Filed 6/26/20 Uziel v. Employment Lawyers Group CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

YEHORAM UZIEL,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS GROUP et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B299226

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. PC057843)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Affirmed.

Yehoram Uziel, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Reif Law Group, Brandon S. Reif and Marc S. Ehrlich for Defendants and Respondents.

In appellant Yehoram Uziel’s first appeal in this case, we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint against respondents Employment Lawyers Group, Karl Gerber, and Eric Palmer (collectively, “ELG”) under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (Uziel v. Employment Lawyers Group (Oct. 19, 2018, B287207) [nonpub. opn.] (hereinafter, Uziel I).) The current appeal arises from Uziel’s notice of appeal from the judgment incorporating the trial court’s rulings on the anti-SLAPP motion, the court’s granting ELG attorney fees related to the trial court proceedings on the anti-SLAPP motion, and the court’s granting ELG attorney fees related to the first appeal. As we explain below, the only ruling cognizable on this appeal is the trial court’s rulings granting attorney fees related to the first appeal. However, in his briefing on appeal, Uziel does not specifically challenge that ruling. Rather, although the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion was affirmed in the first appeal, he seeks to challenge that ruling again on the merits. Because he cannot do so, and because he has forfeited any challenge to the granting of trial attorney fees, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Uziel’s lawsuit against ELG arose out of ELG’s representation of a former employee of Uziel’s company, DC Partners, Inc. (DC Partners). Represented by ELG, the ex-employee, Christian Kepler, filed a lawsuit against DC Partners alleging Labor Code violations, wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kepler dismissed the case with prejudice after Uziel paid him $8,000.

Following dismissal of the Kepler case, Uziel (representing himself) filed the instant case against ELG, alleging five causes of action related to ELG’s alleged misconduct during the Kepler case. ELG filed a special motion to strike under section 425.16, arguing that all of Uziel’s claims arose from protected activity, and Uziel could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. Uziel opposed the anti-SLAPP motion, but produced no independent evidence; he instead relied on the allegations in his complaint. On December 19, 2017, the trial court granted ELG’s motion and dismissed the case. Uziel timely appealed from the trial court’s order of dismissal.

We affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing Uziel’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. We concluded, inter alia, that “[t]he gravamen of [Uziel’s] complaint relied on ELG’s protected activity in prosecution of the Kepler action, and, as a matter of law, [Uziel] cannot prevail on any of his claims.” (Uziel I, supra, B287207, p. 12.)

Following our affirmance, Uziel unsuccessfully petitioned this court for a rehearing. Uziel then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review on November 19, 2018. At Uziel’s request, DC Partners’ former attorney in the Kepler action, Steven Simons, filed an amicus letter with the Supreme Court in support of the petition for review. The letter states in pertinent part: “when the appeal [in Uziel I] was in play, I was asked to provide a declaration in support of the Complaint . . . . Uziel felt that he could not get it to the attention of the Trial Court (because LASC lacked jurisdiction) and the rules of Court of Appeal clearly state that no litigant is allowed (and the Court will not accept) any document not presented to the Trial Court.” It also appears that at some point (although not entirely clear), Uziel filed a declaration executed by Simons with the trial court. The declaration and amicus letter provided a history of the parties’ conduct during arbitration and recounted settlement communications during Kepler case.

After the Supreme Court denied Uziel’s petition for review, we issued the remittitur in January 2019, stating that the dismissal order “has now become final.”

In the interim, while Uziel’s appeal was pending, ELG filed a motion for attorney fees and costs related solely to the trial court proceedings, and Uziel filed an opposition. On April 20, 2018, the trial court granted ELG’s motion and awarded a total of $14,120 in trial attorney fees and costs. Uziel did not file a notice of appeal from this ruling.

Subsequently, following issuance of the remittitur in the appeal affirming the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion, ELG filed a motion for attorney fees and costs related to the appeal, and Uziel filed an opposition. On May 30, 2019, the court issued an order awarding ELG a total of $31,779.67 in appellate attorney fees and costs. The court ordered defense counsel to prepare and submit a proposed judgment.

On July 2, 2019, the court entered judgment, which incorporated and attached (1) the trial court’s December 19, 2017 order dismissing the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute; (2) the April 20, 2018 order awarding trial attorney fees; and (3) the May 30, 2019 order awarding appellate attorney fees. Uziel filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on July 17, 2019.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, under the heading “Statement of the Appealability” in his opening brief, Uziel contends this appeal “is from the ruling . . . authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure Section 904.1 Subdivision (a)(13) from an order granting or denying a special motion to strike under section 425.16. The appeal is warranted based on Simons declaration and Simons Amicus Curiae letter.” As best we understand it, Uziel asserts that he can challenge the ruling granting the anti-SLAPP motion based on Simons’s amicus curiae letter filed with Supreme Court for review, and Simons’s declaration that Uziel had filed with the trial court sometime in 2019.

Uziel is mistaken. Upon issuance of the remittitur in January 2019, our opinion in Uziel I affirming the order of dismissal became final and precluded the trial court (and this court) from reopening the case. “‘The order of the appellate court as stated in the remittitur, “is decisive of the character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled. The lower court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case, and if it should do so, the judgment rendered thereon would be void.’” [Citations.]” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.)

Nor do we consider the propriety of the April 20, 2018 order awarding trial court attorney fees. Uziel did not file a notice of appeal within 180 days from the date of that appealable order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104(a)(1)(C), 8.104(e); § 904.1, subds. (a)(2), (a)(13); Melbostad v. Fisher (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 987, 996; Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 842 [compliance with timing requirement is jurisdictional].) The judgment did not reinstate or extend Uziel’s ability to appeal from the order awarding trial attorney fees (or the order dismissing the lawsuit) by its incorporation of the court’s earlier decision. (Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 583.)

To the extent Uziel purports to appeal from the order awarding appellate attorney fees, he fails to offer any argument or legal authority. ““‘An appellate brief ‘should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as [forfeited], and pass it without consideration.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] It is not the function of this court to comb the record looking for the evidence or absence of evidence to support [a party’s] argument. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1489; see Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We therefore deem any purported contention forfeited.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. ELG shall recover its costs and attorney fees on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J. CURREY, J.