Filed 7/29/20 Hatchett v. Willis CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

NAKIA HATCHETT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAREN WILLIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

D075980

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-00015359-

CU-HR-NC)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William Y. Wood, Judge. Affirmed.

Karen L. Willis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Karen Willis, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s civil harassment restraining order entered against her on May 3, 2019. Willis contends that the trial court erred in entering the civil harassment restraining order because her contact with the person protected by the order served a legitimate interest and, therefore, did not constitute harassment under the relevant statute. Willis also contends that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Willis’s conduct caused the person protected by the order to suffer substantial emotional distress, as the statute requires.

Because Willis elected not to provide this court with a reporter’s transcript or any other record of the evidence presented at the hearing on the restraining order, such as a settled statement, Willis has failed to provide a sufficient record to permit this court to assess her claims on appeal. Given the lack of an adequate record, this court must presume that the evidence presented to the trial court at the hearing on the restraining order supports the issuance of the restraining order. We therefore affirm the order.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Given the lack of a transcript or settled statement in this matter, we have a limited record from which to draw in providing the factual background underlying Nakia Hatchett’s request for a civil harassment restraining order against Willis. In Hatchett’s initial request for a restraining order, filed on March 22, 2019, Hatchett described some of Willis’s conduct toward her as follows:

“Repeated phone calls and voicemails being left once again. Threatened to contin[u]ously call me [and] leave messages about her life w/Ex husband. Threatening to go to my children [and] their fathers with same information. Came to my home after she investigated to find out where I live [and] left a note at my home. Approached me at my car yelling and cursing on another occa[s]ion. Said she may be forced to use her money to do something to me.” (Some capitalization omitted.)

On April 16, 2019, Willis filed her own request for a civil harassment restraining order against Hatchett.

On May 3, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ respective requests for restraining orders. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a civil harassment restraining order against Willis for a period of three years, to expire on May 3, 2022. The restraining order requires that Willis not come within 100 yards of Hatchett, and also orders Willis “not to contact, molest, harass, attack, strike, threaten, sexually assault, batter, telephone, send any messages to, follow, stalk, or destroy the personal property of” Hatchett. The order further prohibits Willis from owning or possessing a firearm, and requires that she sell or turn in to the police any guns already in her possession. The court denied Willis’s request for a civil harassment restraining order against Hatchett.

Willis filed a notice of appeal on May 31, 2019. In designating the record for appeal, Willis specified that she was electing to proceed without a reporter’s transcript, and she did not indicate that she intended to proceed with any other record of the oral proceedings that took place in the trial court.

Willis filed an opening appellate brief. Hatchett has not appeared in the appeal.

III.

DISCUSSION

A person who has suffered harassment may seek an injunction prohibiting further harassment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) For purposes of a civil harassment restraining order, ” ‘[h]arassment’ is . . . a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) A ” ‘[c]ourse of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including . . . making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means . . . .” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)

If, after a hearing, the trial court “finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists,” the court “shall issue” an order “prohibiting the harassment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (i).) “An injunction restraining future conduct is . . . authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 496 (Harris).)

“We review the trial court’s decision to grant the restraining order for substantial evidence.” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) ” ‘The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the record. [Citation.] But whether the facts, when construed most favorably in [petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review.’ ” (Ibid.)

Willis asserts that the evidence before the trial court was not sufficient to establish that she harassed Hatchett. First, Willis contends that the evidence demonstrates that her contact with Hatchett “served a legitimate purpose.” According to Willis, ” ‘each and every allegation in Hatchett’s petition served a legitimate purpose’ to warn of physical violence that could come to Respondent at the hands of [Hatchett’s husband].” She further argues that another of her contacts with Hatchett “served the legitimate purpose of an attempting to effect service [sic].” Beyond this, Willis recounts the incidents about which Hatchett complained and either wholly denies them, downplays them, or offers her own version of what happened. Finally, Willis contends that there is “no evidence in the record [that] supports that appellant’s conduct caused respondent to suffer substantial emotional distress.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.)

Willis’s contentions on appeal fail because she has not carried her burden to provide an adequate record to allow us to review her claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the order. Although Willis has included in the appellate record the written documents filed in support of Hatchett’s request for a civil harassment restraining order, the issuance of a restraining order is not based solely on the evidence set forth in an application for such order. The civil harassment restraining order statute provides that at the hearing on the restraining order, the trial court “shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (i).) Thus, in order for this court to review an appellant’s contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the issuance of a civil harassment restraining order, we must review the evidence presented at the hearing during which the trial court heard evidence from the parties. The record in this case does not include any record demonstrating what evidence was presented at the relevant hearing.

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. . . . ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ . . . ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ‘ . . . ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ‘ . . . ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609, citations omitted.)

Given the absence of a reporter’s transcript or any other record of what occurred at the hearing, we presume that the evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court’s issuance of the restraining order. In light of this presumption, we must affirm the order.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The civil harassment restraining order is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

HALLER, J.