Filed 5/5/20 Alcantar v. Benitez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DIANA LORENA ALCANTAR,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RAFAEL ARMANDO VARGAS BENITEZ,

Defendant and Respondent.

D074834

(Super. Ct. No. EFL09258)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, William D. Quan, Judge. Affirmed.

Marcus Family Law Center, Ethan Marcus and Erin Kathleen Tomlinson for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from the superior court’s order dismissing appellant Diana Alcantar’s third attempt to void a transfer of a San Diego condominium by her former husband, Rafael Benitez, to his mother as part of what Diana alleges was a scheme to hide marital assets. The transfer, which occurred in May 2009, followed shortly after Diana filed for divorce in Mexico, where both she and Rafael lived. In the divorce proceeding, the Mexican court issued an interim support order requiring Rafael to pay child and spousal support and freezing his assets during the pendency of the action. Recognizing that it lacked jurisdiction over multiple bank accounts held by Rafael in California, the Mexican court sought the assistance of the Imperial County superior court to enforce its order, giving rise to this proceeding.

Following the statutory procedure for registering foreign support orders for enforcement in California, Diana initiated this support proceeding in the superior court for the limited purpose of enforcing the Mexican court’s order asking a California court to assist in freezing half of Rafael’s bank accounts in California. However, when she later discovered the condominium transfer, Diana made multiple attempts to void the transfer in superior court rather than seeking relief in the Mexican court. More than six years after the transfer, Diana asked the superior court to enter an order requiring Rafael’s mother, Ninotchka Sanchez (Sanchez), to transfer title in the condominium back to Rafael. That first attempt failed when the superior court dismissed the claims against Sanchez due to Diana’s failure to serve her within three years of her joinder in 2010 and for failing to bring the claim to trial within five years. Diana did not appeal the dismissal of her claim.

Diana made a second attempt at clawing back the condominium by filing a complaint in a new, distinct action to force the sale of the condominium based upon the final Mexican judgment entered in December 2016. The superior court determined this claim was barred by the statute of limitations governing challenges to fraudulent conveyances and dismissed Diana’s complaint. Again, Diana did not appeal the dismissal.

In her third attempt—the subject of this appeal—Diana repeated her motion to join Sanchez and another woman, alleged to be Rafael’s girlfriend, who obtained title to the condominium in November 2017. Diana moved to set aside the transfer on the basis that it violated the injunctions entered in 2009 in the Mexican court and in the superior court. The superior court denied Diana’s unopposed motions, this time on the basis that her claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata due to the court’s rulings dismissing her prior two attempts to undo the condominium transfer.

Diana now challenges that finding in this appeal, arguing that the superior court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata to preclude her claim. Although she correctly argues the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in this circumstance, we agree with the superior court that Diana’s belated attempt to void the condominium transfer fails as a matter of law. Under the limited role played by the superior court in enforcing the Mexican court’s orders, Diana must seek relief regarding the condominium in the Mexican court under the final Mexican judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Diana Files for Divorce in Mexico

In early 2009, Diana filed a dissolution action in Mexico to end her 12-year marriage to Rafael. On January 22, 2009, the Mexican court entered a lengthy interim order regarding multiple subjects, including support and other provisions entirely unrelated to this appeal, including, inter alia, a temporary grant of physical custody of the daughter to Diana, an order that Rafael provide “door access codes and keys” to a house to Diana, and a scheduling order setting the time for Rafael to respond to Diana’s claims. One provision of the order required Rafael to refrain from “selling, encumbering, or squandering any real and personal property that he has acquired during his marriage, or hide such property.” The court indicated it was entering this specific interim order to secure the marital property that would be liquidated and split between Diana and Rafael under a final judgment. The order does not suggest this restraint was related to the interim support order.

As to the provisions requiring Rafael to pay monthly spousal and child support, the court indicated that in order to “guarantee” Rafael’s support obligations and Diana’s claim to her share of the marital assets, it was entering a “temporary measure” requiring Rafael to withhold 50 percent of the balances of his bank accounts. The Mexican court noted that Rafael held several bank accounts in the United States and, recognizing it lacked jurisdiction over the banks in the United States, explained it would be seeking assistance from “the requested Authorities in the United States” to obtain an enforceable order requiring Rafael to withhold “50% (FIFTY PERCENT) of the amounts . . . that may be found under his name in the United States.”

On March 20, 2009, before the Mexican court was able to request assistance from a United States court, Rafael purchased a condominium in downtown San Diego, allegedly without the knowledge of Diana. While the source of the purchasing funds is not firmly established in the record, Diana implicitly asserted that the condominium was purchased with funds from one of the United States bank accounts subject to the Mexican injunctive order.

Days later, on March 23, 2009, the Mexican court sent a “letter rogatory” asking for assistance. As stated in the letter, the Mexican court asked the superior court “[t]o perform the measures that are necessary . . . to order the withholding of 50% (fifty percent) of the amounts deposited in all of the bank accounts of [Rafael].” The letter rogatory did not include any mention of an injunction against transferring any property beyond the contents of the bank accounts.

On May 4, 2009, Diana initiated the underlying proceeding in superior court (case No. EFL09258) by filing a “registration statement” in the superior court, attaching the letter rogatory, and claiming she was entitled to 50 percent of Rafael’s bank accounts in the United States under the Mexican order. (For ease of reference we will refer to this as the “support” proceeding.) Her notice of registration did not include the January 22, 2009 Mexican order.

As required by California statutes regarding registration of foreign support orders for enforcement, the court clerk immediately issued a notice of registration, informing Rafael that the foreign order had been registered, detailing the procedure for contesting the registration, and stating that “[t]he registered order is enforceable in the same manner as a support order made by a California court as of the date the Registration Statement is filed.”

After filing her registration statement, Diana filed a form application for order asking the superior court to issue a temporary order restraining Rafael from “disposing and cashing 50%” of the bank accounts. The form she used included an option to request a restraint on the transfer of any real property, but Diana did not check the box to apply for such an order. At that time, Diana was proceeding in propia persona and did not have attorney representation in the superior court.

The next day, on May 6, the superior court responded by entering a temporary order restraining Rafael from “transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, cashing, borrowing against and disposing of the 50% of the current balance” of four listed bank accounts. The court used a form order that provided options for imposing an order restraining the parties from transferring real property, but the court did not check the box to impose such a restraint.

On May 20, 2009, Rafael transferred ownership of the San Diego condominium to his mother, Sanchez. The next day, he filed a challenge to the registration of the Mexican order in the superior court.

One of the banks alerted Diana that the superior court’s order was not effective because it was directed at Rafael, not the banks. The bank instructed Diana that it would freeze the accounts only if the court entered an order directed at the bank itself. Acknowledging that her own attempt at freezing the bank accounts was unsuccessful, Diana retained an attorney, who promptly asked the court to impose new temporary orders directing the banks to freeze the accounts and an order restraining Rafael from transferring any real or personal property. At the same time, Diana responded to Rafael’s challenge to her registration statement by admitting she “inadvertently attached the Rogatory letter and court translation instead of the actual orders.” She explained that she was seeking relief in the superior court in the form of an award of half of the funds in Rafael’s bank accounts. To support this request, she explained “[t]he Mexican court issued a Letter Rogattory [sic] requesting that authority in the United States withhold 50% of the funds in all bank accounts belonging to Rafael . . . and I am attempting to register the order from Mexico with the instant court so that this could be enforced.”

On June 19, 2009, the superior court granted Diana’s request and entered another temporary order prohibiting Rafael from, inter alia, “transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing, or in any way disposing of any property” and ordered that Rafael’s bank accounts be “frozen.” (Italics added.)

Following a hearing in July 2009, the superior court entered a new order requiring Rafael to transfer all of the money in his frozen bank accounts to a new trust account. At the same time, Rafael withdrew his challenge to the registration of the order and, accordingly, the court found the Mexican court order was registered in California “effective May 4, 2009.”

Diana first learned of the condominium purchase and subsequent transfer to Sanchez in January 2010. In response, she asked the superior court to join Sanchez as a respondent in the support proceeding and filed a “pleading” alleging that Sanchez was assisting Rafael in “concealing community funds in an attempt to obscure assets and property.” In March 2010, the court granted Diana’s request to join Sanchez as a respondent in the “support” proceeding. Thereafter, the record contains no indication that Diana took any steps in the next several years to challenge the transfer of the condominium as part of the proceedings in superior court.

Over six years later, in July 2016, Diana filed a document entitled “complaint to have title of condominium transferred to respondent’s name” in the “support” proceeding. The complaint alleged Rafael’s transfer of the condominium to Sanchez violated the registered Mexican court’s support order. In January 2017, Diana also requested that the superior court register (domesticate) the final dissolution judgment that the Mexican court had entered in December 2016. Rafael challenged both actions by filing a demurrer, motion to strike, and motion to dismiss the complaint. He also moved to strike a reference to the condominium in Diana’s registration statement.

