Filed 6/17/20 Taheri v. Chavooshi CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CRYSTAL TAHERI,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HOSSEIN CHAVOOSHI,

Defendant and Appellant.

B296876

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 18VERO01114)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Michael R. Amerian, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Ben Gharagozli and Ben Gharagozli for Defendant and Appellant.

Crystal Taheri, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In this action involving cross-petitions for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) filed by appellant Hossein Chavooshi and respondent Crystal Taheri against each other, Chavooshi challenges the order denying his motion for attorney fees under Family Code section 6344, subdivision (a), after the trial court dismissed both parties’ petitions. We affirm the trial court’s order.

BACKGROUND

Taheri filed a petition for a DVRO against Chavooshi on June 22, 2018. In response, Chavooshi filed a cross-petition for a DVRO against Taheri on July 18, 2018. After extensive hearings spanning multiple days, the trial court dismissed both petitions, finding that neither party had met their burden of proof.

Chavooshi thereafter filed a motion for attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under section 6344, subdivision (a). At the February 28, 2019 hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated that its tentative ruling was to grant Chavooshi’s request for attorney fees. Taheri, who was self-represented, vehemently objected. After hearing argument from the parties, the court took the matter under submission.

In a written order issued on March 4, 2019, the trial court denied Chavooshi’s motion for attorney fees. In doing so, the court noted that “[a]warding attorney’s fees would only serve to rekindle and stoke the flames of ill will between the parties, who have by all accounts gone their separate ways ever since the Petitions were filed.”

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable law and standard of review

Section 6344, subdivision (a), authorizes a court to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in a DVRO proceeding. The statute states: “After notice and a hearing, the court may issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the prevailing party.” (§ 6344, subd. (a).)

The standard of review for an order granting or denying a motion for attorney fees under the Family Code is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 345.) We reject Chavooshi’s contention that de novo review applies because the trial court applied an incorrect legal theory in denying his attorney fee request.

Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, on which Chavooshi relies as support for his de novo review argument, is inapposite. The court in that case awarded attorney fees to Loeffler, who successfully opposed Medina’s attempt to dissolve a domestic violence restraining order that had been issued against him. On appeal, Medina argued that the fee award was improperly granted under section 271, subdivision (a), which authorizes the court in a family law matter to award attorney fees and costs “‘in the nature of a sanction’” when the conduct of a party or attorney “‘frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation.’” (Id. at p. 1508.) He claimed that sanctions should not have been awarded because there was no evidence that he had frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation. (Ibid.) The appellate court rejected that argument, noting that the fee award had been made pursuant to 6344, subdivision (a), and not section 271. The court in Loeffler stated: “Because section 6344, subdivision (a) provides authority for the trial court to award attorney fees and costs to a party who prevails in defeating an application to terminate a domestic violence restraining order—and Loeffler prevailed in defeating Medina’s application—we reject Medina’s argument that there was no evidentiary basis for the attorney fee and costs award.” (Id. at p. 1509, fn. omitted.)

The trial court here expressly indicated that (1) section 6344, subdivision (a) authorized an award of attorney fees to Chavooshi as the prevailing party; (2) the court had discretion to grant or deny Chavooshi’s fee request; (3) the court would review and consider Loeffler before exercising its discretion to grant or deny the fee request; and the court considered the totality of the circumstances and the interests of justice in denying Chavooshi’s motion. No legal error is presented for our review.

Chavooshi cites the following footnote in Loeffler as the basis for arguing the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying his fee request: “We note that the availability of a fee award under section 6344, subdivision (a) serves to dissuade a restrained party from continuing his or her harassing behavior by filing unwarranted applications to terminate the restraining order.” (Loeffler, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509, fn. 14.) Dissuading a party from filing unwarranted applications to obtain or to terminate a restraining order is one factor, among many, that a court may consider when ruling on a request for fees under section 6344, subdivision (a). Darab Cody N. v. Olivera (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1144 [“request for attorney fees and costs requires the court to exercise its discretion based on a consideration of all the relevant factors”].) Loeffler does not set forth any legal rule to the contrary.

II. No abuse of discretion

Chavooshi fails to establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of his fee request. The record shows that the trial court weighed the evidence and found that neither Taheri nor Chavooshi had met the burden of proof in their respective DVRO petitions. The court determined, under the totality of the circumstances, that the interests of justice were best served by denying the attorney fees request, as a fee award might “rekindle and stoke the flames of ill will between the parties” who had gone their separate ways since the filing of their petitions. The record discloses no abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion for attorney fees is affirmed. The parties will bear their respective costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

__________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT