Filed 6/19/20 Marriage of Huff CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of KAREN L. and SYLVESTER R. HUFF. D075912

(Super. Ct. No. ED69962)

KAREN L. HUFF,

Appellant,

v.

SYLVESTER R. HUFF,

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed.

Karen L. Huff, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.

Karen Huff (now Willis) challenges the trial court’s decision granting her ex-husband, Sylvester Huff, a permanent restraining order against her and denying her one against him. Because the limited record she provides leaves us unable to evaluate her claims, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We glean what factual information we can from the record before us, which consists of an appellant’s appendix. The appendix includes the respective requests for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) filed by both Willis and Huff, the temporary restraining orders each were issued, and the opposing declarations each filed in response to the other’s request detailing the ways they were allegedly abused and harassed. There is no reporter’s transcript. A series of confrontations between Huff, Willis, and Nicki in 2017 through 2019 led Huff to file for a DVRO against Willis. She quickly followed suit. In his declaration, Huff says Willis harassed him and Nicki, sometimes turning violent. Willis maintains she was trying to warn Nicki about Huff’s abusive behavior and recounts further incidents of violence and threats from Huff.

In early 2019, the court granted both requests for temporary restraining orders pending a hearing on the DVRO petition. An evidentiary hearing was then conducted. Our understanding of what occurred there comes exclusively from one page of court minutes. Although sparse on details, we gather that both Willis and Huff were sworn in to provide testimony and some exhibits were entered into evidence. Neither party requested a court reporter. The court denied Willis’s petition for a permanent restraining order against Huff and granted Huff’s against Willis. Representing herself, Willis appealed and filed an opening brief; Huff did not respond.

DISCUSSION

Willis claims the trial court committed both factual and legal errors, abusing its discretion by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, and contravening Family Code section 6340, subdivision (b) by failing to provide a written statement of its reasons. But Willis does not furnish us with a record that would enable us to determine if the court erred in either way she claims.

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; see also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) If an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on any issue, we cannot resolve it in her favor. (Jameson, at p. 609; Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) This standard applies even to litigants who represent themselves. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

As to Willis’s first claim, a court’s decision to issue or deny a DVRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In this context, we affirm the court’s decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. (Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223; § 6300.) We cannot conduct such a review with the record before us because “omission of the reporter’s transcript precludes appellant from raising any evidentiary issues on appeal” including the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s decision. (Hodges v. Mark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 651, 657.) We do not have access to the evidence presented at the hearing; we are missing not only a reporter’s transcript of the testimony by both parties, but also exhibits A to F (and possibly other evidence not noted in the cursory minutes of the hearing).

Although Willis’s second claim is one of legal error, it suffers from the same deficiency. We cannot evaluate whether the court complied with section 6340, subdivision (b) without a reporter’s transcript. Willis argues the lack of a written statement of decision demonstrates the court’s error, but in doing so relies on one clause and ignores another. Subdivision (b) states in part: “The court shall, upon denying a petition under this part, provide a brief statement of the reasons for the decision in writing or on the record.” (§ 6340, italics added.) The trial court is thus obligated to give its reasons for denying a protective order, but it can do so either in writing or orally on the record. Willis fails to demonstrate (and does not represent in her brief) that the court made no oral statement of reasons at the hearing. We thus presume the court provided a rationale as required by law. (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 [“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ “].)

DISPOSITION

The orders of the trial court are affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.