The court dismissed the new complaint against Sanchez, finding that due to Diana’s failure to serve Sanchez with a summons within three years following the order granting joinder of Sanchez in March 2010, dismissal was required under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210, subdivision (a). Alternatively, the court found that the new complaint was duplicative of Diana’s 2010 pleading and, therefore, must be dismissed due to Diana’s failure to bring the claim to trial within five years. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) The court registered the final Mexican judgment, but ordered the reference to the condominium to be stricken. Diana did not appeal or otherwise challenge the court’s rulings.

Diana Files a New Proceeding

In a second attempt to challenge the transfer, Diana filed a complaint in January 2017 initiating a new proceeding in the superior court seeking to “domesticate the foreign judgment” entered in Mexico. (For ease of reference we will refer to this as the “final judgment” proceeding, case No. EFL19433.) In its final judgment, the Mexican court found that Diana was entitled to half the marital assets and continued Rafael’s support obligations, but does not appear to have addressed the proper disposition of the San Diego condominium.

As alleged in the January 2017 complaint, the sole purpose of the “final judgment” proceeding was to obtain a court order for the sale of the condominium with the proceeds placed in a trust account. Diana alleged a sale of the condominium and disbursement of the proceeds was warranted based on both the final 2016 Mexican judgment and because Rafael “transferred ownership of the condominium, to his mother . . . in violation of this Court’s orders.”

Rafael challenged this new complaint by filing a demurrer and motion to strike. Following a hearing, the court sustained Rafael’s demurrer. The court relied on the statute of limitations found in Civil Code section 3439.09 (which concerns challenges to fraudulent conveyances of property) to find that Diana was required to challenge the transfer of the condominium to Sanchez within seven years of the transfer. Alternatively, the court found that it could not offer any relief regarding the condominium under the final Mexican judgment. Accordingly, the court concluded the complaint was barred as a matter of law, sustained Rafael’s demurrer, and ordered the complaint dismissed with prejudice. Diana did not appeal or otherwise attempt to challenge the court’s ruling.

Diana’s Third Attempt to Challenge the Condominium Transfer

Several months after the dismissal of her prior two attempts to challenge the condominium transfer, Diana filed a new pleading in the support proceeding requesting that the superior court void the transfer of the condominium to Sanchez. She again sought to join Sanchez in the support proceeding and argued the transfer was void because it was made in violation of the 2009 Mexican support order registered in the superior court and the superior court’s own orders to implement the support order. Days later, she requested to join a new party, Ivonne Archiveck (Ivonne), who she claimed now owned the condominium. In an accompanying declaration, Diana asserted that Ivonne was Rafael’s girlfriend when Sanchez transferred the condominium to her in November 2017.

The court denied the motions, finding Diana failed to “avoid the bar of res judicata/collateral estoppel” because Diana’s claim “has already been litigated in both cases.” The court found that the previous dismissal orders were a “finding that title to the Condominium cannot be clawed back because of the passage of time.” The court further explained it “specifically finds that joinder of any person or entity with respect to the title of the Condominium is entirely inappropriate, as [Diana] is barred from asserting a claim against any subsequent owner, based on [the June 2017 orders].” Diana now appeals that ruling.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Diana challenges the superior court’s application of the doctrine of res judicata, contending that the court’s previous orders involved a distinct primary right unrelated to her current claim for relief. Diana concedes that “it is clear that a renewed attempt to domesticate the Mexican Judgment of 2016 would have been precluded as being finally decided.” Diana maintains this request arises from her separate rights under the original Mexican support order registered in the superior court and subsequent injunctive orders entered in the superior court, not her rights to 50 percent of community property as outlined by the Mexican court in its final judgment. Diana claims that although the remedy may be the same, the two rights are distinct such that res judicata does not apply to preclude her latest claim.

Diana’s current claim is premised on the well-established principle that a transfer of property in violation of an injunction, while not void, is voidable. (Bagley v. Ward (1869) 37 Cal. 121, 139; Powell v. Bank of Lemoore (1899) 125 Cal. 468, 472; American Trust Co. v. De Albergaria (1932) 123 Cal.App. 76, 78; De Albergaria v. American Trust Co. (1932) 126 Cal.App. 59, 60; Warburton v. Kieferle (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 278, 283.) “In such case, upon a proper showing by a party entitled to the consideration of a court of equity, relief may be granted by setting aside such sale. Otherwise it will be allowed to stand.” (Powell, at p. 472; see also Warburton, at p. 283 [sale in violation of injunction ” ‘will be relieved against only upon a proper showing by one entitled to the consideration of a court of equity’ “].)

