the lock to the storage unit on the roof garden level had also been changed.

“Subsequently, [d]efendants used a malicious and illegal strategy to falsely serve and prosecute a [d]efault [j]udgment against [Muhammad], causing her again to suffer severe emotional distress and incur legal fees.” Specifically, an unlawful detainer action was initiated against Muhammad, and a default judgment was entered against her on November 29, 2017. It seems that at an unspecified point in time, the trial court in the unlawful detainer action set aside a default that was apparently entered prior to the issuance of the default judgment, and Muhammad “was [thereafter] allowed to reside in Unit 106 through April 30, 2018.” (See also People v. One 1986 Toyota Pickup (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 254, 259 [“Entry of default by the court clerk is a statutory prerequisite to both a clerk’s default judgment [citation] and a default judgment by the court”].) The FAC does not further describe the circumstances under which: (a) Muhammad “was allowed to reside” in the unit, and (b) the unlawful detainer action ultimately concluded.

3. Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC, defendants’ request for judicial notice of the stipulated judgment from the unlawful detainer action, and Muhammad’s opposition to the demurrer
4.
On October 9, 2018, defendants Bronstein, “an individual dba K & B Property Management”; Kelman; and 8747 Clifton Way, LLC filed a demurrer to the FAC. They argued that res judicata barred all of Muhammad’s claims because in an unlawful detainer stipulation and judgment (stipulated judgment), Muhammad released all claims against K&B Property Management regarding her tenancy to the fullest extent allowed by law. They further argued that Muhammad failed to allege sufficient facts to state a breach of contract claim, and that her pleading did not clarify whether the underlying contract was written, oral, or implied by conduct. The defendants further contended that Muhammad should not be granted leave to file an amended pleading because she “cannot amend around” the stipulated judgment.

In connection with the demurrer, the defendants sought judicial notice of the stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment was filed on February 23, 2018; it identifies “K+B” as the plaintiff and Muhammad as the defendant; and it provides that judgment shall be entered in favor of K+B and against Muhammad, enforcement of the judgment shall be stayed until May 1, 2018, and Muhammad shall vacate Unit 106 by April 30, 2018.

Of particular note, the stipulated judgment also states: “[Muhammad] may provide [K+B] with a list of items that are ‘stored’ in common storage area [sic]. [K+B] will . . . give [Muhammad] all items that it may have in storage. * * * All property left after 4-30-18 shall be deemed abandoned.” The document further provides: “Except for the provisions of this agreement [K+B] and [Muhammad] release each other from all claims re this ‘tenancy’ to the fullest extent allowed by law.”

The parties to this appeal do not dispute that K&B Property Management’s representative and Muhammad both signed the stipulated judgment. It was also signed by the Honorable Norman P. Tarle, who ordered the “parties to comply with the terms of the stipulation” and directed the clerk to “enter this stipulation as judgment.”

On October 29, 2018, Muhammad filed an opposition to the demurrer. Muhammad argued that the stipulated judgment was “solely intended to encompass claims raised in the unlawful detainer[,] i.e. issues related to [Muhammad’s] right to the possession of the premises,” and that “[t]he release does not protect or immunize [d]efendants’ wrongful conduct surrounding [Muhammad’s] belongings which is specifically discussed separately in the judgment.” She asserted that all 12 of her causes of action “describe and seek recovery not for anything related to the unlawful detainer but for [d]efendants[’] unlawful usurpation and holding of her extensive list of possessions, which were expressly excluded from the waiver of claims described in the stipulated judgment.”

Further, although Muhammad claimed that the stipulated judgment “placed an affirmative duty on [d]efendants to return [Muhammad’s] possessions to [her],” she did not clarify whether any of her claims was in fact predicated on the stipulated judgment. Instead, she suggested that her breach of contract cause of action arose from her “ ‘implied co-tenancy in the unit.’ ” Additionally, Muhammad did not argue that, assuming arguendo she failed to state a claim, she could nonetheless cure any deficiencies in an amended pleading.

