Case Name: Professional Collection Consultants v. Krystal G. Lauron
Case No.: 1-11-CV-213127

Plaintiff/cross-complainant Professional Collection Consultants (“PCC”) brings a motion to file the proposed fourth amended cross-complaint (“4ACC”). Cross-defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. (“Chase”) brings a motion to strike the punitive damages from the third amended cross-complaint (“TACC”).

Chase’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters are subject to judicial notice].)
PCC’s motion for leave to file the 4ACC is GRANTED. The motion was timely filed and complies with the California Rules of Court. (See Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; see also Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1324.) The law favors the granting of motions to amend, and absent prejudice to the opponent, the delay in making a motion to amend will not be deemed a legitimate basis for denial. (See Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) Therefore, the fact that this case has been ongoing for several years does not suffice as a showing of prejudice to Chase.

Chase also argues that the motion should be denied because the 4ACC fails to state a claim. Courts typically do not consider the validity of the proposed pleading in deciding whether to grant a motion for leave to file an amended complaint as “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Super. Ct. (Marker U.S.A.) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) A court has discretion to deny a leave to amend where the proposed amended pleading fails to state a valid cause of action. (Cal. Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280-281.) Denying leave to amend is “most appropriate” where a pleading is deficient as a matter of law and cannot be cured by amendment. (Id., at p. 281.) The only cause of action that Chase argues is precluded as a matter of law is the strict products liability claim. With respect to that claim, he contends that the economic loss rule bars recovery. However, the proposed allegations in the 4ACC are that PCC was personally injured, i.e. the injury is not purely economic and limited to an injury to the product itself, and therefore the economic loss rule is inapplicable. (See Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 482.)

In sum, Chase has made no showing of prejudice or otherwise shown that any of the proposed causes of action are precluded as a matter of law.

In light of the foregoing, Chase’s motion to strike portions of the TACC is MOOT.