Rejecting Diana’s effort to distinguish between her multiple attempts to challenge the condominium transfer, the superior court found that “the primary right [Diana] seeks to vindicate, the right to have the Condominium clawed back, has already been litigated in both cases.”

In its order, the superior court refers to “the bar of res judicata/collateral estoppel” as precluding Diana’s latest motions. “We have frequently used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which we described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ ” ‘primary aspect’ ” ‘ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ ” ‘secondary aspect’ ” ‘ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided in the first suit. [Citation.]” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823-824 (DKN Holdings).) “Claim preclusion ‘prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.’ ” (Id. at p. 824) “Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (Ibid.) “The question of the applicability of claim preclusion or issue preclusion is one of law to which we apply a de novo review.” (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 803.)

On appeal, Diana faults the superior court’s finding that her various claims were identical. However, we need not resolve the issue of whether the alleged primary rights underlying the remedy are truly distinct because the prior orders have no preclusive effect for a different reason. Both claim preclusion and issue preclusion require that the claim or issue be resolved on the merits or actually litigated. (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824.) Here, the prior order in the support proceeding dismissed Diana’s complaint for failure to bring the case to trial within five years (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310) and for failure to issue service of summons. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.210.) The order in the final judgment proceeding found Diana’s claims against the condominium were barred by the seven-year statute of limitations found in section 3439.09 of the Civil Code.

These orders were not decided on the merits of Diana’s underlying claim. The dismissal of an action “for technical or formal defects is clearly not on the merits and is not a bar to the filing of a new action.” (Goddard v. Security Title Insurance & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52.) Accordingly, a dismissal for failure to bring the case to trial within five years or for failure to serve summons has no preclusive effect. (Gonsalves v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Asso. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 169, 172-173; see also Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 214-215.) “A ‘judgment dismissing the prior action for want of prosecution is not one upon the merits [citations] and it does not bar a subsequent action upon the same cause.’ ” (Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 288; see also Stephan v. American Home Builders (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 402, 406 [accepting appellant’s contention that “the prior order of dismissal for failure to prosecute (Code Civ. Proc., § 583, subd. (a)) is neither res judicata nor a bar to the second action insofar as the causes of action therein alleged are not barred by the statute of limitations.”].)

Similarly, a dismissal pursuant to Civil Code section 3439.09 is a dismissal pursuant to a statute of limitations, which also is not considered to be a decision on the merits warranting any preclusive effect. (See, e.g., Boyd v. Freeman (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 847, 855-858; Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 769, 776-777.) “Termination of an action by a statute of limitations is deemed a technical or procedural, rather than a substantive, termination. [Citation.] ‘Thus the purpose served by dismissal on limitations grounds is in no way dependent on nor reflective of the merits—or lack thereof—in the underlying action.’ [Citation.] In fact, statutes of limitation are intended to set controversies at rest by foreclosing consideration on the merits of the claim.” (Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1596.) Thus, even when a lawsuit is dismissed based upon a statute of limitations and “the time for direct attack on the judgment has long since passed, the judgment is not final ‘in the res judicata sense’ because it was not litigated on the merits where it was disposed of solely on technical grounds.” (Mid-Century, at p. 777.)

Because neither of the superior court’s prior rulings considered the merits of Diana’s claim that Rafael’s purchase of the condominium and subsequent transfer to his mother was done in violation of the superior court’s own orders and the registered Mexican support orders, those orders have no preclusive effect and the superior court erred in finding otherwise.

However, setting aside the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the superior court’s order is not subject to reversal because Diana’s claim fails as a matter of law. “No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329; ASP Properties Group, L.P v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1268.)

As alleged by Diana, her current claim centers on her assertion the condominium transfer was void because it was made in violation of the January 22, 2009 Mexican order, which she contends was registered in the superior court. Thus, she contends, she may seek equitable relief in the superior court based on the violation of that registered order.

However, because Diana fails to establish that the Mexican court’s order restraining Rafael from transferring real property was issued as part of its support order as opposed to other unrelated orders the court issued on January 22, 2009, her argument lacks merit.

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act states that “a foreign support order may be registered in this state for enforcement.” (Fam. Code, § 5700.601.) A “support order” is defined as “a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a state or foreign country for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support. The term may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other relief.” (Id. at § 5700.102, subd. (28).)

Thus, under these statutes, the scope of foreign orders that a party may register is strictly limited. A party may register only a foreign order providing for “monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance,” along with any “related” relief. Applying this definition to the Mexican court order at issue here, the provision ordering Rafael to pay monthly spousal and child support clearly qualifies as a “foreign support order.” Similarly, the provision ordering the withholding of half of Rafael’s bank accounts was expressly entered in furtherance of the support award and, therefore, meets the definition of “related . . . other relief” under Family Code section 5700.102, subdivision (28). These contentions are not disputed.