The demurring defendants did not file a reply to Muhammad’s opposition. Rather, on November 6, 2018, they filed a notice of nonreceipt of Muhmmad’s opposition to the demurrer, even though there is no dispute that Muhammad timely filed an opposition to the demurrer.

5. The trial court’s ruling on defendants’ demurrer and its entry of judgment dismissing Bronstein from the action with prejudice
6.
On November 13, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the demurrer that was not transcribed by a court reporter. The court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice of the stipulated judgment. It also sustained the demurrer as to “Paul Bronstein dba K&B Property Management . . . without leave to amend.” The lower court reasoned that “[t]he [s]tipulat[ed judgment] at Paragraph 6 applies to [Muhammad’s] claims against Paul Bronstein dba K&B Property Management.”

The trial court also sustained Kelman’s and 8747 Clifton Way II, LLC’s demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract with leave to amend. Specifically, the court found that Muhammad “fails to allege a contract with the[se] remaining [d]efendants.” The court’s ruling did not explicitly address Kelman’s and 8747 Clifton Way II, LLC’s demurrer to Muhammad’s other causes of action.

On March 1, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing “Paul Bronstein dba K&B Property Management” from the action with prejudice in accordance with its prior ruling on the demurrer. On April 18, 2019, Muhammad timely appealed the judgment of dismissal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 317, 323.) “[W]e accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in [the] . . . complaint. ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[A] complaint otherwise good on its face is subject to demurrer when facts judicially noticed render it defective.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (See Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.)

“ ‘[I]t is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory.’ ” (Franklin v. The Monadnock Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 252, 257 (Franklin).) The trial court also commits error if it sustains a demurrer without leave to amend and “ ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.’ ” (See Sanowicz v. Bacal (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1035.) Nonetheless, a demurrer is properly sustained “ ‘ “if any one of several grounds of demurrer is well taken.” ’ ” (See Franklin at p. 257.) Furthermore, “ ‘ “[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (Yu v. University of La Verne (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 779, 787 (Yu).)

DISCUSSION

Under the res judicata doctrine, a stipulated judgment in an unlawful detainer action will bar a subsequent civil suit if the following three elements are satisfied: “(1) [T]he issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” (See Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 757 (Needelman).) To determine “whether the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical to the ones raised by [the subsequent lawsuit,]” the appellate court must “interpret the stipulated judgment.” (See id. at pp. 757–758.) “[A] stipulation or consent judgment, being regarded as a contract between the parties, must be construed as any other contract.” (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 263.) Generally, “[t]he words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense.” (See Civ. Code, § 1644.)

Muhammad does not dispute that the stipulated judgment was a final judgment on the merits or that she was a party to the unlawful detainer action. Rather, she contends that the stipulated judgment does not satisfy the first element of res judicata because it lacks “[e]xpress and [u]nambiguous [l]anguage” manifesting an “intention to waive or preclude” her claims against Bronstein. (Boldface omitted.)

In particular, Muhammad argues: (1) The release in the stipulated judgment was “limited to issues regarding the validity of her tenancy and the right of possession or occupancy in the apartment”; (2) the stipulated judgment lacked the specificity required to release her claims; (3) the stipulated judgment does not cover her claims because it was not personally signed by Kelman and Bronstein; and (4) the stipulated judgment could not release her causes of action seeking damages for, and the recovery of, her personal property because it obligated K&B Property Management to “ ‘give [Muhammad] all items that it may have in storage.’ ”

For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we reject Muhammad’s arguments and conclude that she has otherwise failed to overcome the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s ruling sustaining Bronstein’s demurrer without leave to amend. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment dismissing Muhammad’s claims against Bronstein with prejudice.

