Filed 6/10/20 Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Amin CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

PACIFIC BANCORP, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH AMIN et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B300000

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC640013)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.

Rob D. Cucher for Defendants and Appellants.

Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, Boris Treyzon and Cynthia Goodman for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Joseph and Sharona Amin appeal from a judgment entered in favor of Pacific Bancorp, Inc. (PBI). The Amins challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that PBI failed to prove the Amins transferred their property with the intent to hinder PBI’s attempts to collect on an underlying judgment against Joseph. The Amins elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript and their briefs do not contain proper citations to the record. Nevertheless, we consider the appeal on the merits and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Without an oral record of the underlying proceedings, we take the following facts and procedural history from the documents in the clerk’s transcript.

In January 2007, Joseph borrowed $500,000 from PBI. He stopped making payments on the loan in 2008. PBI sued Joseph in 2012 and obtained a judgment against him for the loan amount plus interest.

In 2009, the Amins transferred their jointly held real property (the Laurel property) to Sharona as her sole and separate property and then transferred it to the Amin Family Trust in which the Amins were co-trustees. The Amins also signed a marital property agreement wherein the Laurel property was assigned to Sharona as her sole and separate property.

In 2017, PBI sued the Amins to void the transfer of the Laurel property, alleging that Joseph falsely claimed he had no assets to satisfy the underlying judgment and that he fraudulently conveyed the Laurel property to Sharona.

After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of PBI, finding that the Amins knew about the debt owed to PBI since 2007 and transferred the Laurel property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud PBI. The trial court found the Amins were not credible when they claimed that they first became aware of the underlying liability in 2013, noting neither could provide a reasonable explanation for the transfer. Accordingly, the trial court voided the transfer of the Laurel property to Sharona.

DISCUSSION

The Amins dispute whether there was sufficient evidence that they transferred the Laurel property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud PBI.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume the trial court’s judgment is correct and we indulge all intendments and presumptions in favor of its correctness. (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718.) The party challenging the judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) When an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on an issue, we resolve that issue against the appellant. (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)

As noted above, the Amins elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript. The Amins contend that the reporter’s transcript is unnecessary because the relevant dates speak for themselves, specifically, the timing of the transfer and the underlying lawsuit and judgment against Joseph. That is, when they transferred the Laurel property in 2009, there was no way for Joseph to know that he would be liable for the debt to PBI until the underlying lawsuit was filed three years later. In other words, because the subject transfer occurred before PBI sued Joseph for the underlying debt, the Amins could not have formed the requisite intent to avoid a debt that was not yet due.

This argument relies on a misunderstanding of Civil Code section 3439.04, which governs voidable transfers. A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made, if the debtor made the transfer with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor. (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a)(1).) While the dates of certain events may be relevant to a debtor’s intent, they are not determinative. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (b)(1)–(11).) Thus, contrary to the Amins’s position, voidable transfers can happen before or after the creditor’s claim arose. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a).) The dates, therefore, do not speak for themselves.

Further, even without a reporter’s transcript, it is clear that the trial court rejected the Amins’s innocent explanations for transferring the Laurel property to Sharona and found the requisite intent based on the factors in Civil Code section 3439.04, subdivision (b). Per the statement of decision, the trial court found that Sharona received no consideration for the Laurel property, Joseph maintained control over it after the transfer, and neither could provide a reasonable explanation for their actions. The trial court found the Amins lacked credibility and that they knew about the underlying debt at the time of the transfer. We cannot reevaluate the trial court’s credibility finding. The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 319.) The Amins’s argument that the dates speak for themselves and their credibility is irrelevant fails.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Pacific Bancorp, Inc. is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

DHANIDINA, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.