However, the separate provision in the Mexican court order requiring Rafael to refrain from “selling, encumbering, or squandering any real and personal property that he has acquired during his marriage” is not related to the support order, but rather was entered in anticipation of the final judgment. Although this injunctive order was included in the same document as the support order, it is not part of the registered “support order” in the superior court. Accordingly, that specific provision is not enforceable in the superior court under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

This conclusion is bolstered by the language of the Mexican court’s own order—which controls here—expressly limiting the role of the United States court. The Mexican court’s order only sought the assistance of “the requested Authorities in the United States,” i.e., the superior court, to “order the withholding of 50% (FIFTY PERCENT) of the amounts . . . that may be found under [Rafael’s] name in the United States.” No other provision of the Mexican court order was directed toward the United States.

Diana acknowledged the limited role of the superior court under the Mexican court’s order, both in her original registration statement—where she referenced only the portion of the order restraining Rafael from disposing of 50 percent of the bank accounts—and her later filings regarding the initial scope of the support proceeding in superior court. She declared she registered the order “to freeze the [bank] accounts.” Referencing only the portion of the Mexican order concerning the freezing of Rafael’s United States bank accounts, Diana informed the court that “I am attempting to register the order from Mexico with the instant court so that this could be enforced.” The essence of her representations to the superior court was that the only portion of the Mexican court order she was seeking to enforce in the superior court related to the bank accounts, not any broader injunction against transferring property.

It was only later, after she learned that Rafael had allegedly transferred money out of the bank accounts before the Mexican order was registered and after her first attempt at freezing the bank accounts proved to be ineffective, that she sought additional injunctive relief in the superior court. In June 2009, she admitted she was “unsuccessful in freezing the accounts” and therefore asked the superior court to grant additional relief, including its own injunction restraining Rafael from transferring any real property that may have been purchased with funds from the accounts.

This request for additional relief directly from the superior court contradicts Diana’s claim that she believed that registration of the Mexican order itself included this restriction of property transfers. Similarly, the superior court’s July 2009 order in response to Diana’s request supports the conclusion that the registered order that could be enforced in superior court did not include the provision in the Mexican order imposing an injunction against transferring any property. In its own order, the superior court deemed the Mexican order to be registered and separately entered its own order restraining the parties from transferring any property. If, as Diana asserts, the registration of the Mexican order necessarily included an order restraining Rafael from transferring any property, the portion of the superior court’s own order separately granting that same relief would be redundant and mere surplusage.

We believe the more reasonable interpretation of the superior court’s order reflects that both the court and Diana recognized that the initial registration of the Mexican order was limited to the issue of the bank accounts such that any subsequent injunctive relief restraining Rafael from transferring property had to be separately granted by the superior court as part of its authority to enforce the underlying registered Mexican order. Although the superior court eventually issued such an injunctive order, it only did so after Rafael transferred the condominium. Thus, Diana’s allegation that Rafael violated an order enforceable in superior court when he transferred the condominium is contradicted by the indisputable facts regarding the timing of the superior court’s orders. Although we disagree with the superior court’s application of the doctrine of res judicata, we agree with its ultimate finding that Diana cannot state a claim as a matter of law in the superior court regarding the condominium.

In its order dismissing Diana’s latest attempt to have the condominium transfer declared void, the superior court found that rather than seeking relief in superior court, Diana must litigate her claims surrounding the condominium in Mexican court. As the superior court explained, “if the Mexican court were to determine that the Condominium transaction had any relevance, it would be up to that court to make an adjustment to the allocation of other marital assets to compensate for the loss to the marital estate [assuming arguendo it was such a loss].” The record before us contains no indication that the Mexican court has made any findings regarding the proper characterization of the condominium or any effort by Diana to equalize the division of the marital assets to account for the condominium transfer in the Mexican court.

Nothing in this opinion is intended to condone Rafael’s actions or suggest that Diana is not entitled to any further relief under the final Mexican judgment. Instead, we agree with the superior court that any effort to undo the condominium transfer must be first pursued in Mexico, not in California. Our ruling is limited to the narrow issue before us concerning Diana’s ability to claw back the condominium based on an allegation of a violation of an order enforceable in superior court entered over a decade ago. Finding she cannot state such a claim, we affirm the superior court’s ruling.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

GUERRERO, J.