A. Muhammad Fails to Show Her Causes of Action Are Not “Claims Re This ‘Tenancy’ ” Released by the Stipulated Judgment
B.
Muhammad asserts that the claims included in the FAC seek relief for the following misconduct: “(a) damage and waste of [her] personal property and (b) invidious discriminatory conduct” that “result[ed] from [Bronstein’s] unlawful actions in using self-help to evict [Muhammad].” She argues that the release in the stipulated judgment does not cover those claims because it “was limited to issues regarding the validity of her tenancy and the right of possession or occupancy in the apartment.” Specifically, Muhammad maintains that the release’s use of the terms “regarding the ‘tenancy’ ” rather than “arising out of the tenancy” somehow “limits its scope to possession” of Unit 106. (Italics omitted.)

As an initial matter, we note that Muhammad’s interpretation of the term “regarding” is deficient because she fails to support it with any citation to authority. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. . . . The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived’ ”].)

Furthermore, Bronstein correctly points out that, according to a dictionary, the ordinary meaning of the word “regarding” is “with respect to” or “concerning.” (See “Regarding,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regarding (as of Apr. 14, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/7REJ-JJMK>; see also Scott v. Continental Ins. Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 24, 29–30 [“[C]ourts in both insurance and noninsurance contexts regularly use the phrase ‘ordinary dictionary definition [or meaning]’ as if ‘ordinary’ were synonymous with ‘dictionary.’ [Citations.] It is thus safe to say that the ‘ordinary’ sense of a word is to be found in its dictionary definition”].) Thus, the stipulated judgment’s use of the phrase “re this ‘tenancy’ ” renders the release at least as broad as the phrase “arising out of this ‘tenancy.’ ” Indeed, one Court of Appeal interchangeably used the phrases “claims regarding the three-year period [the tenants] occupied the premises” and “claims arising from [the tenants’] occupation of the premises” to identify language that would have precluded a breach of implied warranty of habitability claim had such text been included in a stipulated judgment entered in a prior unlawful detainer action. (See Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171–1172 (Landeros), italics added.)

Muhammad also contends that the “property management was well aware of their potential liability in connection with locking [Muhammad] out of her home and taking her possessions,” and yet the stipulated judgment does not specifically identify those claims. This argument has no bearing on whether the text “all claims re this ‘tenancy’ to the fullest extent allowed by law” is somehow reasonably susceptible to Muhammad’s proposed restriction of the phrase’s coverage to only claims regarding her right to occupy the real property. Accordingly, Muhammad has not shown that the trial court erroneously construed the release. (See Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 229–230 [holding that a plaintiff’s interpretation of an agreement is sufficient to allow a pleading to survive a demurrer if the instrument is “reasonably susceptible” to that meaning].)

Muhammad also fails otherwise to explain why her claims against Bronstein do not constitute “claims re this ‘tenancy’ ” released by the stipulated judgment. In fact, Muhammad suggests in her opening brief that the discrimination claims concern her tenancy because they supposedly “result[ ] from [Bronstein’s] unlawful actions in using self-help to evict [Muhammad].” Similarly, the FAC’s allegations indicate that 10 out of the 12 causes of action concern defendants’ attempt to “lock[ her] out of her rightful home,” and/or Muhammad’s alleged “implied co tenancy,” her status “as a tenant of the . . . property,” her “residency,” or her lawful presence at the apartment. Although Muhammad’s other two causes of action (i.e., trespass to chattels and conversion) do not explicitly reference her tenancy, other portions of the pleading allege that the defendants deprived her of personal property that she stored at the premises “[i]n the course of living at the . . . property.”

Muhammad does not articulate why, despite these averments in her briefing and operative pleading, her 12 causes of action somehow do not constitute claims “regarding” or “concerning” her tenancy. Consequently, we presume the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on that issue. (See Yu, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.)

C. The Stipulated Judgment Identified Muhammad’s Claims with Sufficient Specificity to Release Them
D.
Muhammad contends that the stipulated judgment had to “describ[e] . . . specific causes of action” in order to release any of her pleaded claims for relief. We disagree. The release is akin to a provision of a stipulated unlawful detainer judgment that another Court of Appeal found to have preclusive effect in Needelman: “Needelman ‘waives any claims he may have, which [the lessors] assert do not exist, to bring an attempted wrongful eviction against [the lessors] or any action in any way arising out of or concerned with his tenancy . . . .’ ” (See Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 754, 756–757, italics added.) Thus, the stipulated judgment in the instant case was sufficiently specific to bar Muhammad’s suit.

Muhammad counters that Needelman is distinguishable because the provision in that case used more specific language to describe the claims covered by the stipulated judgment—i.e., the Needelman stipulated judgment also stated that Needelman had waived any claims for attempted wrongful eviction. This distinction is immaterial. Needelman found that the provision therein not only “waived any causes of action related to any alleged wrongful eviction,” but also those “related to [Needelman’s] tenancy at [his] apartment.” (See Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.)

We also find that Muhammad’s reliance on Landeros is unavailing. There, the Court of Appeal concluded that a stipulated judgment entered in an unlawful detainer action did not bar the tenants from subsequently bringing suit against the landlord for breach of the warranty of habitability. (See Landeros, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1169–1170.) Landeros stands for the unremarkable principle that if one wants to release causes of action other than the possession of real property and other types of claims typically implicated in any unlawful detainer action, then the stipulated judgment must include “comprehensive” language evidencing the intent of the parties to release such other claims. (See id. at p. 1172 [holding that the stipulated judgment did not bar the breach of implied warranty of habitability suit because it did not contain “comprehensive settlement language nor any release of all claims arising from plaintiffs’ occupation of the premises”].) We fail to see how Landeros is instructive here given the broad language of the stipulated judgment evidencing the parties’ clear intent to foreclose all subsequent suits regarding the tenancy—i.e., K&B Property Management and Muhammad “release each other from all claims re this ‘tenancy’ to the fullest extent allowed by law.”

Muhammad further argues that this case is akin to Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251 (Vella), because the judgment in this case and the judgment in Vella both allegedly “lack [an] express intention to waive or preclude future claims.” Vella refused to afford preclusive effect to a judgment entered in an unlawful detainer action. (See Vella, at pp. 253–254 [“We conclude that the unlawful detainer judgment was not res judicata under the circumstances”].) Vella, however, did not involve a stipulated judgment, but instead concerned a judgment entered in a contested unlawful detainer proceeding. (See id. at pp. 254, 258 [noting that the trial court explicitly rejected certain affirmative defenses and entered judgment in favor of the purchaser at the trustee sale].) It is therefore unsurprising that the parties thereto did not express any intention to preclude future claims. Conversely, Muhammad evinced her intent to release “all claims re this ‘tenancy’ to the fullest extent allowed by law.”

For these reasons, we conclude that the stipulated judgment was sufficiently specific to release Muhammad’s claims. In addition, because we find the stipulated judgment includes language manifesting Muhammad’s intent to release all claims regarding her tenancy to the fullest extent allowed by law, we need not address her contention that she could not have raised her claims for relief as affirmative defenses in the unlawful detainer action. (See Landeros, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172 [“ ‘In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. . . . The judgment may be conclusive, however, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have entered an agreement manifesting such an intention’ ”]; Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 761 [holding that res judicata barred Needelman’s claims because “all of [them] were based on defenses that could have been raised in [the unlawful detainer action] or were specifically addressed and settled in the stipulated judgment,” italics added].)

E. Whether Kelman and Bronstein Personally Signed the Stipulated Judgment Has No Bearing on the Scope of the Release
F.
Muhammad asserts that “the only signatories are [Muhammad] and the property management company K&B [Property] Management, who was the agent of the landlord under the lease.” She argues that the fact that Bronstein and Kelman did not personally sign the stipulated judgment is “strong evidence of the fact that their conduct was not intended to be within the ambit of the release.” We reject Muhammad’s argument because it is belied by the allegations of the FAC.

The pleading alleges that respondent Bronstein “is an individual doing business as” K&B Property Management. Muhammad has thus tacitly conceded that Bronstein and K&B Property Management are one and the same. (See Pinkerton’s, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348 [“ ‘ “ ‘[D]oing business as’ . . . is merely descriptive of the person or corporation who does business under some other name. Doing business under another name does not create an entity distinct from the person operating the business.” [Citation.] The business name is a fiction, and so too is any implication that the business is a legal entity separate from its owner],’ ” italics omitted].)

The pleading further avers that Kelman served as “the co-manager of the property as part of K & B Property Management . . . .” Bronstein contends that this allegation signifies that Kelman functioned as Bronstein’s “employee or agent.” The aforementioned averment also suggests that Kelman acted within the scope of his employment when he engaged in the misconduct detailed in the pleading (e.g., when Kelman attempted to eject Muhammad from Unit 106). Muhammad does not argue that it is improper to draw these inferences from her pleading. Therefore, she fails to overcome the presumption that the trial court was correct in implicitly concluding that the FAC seeks to hold Bronstein liable for Kelman under a respondeat superior theory. (See Yu, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 787; 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Agency and Employment, § 175, p. 227 [“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the innocent principal or employer is liable for the torts of the agent or employee, committed while acting within the scope of employment”].)

In sum, given the respondeat superior and agency theories of liability Muhammad has pleaded against K&B Property Management and Kelman, there is no distinction from a liability perspective between K&B Property Management’s and Kelman’s misconduct on the one hand, and Bronstein’s misconduct on the other. Accordingly, the absence of Bronstein’s and Kelman’s signatures from the stipulated judgment does not support Muhammad’s contention that their misconduct was excluded from the scope of the release.

G. The FAC’s Claims Relating to Muhammad’s Possessions Are Barred by the Stipulated Judgment
H.
Muhammad further argues that her claims seeking damages for, and recovery of, her personal possessions are not barred by the stipulated judgment. She reasons that excepted from the release are “ ‘the provisions of this agreement,’ ” including the provision requiring K&B Property Management to “ ‘give [Muhammad] all items that it may have in storage.’ ” She also contends, albeit for the first time in her reply brief, that her “claims as to the possessions are proper to enforce the terms of [the stipulated judgment].” (Italics added.)

At no point does the FAC purport to invoke any of the provisions of the stipulated judgment. In fact, the pleading makes no reference to the stipulated judgment at all. It vaguely avers that a default in the unlawful detainer action “was set aside and [Muhammad] was allowed to reside [at the apartment] through April 30, 2018.” Furthermore, the pleading raises only one breach of contract cause of action, which relies on the premise that the defendants, “[b]y virtue of their relationship as [p]roperty [m]anagers of the . . . [p]roperty, . . . owed duties to [her], as [a] tenant of the . . . [p]roperty.” Given the absence of any cause of action based on the stipulated judgment, Muhammad cannot show that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to her causes of action.

In her briefing, Muhammad does not contend that the trial court should have granted her leave to amend her pleading in order to add claims predicated on the stipulated judgment. Even if Muhammad had made this argument on appeal, we would reject it because: (a) such claims appear to be entirely new causes of action and Muhammad does not contend otherwise; and (b) Muhammad did not ask the trial court for leave to include them in an amended pleading. (See Community Water Coalition v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Com. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“It is the rule that when a trial court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, the scope of the grant of leave is ordinarily a limited one. It gives the pleader an opportunity to cure the defects in the particular causes of action to which the demurrer was sustained, but that is all. [Citation.] ‘The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend’ ”].) Consequently, Muhammad fails to establish that the trial court erred in sustaining Bronstein’s demurrer without leave to amend. (See Needelman, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 762 [“It is the ‘plaintiff’s burden to show the reviewing court how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] It is not this court’s role to construct arguments that would undermine the lower court’s judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment dismissing Muhammad’s claims against Bronstein with prejudice is affirmed. Bronstein is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WHITE, J.*